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Abstract 
 
The study focuses on community participation among the poor of Bogotá, Colombia. It 
explores the changing relationships between poor communities, local politicians and the 
city government before and after the institutional reforms and changing approach to 
development that occurred during the 1990s. The case studies were conducted in six 
irregular settlements, all developed in contravention of the city’s planning regulations. 
Data were collected using a sample household survey and in-depth interviews with 
community leaders, local inhabitants and the representatives of outside organisations.  
     In the 1990s, clientelistic practices became less effective to push the regularisation 
process. City programmes toward irregular settlements became more holistic and 
benefited from better coordination between the different public entities. As a result, the 
inhabitants became more discriminating in identifying the most effective strategies for 
obtaining the services and infrastructure that they required. 
     Competent government intervention was ultimately the most important factor in 
furthering the regularisation process. However, regularisation could not be achieved 
without community participation. Community involvement was important both before 
and after a settlement was recognised. The community had to find the money to put 
down a deposit before the service agencies would install services. This required not 
only a minimum level of economic resources but also firm community leadership.    
     The study also shows that apparently contradictory decisions made by the different 
communities were highly rational. Whether the inhabitants were willing to pay for 
services depended on the benefit they expected in return. Their criteria changed through 
the consolidation process because their most urgent needs changed. Today, after the 
pricing system of public services changed, access to services depends mostly on users’ 
purchasing power and not on the collective negotiation led by the JAC leaders. 
     In the 1990s, under the new constitution with its laws protecting citizen’s rights, 
‘participation’ of citizens in the political arena as well as their right to obtain basic 
services was clearly recognised. Under this legal framework, community participation 
gives the poor a voice with which they can present claims as well as criticise the 
negligence of public administration. However, the protests of the inhabitants against 
increased public service charges show that the community-based organisations 
sometimes still have reason, and the ability, to mobilise the local people as a final 
resort.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
IMAGES 
 
Living Conditions: Settlements perched on steep hillsides with paths that 
were slippery even when they were dry. After heavy rain, no vehicle could 
climb the muddy unpaved roads. Dogs barking and running out of the 
flimsy houses whenever a stranger came. 
 
Water: A donkey was climbing a steep slope carrying plastic tanks filled 
with water. People in Bella Flor purchased water from Don José who made 
his living selling to the local residents. Don José’s business lasted eighteen 
years until the water pipe was installed. As one woman said, ‘here 
everything takes time, but it cannot be helped, because they say that we are 
illegal occupants’. 
 
The School: I met Leo, a school teacher and community leader, in Potosí in 
1992. At the time, the ‘school’ was just a small prefabricated structure on 
the hill top. 
 
Regularisation: By 1999, the settlement of La Paz had improved little in 
the fourteen years since its foundation. A leader there grumbled about how 
the state ignored them. 
 
The ability of poor people to survive and improve their lives has been always 
impressive. If the police knock their homes down one day, people build two more 
homes the following night. They negotiate and fight with government agencies and 
enlist the support of different actors: politicians, the Catholic Church and NGOs. 
Gradually, they obtain the help they need. The speed with which each settlement obtains 
public services, however, varies from settlement to settlement. Sometimes residents in 
the irregular settlements steal water or electricity; sometimes they fight for or negotiate 
with the state to get these services. Some barrios are considered to be radical or 
politically astute, others to be calm or reasonable. Inhabitants sometimes work together 
to demand what they need. But the energy and duration of community spirit varies; in 
places it has a long life, elsewhere it disappears quickly.  
  1
  It was the struggles of the people who lived in the irregular settlements—their 
problems and their hopes for the future—which first led me to study the lives of the 
poor and their involvement with their communities. I have been analysing Colombian 
urban development issues since 1984 when I started my professional career as a 
researcher for a Japanese semi-governmental institution which was involved in research 
into current socio-economic and political issues in developing countries. My research 
interest was always around the areas of urban poverty, rural-urban migration, the urban 
informal sector and so on. Two joint-research projects conducted with a group of 
Colombian academics gave me direct access to the poor communities living on the 
periphery of the capital city, Bogotá (see Hataya et al, 1994; Jaramillo; Alfonso and 
Hataya 1996; Hataya 1999). Research subjects such as city government policies, urban 
administration and provision of public services were all relevant and encouraged me to 
look at the whole context in which the urban poor struggle in their daily lives. However, 
the more I got involved in the question of urban poverty, the more I found it necessary 
to approach the topic from the viewpoint of the inhabitants themselves. This was my 
central motivation; to observe community-state relations from the position of the people. 
This thesis is the result of more than ten years of observation in the barrios of Bogotá, 
one of Latin America’s major cities. The principal aim of this study is to explore how 
community struggle in the irregular settlements has changed in recent years and how 
relationships with the state have been affected.  
   This chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning of key concepts such as 
community and community participation. This is followed by a review of the literature 
on the studies of irregular settlements in the Latin American context. Finally, I outline a 
series of research questions for this study. I argue that my focus on community 
participation in the irregular settlements is relevant and important if we are to explore 
community-state-outsider relationships meaningfully.  
 
  2
  
COMMUNITY AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: DEFINITIONS AND DEBATES 
 
How should we define a ‘community’?  
There is a huge body of sociological and anthropological writing on the concept of the 
community. MacIver defines a community as:  
any area of common life, village, or town, or district, or country, or even wider area. 
To deserve the name community, the area must be somehow distinguished from other 
areas, the common life may have some characteristic of its own such that the 
frontiers of the area have some meaning (MacIver, 1924: 22-23). 
In short, people share certain common characteristics while living in a particular area. 
He notes that communities can only be defined according to their degree of intensity:  
Wherever men live together they develop in some kind and degree distinctive 
common characteristics—manners, traditions, modes of speech, and so on.( . . .) It 
will be seen that a community may be part of a wider community, and that all 
community is a question of degree.( . . .) It is a question of the degree and intensity 
of the common life (MacIver, 1924: 23). 
A community is different from an association. A community is at the centre of social life 
while an association is an organisation established to pursue one or more common 
interests. A community, therefore, may contain numerous associations, including 
antagonistic ones. For MacIver, the size of the community is almost irrelevant; the 
critical issue is whether a group of people share a common ethos.  
 Davies and Herbert (1993: 4) argue that the term ‘community’ is derived from shared 
characteristics that bind people together. These shared characteristics or common values 
might be derived from shared origins (kinship, tribe, history or place); similar features 
or activities such as economies, interactions or social structures; or similar attitudes, 
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 behaviours and purposes. A community has a spatial or territorial context, and the term 
‘neighbourhood’ is often used as a synonym (Davies and Herbert, 1993).  
 Park (1967) defines a community as ‘a collection of people occupying a more or less 
clearly defined area. But a community is more than that. A community is not only a 
collection of people, but it is a collection of institutions’ (Park, 1967: 115). He identifies 
three elements of a community: its ecology, its economic organisation, and its cultural 
and political forms. The three are integral but its ‘ecology’ is fundamental. Burgess 
emphasises the importance of geographical setting of the community. He argues: 
Whatever else the community may be, it signifies individuals, families, groups, or 
institutions located upon an area and some or all of the relationships which grow 
out of this common location. Community is the term which is applied to societies 
and social groups where they are considered from the point of view of the 
geographical distribution of the individuals and institutions of which they are 
composed (Burgess, 1967: 144). 
In this thesis I follow this traditional definition of a community as a group of people 
living in the same geographical area who share a common ethos. Community thus 
defined is linked to geographical area. In this thesis the territorial base is the local 
neighbourhood or barrio.1  
 
The creation of communities by outside agencies 
Early definitions of communities were often based on life in rural areas or villages. 
People lived in traditional societies that changed relatively little over the years. The 
communities that are discussed in this thesis are, of course, very different. They consist 
of migrants from rural areas as well as locally born urban people. The very different 
context raises the question of whether the people living in the same area share any 
                                                  
1 The debates on the heterogeneity of the community defined based on the geographical area will be 
discussed later in pages 23-25. See Guijt and Kaul Shah (1998). I will use this definition as the 
working definition of a community throughout the thesis. 
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 common interests. Does the very fact of living in difficult conditions such as in an area 
deprived of services force people to identify with their neighbours? Or, does it create 
some kind of anomie whereby no one associates with anyone else?  
 In the field of development issues, regardless of the internal heterogeneity of a group 
of people, the term ‘community’ has been commonly used to refer to the targeted 
population (or beneficiaries) of a development project. The term community 
development was used first by the United Kingdom Colonial Office in the 1940s and 
50s (Brokensha and Hodge, 1969; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Promoting development 
at the local level in the countries of the South soon became one of the key principles of 
governments in the North. However, in the South, community development became not 
only a key strategy for combating poverty but also a way of controlling communities at 
the same time. While the state’s main aim was to include communities in the national 
development plan, sometimes community development was used in an attempt to turn 
local communities away from leftist, particularly communist, movements during the 
Cold War (Campfens, 1997a; Abbott, 1996: 16; Voth and Brewster, 1989).  
 The strongest impetus for community development came under President John F. 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress programme, which provided large amounts of aid for 
Latin American countries in the early 1960s.2 Latin American countries in general 
established community development programmes to mobilise people in their local 
communities as an integral part of their national development plans (Quiróz and Palma, 
1997). State-initiated community-development programmes were employed widely in 
developing countries, of which many were financed by aid agencies, such as United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Campfens notes that: 
 Community development programs were established to mobilize people in their local 
communities as an integral part of the five-year plans masterminded by national 
                                                  
2 For details of the historical background of the Alliance for Progress, see Latham (2000). 
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 lanners and operating under a centralized system of management and resource 
allocation (Campfens, 1997b: 16-17). 
 For example, during the 1950s, the fear that social and political marginality typified 
the low-income areas of Latin American cities led many outside agencies to try to 
engender a spirit of cooperation. People should be encouraged to work together for their 
collective benefit. Thus, the concept of community as put forward by community 
development programmes was one created by outside agencies, regardless of local 
initiatives, practices and the heterogeneous interests of community members. 
 Although community development programmes were first employed in the rural 
sector, they soon became a key element in the strategy to combat urban poverty. Violich 
and Astica (1967) argue that city governments came to recognise the limitations of 
conventional urban planning, such as the creation of regulator plans and the provision of 
subsidised low cost housing. A new type of urban planning was needed that 
incorporated the community development concept. General plans would aid 
development only if social and economic goals were incorporated and, most importantly, 
local communities were to share responsibility for preparing and implementing them.  
 The neighbourhood was understood to be the ‘community’ whether or not the 
inhabitants shared common values. In practice, neighbours often collaborated with one 
another in many urban areas. As Violich and Astica (1967: 39-40) point out:  
   There has been a considerable movement in recent years toward the formation of 
citizens’ groups representative of the local community. Although they are not 
officially recognized within the existing governmental structure, these neighborhood 
associations for civic betterment have been a tradition in certain countries.  
The citizens’ groups’ main objectives were to defend the rights of the inhabitants over 
occupied land and to secure basic public services. They employed a variety of methods, 
such as applying pressure on politicians to receive resources and official services, 
seeking assistance from religious bodies, and so on.  
  6
  
Community participation  
From the late 1970s, the concept of community participation became fashionable in the 
execution of development projects in the South. The emphasis on community 
participation was promoted after development theorists criticised the top-down nature of 
the implementation of community development programmes, claiming that as such they 
were ineffective in the fight to eradicate poverty (Midgley, 1986).  
 In the 1970s, development policy began to focus on new paradigms centred around 
the idea of basic human needs. In this context, development theorists (and governments) 
recognised the importance of involving the community in the planning process of more 
efficient, more functional development projects. Cooke and Kothari (2001: 5) explain 
this: 
    The ineffectiveness of externally imposed and expert-oriented forms of research 
and planning became increasingly evident in the 1980s, when major donors and 
development organizations began to adopt participatory research and planning 
methods. 
The participatory approach was first identified as a technical concept for the planning of 
development projects in the rural sector. The work of Robert Chambers was the most 
influential in this area (see Chambers, 1983; 1994), and it was he who created the 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) method. The principal idea was to involve the 
(rural) community in identifying local needs and then to prioritise these in order to plan 
out the concrete development project. It was thus a concerted attempt to integrate and 
reflect local people’s knowledge of their own needs in development planning.      
 The main argument in support of community participation was that it put the 
intended beneficiaries at the centre of the development project by encouraging their 
involvement in both the planning process and control over resources provided by the 
project. This argument influenced aid institutions such as the World Bank, which came 
  7
 to adopt the idea of community participation in their development initiatives and 
projects (World Bank, 1994; Bhatnagar and Williams, 1992; Nelson and Wright, 1995; 
Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996).  
 In the field of housing, most slum upgrading and sites-and-services projects3 in the 
1970s and 1980s encouraged community participation. The state attempted to generate a 
spirit of participation in order to advance community development programmes on the 
strength of existing initiatives. Such participation, therefore, might be people-initiated 
or might be prompted by the state. 
  But what precisely does community participation mean? In a narrow sense as a 
development initiative, it means the mobilisation of the intended beneficiaries of a 
specific programme. These beneficiaries, identified here as the community, should be 
involved in the decision-making process of the implementation of the project in 
question (Paul, 1987; Imparato and Ruster, 2003; Cornwall, 2006). In a housing 
programme, for example, it might consist of cooperative financing, collective labour, 
attendance at meetings, etc. The term participatory planning or participatory 
programmes derived from this definition. In a wider sense, and as the real practices 
show, community participation ought to involve a broader level of commitment to the 
community, whether or not individual families would be direct beneficiaries. Such 
participation might include helping to finance the construction of community projects, 
organising bazaars or lotteries to generate funds for communal use, or taking part in 
demonstrations or collecting signatures to petition the city authorities for help. This is 
what I consider community participation in general to mean, regardless of state 
intervention. In other words, it means the people’s involvement in communal actions in 
order to obtain collective needs. When the community cannot rely on the state presence, 
                                                  
3 In the slum upgrading projects, the state (either national government or city authorities) invests in 
improvement of basic infrastructure for the existent slums. On the other hand, in the 
sites-and-service projects in general, the state provides the serviced land to the poor and the 
beneficiaries are then expected to build their own houses. 
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 they carry out these actions as a form of collective self-help. They also resort to 
communal actions in order to negotiate with the state for further state intervention. Thus, 
from my viewpoint, we should not limit the term community participation only to the 
meaning of state-initiated development initiatives, but should widen it to include 
community-initiated development initiatives.  
 Desai (1995; 1996) highlights the importance of taking into account local problem 
solving practices, which she identifies as grass-roots-initiated community participation, 
as distinct from state-initiated community participation. According to Desai’s critique, 
community participation as a framework for the implementation of development 
projects excludes people’s involvement in traditional communal activities and local 
decision-making mechanisms. However, from the perspective of any leader, the 
collective self-help activities taking place during their period of community struggle 
should definitely form the central part of community participation. Desai (1995: 43) 
points out the problematic notion of spontaneous participation as follows: 
   There is a wealth of anthropological evidence to show that elaborate procedures for 
participation exists in rural communities throughout the Third World, such as the 
meetings of village elders or gathering of tribal clans to discuss common problems 
and find solutions, though these are seldom regarded as spontaneous participation. 
The exclusion of these and other forms of indigenous involvement reveals that the 
definition of spontaneous participation used in the literature is a narrow one and is 
based on western ideological preconceptions rather than on local practices.  
She characterises state or outsider-initiated community participation as follows: 
   The novelty of community participation as a development initiative, however, 
derives from the fact that it involves intervention by, and cooperation with, the state 
and /or other development agencies (Desai, 1995: 43).  
As shown, a clear definition of ‘community participation’ is very difficult. We need to 
know who participates in what and for what reason. Desai states: 
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    the two basic terms ‘community’ and ‘participation’ are pretty useless, indeed 
disabling, for clear thought. They are both enormously vague and complex and are 
booby-trapped with begged questions (Desai, 1995: 43-44). 
Despite this she decides to stick with these two basic concepts but does not exclude the 
local practice of community activities and decision-making mechanisms through 
community organisation from her idea of community participation. In her case studies 
of slums in Bombay, she examines the nature of community participation in the light of 
external as well as internal aspects of community organisation. In this way Desai 
manages to overcome the limitation of these two basic concepts by exploring and 
interpreting the complex and heterogeneous nature of community and local practices of 
participation in the real world. She concludes that the slum-dwellers have little 
conception of community participation and the very idea of participation is something 
imposed upon them (Desai, 1995: 301; 1996: 225-26). 
  I will also continue to use the term community participation. Like Desai, I will focus  
on the interpretation of participation in the light of local practice and the perceptions of  
the settlement inhabitants. Whether the inhabitants’ involvement in collective self-help  
action should have been interpreted as participation was not always clear before my  
fieldwork. Therefore, I decided to use the term ‘community involvement before/after  
the start of state intervention’ in my study. I will discuss how the interpretation of  
community involvement changes and what ‘participation’ means from the inhabitants’  
view in chapter 6. This distinction is crucial to understand the changing nature of  
state-community relationships. 
 
Community participation and empowerment 
Many proponents of community participation went further, arguing that it should 
become more independent of specific projects and should strive to do much more than 
simply improve physical conditions (Yap, 1990; Kaufman, 1997). What was required 
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 was a change in the power relationship between the poor and the authorities. Such a 
view is implicit in United Nations Research Institution for Social Development 
(UNRISD)’s definition of community participation: ‘a process designed to increase 
control over resources and regulative institutions, on the part of groups and movements 
of those hitherto excluded from such control’(UNRISD, 1979: 8).4 According to this 
view, increasing community participation is an end rather than just a means. 
Where participation is interpreted as a means, it generally becomes a form of 
mobilisation to get things done. . . . Where participation is identified as an end the 
objective is not a fixed quantifiable development goal but a process whose outcome 
is an increasingly meaningful participation in the development process (Moser 1983: 
3-4).  
When community participation is an end in itself to give the vulnerable the political 
power to influence the decision-making process of public policies, it then becomes a 
strategy for empowerment. In this sense, participation is particularly important in 
unequal societies. When participants are unequal in their endowments, participation 
means the less endowed taking part in and influencing the decision-making process in 
their favour. ‘Taking part essentially then means the collective actions of the less 
endowed’ (Desai, 1995: 41).   
 Imparato and Ruster (2003: 20) share this view and define ‘participation’ in 
development programmes as: 
a process in which people, and especially disadvantaged people, influence resource 
allocation and policy and program formulation and implementation, and are involved 
at different levels and degrees of intensity in the identification, timing, planning, 
design, implementation, evaluation, and post-implementation stages of development 
projects.  
                                                  
4 UNRISD stands for United Nations Research Institution for Social Development. 
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 They also provide a scale for evaluating levels of participation: receiving information, 
being consulted, sharing control and being fully in control (Imparato and Ruster, 2003: 
22-24).  
 Abbott (1996) gives a more detailed theoretical analysis on the empowerment 
process through community participation. The process of empowerment needs a 
preceding process of conscientización which refers to a learning process to perceive 
contradictions in one’s society and to take action to change them. For Abbott, the whole 
empowerment process should be understood as a long process, from learning process to 
political empowerment, in which the role of external actors such as NGOs is definitely 
influential. 
 
Critical debates on community participation 
Since the 1980s, community participation and the participatory approach have been 
used extensively in the field of development. For development planners, participation 
has become a prerequisite if projects are to receive aid from international organisations.  
This trend has been especially noticeable in the field of service delivery systems, either 
public services or social infrastructure. Brett (1996: 5) states: 
   The economic and political crisis of the 1970s and 1980s have now discredited 
service delivery systems based on centralized bureaucracy, forcing theorists of 
development administration to shift their focus from hierarchy and control to 
participation and empowerment. 
According to Brett (1996: 5-6), this shift was a result of the affirmation of community 
participation as a useful strategy by theorists of various different leanings. The 
right-wing school of thought saw a participatory approach as an enabling strategy, a 
means to implement a development project more efficiently. For the left-wing school of 
thought, community participation was a means of empowering the vulnerable. Thus, 
support for participation has now moved into mainstream donor and private-sector 
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 agencies, including international organisations such as the UNDP and World Bank. 
Community participation is considered useful in order to implement development 
projects more effectively, particularly within a neo-liberal ideological framework. The 
participatory approach has also been perceived as making public service provision more 
efficient and accountable, and therefore, as a step towards achieving good governance 
(Brett, 2003: 2). 
But, while there is still support for the idea of participation as ‘a good thing’, the 
effectiveness of the participatory approach in terms of its impact on poverty and its 
ability to improve the social conditions of the poor has begun to be widely questioned.  
In this section, I will highlight the main debates around community participation 
which explore the gap between theory and practice. First I will analyse the debates 
regarding the dilemma between effectiveness and empowerment and the issue of 
accountability. Then I will look at the multilateral relationship involved in the practice 
of the participatory approach. Special attention will be paid to the role of NGOs in 
state-community relationships. Finally, I will touch upon the issue of the ‘myth of 
community’ which pertains to the gap between the imposed definition of the ideal 
/homogeneous nature of community and the reality.  
 
Effectiveness of community participation/involvement in development projects 
Though community participation is a good thing in theory, in practice it has many 
limitations. In his analysis of cooperative organisations (or ‘Participatory Voluntary 
Organisations’- PVOs to use his term) in Uganda, Brett (1996) explores the reasons why 
sometimes the participatory principle does not work. The organisations in question are 
rural marketing cooperatives and NGO-supporting PVOs designed to provide services 
and run income-generating projects for the poor. He examines how the unequal 
distribution of knowledge and skills among the members of the cooperatives impeded 
the rank and file members’ participation in the decision making process. Before 
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 beginning participatory projects, local groups need technical support from external 
agencies, either donors or supporting NGOs, in order to obtain the necessary skills and 
knowledge. Without this support for capacity building in the preparatory period, 
participatory projects may fail. 
  Another factor Brett highlights is the cost of participation in the decision-making 
process. Decision-making as well as involvement of the poor takes time which means 
that this is an opportunity cost for them. This opportunity cost becomes particularly 
expensive when the decision-making process must involve the best informed members 
of the organisation, whose labour time tends to be more expensive than other rank and 
file members. 
  The third point he raises is overestimation of the egalitarian nature of cooperatives. 
Providers of participatory projects tend to assume very similar levels of commitment, 
contribution and distribution of rewards(output), but ‘In reality most activities involve 
very unequal inputs, while at best some members are likely to be willing to “free ride” 
on the labour of others’ (Brett, 1996: 16). 
  Jenkins (1999) explores the limits found in community involvement in service 
delivery and housing policy in case studies carried out in South Africa. He focuses on 
the difficulties experienced with community involvement in developing low-cost 
housing projects. In 1994, the new housing policy introduced a financial mechanism as 
a capital subsidy, based on projects with community partners --- called the 
‘project-linked subsidy’. He examined whether in practice this project-linked subsidy 
succeeded in involving communities but found that lack of human resources and time 
conflict were the main factors impeding effective community participation. 
  Jenkins identifies the weakness of local government (lack of administrative and 
financial capacity) as well as the weakness of community organisations as significant 
factors in the failure of these projects. The latter lack the human resources necessary to 
manage participatory projects. He argues that the identity of civil society is not 
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 sufficiently developed in addition civil society itself is dominated by primordial 
community traditions, which can impede the conscientisation of community members 
towards their collective needs (Jenkins, 1999). 
  Another issue highlighted by Jenkins is the conflict between the time required for the 
community involvement and the time frame for the execution of the community-based 
projects. In general, housing delivery policy expects rapidity which does not fit in with 
the amount of time required by community participation projects (Jenkins, 1999: 
438-42). As a result of this, the compulsory agreement (legal agreement between the 
developer and the ‘community partner organisation’ in the project-linked subsidy) 
known as the ‘Social Compact’ was not signed properly, backed by the community.  
Traditional decision making processes in the community take time. Building 
accountability in the community decision making system takes much longer than the 
time frame which top-down projects require. Therefore, the requirements and conditions 
of the project provider (usually a public agency or the state) do not correspond with the 
traditional time frame of the community. 
  Adato and Haddad’s (2002) work also illustrate the gap between project objectives 
and the practice of community involvement. They base their argument on the experience 
of public works programmes in South Africa. These programmes had multiple 
objectives not only to generate jobs and reduce poverty but also to promote job training 
and community participation. South African public works programmes have been 
designed to involve community participation, targeting the poorest of the poor. Once 
localities receive funding for a project, the next part of the targeting process occurs 
when decisions are made as to which people in a community receive jobs. Adato and 
Haddad point out the problems inherent in the systems for selecting workers for the 
public works programmes when the community gets involved in the decision-making 
process: 
   The processes were generally need-based in that poverty and unemployment were 
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 necessary criteria for eligibility, although those chosen might not be those most in 
need…. Equality of opportunity was often a high priority, so a random system was 
used. Community members also saw it as equitable to give some jobs to people who 
had given their time to promoting community development (Addat and Haddad, 
2002: 31). 
This is an example of how community-initiative decision-making as part of a 
participatory programme can in fact conflict with the objectives of the programme, and 
render it ineffective. Programmes are carried out as intended but the beneficiaries are 
not drawn from the target group that the project originally identified. A positive side of 
the participatory approach is that community initiatives from below are respected and 
participants are not guided by an externally imposed decision making system. However, 
in the final analysis, local initiatives to allocate resources in this way clearly do not 
guarantee an equitable distribution.  
 
Efficiency vs. empowerment debate  
As discussed above, the effectiveness of project implementation through community 
participation is doubtful in practice. The participatory approach does not fit the time 
frame or other performance-enhancing cost-efficient requirements embedded in public 
service delivery systems. This contradiction becomes more critical when we look at 
community participation as an end: to lead to the community’s empowerment. This 
discussion is based on the dichotomy between classifying community participation as a 
means to search for cost-effectiveness and seeing it as an end for empowerment. The 
latter will never become established while the state controls development and resource 
allocation. 
  Cleaver (2002) discusses the efficiency /empowerment dilemma and highlights the 
fact that the current theorising of participatory approaches tends to be dichotomised into 
means/ends classifications. 
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  These distinguish between the efficiency arguments (participation as a tool for 
achieving better project outcomes) and equity and empowerment arguments 
(participation as a process which enhances the capacity of individuals to improve 
their own lives and facilitates social change to the advantage of disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups) (Cleaver, 2002: 226). 
However, I would argue that this dichotomy is based on the presupposition that 
participation is static, which should be reconsidered. In order to discuss the efficiency 
vs. empowerment issue, it is useful to recognise the danger of the generalisation of the 
term ‘participation’ and possible changes in the nature of participation through time. 
 White (2000) analyses the variety of forms and interests in participation and 
categorises them (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Interests in participation by Sarah White 
Form Top-down Bottom-up Function 
Nominal Legitimation Inclusion Display 
Instrumental Efficiency Cost Means 
Representative Sustainability Leverage Voice 
Transformative Empowerment Empowerment Means/End 
Source: White (2000). 
 
As Table 1.1 shows, there are four main different forms of participation with a variety of 
interests. ‘And in practice, any project will typically involve a mix of these different 
interests which change over time’ (White 2000: 144). Therefore, the real practices of 
‘participation’ should be understood as including the dynamics operating between these 
different interests both within a community and within the external organisations.  
It is more than clear that the top-down interest of efficiency does not always fit with the 
bottom-up interest of empowerment. Therefore, participation is a site of conflict.   
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 The issue of accountability 
Accountability is another issue influencing the effectiveness of community participation. 
Accountability is generally understood as a means by which individuals and 
organisations report on their activities to the recognised authority (Edwards and Hulme 
1994). In other words, ‘upward’ accountability towards powerful authorities is what is 
mostly concerned. The accountability of local NGOs involved in participatory projects 
to their donor organisation is a typical example. However, in the context surrounding 
the implementation of participatory projects, accountability has different directions 
–‘upward’ and ‘downward’. In order to involve community members in the process of 
the implementation of a development project, downward accountability from project 
provider (or agency financing the project) towards the beneficiaries is required. The 
downward accountability of a participatory project became particularly acknowledged 
as administrative decentralisation advanced in many developing countries. 
  The accountability of a participatory project has different levels as well: either 
between donor organisations and local NGOs which deliver the projects, between NGOs 
and beneficiary communities, and between community leaders and the rest of the 
community. When the provider of the projects is the local government, their 
accountability towards both intermediate NGOs (if any) and beneficiary communities is 
required. In addition, Shah and Kaul Shah (1994) argue that accountability relates to the 
wider process of information exchange, decision-making, management, negotiation and 
bargaining between different stakeholders. ‘Accountability exists between peer groups 
and operates at many levels’ (Shah and Kaul Shah, 1994: 183). 
  Desai and Howes (1994) highlight the lack of downside accountability of NGOs 
towards the community in India. They criticise what they term functional accountability, 
that is, the way in which accountability to the community has become simply a matter 
of ‘reporting’ what was done by the project in the locale in a very routine and 
mechanical way. Desai and Howes emphasise the importance of strategic accountability 
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which serves to explore the gap between the objective of the project and the results at 
the individual project site in order to suggest changes for the long term improvement of 
the projects. In general, they find no strong pressure for strategic accountability coming 
from above, ‘the merits of alternative initiative and courses of actions are actively 
reviewed from below’ (Desai and Howes, 1994: 89). Strategic accountability can be 
reinforced through informal meetings with community members (beneficiaries of the 
project) to evaluate the projects. However, given the unequal and diverse nature of the 
community, sometimes NGOs do not have equal access to all the different groups in the 
community, neither can they transform existing power structures within the community. 
Therefore, the ideal of full downward accountability cannot be achieved, while there is 
increasing pressure from the donor institution on the project managers to provide 
prompt information proving the financial accountability of the funds provided. 
  Shah and Kaul Shah’s (1994) suggestion is more straightforward. They emphasise the 
importance of reciprocal accountability between NGO, beneficiary community and 
other stakeholders. This position is based on their critical reflection on the lack of 
self-evaluation of NGO’s activities through feedback from the community. They argue 
that accountability is a process of information exchange, consultation and joint 
decision-making. Therefore, for them, accountability is an essential means of 
empowerment. They state: 
  Participatory methods provide fertile ground for increasing the accountability of 
Southern NGOs to the community institutions and membership organizations they 
support. However, this method, when applied properly would affect the power 
relationship. (…) Most NGOs are happy to involve community institutions in 
programme monitoring and evaluation, but are less active when it comes to 
evaluating the performance of the NGO itself as a support institution (Shah and Kaul 
Shah, 1994:190). 
They suggest that if local NGOs wish to improve downside accountability towards the 
 community, they should be prepared to adopt their own structural innovations and 
decision-making systems, particularly when these NGOs serve as provider of services.  
On the other hand, Fox (1992) looks at the accountability of leadership within the 
community. He analyses leadership accountability towards the rest (rank and file 
members) of the community in regional peasant organisations in the democratic 
transition period in Mexico during the 1980s. Fox suggests that accountability has both 
internal and external dimensions. He states: 
Leadership accountability refers to members’ capacity to hold leaders responsible for 
their actions, but it also requires some degree of autonomy from external domination. 
Autonomy refers here to a group’s control over setting its own goals and making its 
own decisions without external intervention (Fox, 1992: 23). 
Fox’s argument is relevant if we are to understand how leadership accountability serves 
the empowerment process of the community, particularly in the state-community 
relationship. However, as he recognises, leadership accountability is not sufficient for 
the community to gain power. He suggests that the presence of participatory subgroups 
is crucial for leadership accountability, in order to provide a system of checks and 
balances within the community (Fox, 1992: 27-28). 
 
The role of NGOs in promoting community participation: potential and limitations 
The role of NGO’s in promoting participatory projects is considered by some to be 
crucial and is much debated in studies of community participation (Abott, 1996; Hardoy 
et al., 1995). Before touching upon the topic, it is worthwhile recognising that the 
position of NGOs in relation to the state, donor organisations or to the targeted 
beneficiaries and communities varies, as the functions of NGOs in development 
diversify. 
Korten(1987) analyses the evolution of NGOs and characterises them as follows. 
What he terms first generation NGOs started as charitable relief organisations, dedicated 
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 to delivering welfare services to the poor and unfortunate. Those in the second 
generation focused on small scale local self-reliant development. In the late 1970s many 
NGOs undertook community development projects in areas which it was difficult for 
the state to access. The state also introduced the participatory approach for community 
development, but did so independently of the NGOs. As such there was no coordination 
between the state-led and NGO-led participatory projects at that time. The third 
generation of NGOs appeared in the 1980s when structural reforms of institutions were 
required in many developing countries in order to overcome financial crises and 
accomplish democratisation. Korten emphasises that, in this context, NGOs with the 
potential to serve as catalysts of institutional and policy change must assume a greater 
leadership role. Today, under the direction of ‘people-centred development’, both 
donors and national governments now look to NGOs ‘as a means of getting benefits 
more directly and cheaply to the poor than governments have been able to accomplish 
on their own’ (Korten, 1987: 147). 
From the point of view of NGOs, their role shifts from being service suppliers 
contracted by the state or donor institutions, to becoming agents of change, influencing 
public policies so that they are more relevant to community needs. Clark (1995) 
perceives this change in NGOs as a move from a ‘supply-side’ approach to 
‘demand-side’ activities (Clark, 1995: 594).  
In order for NGOs to take up this position of central leadership in development 
policies and be able to influence policy makers, they need professionalisation and a 
scaling-up of activities. At the same time, if they are to act as a catalyst then NGOs must 
work with governments. This presents a problem in that NGOs either become overly 
bureaucratic or through financial pressures can no longer maintain a close relationship 
with the local community. Korten argues: 
One reason that some NGOs have resisted dealing with their own internal 
development is a fear that in responding to calls for professionalisation they would 
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 become more like the conventional bureaucracies of government that they commonly 
believe to be ineffective (Korten, 1987: 155).   
Lee (1994) acknowledges the capacity of local NGOs to demonstrate new participatory 
methods of working with community organisations in improving environmental 
conditions in areas of urban poverty. Local NGOs can facilitate the successful 
implementation of a community-based effort through an empowering strategy for the 
poor. Principal tasks that local NGOs can offer in relation to an empowering strategy 
are:  
building and enhancing the viability, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of community 
organizations through innovative participatory tools and methods; provision of 
technical inputs related to management and accounting skills, information, and 
monitoring and evaluation; and coalition-building to create linkages between 
communities and wider political processes (Lee, 1994: 163). 
The spirit of solidarity, the principles of reciprocity and redistribution tend to be 
weakened in the urban context, however, local NGOs can help the urban poor to be 
aware of communal concerns. This is the merit of local NGOs: conscientisation of the 
poor of their local needs (Lee, 1994; Abbott, 1996). Local NGOs also can offer them 
‘how-to’ strategies for negotiating with other government institutions, informing them 
of their right to public services and providing them with a knowledge of the legal 
framework to protect it. However, Lee points out that a weakness of this kind of NGO is 
the limited replicability of their work due to its small-scale and dedication to a limited 
number of local residents. Limited capacity to generate funding and a limited technical 
and managerial capacity also hinder the expansion of the work of this type of NGOs’ 
(Lee, 1994; Fonjong, 2001).  
One way for NGOs to ensure that their work has a greater impact would be to build a 
relationship of ‘cooperative autonomy’ (Lee, 1994: 170) between themselves and the 
state, however this task presents its own challenges. Clark (1995) argues that a strong 
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 collaborative relationship between NGOs and the state can be built when the 
government has a positive social agenda. However, mutual distrust and jealousy 
between the two are deeply rooted. After all, state-NGO partnerships will affect the 
existing political power relations, which impedes healthy state-NGO relationships 
(Clark, 1995; Desai, 2002). 
 
The myth of community 
Some authors argue that there are problems with the generally accepted definition of 
community as something unitary and homogeneous (Lee, 1994; Gujit and Kaul Shah, 
1998; Cleaver, 2002). Far from being homogeneous, real communities are 
heterogeneous by nature. Community is a myth and therefore, the co-operational 
relationship between the state and the community is also a myth. The application of the 
participatory approach in a real community thus risks generating a new form of 
exclusion in the poor. 
Cooke and Kothari (2001) focus on the limitations of community participation both 
in terms of methodological problems and of essential problems of community 
participation per se, that is, the problems of the politics of the discourse itself. In terms 
of its methodological limitations, Mosse (2001) points out various factors which 
hindered or were even contradictory to the premised conditions of the community. For 
example, Mosse describes how the participatory approach often overlooked the role of 
pre-existing organisations of community representation. This meant that if a community 
already had a traditionally established decision-making system, then the committee set 
up for the purposes of the participatory project often failed to work as the space in 
which the community took their decisions (Mosse, 2001: 42-44). Kothari (2001: 152) 
also suggests that ‘By constructing dichotomies of power [powered vs. disempowered] 
and oppositional social groupings, participatory approaches simplify highly complicated 
social relations’ (parenthesis added). This suggests that a local community is structured 
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 within multiple strata and the interests and value of each stratus are different. Therefore, 
the preconception of a community, the presumed targeted population for a development 
project, as one equally disempowered society might be erroneous. Gujit and Kaul Shah 
(1998) argue that the participatory approach is premised on a definition of a community 
as something homogeneous whereas their evidence illustrates the heterogeneous internal 
structure of a local community. They point out that many participatory development 
projects employ this assumed definition as a given pre-condition and overlook the true 
internal complexity of a community. Peters (2000) agrees with this point and warns of 
the danger of using the generalised term community for local sites with internal 
differences. She also highlights the importance of understanding who controls the 
project and who makes decisions under the guise of participation.  
The selection of workers by community initiative for public works programmes in 
South Africa shows that this apparently ‘democratic’ and community-based involvement 
in the poverty reduction programme may exclude certain groups of the community such 
as women. In the case studies conducted by Adato and Haddad (2002), the targeting of 
women for employment was one of the objectives of public works programmes, but 
they suggest that community-run projects gave insufficient priority to women. This 
finding suggests that the community-led decision-making processes may sometimes 
include pre-existing cultural bias and social conflict which then lead to the generation of 
another form of exclusion within the poor communities. Cultural bias against women in 
the male-dominated construction sector is a typical example.  
community participation mechanisms need to be transparent, accountable, and open to 
participation from outsiders, so that local power relationships and biases against 
certain groups such as women do not exclude people who may most need jobs (Adato 
and Haddad, 2002: 33). 
 From the view point of methodological applicability, Chambers (1997) provides 
auto-critiques on the technical limitation of the PRA method (see also Cornwall, 1998). 
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 These critiques suggest the difference between the assumed internal nature of the 
community and the reality. The participatory approach failed to capture the inherent 
hierarchies, power differentials and socio-economic disparities in local communities 
(Mosse, 2001; Puri, 2004). As a consequence, the local knowledge presented to the 
project planners (or donor institutions) did not necessarily represent the collective needs 
of the whole community.  
 
The necessity of a gender perspective in community participation 
A gender perspective is another issue emphasised in the recent debates on community 
participation. A focus on women’s role in community development has become 
indispensable in any social development project, particularly in developing countries. 
Some of the previous studies of urban poor settlements revealed that women played an 
important role in community struggle as they were more aware of local felt needs and 
had a more realistic knowledge of community situations than men (Forweraker and 
Craig, 1990; Tacher and Padilla, 1997).  
Women became more motivated to participate in collective activities during the 
1970s and 80s particularly under authoritarian regimes such as those that existed in 
Chile, Argentina and Perú. Community self-help activities for survival strategies such as 
the community kitchens (comedor popular) and mothers’ clubs either in Santiago de 
Chile or Lima, Perú were good examples (Salman, 1997; Blondet, 1990; 2004).  
In the practice of community participation, however, concern with gender issues was 
still very limited (Beall, 1997b; Jelin, 1990). Some researchers criticised gender 
inequality in the implementation of participatory projects. Cornwall (1998: 53) suggests 
‘If participatory development is explicitly concerned with the effects of inequality, it is 
crucial that gendered inequalities are addressed.’ In practice however, as Levy (1998: 
254) points out ‘much of the research and planned intervention professing to be 
“participatory” excludes women and other subordinate social groups.’  
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 This limited perspective in participatory development was partly related to the 
internal power relations between women and men in the community. Desai (1995) 
points out the women have little voice or are excluded from the existent 
decision-making system in the community itself. In Latin American countries, the 
exclusion of the women in the urban communities was not explicit as such, but several 
authors suggest that their involvement in public representation was still limited. Tacher 
and Padilla (1997) emphasise that women’s role in community participation was always 
crucial yet mostly invisible. Blondet (1990: 31) argues that the reason for this 
invisibility is associated with role demarcation between men and women in the 
community: 
While the women participate en masse in such mobilizations, it is possible to 
distinguish between different types of participation. In the type of mobilization and 
organization among neighbours just described, involving a direct connection with 
the public sphere, women participate on an ad hoc, temporary and unstructured 
basis. The women do not take up positions in the organizations or assume 
responsibilities, since these are predominantly male functions. On the other hand, in 
other activities linked to neighbourhood development that take place in the 
immediate locality (…), women take on more active roles in the participation 
process.  
Bennett, Dávila-Poblete and Nieves (2005) discuss the value of women’s local 
knowledge and illustrate their capacity to manage water related affairs, as this issue is 
fundamental to their daily life. They suggest however, that there were still persistent 
cultural barriers such as machismo5 which inhibited the women from taking up 
leadership positions in the local organisation. All of these aspects illustrate how the 
internal structure of the local community was affected by gender inequality and 
                                                  
5 A concept or self-identification of men deeply rooted in Latin American society, which has its 
origin in a sense of honour, felt to depend on a man’s own actions. Currently it is understood as the 
display of or pride in masculinity.  
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 differences. 
 
What does community participation empower people to do? 
A further critique regards the theoretical and conceptual limitations of participation in 
relation to its potential to empower the community (Kothari, 2001).This questions what 
the participatory approach actually empowers the targeted population (participants in 
the development projects) to do. Though their study is limited to the PRA case, Henkel 
and Stirrat (2001: 182) write: 
 what people are ‘empowered to do’ is to take part in the modern sector of 
  ‘developing’ societies. More generally, they are being empowered to be elements in 
the great project of ‘the modern’: as citizens of the institutions of the modern state; as 
consumers in the increasingly global market; as responsible patients in the health 
system; as rational farmers increasing GNP; as participants in the labour market, and 
so on. Empowerment in this sense, is not just a matter of ‘giving power’ to formerly 
disempowered people. The currency in which this power is given is that of the project 
of modernity. (…) It is in this sense that we argue that ‘empowerment’ is tantamount 
to what Foucault calls subjection. 
In other words, they argue that community participation empowers people to fit into a 
society that has not been initiated by the community itself. They claim that this 
empowerment is aimed at rejecting or excluding the community’s existing social norms 
and structures and has the potential to reshape the nature of participants according to the 
principles and values of the society of the donor countries concerned.  
 Hickey and Mohan (2004), on the other hand, defend the meaning of community 
participation as a strategy to empower the poor. They reject the contemporary critique of 
participation and justify the meaning of community participation with the following 
three arguments: First, they consider that there are scaled up and diversified 
methodologies of community participation across all arenas and levels of 
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 decision-making. Second, they consider the community participation approach within a 
broadened agenda in order to capture political participation such as participatory 
governance. Third, they reject the current form of participation and seek radical 
alternatives for development through the reframing of community participation. These 
three justify the significance of community participation in itself, but not in the sense of 
implementation of development projects, nor in the sense of empowerment of 
beneficiaries of the projects. Hickey and Mohan (2004: 12-14) focus on the potential of 
community participation to serve for citizenship rights and for political change. In fact, 
as they emphasise, the term community participation is highly ideological therefore its 
interpretation varies depending on who uses the term. 
 The above discussions and debates on community participation are relevant and 
worth consideration when I focus on the issue of community participation in my case 
studies in the irregular settlements of Bogotá. As mentioned already, the nature of 
community we talk about here will be quite heterogeneous depending on the country, 
region, and locality, whether rural or urban. How has the concept of community 
participation been interpreted in local practice? Is there any difference in the 
understanding of community participation by the people of the settlements and by the 
public officers of the city administration? 
 In the next section, I will review the previous studies on irregular settlements in Latin 
America in order to situate my research topic of community participation within these 
contexts. How far did the previous studies explore the nature of community in the 
irregular settlements? Were there any other aspects of concern or interest when 
approaching these settlements?   
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IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS 
 
Definition of irregular settlements 
A variety of terms have been used to describe the poor urban settlements of Latin 
America, such as colonia popular (Mexico City), favela (Rio de Janeiro), población 
(Santiago), barriada or pueblo joven (Lima), barrio (Caracas), villa miseria (Buenos 
Aires), barrio popular (Bogotá) and so on. The terms are often translated into English 
as ‘squatter settlements’, ‘shanty towns’ or ‘slums’. The differences in their physical 
and social conditions in comparison with the higher income areas of the city have often 
led to them being characterised as marginal settlements (Perlman, 1976). Adjectives 
such as ‘illegal’, ‘irregular’, ‘self-help’, ‘squatter’, ‘spontaneous’ or ‘low-income’ have 
also been used to describe their socio-economic characteristics and methods of 
construction. As Gilbert argues, ‘different definitions reflect different philosophical 
approaches to the housing issue and that self-help housing takes a myriad forms. 
Generalization in such a situation is dangerous’ (Gilbert and Gugler, 1991: 122). 
 In this study, I will use the adjectives ‘irregular’ or ‘self-help’ to describe these kinds 
of settlements. They are irregular settlements because they lack planning permission and 
are sometimes developed in areas unsuitable for urban development. Many are located 
on the sides of steep hills, in swampy areas, or beyond the urban perimeter determined 
by the city administration as the area appropriate for urban development. 
 ‘Self-help’ refers to the process through which the residents manage the construction 
of their houses. They build their own homes with their own resources, frequently, with 
little or no help. Each home is built in gradual steps according to the financial capacity 
of the family. Even when they employ skilled labourers, they design and finance the 
construction themselves, and not infrequently breach the building norms of the 
city—for example in terms of earthquake resistance. Self-help is also an appropriate 
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 term in a wider sense, describing the way that collective effort produces provisional 
water and sewage systems. In the absence of official servicing, collective efforts 
sometimes satisfy the immediate needs of the community (Turner, 1976; Mangin, 1967; 
Gilbert and Gugler, 1991; Ward, 1982: 7).  
 In Bogotá, most settlers purchase plots from informal developers who subdivide the 
land with little consideration for the legal planning requirements. This irregular land 
subdivision differs from a ‘squatter settlement’, insofar as the residents pay for the plot 
rather than invading it, either individually or collectively. Unlike formal settlements, the 
authorities intervene in the settlement after the arrival of the inhabitants. Regularisation 
is the process by which city authorities recognise these informal settlements and 
introduce or upgrade infrastructure.  
 ‘Pirate urbanisation’ in Bogotá is illegal, but is generally tolerated by the authorities 
(see pages 128-30 in chapter 3). How would the population have been housed 
otherwise? Given the lack of official solutions to the housing problem, ‘illegality’ has 
been inevitable.  
 If illegality has been inevitable, then it is perhaps better to use the terms ‘informality’ 
or ‘irregularity’. Unlike land invasions, which take over other people’s land, most forms 
of ‘illegal’ development in Bogotá obey the basic rules of ownership. Subdividers buy 
land, or seek the permission of the owners, to urbanise the land. The irregularity of the 
settlement process consists in failing to obey the planning regulations or to provide 
services. Since most of the poor in Bogotá who have become homeowners have done so 
through this irregular process, it seems harsh to label their housing illegal. Therefore, in 
the thesis I will use the term ‘illegality’ only to describe the case of settlements created 
by land invasion, or to the case of land brokers who subdivide land without transfer of 
ownership.   
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CHANGING ACADEMIC APPROACHES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN POVERTY AND 
HOUSING  
 
Interest in urban poverty and the housing of the poor is hardly new, and a multitude of 
academic studies have appeared focusing on these issues. However, the perspectives 
employed and the policies proposed have changed remarkably over time. As such, it is 
useful to understand how current understanding differs from earlier views.  
 
Urban ecology school  
Academic interest in the problems of the city emerged after the industrial revolution of 
the nineteenth century in Europe. Preoccupation with urban poverty increased 
particularly after World War I, when urbanisation accelerated in Western countries. 
Wirth, Parks and Burgess led the group known as the Chicago School, representing an 
emerging American urban sociology. Wirth’s ‘Urbanism as a way of life’ (1938) and 
The city by Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1967) analysed the structure of the modern 
city from the viewpoint of ecological determinism. Both works tried to explain the 
structure of the urban system and the development of residential areas by describing 
modes of life. Lind and Lind’s Middle town in transition (1937) was a classic empirical 
study analysing social problems in the growing city.  
 Social problems in the city—crime, poverty, malnutrition, slums, etc.—were 
considered to be symptoms of ‘urban pathology’. As a medical term, ‘pathology’ refers 
to the array of processes, including diseases, which impede life functions. Deviant 
behaviour in individuals, groups or even throughout society is called social pathology 
(Brown, 1942; Elliott and Merrill, 1941). Urban pathology brings about deviant 
behaviour and disorganisation and threatens life in the cities, just as disease threatens 
individual life functions. 
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 The culture of poverty 
Further development of the field of urban pathology grew out of Oscar Lewis’ work on 
Mexico City, Puerto Rico and New York (Lewis, 1959; 1963; 1966). His ethnographical 
observations on family life had a tremendous impact on the anthropological method as 
well as on the study of urban poverty. On the basis of his intensive observation of 
individual families, his ‘multi-autobiographies’, he tried to avoid middle-class 
researcher bias and to understand the causes of poverty (Lewis, 1967). From this work 
he conceived the concept of ‘the culture of poverty’. 
 Lewis did not provide a concrete definition of the concept but suggested more than 
70 social traits, whose presence or absence demonstrated the culture of poverty. These 
traits included:  
   lack of effective participation and the integration of the poor in the major   
institutions of the larger society; suspicion; apathy, cynicism; a minimum of 
organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family; high incidence of 
child and wife abandonment; strong feelings of marginality; helplessness, 
dependency, and inferiority; lack of impulse control; a strong present-time  
orientation with relatively little ability to defer gratification and to plan for the 
future; a sense of resignation and fatalism; and a high tolerance for psychological 
pathology of all sorts (Lewis, 1966: xiv-xvii). 
According to Lloyd (1979: 58) the poor were isolated from the rest of the city. They had 
few forms of social organisation beyond the family and limited means to access 
well-paid forms of work. It was this failure to become integrated into mainstream 
society that caused the poor to develop their own way of coping with that social 
marginality—the (sub)-culture of poverty. But in turn the social traits produced by this 
subculture kept them poor. Their only chance of escaping poverty depended on their 
developing class consciousness and improving their mobility by ridding themselves of 
the ‘culture of poverty’ (Lloyd, 1979: 58). 
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  On the basis of his comparison of the behaviour, feelings, and mentality of Mexican 
and Puerto Rican families, Lloyd argued that the culture of poverty emerged universally 
in developing countries during the process of modernisation and urbanisation. Although 
Lewis did not intend to create a stereotype of the urban poor, this is precisely what he 
did.  
 This interpretation of urban poverty was soon challenged by other research. Unlike 
Lewis, whose families lived primarily in central slum areas, the families living in 
self-help settlements seemed to be very different. They had a wider view of society and 
did not demonstrate the apathy, despair or inferiority of Lewis’s families; on the 
contrary, they were hopeful and felt some degree of accomplishment about their lives 
(Lloyd, 1979; Eckstein, 1977; Cornelius, 1975; Ward, 1976). On the basis of this and 
other work, the concept of ‘culture of poverty’ came into disrepute. 
 
Marginality  
The term ‘marginal’ has been used frequently over the years to refer to the urban poor. 
Perhaps the first usage was by Robert Park in his research on human migrations, 
cultural contacts and conflicts. Park explains the ‘marginal man’ as:  
a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct 
peoples yet never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his 
past and his traditions, and not quite accepted because of racial prejudice, in the new 
society in which he now sought to find a place. He is a man on the margin of two 
cultures and two societies which never completely interpenetrated and fused (Park, 
1928: 98-99). 
Later, the term ‘marginal’ or ‘marginality’ came to be applied widely in Latin American 
countries to refer to irregular settlements and later to the dwellers of these settlements. 
 According to Germani: 
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 In Latin America the term ‘marginality’ began to be used principally with reference 
to urban ecological characteristics, that is to say, to the sector of the population 
segregated into areas of improvised dwellings on illegally occupied land. From this 
point it was extended to the conditions of work and the level of life of this sector of 
the population. Then its marginality was perceived both in relationship to the 
socio-economic system of production and to the regular system of consumption of 
goods and services. Simultaneously it was noticed that this state of marginality 
included other essential aspects like political and union participation, formal and 
informal participation and in general its absence or exclusion from decision making 
whether at the level of the local community, the situation in work, or in the order of 
broader state and national structures and institutions (Germani, 1972: 5; translated 
and quoted in Peattie, 1974: 102). 
Nelson summarised the characteristics of ‘marginal’ people as follows: 
In Latin America, the growing numbers of unskilled, semi-employed and abysmally 
poor urbanites are often called the ‘marginals.’ (…) Their social status is low, and 
they are excluded from the formal organizations and associations and the informal 
and private webs of contacts which constitute the urban social structure. To the extent 
that they are rural in origin, they may also be culturally marginal, clinging to customs, 
manners, dress, speech and values which contrast with accepted urban patterns. They 
lack ties to or influence on the established political institutions. Many are marginal in 
a literal geographic sense, living in squatter settlements on the fringes of the cities 
(Nelson, 1969: 5). 
 According to Lómnitz (1977: 10): ‘The marginals are largely occupied in unaffiliated 
manual labor, unpaid family labor, and small-scale family enterprise’. She thought the 
term marginality was a suitable descriptor of those working class people who were not 
employed in the formal industrial sector and therefore excluded from its associated 
benefits, e.g., social security cover.  
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  Perlman (1976), however, provided the fullest review of the nature of marginality 
and its distinctive meanings both across disciplines and through time. She identified five 
broad categories of usage: 
• First, architects, planners and housing authorities identified marginality largely in 
terms of location. They considered squatter settlements to be marginal due to their 
sub-standard physical conditions, such as lack of basic urban services, hygiene, 
peripheral location and illegal status of land occupation. Sometimes, the personal 
qualities of the residents were equated with their location.  
• Second, those who were jobless or underemployed were often considered to form 
part of the marginal urban underclass. 
• Third, newcomers were often included in the marginal population. Rural migrants, 
with their supposed distinctive sub-culture, were often thought to lack the skills or 
ability to become integrated into urban society. This interpretation was sometimes 
linked to the concept of the ‘culture of poverty’: any sub-culture different from the 
mainstream was regarded as marginal. 
• Fourth, marginality was often associated with racial or ethnic status. Those with 
Indian or Negro blood were assumed to have characteristics that excluded them from 
mainstream society.  
• Finally, the marginal population often included social deviants: criminals, beggars, 
travellers, etc. This group were deemed to be doubly marginal: they had rejected their 
own group but had not been absorbed into the dominant culture. 
 Perlman challenged these conventional interpretations of urban marginality on the 
basis of her research in six favelas in Rio de Janeiro. She found that the favelado had 
developed wide social networks beyond their nuclear families and so were not socially 
marginal. Nor were they politically marginal. For example, leftist activists often hid 
from the authoritarian military regime by seeking refuge in the favelas. They continued 
their political activity underground, mobilising the people in the self-help settlements 
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 without resorting to the traditional patron-client relationships. Even if most favelado 
were not radical and did not participate in riots against the regime, they understood the 
nature of the general political situation. Perlman also realised that it was difficult to 
demonstrate that the favela population was marginalised psychologically or culturally. 
 On the basis of evidence from Ciudad Netzahualcoyotl, in Mexico City, 
Vélez-Ibañez (1983: 19), too, criticised the idea that poor people were culturally 
marginal: ‘Social anomie, rootlessness, non-adaptability, “traditionality”, passivity, 
criminality, pessimism, and fatalism are neither necessary nor sufficient descriptors of 
urban populations in poverty circumstances’. Rather these people were ‘economically 
and politically excluded from the economic and political benefits of the nation-state and 
its economic system’ (Vélez-Ibañez, 1983: 19). More controversially, he criticised the 
idea of integrating this population into the social mainstream. Any attempt to integrate 
marginal people as a whole, he asserted, would only succeed in integrating certain 
individuals, thereby increasing the level of inequality. 
 Generally, the principal aim of urban investigation in Latin America during the 1960s 
and 1970s was to demonstrate that the ‘(sub)culture of poverty’, ‘marginality’ theories 
and human ecology were inadequate explanations for urban poverty and the life styles 
of the poor.6 Most importantly, these works rejected the idea that the culture and 
behaviour of the urban poor manifest undesirable qualities that ought to be eliminated 
through faster economic development. Increasingly, the work showed how successfully 
the poor became integrated into wider society. They changed their cultural standards 
when they moved from rural life to an urban context. Many writers showed how the 
supposed peripheral slums actually offered poor people the opportunity to create better 
lives (Ward, 1976; Matos Mar, 1968; Riofrío, 1978). Their struggle to obtain land, build 
their own homes and find jobs, and their active use of social networks to sustain 
themselves showed that these people were anything but marginal.  
 
                                                  
6 For the overview of the debates on marginality, see also Ward et al. (2004).   
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 Self-help housing and the changing form of state intervention  
Though the concept of marginality was increasingly rejected by academics, urban 
administrators and planners continued to identify poor settlements as being marginal to 
the rest of the city. This viewpoint contributed to the dominant approach in Latin 
American urban planning until the early 1970s, the idea that the slums and shantytowns 
should be eliminated. The shantytowns should be cleared, if necessary by force, and 
new formal housing units created for them. This strategy soon proved to be fatally 
flawed as new irregular settlements emerged more rapidly than the administration could 
create new homes.  
 The new housing that had been built for displaced people also proved to be 
problematic. The projects were not based on consultation with the residents and did not 
take their specific needs into consideration. The dwellings were far too uniform in 
design and most seriously of all, the rents were beyond the means of the target 
population. The building costs were so high that the government could never have 
afforded to accommodate all those who needed housing (Malpezzi, Mayo and Gross, 
1985; Gilbert and Varley, 1991; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989: 107-08). 
 Increasingly, governments began to realise that they should leave most self-help 
housing in situ. Many governments adopted a laissez-faire policy, but others adopted a 
new orthodoxy that was to help the community to improve the settlements. Such an 
approach was strongly influenced by the work of John Turner and William Mangin, 
(Turner, 1968; 1976; Mangin, 1967) whose evidence convinced some governments and 
particularly international aid organisations to change their approach. Put simply, with 
government help ordinary people could build forms of shelter superior to the kinds of 
cheap standard unit dwellings provided by architects and the formal sector (Pugh, 1994; 
Werlin, 1999). 
 Turner and Mangin identified the strengths of ‘self-build’ and ‘self-help’ housing. In 
Freedom to Build, Turner and Fichter (1972) show how the design and construction of 
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 their housing displayed the rationality of the self-help builders. ‘Aided self-help’ 
programmes could combine the rationality and innovativeness of the poor with the 
resources and technical expertise of the government (Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1976). In 
crude terms, people could build their houses and governments could supply those 
houses with infrastructure and services. 
 The debate about the virtues of a ‘self-help housing’ policy became one of the central 
issues among urban planners and academics. Turner’s emphasis on the people’s freedom 
to build was criticised by Marxist social scientists (Burgess, 1978; 1985). From a 
Marxist viewpoint, aided self-help leads to exploitation of the poor and encourages the 
government to abdicate key areas of responsibility (see also Ward, 1982 and Mathéy 
1990). 
 Despite this critique, governments in many developing countries, particularly in 
Latin America, incorporated many self-help principles into their housing policies. As a 
result, there was a shift in thinking about housing for the poor. The perception of slums 
changed from one of despair to one of hope. In terms of policy, the problematic slum 
changed its form to being ‘part of the solution’. Governments began to think about 
sites-and-services approaches whereby the authorities would provide low cost plots and 
basic services and the residents would build their own housing (Lloyd, 1979). 
 Gradually, international aid agencies and the multilateral development banks began 
to adopt this advice and try to apply the practice of aided self-help on a massive scale. 
The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for example, moved 
strongly in the 1970s towards slum upgrading and sites-and-services programmes 
(Malpezzi, Mayo and Gross, 1985; Gilbert, 2001; Zanetta, 2004). 
 The respective governments gave up slum clearance and shifted to improving the 
existing irregular settlements, utilising residents’ resources (labour, self-help practice), 
which became a principal measure of housing policy toward the poor sector. This slum 
upgrading was one of the two major strategies undertaken in this period, focusing on the 
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 need to remedy the problems of existing irregular settlements (Gilbert, 2001; Ward, 
1982). As Zanetta (2004: 19) puts it: 
The focus of the World Bank’s strategy was on developing effective low-cost 
solutions that could solve the low-income housing shortages of rapidly urbanizing 
cities, drawing on Turner’s model of self-help. While Turner’s advocacy for self-help 
housing was based on its potential to replace public housing policies that were 
excessively bureaucratic and technological while providing opportunities for 
individual and community development, the World Bank emphasized the economic 
aspects of the model. The concepts of ‘affordability’ and ‘replicability’ became 
central tenets in the urban agenda, calling for reduced standards and the use of cost 
recovery mechanisms as a way of maximizing the impact of scarce public resources.  
 Although the sites-and-services approach was widely considered to be the best 
among a limited set of alternatives, the application of specific programmes were often 
strongly criticised. The schemes might be too small or the programme might not cater to 
the poorest. Frequently the cost of sites and services schemes was too expensive for the 
poor and as a result it was better-off families who benefited most. Hart Deneke and 
Silva (1982), for example, found that in a generally successful ‘sites and service’ 
programme in El Salvador the cost of the land and building materials was generally 
beyond the budgets of the poor.  
 
Community struggle and the slum as a political issue  
Community organisations that promoted collective self-help actions became another 
pillar of research focusing on the irregular settlements. Political scientists were 
interested in how partisan forces operated in local communities and what role the 
barrios played in local politicians’ campaigns for election. Those who focused on 
community organisations in the irregular settlements had a particular interest in 
clientelism (patron-client relationships) between local politicians and community 
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 leaders (Nelson, 1979; Díaz, 1986; Auyero, 1997). Nelson (1979) analysed in detail the 
role of neighbourhood organisations and the reasons why they were formed. Knowing 
that the community organisations were used as political machinery for electoral 
campaigns, the inhabitants had their own incentives for committing to the struggle for 
their own needs, since this was the most effective method of accomplishing their aims 
aside from political patronage.  
 In some Latin American cities during the 1960s and 1970s, and sometimes until the 
1980s, the urban poor often organised protests against government policies and asserted 
claims to fulfil their needs. Some scholars saw such community-based struggles as an 
indicator of the potential of people to improve their own lives. Arango (1981; 1986), 
Buenaventura (1984) and Torres (1993), for example, dealt with people’s resistance to 
eviction or their efforts to obtain housing through collective land occupation in 
Colombian cities. They suggested that the government was guilty of neglecting the poor, 
and recognised the legitimacy of the arguments advanced by the leftist movement.  
 Sometimes, of course, popular struggles were initiated and manipulated by the 
government. In most Latin American countries, official party oriented community 
organisations were created after World War II. Whether the government regime was 
democratic or authoritarian, top-down community organisation was among the political 
strategies used to control the people and prevent the leftist movement from taking root. 
Civil society, defined as a sphere where citizens can exercise their own initiative in 
political space, therefore, did not emerge in any Latin American society. Hence 
promoting community-based organisations did not necessarily mean the reinforcement 
of popular autonomy. 
 The people of the irregular settlements could improve their living conditions to a 
certain extent by unauthorised means, such as by building provisional sewerage systems, 
and by illegally siphoning off drinking water or tapping into electricity lines (Hardoy 
and Satterthwaite, 1989; Kellett, 1995). To substantially improve their living conditions, 
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 however, they needed to obtain public services in the officially authorised manner, and 
therefore to negotiate with the competent authorities. As De Soto (1989; 2000) explains, 
in a Peruvian case, the procedures involved many steps such as the production of a map 
of the settlement, its approval by the planning office, mitigation of risks in the 
construction, authorisation for the construction of service infrastructure and so on. So 
much paperwork was required that it could easily take more than ten years to complete. 
To fulfil their immediate needs while this process was going on, residents might turn to 
illegal methods.  
 Community organisations directed collective efforts towards obtaining public 
services, with their leaders negotiating with the respective city agencies. One way local 
politicians have been able to win votes in the settlements has been to offer support for 
such efforts. They have tended to intervene in such collective self-help activities 
whenever they recognised residents as potential voters. Politicians might provide either 
material or financial assistance for the construction of provisional infrastructure of basic 
services in exchange for votes. They might also offer logistical support to the 
community during negotiations about the regularisation of municipal services. When 
such partisan-inspired negotiation processes do not work however, residents might 
resort to ‘unconventional’ collective actions such as civic strikes, demonstrations, and 
occupation of the municipal offices (Cornelius, 1975; Torres, 1993). These 
unconventional actions might even be supported by local politicians. Although they 
might try to take the initiative, in general, the people were ultimately co-opted by 
partisan political forces. They were forced to admit that the most effective method for 
resolving their needs was dependence on politicians who could influence the city 
administration. 
 Studies that examined the question of slums as a political issue emphasised the high 
dependence of social movements on partisan forces among the urban poor. Collier 
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 (1976) highlights this political dependence and control over irregular settlements in 
Peru in his analysis of cases observed under the authoritarian regime. He argues: 
Squatter settlements and public policy toward settlements have frequently been used 
as a means of linking the urban poor to the state in a way that is viewed as 
constructive, rather than disruptive, by the government in power. (…) On the other 
hand, the opportunities for self-help offered by the settlements can serve to create a 
kind of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the settlements that make radial political 
alternatives irrelevant (Collier, 1976: 37-38). 
 While the residents of the irregular settlements were aware of the insecurity of their 
claim to occupation as an assertion of their housing rights, they would not initiate any 
sort of upheaval for fear of eviction. They thus could be easily co-opted by offers of aid 
in kind or of jobs. This meant that, independent of the stages of the upgrading process, 
the urban masses in the irregular settlements could be made to obey the dominant class.  
 Settlement policy, therefore, was used by the poor as a strategy for obtaining political 
support and by politicians as a means of stemming leftist-movement ideas from 
spreading. The restriction on autonomy helped to control people in the settlements 
(Ward, et al., 1990: 221-22). Residents in the informal settlements have been treated as 
potential voters in partisan elections. As long as the government political machines 
could control, manipulate or co-opt the urban poor, the city authorities could resolve the 
complaints of the urban upper class as well as the rebellion of the urban poor, which led 
to a certain level of political stability. 
 
Holistic studies on irregular settlements 
Academic work increasingly adopted a holistic approach to the irregular settlements. 
Researchers analysed the socio-economic characteristics of the dwellers, the housing 
policies of local governments, the relationships between community and local 
politicians, the role of community-based organisations and their leaders, and so on. 
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 Based on integrated analysis of a multifaceted data set, scholars tried to identify the 
obstacles in the regularisation process in order to make further political 
recommendations. 
 The relationship between residents of the irregular settlements and the local 
government, including the municipal administration and public service utility 
enterprises, has come to be one of the central issues of research on these settlements. 
Research has come to cover wider aspects, including the migration patterns of dwellers, 
the physical process by which the informal settlements were created (self-help housing 
process); clientelistic relations between community leaders and local politicians, and 
their relations with the state agencies. Gilbert and Ward (1982; 1984a; 1984b; 1985) 
were typical in approaching irregular settlements in a holistic fashion. Based on their 
detailed analysis of housing policies in three Latin American countries (Colombia, 
Venezuela and Mexico), they pointed out the limits of the strategies used by the city 
authorities. They also analysed the functions of community organisations in the 
dwellers’ strategies for negotiation with local governments. They recognised the 
people’s difficulties in maintaining such collective self-help practices, especially once 
some of the basic needs were provided. However, they did not deny the merit of 
community participation as an alternative way for the dwellers to obtain their basic 
needs. 
 Studies on irregular settlements before the 1990s were mainly based on empirical 
analysis of specific cases. They concentrated on one or a few aspects of the nature of 
residents and their interaction with the state. The principal themes were the way of life, 
socio-economic characteristics of the urban poor, social movements, urban and housing 
policies, influence of politics on the urban poor, etc. Works by Gilbert and Ward made a 
distinguished contribution by approaching these issues in an integral way and showing 
how problems of the urban poor and urban policies (housing policy in particular) should 
be understood in the macro-economic context of each country. 
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CHANGING APPROACHES TO IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT RESEARCH 
 
Enormous changes have taken place in the political, social, and economic situations of 
Latin American countries since 1990. First, most of the countries have adopted 
neoliberal policies and shifted toward market-oriented mechanisms (Smith and 
Korzeniewicz, 1997; Oxhorn and Starr, 1999; Wiarda and Kline, 2001; Vellinga, 2002). 
Second, countries formerly under authoritarian regimes have made progress in the 
consolidation of democratic regimes. The quality of democracy in the countries, such as 
Colombia, which had not been governed by military regimes in previous decades, also 
improved through decentralisation policies and other institutional reforms.  
 What impact did these changes have on policies toward the urban poor and their 
responses to the state? Did the collective actions of the urban poor influence the 
democratisation process? Did the political changes result in increased autonomy for the 
community-based organisations? These questions have been the focus of recent studies 
on irregular settlements.  
 
Shift to neoliberal policies 
Neoliberalism prompted a change from direct government involvement in the economy 
to market-led economic policy. In the field of housing policy, the government reformed 
the systems for providing housing subsidies, created a new organisation for providing 
privatised public service through regular channels, promoted the provision of land 
served with public utilities, transfer of land titles, and so forth. All these were strategies 
to enable the housing market to function more efficiently (Zetter and Hamza, 2004). 
 As it turned out, neoliberal reforms together with decentralisation were all part of the 
package suggested by the World Bank and other international financial agencies of 
development. The idea of ‘market enablement’ and good governance strategies in the 
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 field of housing policy also came from Washington. In fact, the change in housing 
policy orientation was a reflection of the World Bank view on housing issues. 
In 1991, the World Bank set out the pivotal role for cities in its now landmark policy 
statement. This encapsulated and gave substance to the shift in urban-sector 
policy-making under conditions of market enablement. Rejecting the large-scale 
public-sector role and the project-driven model of the earlier era, the strategy 
favoured ‘urban operations on city-wide reform, institutional development and high 
priority investments, and puts development assistance in the urban sector in the 
context of broader objectives of economic development and macro-economic 
performance’ (World Bank, 1991: 4, cited in Zetter and Hamza, 2004: 14). 
 The housing strategies promoted by the World Bank as a new agenda in the 
developing countries were called ‘enabling strategies’, meaning procedures for making 
the housing market function better. More concretely, the strategies recognised the 
important contribution of the private sector in meeting housing needs more effectively 
(World Bank, 1993: 19). Five principles guided the Bank in its recommendations. First, 
the Bank would encourage governments to play enabling roles, moving away from 
government construction, financing, and maintenance of housing and toward improving 
housing market efficiency and the housing conditions for the poor. Second, housing 
assistance would have a sectoral rather than single-project focus. Third, the Bank would 
seek to assist counterpart institutions (governments) that have regulatory roles and were 
willing to remove market distortions. Fourth, support would be provided for innovative 
models of lending for housing. Fifth, greater commitment of governments would be 
sought for improving collection and analysis of housing-related data in order to better 
assess housing sector performance and improve the process of policy formulation and 
implementation (World Bank, 1993: 7). 
 If the state fulfils its role in two realms, namely, modes and tools of intervention and 
management and modes of governance, the market enablement paradigm should 
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 function well in the field of urban policy. Mode of intervention here refers to market-led 
provision of services and land, including privatisation of public service enterprises and 
deregulation of legal processes in order to facilitate transfer of land titles. Mode of 
governance refers to encouragement of civil society and capacity building of local 
governments through decentralisation (Zetter and Hamza, 2004: 15). 
 The impact of the market enablement paradigm on urban policies for enhancement of 
the living standards of the poor is a subject for further research. However, some case 
studies have focused on community participation in relation to governmental policy 
under the influence of neoliberalism (Pezzoli, 1998; Smith, 1999). Smith’s study on 
irregular settlements in San José (Smith, 1999; Smith and Valverde, 2001) is an example. 
The study considers the political implications of the new housing policy.  
 Smith points out the persistent influence of political control on the urban poor in 
Costa Rica, as observed in the new models of upgrading programmes under the 
community-participation framework. From the mid-1980s, Costa Rican housing policy 
toward the poor shifted to an aided self-help model, ironically discouraging the 
mobilising power of community-based housing committees. Delay in the 
decentralisation process itself was definitely one factor impeding community 
participation. A second factor was lack of the community’s right to get involved in the 
decision-making process. Between 1994 and 1998, the Costa Rican government created 
an inter-institutional mechanism to improve living conditions in the informal sector. 
However, this mechanism did not involve the housing committees in the 
decision-making process and ended up only as a coordinating organ. State institutions 
were persistently reluctant to recognise autonomous participation by communities, 
while political parties continued to manipulate the urban poor.  
 
The impact of the participation of the private sector in public service delivery 
Following the shift in development policies towards neoliberalism, privatisation, or  
private sector participation in the delivery of public services has had an increasing  
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 impact on the life of the urban poor. The public-private relationships inherent in  
privatisation can take various forms; a combination of public ownership and private 
operation; private ownership and private operation; public and private consortium and 
so on. Budds and McGranahan (2003: 89) note that private participation ‘usually refers  
to a contractual agreement involving a public agency and a formal (often multinational)  
private company’. Taking the case of water and sanitation provision, they clarify that  
privatisation refers to processes that increase the participation of formal private  
enterprises in service provision but do not necessarily involve the transfer of assets to  
the private operator (Budds and McGranahan, 2003: 89). Batley (1996) analyses a range  
of public-private relationships in service provision and discusses their implications. He  
emphasises the role of government in service provision as well, arguing: 
  None of these alternatives, at least in the case of public services, completely 
exonerates government from any involvement; the public role changes rather than 
disappears with ‘privatisation’. Rather than a simple transfer of assets form public to 
private sectors, we are therefore usually talking about changing their roles and 
relationships with regard to ownership, operation, control and regulation (Batley, 
1996: 724). 
The aim of introducing private providers and market principles into public service 
delivery is to increase efficiency through competition, to increase responsiveness to 
consumer choice and to bring in private resources (Batley, 1996: 748). Batley’s case 
studies examine how efficiently and effectively the new public-private arrangements for 
provision produce and deliver services. The results however, do not fully support the 
argument that privatisation provides a better performance. He claims that efficiency and 
effectiveness seem to derive not only from the institutional environment surrounding 
particular sectors, but also from the institutional conditions pertaining to particular 
locations. Factors other than ownership, such as the existence of competition, 
operational autonomy and political support for management may be more important in 
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 determining performance (Batley, 1996: 747-48). 
Like Batley, most of the debates on the impact of privatisation in service provision 
focus on its effectiveness, efficiency and cost (see for example, Clarke, Kosec and 
Wallsten, 2004). Broadly, the debates lead to two different positions on privatisation in 
service provision. One considers that the privatisation of public service delivery is a 
good thing and that the urban poor have benefited from an improvement in the quality 
and quantity of the services. The other argues that privatisation has been detrimental to 
the life of the poor, particularly as a result of increased service charges.  
In fact, some Latin American cases evidence the ‘failure’ of privatisation, as the 
privatisation project was suspended due to increased urban protest against the higher 
service charges. The experiences of water privatisation policies in Buenos Aires and 
Cochabamba in Bolivia are typical examples (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Nickson and 
Vargas, 2002).  
However, such dichotomous debates are not necessarily relevant. Kessides (2005: 90) 
recognises the favourable results of privatisation, taking into account the increase in 
investment and service coverage, improvement of productivity and cost-effectiveness, 
rationalisation of prices relating to costs and improvement of responsiveness to 
consumer needs. He emphasises that improvements in physical performance, service 
quality and efficiency were accomplished through privatisation and deregulation, 
particularly in the case of telecommunications and electricity supply (for example, the 
case of Chile). On the other hand, he recognises the negative effects on distributional 
equity caused by job cuts in the privatised utilities. He argues that the negative 
distributional effects have to be offset against the improvements in service quality and 
the increased coverage of service supply benefiting poor people. 
Some argue that this negative impact on the urban poor should not necessarily be 
attributed to privatisation itself, but should be interpreted as the result of privatisation 
and a combination of other macro-economic and political factors. Nickson and Vargas 
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 (2002) analyse the ‘failure’ of water supply privatisation in the municipality of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, which occurred in 2000 as a result of a six month-urban protest 
against water tariff increases. Following political pressure, a major franchise contract 
for supplying water and sanitation services in the form of a concession (granted in 
1999) was cancelled. The protest was sparked by the introduction of a new tariff 
structure bringing considerable increases in service charges. However, Nickson and 
Vargas suggest the tariffs were not the only reason for the protest and argue that there 
was a strong interrelationship with the wider macro-economic context in which the 
protest occurred. 
At the time there was growing opposition to the prevailing neo-liberal economic 
strategy. A pioneering structural adjustment programme had been introduced in 1984 
and a major state reform programme was undertaken from 1993, involving 
decentralization and the capitalization of state-owned enterprises. But the upsurge in 
domestic and foreign investment generated by this strategy was less than expected. As 
a result, economic growth grew at an average annual rate of only 4.2 per cent from 
1990-99, little above the 2.4 per cent population growth rate over the same period. 
(…). Despite a range of poverty alleviation programmes, towards the end of the 
decade seventy per cent of the population remained below the poverty line (Nickson 
and Vargas, 2002: 109-10). 
They conclude that while the tariff increase was the major catalyst for the opposition of 
consumers toward the concession contract, the failure of the Cochabamba concession  
was due to a combination of complex political, social and economic factors (Nickson 
and Vargas, 2002: 116).  
The case of water supply privatisation in Buenos Aires also involved increased 
service charges, and the project became the target of attacks by consumers, particularly 
those who had difficulty paying. Loftus and McDonald (2001) critically analyse the 
implication of water privatisation in Buenos Aires in light of the very positive 
  49
 evaluation of the process by its neoliberal proponents. They argue that the claim that the 
water concession has aided poverty alleviation in Buenos Aires is misleading. Their 
argument regarding the negative impact of the privatisation of the water supply can be 
summarised as follows. The poor’s limited capacity to pay the water tariffs meant the 
company could not fulfil its investment targets. It had to suspend part of its planned 
intervention programme due to lack of funds. This meant that the new water 
infrastructure did not reach all the target areas, while many poor households fell into 
serious arrears and were disconnected from the network. Under this market-driven  
framework, there was no other choice for the poor but to protest and demand their right  
to water, via the community-based actions against the increased tariffs. In this sense, the  
community-based protest had a reason.  
  Analysis by Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999), in contrast, estimates the  
macroeconomic and distributional effects of the privatisation and regulation of public  
services in Argentina, utilising a computable model. Although we should consider the  
methodological differences, the conclusion regarding the distributional implications of  
privatisation, measured by the Gini coefficient was the exact opposite to what Loftus  
and McDonald suggested in the case of Buenos Aires: privatisation served to reduce 
social inequality in terms of income distribution. On the contrary, Chisari, Estache and 
Romero observe that the poorest social groups stand to gain the most from 
improvements in gas and electricity, but also gain relatively more from improvements in 
water (Chisari, Estache and Romero, 1999: 377). They argue that regardless of social 
class, the citizens of Argentina have benefited from the privatisation and regulation of 
utilities. They suggest that it was the increase in both unemployment rates and interest 
rates between 1993 and 1995 caused by the ‘Tequila Effect’ that had a negative effect on  
income distribution during that period rather than the privatisation of utilities. 
  Despite positive evaluations of this kind, the critics of privatisation in the Latin  
American context are persistent, arguing that the benefits of such schemes to the poor  
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 do not outweigh the disadvantages. Birdsall and Nellis (2005: 26) argue that this  
criticism is unfair. 
   Privatization has been unfairly criticized in Latin America, in part, because it was 
the most politically visible, structural reform in that region during the 1990s, a 
disappointing decade of reform without growth. 
They write that there is a need to analyse the impact of privatisation (or private 
participation in public service delivery) in a more comprehensive way. For this, at least 
three elements should be considered. They are: conditions before privatisation; initial 
level of inefficiency of the companies concerned; and environment following 
privatisation (such as degree of competition and regulatory arrangements) (Birdsall and 
Nellis, 2005: 6). According to their analysis, in the Latin American cases the equity 
–enhancing effects of increased access to infrastructure services outweigh the negative 
effects of increased prices. They also highlight the point that although the increased 
prices, if any, have burdened lower-income households, the bottom line is still one of 
absolute gains in welfare for the poor (i.e. highly subsidised). Gilbert (2007), through 
his analysis of the Colombian case, supports this position: privatisation has improved 
the living conditions of the poor the most, and their negative perception of any increases 
in service charges should be interpreted in the context of the country’s macro-economic 
situation. He also emphasises that the increase in service charges is often overestimated 
by those who attack the privatisation process. For them, the protests of the poor against 
the increased service tariffs s was not economically reasonable, but maybe made sense 
politically, particularly when the left-wing (opposition to the government in power) 
intended to oppose or attack the government (Gilbert, 2007). 
  Now, how and to what extent was the community involved in this process of 
privatisation? This is another important point in the discussion regarding the impact of 
privatisation on the relationships between the state, the private sector (or service 
providing NGO) and the community as beneficiaries. The case studies above found that 
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 there was very little space for the community to be involved in the decision-making 
process of privatisation (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Nickson and Vargas, 2002). 
Although a participatory approach has been put in place for the implementation of 
service delivery once the privatisation process is up and running, there is no real space 
for the negotiation of the introduction of the privatised service delivery itself. Therefore, 
the community has no alternative other than to resort to protests to express their dislike 
of privatisation. A closer analysis of the community’s perspective on this matter is 
useful to clarify the difference between the concept of rationality for the regulatory 
agency and for the community users. In this regard, the work of McKenzie and 
Mookherjee (2005) is helpful. They argue that lack of adequate information about the 
tariff regulation methodology may cause users to misinterpret the level of increases in 
service tariffs and result in a protest.  
 
The democratisation process  
Democratisation created new mechanisms of political participation such as the popular 
election of mayors and civilian control of local administration. The new mechanisms 
permitted the voices of the poor to be heard more than in the past. The needs of citizens 
came to be considered and reflected in development projects at the local level, and this 
was expected to eventually improve the quality of city governance, including housing 
policy. Obviously, there are limits to the effectiveness of representative democracy. As 
Devas (2004: 30) suggests, ‘it would be naïve to assume that decentralization 
automatically ensures local decision-making reflects local needs and priorities, 
particularly of the poor’. The outcome of the democratic process for the poor depends 
on the capacity and accountability of elected representatives and local legislatures. 
However, whatever the shortcomings of democracy, it now allows the poor to have a 
voice that can be reflected in government approaches to settlement problems (Devas, 
2004; Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, 2003). 
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  Several case studies examined whether the urban poor gained a voice in the public 
sphere through democratisation. Gay (1994) discusses changes in the nature of 
community organisations in Rio de Janiero’s favelas and their relationship to members 
of the local political elite during the democratisation process. The urban poor sector in 
Brazil had been the object of political mobilisation and control under successive 
political regimes after democratisation, therefore the social movement of favela 
residents against the regime did not have a substantial influence on democratisation.  
However, during the process of democratisation favela organisations received support 
from external sources such as the Catholic Church and NGOs, which in turn influenced 
the established relationship between popular organisations and the political elite. His 
case studies suggested that, independent of the level of political manipulation by 
partisan forces, favela residents gained more control and autonomy over participation in 
the political process as well as in their relationship with the political elite. 
 Two studies on the poblaciones of Santiago de Chile during and after the Pinochet 
authoritarian regime have implications similar to those of Gay (1994) in their 
interpretation of the role of community organisations during the political transition. 
Salman (1997) examines what activities and community organisation roles were 
effective in three poblaciones under the dictatorship. He tried to answer the question of 
whether the pobladores’ movement was the driving force of democratisation or rather, 
whether it had simply served as a crisis-management organisation and strategy for 
survival. Salman employed a multi-dimensional approach, which included the particular 
history of each población, interaction among the pobladores and other actors such as the 
Catholic Church and NGOs and the collective identity of the participants. He concluded 
that the pobladores’ activities could not have been a driving force of the social 
movement for democratisation under the strong repression of political activities of any 
kind. However, the evolution of small-scale organisations designed for survival projects 
and the significant influence of interventions by the Church and other NGOs and the 
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 formation of social networks reinforced the autonomy of the pobladores in relation to 
the political parties.  
 Conducting an empirical study of grass-roots organisations found in one area of 
Santiago that contained ten poblaciones, Guerra (1997) examines the development of 
networking and other informal organisations in the popular sector under the 
authoritarian regime and their role in alternative development. His multifaceted analysis 
of these organisations reveals that, after the state and the market, it was such networks 
in the popular sector that led development. These studies show that popular movements 
and activism emerging in the irregular settlements were not necessarily prompted by the 
democratisation process. However, the growth of the organisations and their interaction 
with the Church and NGOs reinforced the initiatives of the poor, making them more 
independent from the state and political parties.  
 Similar analyses have been conducted in the countries that did not experience 
political transformation (democratisation) from a military regime in the same period. 
Mexico, like Costa Rica and Colombia, did not have long periods of military rule during 
the 1960s and 1970s, but made progress in democratisation in the 1990s. If we compare 
Aguilar (1988) and Moctezuma (2001), we can observe how the urban poor gained a 
voice and a measure of autonomy in relation to the state in Mexico in this process. 
Aguilar (1988) describes the long history of limited participation by officially organised 
local community associations in Mexico under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) regime. In theory, neighbourhood councils and the block leader system were 
channels for public participation, but the actual involvement of residents in 
decision-making was quite limited. As Aguilar (1988: 33) points out, ‘They had only a 
consultative function, which made them very weak, as they did not have any legal 
capacity to intervene in decisions about local urban policy.’ In fact, all independent 
popular movements were restricted under the PRI-dominated regime. Moctezuma 
(2001) focuses on the relation between popular movements and Mexican 
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 democratisation. He argues that the victory of PRD (Party of the Democratic 
Revolution) leader Cuauthémoc Cárdenas as mayor of Mexico City—the first instance 
of liberalisation from authoritarian rule—had been influenced by the popular movement. 
‘During the 90s, a new wave of social movements kept promoting self-reliance projects 
and participatory planning, seeking to consolidate community organisations’ 
(Moctezuma, 2001: 126), and as a result, a participatory planning scheme was 
introduced in Mexico City. In addition, the formation of NGOs and community-based 
organisations was reactivated in the reconstruction process following the earthquake of 
1985. The case of Mexico City reveals the change in power relations between the state 
and the community in their negotiation process. Due to the state’s recognition of the 
value of community-based and collective self-help actions, the dominance of top-down 
control over the community-based social programmes weakened and community 
organisations in the irregular settlements gained more initiative and influence in the 
decision-making process. 
 
Debate on decentralisation vs. participation/ accountability 
Decentralisation is another issue which affects service delivery at the local level, and 
therefore, the improvement of living conditions for the urban poor. Decentralisation in 
general means ‘the transfer of authority over and responsibility for public functions 
from the central government to subordinate, lower government organizations or to the 
private sector’ (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 176). Under this general definition, 
however, various types of decentralisation are implemented in practice: devolution, 
deconcentration, delegation and privatisation (Rondinelli, 1991). According to Manor 
(1999), decentralisation policies in Latin America are a mix of these types. 
Decentralisation in many Latin American countries began in the 1980s, partly due to 
the requirement of international donor agencies to implement structural adjustment 
programmes to overcome financial crisis in the region, but was also stimulated by the 
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 process of democratisation. Stren (2003: 10) states:  
Decentralization in a meaningful sense implies the granting of substantial political 
autonomy to regional centers of power―a pattern that is inimical to tight, 
unaccountable control by a national state for an extended period of time. Real 
decentralization almost certainly leads to the enhancement of democratic 
opportunities at the local level. 
Almost all Latin American countries have introduced some form of decentralisation 
policy since ‘democratisation was an important objective of decentralisation policies in 
the 1980s’ (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 176).  
If decentralisation is an instrument for achieving good governance, it should 
stimulate citizens’ participation in local decision-making processes (Van Lindert and 
Nijenhuis, 2002: 175). Based on this hypothesis, a close relationship between 
decentralisation and community participation in order to accomplish local good 
governance has become one of the central focuses in analysing the role of 
decentralisation in Latin American countries in the 1990s. 
Blair distinguishes the new meaning of decentralisation emerging in the 1990s from 
the conventional one, which emerged during the 1950s. According to his analysis, what 
makes the current form of decentralisation different from the earlier one is the inclusion 
of two new themes: participation and accountability. Blair argues: 
The major promise of democratic decentralization, or democratic local governance 
(DLG) (… ) is that by building popular participation and accountability into local 
governance, government at the local level will become more responsive to citizen 
desires and more effective in service delivery (Blair, 2000: 21). 
The achievement of good governance by decentralisation, however is based on several 
assumptions, for example that it will be easy to develop community participation and 
straightforward partnerships between local government and civil society. Oyugi (2000: 
vii) notes, ‘In the literature on decentralization, there is usually the assumption that 
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 decentralization provides the setting within which participation in development by local 
stakeholders can take place.’ Devas and Grant (2003: 307) argue, ‘The current fashion 
for decentralisation is built on the assumption that it will result in decisions that reflect 
local needs and priorities’. Schalkwijk argues that ‘one usually assumes decentralization 
is accompanied by increased participation by the population’ (Schalkwijk, 2002: 158). 
He also notes that partnerships between the government, private sector and civil society 
can provide effective means for managing urban development. However, ‘the 
partnership model supposes that government acknowledges its shortcomings and is 
willing to accept the formulation and/or implementation of policy’ (Schalkwijk, 2002: 
158).  
Decentralisation is thought to be a good thing for a better service delivery, based on 
the principle of citizens’ participation. Various case studies however, provide evidence 
that this assumption is sometimes untrue. 
  Schalkwijk (2002) analyses the frustrations of community participation in Bolivia 
following decentralisation reforms. In Bolivia, the law on popular participation (LPP) 
which came into effect in 1994 was the basic legal framework for the involvement of 
citizens, particularly marginalised populations, in the decision making processes of the 
local administration. The LPP provides legal recognition for territorial-based 
organisations (TOBs) or neighbourhood committees (juntas vecinales) as 
representatives of the people, which can act in the decision process of planning for 
municipal development. The TOBs are expected to serve their communities by 
identifying their needs, and to participate in and supervise the execution of projects and 
programmes at municipal level. With the intention of reinforcing the mechanism of 
accountability, the LPP called for the installation of committees of vigilance which act 
as a link between the TOBs and municipal governments. Committees of vigilance were 
primarily concerned with monitoring the spending of public funds (Schalkwijk, 2002: 
159-61). However, the LPP gave the task of representing the community to the 
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 committees of vigilance, which were not trusted by the community leaders. These 
committees were co-opted by the political parties. This meant that local needs as 
recognised by the community and their monitoring function were not properly 
transmitted to the municipal government. On the other hand, the IDB financed projects 
which provided a setting for a partnership between the local government and the 
communities. TOBs had the chance to enter the neighbourhood improvement 
subprogramme through the projects. However, the federation of TOBs was also heavily 
politicised and failed to mobilise the community leaders to get involved in the 
subprogrammes. In the end, the TOBs failed to utilise both the opportunities for 
participation given by the LPP and the opportunities for partnership given by projects 
financed by the IDB. The reasons for the failure can be attributed to the following 
factors: lack of awareness of the communities of these opportunities and effective 
strategies to utilise them; a longstanding tradition of dependence on making demands 
through political parties; lack of motivation of the federation of the TOBs to mobilise 
the community and lack of administrative capacity of the municipal government to 
involve the residents in the process of determining local needs and priorities.    
  The case of Montevideo, capital city of Uruguay, analysed by Goldfrank (2002) also  
illustrates the flaws in the assumptions about decentralisation. He analyses the  
decentralisation and participation programme implemented by the municipal  
government of Montevideo in 1989 and further institutional reform conducted in 1993.  
The programme contributed to improvements in city services by providing the  
government with better information about citizens’ needs. It failed however, to increase  
civic engagement among city residents because ‘the channels of participation offered  
did not convince average citizens that their input in public forums would have a  
significant impact on governmental decisions’ (Goldfrank, 2002: 51). Although the  
decentralisation of the city administration opened up new channels of citizen  
participation, the mechanisms failed to stimulate the residents to get involved in the  
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 forums which directly informed the local government of the citizens’ needs. The reason  
for this failure was attributed to institutional changes in participatory mechanisms  
introduced in 1993. Between 1990-1993, the participatory mechanisms involved the  
direct attendance of residents at public meetings to openly discuss local priorities for the  
administration’s five-year budget plan. However, these meetings created huge lists of  
demands, which it was almost impossible to prioritise into a coherent budget. Based on  
this experience, the reforms to the project at the end of 1993 added two layers of  
intermediate representation between the municipal government and residents. However,  
this reform contributed to a decline in participation, particularly by the rank and file  
residents. After the reform, the meetings were more akin to information-providing than  
to decision-making (Goldfrank, 2002: 57-58).  
  The participatory budgeting experience in Brazil, in contrast, has been widely 
considered a successful case of decentralisation through the participatory mechanism 
(Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002; Koonings, 2004; Baiocchi, 2004). So what are the 
factors which make decentralisation accompanied by citizens’ participation possible? 
Van Lindert and Nijenhuis analysed this using Porto Alegre’s experience. They 
believe that the main factors behind the success of Porto Alegre’s participatory 
budgeting venture are: the political continuity of Labour Party (leftist) administrations 
since 1988; the city’s strong tradition of social movements since the 1970s, serving as 
the basis of popular participation in the 1990s and the long history of neighbourhood 
organisations (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 189). The participatory budgeting 
system in Porto Alegre is a year-round activity involving assemblies, gatherings, forums 
and intermediate consultations. As such it is no less complicated than experiences in 
other Latin American cities such as El Alto in Bolivia and Montevideo in Uruguay. The 
success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre derives from adaptations and 
improvements over the years, which have been made possible by the intense 
involvement of municipal officers and community organisers. This success has also 
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 been sustained by the stability of the Labour Party and the expertise of the 
community-based organisations. The local government’s efforts, willingness and 
capacity to promote popular participation is crucial. In addition, the learning process 
involved in capacity building to enable the community organisations to follow the 
procedure of a year-round budgetary system is essential. In order to achieve this, the 
local government has an important role to play in raising awareness, popular education, 
training, and dissemination of information at the neighbourhood level (Van Lindert and 
Nijenhuis, 2002: 190). The merit of the Brazilian experience in terms of the 
effectiveness of community participation following decentralization is due to its direct 
participatory mechanism which directed efforts towards capacity building for both the 
municipal government and average citizens. The cases of decentralisation in Bolivia and 
Montevideo, in contrast, emphasised the establishment of a legal framework to facilitate 
community participation, but the new laws and institutions created as a result of this 
failed to motivate the citizens (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 193-94).7  
  Based on these case studies, I would argue that the process of decentralisation does 
not necessarily guarantee improvements in the accountability of the local government 
toward the community. Nor does it make certain the empowerment of the community 
through community participation.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
This dissertation is built upon the literature described above. There are numerous 
studies on irregular settlements and my review is not exhaustive. However, some of the 
recent case studies have demonstrated that certain aspects of the relationship between 
                                                  
7 Having said this, it is important to remember that part of the reason for the success of the Porto 
Alegre case was the political continuity of consecutive Labour Party administrations. In other 
words, the sustainability of the participatory budgetary system was dependent on the fortunes of 
this political party. 
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 the community and the state have been changing. Most of these studies interpret these 
changes either from an economic or a political perspective, few have used a 
multi-faceted approach. As for the discussion on community participation, there are a 
few examples where community struggle is examined after 1990. These studies however, 
tend to focus on community participation within particular meanings: for example as a 
‘community participatory project’ to implement state-initiated projects for the 
improvement of living conditions; or as ‘popular participation’ in local elections or 
‘participatory local planning’ in the administrative arena in the decentralisation process. 
  My case studies on irregular settlements in Bogotá will analyse the changes in the 
nature of community struggle and its interaction with the state and other external actors. 
My study uses an integral approach and includes the inhabitants’ views. I will 
implement the wider conceptual definition of community participation to include 
community-initiated participation (struggle). The analysis of long term community 
collective action, including the periods before and after state intervention began aims to 
explore the meaning of community participation in the real world.  
  The analysis uses empirical data derived from the barrios of Bogotá in the 1990s to  
examine the following key questions: 
1) How has the nature of community struggle and government approaches to the poor 
changed as a result of the strengthening of democracy and decentralised government? 
2) How has the increasingly market-oriented approach to urban and economic 
development (including privatisation and rationalisation of public service provision) 
affected the lives of people in the barrios? 
3) How effectively has the participatory approach of the city government to the 
community affected the lives of people in the irregular settlements since 1990? 
4) How far did the presumable community participation succeed in the involvement of 
the community in the decision-making process and enforce its control over resource 
allocation? 
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Several hypotheses emerge from these general questions:  
Question 1 
(a) The changes that occurred in Bogotá in the 1990s in terms of administrative 
decentralisation and democratisation resulted in a more efficient and accelerated 
urban management, particularly toward the poor sector. 
(b) The strategies taken by the communities to claim for their needs to the city 
authorities have become less conflictive and more collaborative. 
(c) Community struggle has become less clientelistic and more technical in nature. As 
a result, communities with political patrons no longer gain a major advantage over 
those without. 
(d) Privatisation of the provision of services has permitted the regularisation of the 
informal settlements without the aid of political patrons. 
(e) NGOs and the church (both Protestant and Catholic) have become more influential 
in encouraging community development.  
(f) Settlements with strong community-based organisations develop faster than those 
without.  
(g) The community’s reason for struggle has come to be based on their citizens’ rights to 
obtain basic needs.  
 
Question 2 
(h) Community-based collective action tends to disappear once settlements are 
regularised because they are no longer necessary. 
(i) The claim for land title deeds is the last issue in the whole process of regularisation 
that mobilises people to take collective action.  
(j) The living conditions of the urban poor (of the former irregular settlements) have 
improved enormously, but sustainability depends on what people can afford. 
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 (k) Though community-based collective action decreases after the settlements 
consolidate physically, whenever the inhabitants feel the need to make claims or 
protests their organisations mobilise to take action.  
 
Question 3 
(l) The framework of community participation in the slum upgrading projects has 
involved the targeted community in the execution process, but not necessarily in the 
decision-making process.  
(m) Local communities have become more autonomous thanks to access to the learning 
process of how to apply to the projects. They now demand access to services and 
infrastructure as human rights instead of requesting them as favours from political 
patrons. 
 
Question 4 
(n) Community participation has flourished as the city authorities have encouraged 
communities to participate and dictate the ways in which their neighbourhoods 
should develop. 
(o) The meaning of community participation as interpreted by the city authorities is not 
necessarily the same as the involvement of the community in the kind of collective 
action which the people have traditionally conducted. 
 
 In order to examine these hypotheses, a holistic approach is necessary. Microanalysis 
within the macro context is essential to understanding the relationship between residents 
and the local government.  
 Some recent studies have examined the attitudes of poor residents and their 
relationship with other external organisations, but their approach is mostly limited to the 
political perspective. They lack concern for the changing nature of community 
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 organisations and the strategies and collective action conducted at different stages in the 
improvement process. A perspective presenting poor people’s struggle for fulfilment of 
their basic needs is important. Since the 1970s, numerous studies on irregular 
settlements have conducted micro-level analyses, but all of them concentrate on at best 
only a few aspects of institutional change. Few have taken up the challenge of 
understanding the complex dynamics of the whole.  
 I believe it is necessary to apply the holistic approach adopted by Gilbert and other 
scholars to the current situation of the urban poor. Clearly, the economic and political 
contexts in Latin America’s major cities today are very different from the 1980s. Given 
the extent of the changes taking place in macro contexts, we need to analyse the 
interactions between communities and the new institutions that have been involved in 
the process of improvement of the irregular settlements. Two macro processes must be 
taken into consideration: the democratisation process and the shift to neoliberal policy. 
In particular, we need to look at the impact of the decentralisation process and of market 
oriented development programmes on the lives of the urban poor.  
 The community participation framework is an effective approach for this purpose. 
During the 1990s, more Latin American governments adopted the community 
participation approach when planning development programmes. While they recognise 
the role of community-based organisations and NGOs, they have also learned the 
necessity of activating the linkages between them and the state. Co-financing projects 
between the state and the community under the community participation model can help 
to reduce the fiscal burden of social development (Mayo and Craig, 1995). The real 
relationships between the community, the state, and other NGOs, however, are neither 
clearly revealed nor sufficiently understood. The impact of market-led development 
policy on the same relationships is unclear as well. A close examination of the attitudes 
and ideas of each actor will provide a more precise understanding of the relations 
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 between them and thus the micro analysis of local practices is indispensable.8 In 
addition, an analysis of how the residents themselves evaluate their own practice of 
so-called community participation will show whether they have gained autonomy (or 
independent space for negotiation) in relation to politicians and the state.  
 The following chapters examine the working hypotheses listed above. 
Chapter 2 explains the reason why I selected Bogotá-Colombia as a research place 
and presents the methodology for this study. Chapter 3 describes government 
approaches to the settlements in Bogotá and the reactions of the people by the 1980s.  
Chapter 4 describes the changing context of the 1990s, the process of democratisation, 
decentralisation and the reforms of the city administration. Chapters 5 and 6 use case 
studies to analyse the ways in which the meaning and changing nature of community 
participation are interpreted by both the community and the government. Chapter 5 
provides the history of the consolidation process of the six study settlements. Chapter 6 
then analyses the determining factors of community participation, examining the gap 
between the value of participation from the view of the city administration and from the 
view of the inhabitants. Chapter 7 presents the concluding arguments of the study. It 
discusses how the relationship between the community and the state and other external 
actors has changed. It also highlights the gap between the theory and practice of 
community participation. Analysis of interpretations of community participation, I 
maintain, is crucial to understanding the nature of the relationship between the 
community and local governments. This framework is relevant not only to examine the 
level of autonomy of the community in relation to project sponsors but also to 
understand the meaning of community struggle with and without the intervention of the 
state.  
 
                                                  
8 Kellett’s intensive work on the consolidation process of three informal settlements in Santa Marta 
(Kellett 1995) contains many relevant insights particularly with regard to the research method (see 
chapter 2 for details)  
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CHAPTER 2  
METHODOLOGY 
 
The research took the form of case studies of selected irregular settlements in Bogotá, 
Colombia. Bogotá is an interesting city to focus on for this research topic. The issue of 
irregular settlements should be understood in both the local and national context. 
Colombia has aspects in common with other countries in the region but also has its 
peculiarities.  
 This chapter first outlines the background and rationale defining the research area as 
well as the period of study. It then describes the method used for selecting and carrying 
out the case studies. Discussions about my positionality in the research and the ethical 
considerations that arose during the fieldwork are also included.  
 
 
SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH AREA: COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ  
 
The Colombian political and administrative process  
Colombia is one of the few countries in Latin America that was not ruled by what 
Guillermo O’Donnell called ‘bureaucratic authoritarian regimes’ (O’Donnell, 1973). 
Therefore it is usually categorised as a country with a stable democracy, but at the same 
time one troubled by bipartisanship, split between liberal and conservative coalition 
groups under elite political leadership (Berry, Hellman and Solaún, 1980; Kline, 1983; 
Hartlyn, 1988). From 1948 until the mid 1960s the country was embroiled in a period of 
political confrontation between the liberals and conservatives, known as La Violencia.  
 In 1958, the liberals and conservatives established the so-called National Front, a 
regime under which the two parties took power by turns and shared equally seats in 
parliament as well as posts as governors and councillors. The National Front regime 
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came to an end in 1974, but in practice, the bipartisan regime continued throughout the 
1980s.1 Under this regime, tensions between the organised urban poor and local 
governments were mostly controlled through top-down community development 
strategies. The poor launched demonstrations, strikes, and other collective actions to 
demand support for their basic needs, but they were also manipulated by partisan 
political forces exploiting patron-client practices (see Torres, 1993; Gilbert and Ward, 
1984a; 1984b). Left-wing forces, meanwhile, organised armed guerrilla groups in 
several factions that plunged Colombia into violent and prolonged civil strife. A process 
of forging peace between the state and the guerrilla groups made progress during the 
time of the Belisario Betancur government (1982-86). However, the peace process has 
frequently become deadlocked and the Colombian democratic regime faced 
destabilising violence from leftist guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary groups in 
rural areas (Kline, 1995; 1999).2
 Given the situation, institutional reform of the state has been a priority for successive 
Colombian governments. Apertura política (political liberalisation) was one of the 
principal goals of the government of César Gaviria (1991-94) and institutional reform of 
the state was part of the new constitution of 1991. These reforms included the 
redefinition of the role of state, declaration of a pluralistic partisan regime, 
decentralisation, reinforcement of citizen rights and so forth. Thus, in 1991 Colombia 
entered a new political era seeking greater democracy. Decentralisation was one of the 
major strategies adopted for this end. 
 Colombian decentralisation had both a political aspect and a fiscal-administrative 
aspect. It had begun in the mid-1980s through the introduction of new legislation. The 
                                                  
1 The end of the bipartisan regime occurred gradually though. At the national government level, 
César Gaviria (1991-94), who was from the non-traditional wing of the Liberal party, won the 
presidential election but Pastrana (1998-2002) was elected from the traditional Conservative party. 
At the local level in Bogotá, the victory of Mockus in 1995 signalled the end of the bipartisan 
regime in mayoral elections, but the bipartisan influence persisted in the elections of city councillors.  
2 Although the peace process made considerable progress during the administration of Alvaro Uribe 
(2002-2006 and re-elected for the period of 2006 to 2010), there is still much to do in terms of 
finding a solution to the problem of political violence in Colombia.  
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budget of each municipality was reinforced through progressive increases in the transfer 
of resources from national government revenue. Jurisdiction over some basic services 
(education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing, etc.) was shifted to the 
municipalities. At the same time, citizen control over the administrative and fiscal 
policies of local government was reinforced. The popular election of mayors was passed 
into law and the first mayoral election occurred in 1989.3 The creation of local 
administrative boards representing the lowest level of parliamentary government at the 
municipal level was determined legally in the late 80s. These reforms were confirmed 
under the new constitution of 1991. The new constitution also stipulated the election of 
city mayors, the popular election of governors, the recall of mandates, and the 
conducting of plebiscites (Gaitán and Moreno, 1992; Santana, 1996; Bell, 1998; 
Moreno et al., 1997).  
 Decentralisation was not without difficulties given Colombia’s long history of 
centralism. The main problem was how to distribute administrative powers previously 
concentrated at the national government level. The political aspect of decentralisation 
promoted local participation in order to reinforce local governance. A legal framework 
establishing citizen control over the budgets for local administration and development 
and a new system of civilian (watchdog) monitoring of public projects were introduced 
to this end. 
 Recent studies have sought to explain the changing nature of relations between the 
state and civil society by analysing voting behaviour in local elections in the 1990s 
(Gutiérrez, 1998; García, 2003). They found that the traditional bipartisan model of the 
Colombian democratic regime was undergoing a transformation and new citizen-led 
political movements were expanding the space of political participation. The case 
studies are still limited, however, and their approach concentrates on the political 
                                                  
3 The election of representatives (councillors) to local government (municipality) had started in 1935 
(see Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán, 2001).  
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perspective; the economic aspects, such as urban policies toward the poor, have yet to 
be examined.  
 
Colombia’s economy  
Colombia’s economic development was relatively stable from the 1960s until 1997. The 
country never experienced hyper inflation nor rescheduled its external debts.  
Colombian macroeconomic performance during the decade of ‘crisis’ was better than 
the rest of the countries of the region,4 however the Gaviria government had to adopt a 
series of economic strategies suggested by international organisations such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, in the early 1990s the national 
government began to stimulate neo-liberal and market-oriented economic development. 
Gaviria initiated policies aimed at trade liberalisation called apertura económica 
(economic liberalisation). In fact, during his administration, protective tariffs for most 
imported goods were drastically reduced (Dávila, 1996). With respect to the labour 
market, employment contracts became more flexible. Reform of the pension system was 
conducted by setting up a savings system using private financial agencies. In addition, 
reform of the financial sector allowed access to foreign investors for the first time and 
rules surrounding foreign investment in general were liberalised (Caballero, 2004). 
 The Samper government (1995-98) put more emphasis on social investment in the 
fields of education, public health and so forth.5 However, political corruption during its 
electoral campaign led to distrust of the state, which in turn led to a reduction in private 
investment in the real economy. On the other hand, the national government expanded 
public investment which increased the fiscal deficit. As a result, the Colombian 
economy fell into serious economic recession in 1997. The subsequent Pastrana 
government (1998-2002) was confronted with two urgent tasks: to reconstruct the 
                                                  
4 For example, the annual growth rate of Colombia’s GDP per capita was never negative during the 
1980s, and its level of inflation was moderate (23 per cent annual average). See Appendix E.1 for 
data on annual increase of GDP and Appendix E.2 for data on annual inflation.  
5 See Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1994) for details. 
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Colombian economy and to restart the peace process. Under this adminstration 
neo-liberal economic policies and market liberalisation continued apace, for example 
through the promotion of private investment in public services and infrastructure. At the 
same time, the national government had to focus on making the public sectors function 
more efficiently in order to resolve the fiscal deficit. On the other hand, there was a 
great need to reinforce social investment, due to the economic crisis of 1997-2000 
which seriously affected the life of the poor. The Pastrana government continued with 
‘pro-poor’ programmes through efforts to expand the coverage of education and public 
health care. Its development plan emphasised job creation through subsidies and the 
generation of credits for micro and small enterprises (DNP, 1999). 
 What were the ramifications of the economic liberalisation process on housing policy 
in Colombia? Essentially this process meant that housing policy shifted from offering 
housing itself to ‘enabling strategies,’ facilitating a conducive environment for the 
housing market.  
 Gilbert (1998) analyses the main orientations of the Colombian housing policy in the 
90s. The Gaviria government abolished the ICT (National Housing Institute), replacing 
it with a new housing authority, INURBE (National Institute of Social Interest Housing 
and Urban Reform). The mission of the new authority was to provide subsidies to the 
poor instead of actually constructing low-cost housing. INURBE channelled these 
subsidies to privately supplied housing options and encouraged the private sector to 
supply more so-called ‘social interest housing’(hereafter VIS). It was expected that 
promotion of the labour-intensive construction sector would help to generate jobs. Thus, 
the new policy of the Gaviria government was highly market-oriented, following the 
World Bank’s recommendation of enabling strategies designed to invigorate the 
housing market (Gilbert, 1998: 157). The Samper government continued the basic 
Gaviria line but made some substantial modifications: collective subsidy programmes 
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were emphasised over individual subsidy programmes, and programmes for upgrading 
squatter conditions received more priority than construction of social interest housing. 
 These new housing policies reflected the change in orientations of international aid 
organisations. During the 1980s, the World Bank, USAID and the IADB took on a 
less-interventionalist, pro-market stance. However, the result was the deepening of 
poverty during the ‘lost decade’, the 1980s. Recognition of that worsening led the 
World Bank to change its strategy. By the 1990s, much higher priority was being given 
to poverty alleviation and social development. The general policy orientation of these 
agencies shifted toward a strong commitment to institutional reform, sector-wide 
policies, better urban management and less government intervention. It was essentially 
a shift toward enabling strategies in the housing market and Colombia vigorously 
followed this trend. 
 During the Pastrana government, the basic components of housing policy were 
similar to previous governments in the 1990s. Newly promoted in this period was the 
transfer of ownership (title deeds) of housing lots in order that poor families, backed by 
the title deed as mortgage, would have easier access to long-term loans (DNP, 1999: 
128-29). Another new element was the redefinition of so-called VIS. The price of a new 
house in the category of VIS was increased from 135 minimum legal salaries up to 200, 
although the maximum price to be eligible for the subsidy was kept at 135. The 
promotion of housing construction was aimed at reactivating the national economy, 
since the construction of VIS was favoured by a series of preferential treatments such as 
reduction of taxation and simplification of the procedures for obtaining construction 
permits. The general framework of urbanisation during this period was determined by 
the Spatial Development Plan (POT) defined under the Law No. 338/1997, the general 
policy of which was to organise land use in a more rational way in terms of the 
market-led economy.  
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Bogotá as research locale 
Having placed these trends within the national context, Bogotá is a good locale for 
studying community participation in the irregular settlements. 
 First, it has a high proportion of its poor living in irregular settlements. The 
percentage of population below the poverty line was 49.6 per cent of the total 
population in Bogotá in 2000 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2002a). Approximately 40 
per cent of the existing urbanised area in Bogotá was originally irregular settlements 
(Martín, 2000).  
 Second, although Bogotá has a fairly high per capita income, it is a city of great 
inequalities. For example, in 2001, the Gini coefficient was 0.56 in 2001 compared with 
the national average 0.54, while Bogotá’s per capita income was almost double the 
national average (2,690 US dollars vs. 1,773 US dollars)6 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 
2002a; 2002b).  
 Third, the regional product in Bogotá District was higher than any other department 
(state) in the country between 1990 and 2002,7 which means that the Bogotá economy 
was vividly reflected in national macroeconomic performance. Bogotá showed 
relatively stable economic growth except for the year 1999 when the annual rate of 
increase of GDP per capita was negative (-11.3 per cent), as a result of the national 
economic recession. Gilbert (2006) argues that the Bogotá’s economic growth during 
this period was not sufficient to employ the increasing population; its unemployment 
rate rose to a peak of 21.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2001. These data suggest that 
many poor people live in Bogotá and the economic recession would have greatly 
                                                  
6 In the period between 1998 and 2004, the Bogotá Gini coefficient fluctuated between 0.55 and 0.59 
(Gilbert, 2006). 
7 In this period (1990-2002), GDP in the Bogotá District ranged between 21.4 per cent and 24.2 per 
cent, while GDP in Antioquia department, which was the second highest in the country, ranged 
between 14.5 per cent and 16.4 per cent of Colombia’s total GDP (http://dane.gov.co, accessed 15 
June 2006). See Figure 2.1 for further details of the political and administrative division of 
Colombia. 
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affected their lives. Any government attempt to resolve this inequality has been a great 
challenge. 
 Fourth, a series of institutional reforms defined in the 1991 Constitution were applied 
to Bogotá at the local level gradually throughout the 1990s. The process of 
decentralisation, which was one of the major institutional reforms defined in the 1991 
Constitution, had a great impact in Bogotá. The first popular election for Bogotá city 
mayor had already taken place in 1989 but political and administrative decentralisation 
was reinforced by the establishement of the Local Administrators’ Committee (JAL). 
JAL was created in 1992 as a new legislative institution for the twenty localidades8  
(here after localities) of which the Capital District is composed (see Figure 2.2). This 
gave citizens from each locality a new channel for political participation through 
elections. In addition, a citizens’ veeduría (monitoring) system was created to oversee 
local public investment. The tutela system, a legal system to protect citizens’ rights was 
also introduced in Bogotá (details will be explained in chapter 4). These new systems 
stimulated community involvement and control over public resources and assured the 
protection of citizen’s rights, at least in theory. 
 Finally, the citizens of Bogotá were exposed to a new wave of changes as the country 
underwent economic liberalisation. For residents of the irregular settlements, three 
factors were particularly important. One was the acceleration of the regularisation 
process, including the promotion of transfer of land title deeds. Another was the reforms 
in the management of public service companies. In Bogotá, these reforms included the 
privatisation of the companies responsible for waste collection and electricity services.9 
Both processes led to a shift in policies on irregular settlements, excluding clientelistic 
arrangements, which traditionally characterised the relationship between local 
politicians and poor communities. A third element was the impact of the economic 
                                                  
8 Localidad (locality) is the lowest category of political and administrative division of Bogotá 
Capital District. 
9 Water supply and sanitation services are still publicly owned, but a consignment system involving 
private capital was introduced in some areas in 2003.  
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crisis during the period 1997-2000 which had serious consequences for those in the 
irregular settlements.  
 Thus Bogotá experienced a period of transition in the late 1990s both in terms of 
political transformation as well as a change in urban management. Focus on the 
irregular settlements in this period therefore, is relevant in order to analyse the factors 
which determined the relationship between the community, the state (city government) 
and the market. 
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Figure 2.1  Republic of Colombia: political and administrative division
Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (1999)
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Source: Drawn from a map from the Bogotá city website (https://www.bogota.gov.co)  
Figure 2.2   Localities of Bogotá District Capital
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 PERIOD OF STUDY 
 
The study refers to the period from 1992 to 2003 with special focus on the late 1990s 
during the Peñalosa administration of Bogotá city government (1997-2000), since most 
of my fieldwork in Bogotá took place between September 1999 and September 2000. 
Coincidently, Colombia was hit by a severe economic recession in the period 
1997-2000 which dramatically affected the lives of the people of Bogotá. I have taken 
1992 as the first year of my time frame because the institutional reforms in Bogotá 
under the 1991 Constitution began to be actioned under the Castro administration 
(1992-1995). However, the second Mockus administration (2000-03) is also referred to 
in the study as my follow up research was conducted during this period.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS USED FOR THE STUDY  
 
Most of the information referred to in the following chapters was collected during 
fieldwork conducted from the end of September 1999 to mid-September 2000 in Bogotá. 
Supplementary field research was conducted in November 2000, August 2001, 
November 2003 and August 2004, in order to collect specific additional data. 
 The following research methods were used in the fieldwork: 
1. Review of documents and reports in the major local newspapers relating to urban 
plannning and services provision in Bogotá (see Appendix A for a list of the 
locations of primary document research). 
2. Open-ended interviews with policy makers and academic experts working with urban 
planning and policy in the Bogotá city government (see Appendix B.1 for a list of 
those interviewed). 
 77
3. Collection of basic published information on the case study settlements, especially, 
official maps and the ‘Resolución’.10  
4. Questionnaire survey of sample households in the case study settlements. 
5. Semi-structured interviews with residents (household heads and/or their partners) 
selected from the sampled households (see Appendix B.2 for a list of those 
interviewed).  
6. In-depth interviews with community leaders, NGO representatives, representatives of 
the Catholic Church, and local politicians involved in the development of the case 
study settlements (see Appendix B.3 for a list of those interviewed).  
7. Direct observation of community meetings and meetings negotiating with the 
representatives of the Bogotá city government. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE FIELDWORK  
 
The one-year research period in Bogotá was devoted to four basic activities: 
documentary research; research on district institutions (relating to urban planning and 
public service provision); settlement research (household surveys and interviews with 
inhabitants); and research on NGOs, religious groups, politicians and other social actors 
connected with the development of the case-study settlements.  
 To place the case studies in context and determine criteria for selecting case-study 
settlements, I devoted the initial period of the fieldwork to reviewing documents and 
studying relevant institutions. The information collected was useful for examining 
different data sources regarding the case-study settlements. The research on the 
institutions became the basis for a series of interviews with key personnel at the 
institutions concerned who were committed to the regularisation of the case-study 
                                                  
10 Regulations issued by the District council of Bogotá for recognition of the regularisation of the 
respective settlements. 
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settlements.  
 The settlement research proceeded in three stages: preparatory investigation; a 
household survey via sampling method and semi-structured interviews with selected 
inhabitants. General data were collected through unstructured interviews with key 
members of the settlements (i.e., community leaders or settlement founders).  
 First, all available data sources relating to the selected settlements were reviewed. 
Most of the leading members of the Community Action Boards (JACs; role and history 
to be analysed in chapter 3) in the case-study settlements possess general information 
on the settlement that they themselves have collected. However, the information they 
offered was limited to home owners with registered memberships and did not include 
tenant residents. In each study settlement, meetings were arranged with community 
leaders to explain the objective of the research and obtain information on current 
community activities. The information obtained made it possible to enhance the content 
of the questionnaire and identify some of the institutions connected with current social 
development projects in the study settlements. It was also helpful in creating a list of 
institutions to ask about in the questionnaire.  
 Second, a household survey conducted via the sampling method was designed to 
identify currently felt needs. This included perceptions of the institutions considered 
responsible for dealing with problems in the settlements related to those needs as well 
as the level of community participation in the process of improving the conditions in the 
settlement. Data collected using the household survey was processed by using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Science).11 The data processing was conducted in order 
to yield simple frequencies on most of the variables in the questionnaire. It also yielded 
a comparative analysis between two sub-groups selected from the population (e.g., 
comparisons according to various variables between household heads and their partners, 
between house owners and tenants, etc.) and among the six case-study settlements. This 
                                                  
11 SPSS is a statistical computing programme. 
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process was aimed at obtaining quantitative information on the socio-economic 
characteristics of household heads and their partners, needs felt, evaluations of 
community actions to resolve settlement problems and attitudes vis-à-vis community 
participation.  
 The results of this survey also helped identify potential households to approach for 
the semi-structured, in-depth interviews. It also highlighted the external social agents 
involved in community development projects in the respective case-study settlements. 
Themes and key questions for this third stage of the settlement research were 
formulated in such a way as to complement the outcome of the household survey. 
 Open (non-structured) interviews with key actors in settlement society were 
conducted during the preparatory investigation in order to collect contextual 
information on the settlements. 
 The interviews, of both inhabitants and representatives of social actors, were aimed 
at obtaining three kinds of information: (1) more detailed information on the process 
and background pertaining to the involvement of different institutions and their 
relationship to individual households; (2) evaluations of past and present involvement 
of different social institutions and its linkage with community-based activities from the 
viewpoint of the residents; and (3) the residents’ perceptions of community-based 
development schemes and the level of commitment of different social institutions. 
 Thus explained, the research was pursued at two different levels: at the institutional 
level (city government, related public institutions/companies) and at the barrio level, 
including not only community self-help activism but also the reactions to, negotiations 
with, and conflict with the city government.  
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 RESEARCH ON URBAN POLICY, PLANNING AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION 
 
In order to analyse the city administration, previous development plans, urban planning 
programmes and current official documents on social and urban development in Bogotá 
District were reviewed. Interviews were also conducted with key individuals—both 
policy makers (government and public officials) and academic analysts in the field of 
urban development and urban planning in Bogotá. 
 In respect to the functions of public service agencies and other divisions of the 
Bogotá city government, the study examined, through data collection from official 
records and documents, the history of services provided for the settlements as well as 
the political agendas tied up with such services. Key officials were interviewed at such 
agencies as the Bogotá Water and Sewerage Company (EAAB), the Company of 
Energy (CODENSA),12 the Bogotá District Planning Department (DAPD), the 
Department of Community Action (DAAC), the Secretary of Health of the Bogotá 
District government and the Demarginalisation Programme office. The survey of 
documents covered the annual reports of EAAB, CODENSA and the archives of the 
Bogotá Electricity Company (EEB) and DAAC. Original correspondence between the 
community and the agencies archived in their so-called ‘barrio files’ were especially 
useful in investigating the negotiation process between the community and the 
respective agencies in relation to the regularisation of community services. Documents 
collected in the library of the DAPD and City Council meeting records were also 
reviewed. 
 
                                                  
12 Compañía de Energía, S.A., a company created through the privatisation of the previous public 
electric power service company, EEB (Bogotá Electricity Company).  
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 CHRONOLOGY OF SETTLEMENT RESEARCH  
 
Since this study focuses on community participation from the inhabitants’ viewpoint, 
the case studies of the irregular settlements form its core. The bulk of the fieldwork was 
devoted to the household survey and in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants. 
Selection of inhabitants to be interviewed as well as the research into other social actors 
relevant to the inhabitants’ situation was based on the results of the household survey. 
 The year-long fieldwork period was divided into two with a two-week break between 
for reevaluation and consultation with supervisors. I also used this break to review the 
progress made during the first six months and modify the methodology where 
necessary.  
 The first period (September 1999-March 2000) included three months of preparatory 
investigations including: selection of the case-study settlements, collection of basic data 
on these settlements, testing of the questionnaire, a pilot survey, and modification of the 
questionnaire. Potosí-La Isla (one sector of the Jerusalén barrio) was selected for the 
pilot survey because I had maintained a good relationship with some of the community 
leaders there ever since conducting my first barrio research in 1992.13 They understood 
my interest in the research project and gave me useful information regarding the general 
situation in the community. During this period, the three barrios, Bella Flor, Danubio 
Azul, and La Paz were selected for the main household survey (see below for a 
discussion of the criteria used in the selection process). To conduct the pilot survey, two 
local people were hired to assist in the supervision of the household survey. They were 
the same people who had participated as interviewers in my first barrio survey in 1992  
After modifying the questionnaire in the light of the experience of trying out the pilot, 
the main household survey began in January 2000 in Bella Flor.  
                                                  
13 About this study, see Hataya et al. (1994) and Hataya (1999). 
 82
 83
  Before starting the main survey, I conducted an orientation session with four 
additional interviewers that I had hired to work on the survey to familiarise them with 
the manual I had made to assist with the questionnaire. All the interviewers were 
free-lance data collectors who had worked on social surveys with some of the 
researchers of Universidad de Los Andes. I hired eight interviewers in all,14 but their 
availability varied considerably during the period of the fieldwork. Sometimes I only 
had two people, but at other times five showed up at once, so I had to be flexible in 
terms of the progress of the surveys. I interviewed at least 10 informants per settlement 
and filled in the questionnaires accordingly, but most of the time, I concentrated on 
supervision of the data collection and coordination of the fieldwork.  
  A jeep with a local driver was also hired for a few hours a week. It was indispensable 
since all the settlements studied were located in very steep areas which were not easy to 
access. Sometimes, during heavy rain, I had to suspend the trip because the unpaved 
roads made it impossible to reach the settlement. The jeep served as our mobile office, 
too. Most of the interviewers were female, and were identified as ‘strangers’ by the 
barrio people, so it was useful for them to have some private space in the field.  
  When we were conducting the household survey a typical day started around six 
o’clock in the morning. I picked up the interviewers on the way to the barrio which took 
from one to one and a half hours. The work stopped when darkness fell at 6.00pm for 
security reasons. After dropping off all the interviewers on the way back to the city 
centre (where I lived), I reviewed all the questionnaires we had filled in during the day 
and made research memos whenever necessary. All these tasks often took me up to 
midnight. 
  By the beginning of March 2000, I had completed the household surveys for two 
more settlements, namely, Danubio Azul and La Paz. The procedure for the study of 
                                                  
14 Two of the people I had initially hired had to quit so I had to replace them later in the fieldwork. 
These two were given a separate orientation. 
each settlement up to that point is summarised as follows.  
1. Pilot survey on Potosí-La Isla (Sector of Jerusalén, Ciudad Bolívar, Locality No. 
19) 
Test of questionnaire design; household count of five blocks (24-25 October 1999) 
Modification of questionnaire and preparation of manual for household survey 
Household survey (12-16 and 21 November 1999) (total of 154 cases) 
Codification, data correction, data input, and processing (December 1999). 
Modification of questionnaire for application to other settlements (January 2000)  
2. Bella Flor (Sector Quiba, Ciudad Bolivar, Locality No. 19). 
Site observation and informal interviews with residents (November 1999) 
Interview with community leaders (11 December 1999) 
Household counting (21 December 1999)  
Household survey (14-16, 22-23 January 2000) (total of 103 cases) 
Codification, data correction, data input and processing (February 2000). 
3. Danubio Azul (Usme, Locality No. 5) 
Site observation and interviews with community leaders (7-8 and 14 December 
1999) 
Presentation at community assembly (30 January 2000)  
Household count (2 February 2000) 
Household survey (4-6, 11-13 February 2000) (total of 157 cases) 
Codification, data correction, data input and processing (February-March 2000). 
4. La Paz (Sector Fiscala, Rafael Uribe Uribe, Locality No. 18) 
Site observation and informal interviews with residents (7 December 1999) 
Site observation and interviews with community leaders (9 February 2000) 
Household counting and household surveys (25-28 February , 2 and 4-5 March 
2000) (total of 143 cases) 
 Codification, data correction, data input and processing (March 2000). 
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 After the break in the research, which corresponded to the last two weeks in March 
2000, I began qualitative research on the studied settlements, beginning with the 
in-depth interviews of residents in Potosí-La Isla. I prepared a series of questions that 
served as a scenario for each interview and organised a public meeting with members of 
the community in Potosí-La Isla to show them the result of pilot household survey. At 
that meeting, I discussed my plan for further research through in-depth interviews.15 
The feedback obtained from this meeting was helpful in writing the questions for 
further interviews.  
 After conducting a couple of interviews in Potosí-La Isla, I examined the relevance 
of the questions (both the concepts behind them and the vocabulary used) and made 
modifications where necessary. The in-depth interviews conducted in sector Potosí-La 
Isla thus served as pilot interviews, although the findings themselves were relevant to 
the study as a whole. 
 During April and May 2000, I concentrated on conducting in-depth interviews with 
selected residents of Potosí-La Isla and Bella Flor. I conducted all of the in-depth 
interviews myself, although I was usually accompanied by one of the assistants I had 
hired. She helped me to give further explanation when the interviewees had difficulty to 
understand the words I used (all in Spanish). She also rephrased the local slang when I 
did not understand. During these months, I also visited the other study settlements, 
presenting the results of my simply analysed household survey to members of the 
community as a way of expressing my appreciation for their collaboration and also to 
get feedback from them about the results.  
 Meanwhile, I analysed the results of the household survey to reflect the supervisory 
feedback obtained in the March break and considered the addition of a few more 
case-study settlements. In June, three more case-study settlements were added to the 
study: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén as a whole, and Juan José Rondón.  
                                                  
15 I tried to organise similar meetings with the communities of other study settlements, but without 
success, being able only to organise a couple of open interviews with key persons. 
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 The household surveys for these settlements were conducted as follows: 
5. Diana Turbay (Rafael Uribe Uribe, Locality No. 18) 
 Site observation and informal interviews with key persons (30 May, 2 June) 
 Site observation and interviews with community leaders (14, 21 June)  
 Household count of the selected blocks (1-2 July) 
 Conduct of household surveys (5-6, 8-9, 16 July) 
 Codification, data correction, data input, and processing (July) 
6. Jerusalén 
 Site observation and informal interviews with community leaders (14 July) 
 Household count of the selected blocks (15 July) 
 Conduct of household survey (22-23, 26-27, 29-30 July) 
 Codification, data correction, data input and processing (August) 
7. Juan José Rondón (Sector Yomasa, Usme, Locality No. 5) 
 Site visit and further contact with community leaders (October 1999) 
 Site observation and informal interviews with key persons (5 August) 
 Household count of the selected blocks (12-13 August)  
 Conduct of household survey (19-20, 26-27 August) 
 Codification, data correction, data input and processing (August) 
 During June and July, while starting the surveys at the recently added settlements, I 
continued to conduct in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants of Danubio Azul and 
La Paz. Interviews of the inhabitants in Diana Turbay, the other sectors of Jerusalén, 
and Juan José Rondón were conducted during August and September (until 10 
September). Throughout the second semester (April to September), I also conducted 
open interviews with other key individuals in external social agencies (NGOs, religious 
groups, politicians). 
 The database of results of the last three household surveys was compiled by the end 
of August. Most of the in-depth interviews as well as the open interviews were taped, 
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and about half of them, which I selected according to importance, were transcribed by a 
locally hired assistant. 
 After completing the fieldwork on 18 September 2000, I returned to Japan, but 
subsequently made two follow-up research trips to Bogotá. During the first, from 18 
November to 8 December 2000, I visited the last three settlements (Diana Turbay, Juan 
José Rondón and Jerusalén) to report on my findings from the household surveys. I also 
revisited a couple of people whose interviews that had not been recorded due to 
technical problems. In my second visit, in August 2001 I mostly collected additional 
materials on issues related to the main topic of the thesis, including the transfer of land 
title deeds, security problems (especially intervention and presence of leftist guerrilla 
groups in the study settlements), and displaced people. I collected documentation about 
these issues and conducted interviews with specialists and experts on the topics of my 
research in order to reinforce my knowledge and obtain insights based on their 
experiences. 
 
 
SELECTION OF STUDY SETTLEMENTS 
 
The key question in this study was why in some irregular settlements the consolidation 
and regularisation processes advanced rapidly while in others these processes were 
delayed. The main task for the early stage of the fieldwork, therefore, was determining 
the criteria for selection of the case-study settlements. In order to obtain the ideal cases 
with which to examine this question, I needed to identify examples of communities that 
were similar in condition and nature at the initial stages of development but that had 
experienced different processes of regularisation and levels of consolidation. I had to 
find the optimum way to combine quantitative and qualitative analysis so as to select 
cases (settlements) that could be studied in sufficient depth, based on an overall 
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understanding of the entirety of the studied area, and thereby test my hypotheses. 
Needless to say, any attempt at quantitative representation through case studies was 
almost impossible and did not make sense, since the number of ‘settlements of illegal 
origin’ in the periphery of Bogotá was too large (according to a DAPD approximation 
in 1999, there were around 1,500 illegal settlements or barrios de origen clandestino 
around Bogotá). 
 
The following criteria were established: 
1. Illegal origin of land occupation  
All the settlements I considered for the study were those established either by politician 
(or other activist)-instigated pirate urbanisation, illegal land subdivision, or invasion. 
The low-income settlements promoted by the social housing programmes of NGOs or 
official institutions such as the Popular Housing Fund (CVP) were omitted because in 
these cases the state is considered a presence from the outset and the land is not illegally 
occupied. Such settlements would not provide relevant data for examining whether or 
not communities had gained bargaining power in the course of dealing with external 
institutions. 
 
2. Land occupation beginning during the early 1980s 
The study settlements were chosen so as to include those where land occupation began 
at approximately the same time, although they might be at different levels of physical 
consolidation. The reference term of establishment was fixed at between 10 and 20 
years prior to the study, that is, sometime during the 1980s. In this way, the selected 
settlements have a similar background in their historical process of consolidation. The 
reference term—10 to 20 years—was considered a reasonable time span in which 
people would remember past events and their own performance and actions (this 
assumption proved wrong in some cases).  
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 3. Lowest socio-economic stratum  
The study settlements were selected from the poor sectors classified as belonging to the 
lowest socio-economic strata (according to the DANE definition, either estrato 1 or 2)16 
in order to secure a certain level of homogeneity among the selected cases. 
 
4. Similar topographical conditions 
The cases were selected from three localities in the southern part of the city: Ciudad 
Bolivar, Usme, and Rafael Uribe Uribe. There are significant concentrations of irregular 
settlements in these three, most of which were built on steep slopes or hillsides. 
Expansion of the delivery of public services in these areas is alike in facing the 
difficulties posed by these topographical conditions. 
 These criteria were refined in order to include the following aspects, both shared and 
different.  
• Aspects in common:    
1) illegal origin of the land tenure 
2) approximately the same terms since land occupation began 
3) lowest socio-economic strata 
4) initial difficulty in access to public services, networks and the transport system. 
 
                                                  
16 Colombian socio-economic stratification is based on various indicators which appraise the living 
conditions in residential areas according to physical conditions such as the building material used for 
dwellings, access to and condition of urban infrastructure and provision of public services. Average 
income level is approximated for referential use according to the strata. Until 1990, each public 
service delivery company used a different methodology in order to create its own stratification with 
the aim of determining a tariff for service use differentiated by strata. In 1991, the methodology was 
unified at the national level and the DANE is now in charge of determining the strata by decrees. 
Socio-economic stratification is updated constantly according to physical changes in the cities. The 
city of Bogotá is classified into six strata. Stratus 1 is the lowest and Stratus 6 is the highest. See 
DAPD (2004) for the legal explanation on stratification. See Appendix F for the current stratification 
in Bogotá.  
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• Aspects where different:  
1) current density of occupation  
2) progress of regularisation 
3) current level of physical consolidation (= level of improvement in self-help housing  
in terms of construction materials and expansion of the area constructed; the level of 
public service provision; the provision of other social services.) 
4) level of institutional intervention 
 This combination of criteria permitted me to choose study settlements that were to a 
certain extent homogeneous in terms of initial conditions and early process of self-help 
construction, although they exhibited diversity in their current physical condition. 
 The procedure for selecting the case settlements was based on a database categorised 
by the above mentioned criteria: illegal origin, year of establishment; socio-economic 
stratification, etc. Three different thematic maps were used and their data analysed 
comparatively. Two thematic maps are: 
• Map of legalised settlements or settlements being legalised drawn by DAPD (see 
Figure 2.3); 
• Map of socioeconomic stratification: stratus 1 and stratus 2 drawn by DAPD (see 
Figure 2.4).  
These were compared with another set of maps, which showed the target area of 
intervention by two special district programmes (the ‘South Bogotá Project’ and the 
‘De-marginalisation programme’; see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4 in chapter 4 
respectively). 
 I discovered that the current target area for institutional intervention overlapped the 
entire focus area of my research. Most of the settlements that could be selected under 
the criteria I proposed fell within areas where public service enterprises had difficulty in 
intervention because of conflict (either local violence or presumed presence of leftist 
groups) or topographical conditions (many blocks were not suitable for urban 
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development.) After 1990, public service enterprises like EAAB and CODENSA 
(ex-EEB) came to apply alternative strategies to provide services through the 
‘community-based’ approach.  
 Ultimately, the selection of the study settlements was not rigidly based on the 
at-random rule, but rather was purposeful and subjective, based on observations from 
my visits to the candidate settlements. Acceptance by the community proved important 
in the final decision.17  
                                                  
17 In addition, I considered settlements I had surveyed in 1992, namely Potosí-La Isla and Juan José 
Rondón, where I had the advantage of having previously established contacts with the community. 
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Figure 2.3 Bogotá: legalised settlements and settlements being legalised
Source: DAPD, ‘Mapa de barrios legalizados y en el trámite de legalización’ , 1999.
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Figure 2.4 Bogotá: stratus 1 and stratus 2
Source: Map drawn by DAPD, Subdirección Económica de Competitividad e Innovación, 1999.
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 Having completed this initial selection process, I reduced the candidate settlements 
for application of the household survey first to ten,18 and finally to six in total: 
 Ciudad Bolívar: Jerusalén and Bella Flor   
 Usme: Danubio Azul and Juan José Rondón 
 Rafael Uribe Uribe: La Paz and Diana Turbay  
(see Figure 2.5 for their location). 
Of these six, Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La Paz were surveyed in the first semester of 
the fieldwork. The other three: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Juan José Rondón were 
added in the second semester of the fieldwork for two reasons. First, I realised that the 
influence of political intervention in the study settlements was not clearly reflected in 
the results of the first three surveys. So, in order to achieve a better comparative 
analysis, I needed to include a case established by direct political intervention, one of 
the most commonly known ways that irregular settlements (irregular urbanisation) were 
created during the 1970s through the mid-1980s. Diana Turbay was included in 
response to this need. Second, after postulating the fourth working hypothesis, I realised 
the necessity of examining topographical conditions as another determining element in 
                                                  
18 One settlement of the Quiba sector in Ciudad Bolívar was initially considered, but omitted simply 
due to time constraints. The Alto Cazuca and Alto Estancia area of Ciudad Bolívar, where there had 
been vigorous illegal urbanisation activity along the border between Bogotá District and Sumapaz, 
was also initially selected for the research, but ultimately omitted because of the difficulty of gaining 
access to general information in the municipality of Sumapaz. One of the irregular settlements 
located in Alto Chapinero where I had studied previously was also excluded because of the 
particularity of its historical process and because the locality of Chapinero itself was less 
representative in terms of concentration of illegal settlements.  
  The possibility of adding study settlements from either Suba or Bosa localities, where irregular 
settlements were also concentrated, was initially considered, but given constraints of time and the 
‘topographical similarity’ criterion finally adopted (4. above), I did not include them. The 
topographical characteristics of the irregular settlements in these two localities differ greatly: they 
are located in the flat area which has poor drainage and is vulnerable to flooding. 
  During the pilot survey in Potosí-La Isla barrio (in Jerusalén, Ciudad Bolívar), the process of 
selection of study settlements continued with visits to the sites and informal interviews with local 
residents in different areas located in the initially selected focus area. In order to include some 
settlements that fulfilled my criteria and that also had a high level of current state intervention, I also 
met several times with public officials in charge of two Bogotá District legalisation programmes (the 
Demarginalisation Programme and the Project for Improvement of Settlements in southern Bogotá 
in order to obtain basic information on the intervention process and learn how best to gain access to 
their target settlements.  
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differing levels of state intervention. In fact, the geographical conditions were quite 
different between Bella Flor and the others. Therefore, I added another irregular 
settlement with similar conditions, Juan José Rondón.  
 The reason for adding the Barrio Jerusalén was different. I took Jerusalén as a whole 
in order to utilise the information gained in the pilot research on Potosí-La Isla.19  
 
                                                  
19 The results of the pilot household survey could not be utilised for comparative analysis with other 
settlements, because the form of the questionnaire had been modified. However, the in-depth 
interviews with selected inhabitants as well as key social actors in Potosí-La Isla provided rich 
information in regard to the history and structure of Jerusalén, and therefore seemed valuable for use 
in the research. In order to use them in a coherent way, the sampling needed to be carried out 
covering the whole area of Jerusalén. 
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Diana Turbay
La Paz
Danubio Azul
Juan José Rondón
Jerusalén
Bella Flor
Figure 2.5  Location of six case study settlements.
Source: Based on Decreto 200 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols added.
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 DESIGN AND PROBLEMS OF SAMPLING METHOD 
 
The sample size was statistically determined by the nature (level of homogeneity) of the 
study population and ideal levels of confidence and precision. Naturally, the larger the 
sample size, the more representative the sample, but for the purposes of the study the 
size of the survey had to be manageable. Information on the size of the study population 
is not indispensable, but a gauge for the level of homogeneity across key 
socio-economic variables determined according to the research aim. This is crucial, 
because it affects the sample size. Accurate information on the total population as well 
as on density and location of land occupation was not available for the case-study 
settlements. The principal sampling method was designed and applied in the pilot 
survey, which was conducted in Potosí-La Isla (a sector of the Barrio Jerusalén) in 
November 1999. The pilot survey proved instrumental in examining the level of 
homogeneity of the target population and brought to my attention many important 
factors that needed to be considered to shape the sampling method. Taking these aspects 
into consideration, I modified a few elements of the sampling method for application in 
the household survey in successive study settlements (Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La 
Paz).  
 
Size of sample 
When I conducted the pilot survey, a sample was compiled roughly, consisting of at 
least 100 households. In the course of compiling the sample for the pilot survey, the 
diversity of the population became apparent, and I subsequently added some more cases, 
expanding the final sample to approximately 150. 
 The target sample size between 100 and 150 can be explained according to the 
following exercise based on the preconditions I determined. 
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 I set the preconditions where: 
   the confidence level of the sample is equal to 95 per cent (that means the 
standard deviation is equal to 1.96); and 
 the level of precision is equal to 8 per cent. 
The level of precision was set at 8 per cent simply because of constraints of time and 
funding. 
For example, 
1. Starting with the presupposition that the population is fairly homogeneous, the 
maximum variance was approximated at between 20 and 80 per cent, giving 96 as 
the optimum sample size.  
( )( ) 968.02.0
08.0
96.1
2
2
==N
2. Starting with the presupposition that the population is fairly diverse, the maximum 
variance can be calculated at between 50 and 50 per cent, giving 150 as the optimum 
sample size. 
( ) 1505.0
08.0
96.1' 22
2
==N
I ultimately conducted between 103 and 167 household surveys in the settlements, 
depending on their level of homogeneity (calculated using a dummy variable for 
tenancy rate, as explained below). 
 
Gauging homogeneity and diversity 
The level of homogeneity (or diversity) of the study population was a central factor in 
defining the sample size. During the pilot survey, I sought to identify factors or 
variables that would make a difference in terms of interest in community participation. 
Had I not done so, I would have had to adopt sample sizes consistent with the maximum 
variance (50 per cent) for all the settlements, which was beyond my capacity. Since 
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selection of the study settlements was based on criteria that assumed a certain level of 
homogeneity in terms of socio-economic stratification, diversity of the population was 
difficult to detect by simply judging from physical characteristics (materials used for 
dwellings, etc.).  
 Many previous studies on irregular settlements had already demonstrated the 
reluctance of tenants to take part in community affairs (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 205). 
The ‘owner-occupant’ and ‘tenant’ classifications were therefore variables in residents’ 
attitudes toward collective action, although this point had been overlooked in the first 
stage of the fieldwork. My initial estimate prior to the pilot survey was that the 
proportion of tenants in relation to the total study would not be significant and that 
therefore the home-owner and tenant distinction need not be taken into account. 
However, the results of the pilot survey revealed that around 25 per cent of the 
households in the sample were tenants and that they were indifferent to community 
participation even though the needs they indicated were quite similar to those of home 
owners. I therefore made the proportion of tenants in the study population a determining 
factor in the homogeneity/diversity of the population. 
 
Method of selecting households  
Verifying the location of blocks  
First, I made a list of blocks according to the official map on the settlement published 
by the DAPD. This map and not the map published by the National Statistics 
Department (DANE) was used because the District map has more detailed information 
at the block level and is larger in scale, even though it is not at as up-to-date. Some of 
the blocks on the map no longer exist on site, however, so the information on the blocks 
and housing lots had to be adjusted according to the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, 
the District map was used as a basic reference throughout the field survey. As the 
geographical order of the location of each block does not coincide with the numerical 
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order, I selected the blocks at random from the numeric list. For the pilot survey, blocks 
were selected 1 for each 3, beginning with the number 2 (2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 and so 
on).  
 
Counting of households 
For each selected block, the total number of households was counted. Here, ‘household’ 
was defined according to the definition used by DANE in its census and household 
survey. I defined a ‘household’ as a unit of residents sharing the same kitchen and food, 
not limited to direct family ties. Therefore, when a landowner has a tenant in the same 
house, the latter is counted as a separate household. It proved necessary to count the 
households in order to apply the systematic sampling method (explained below), since 
the size of blocks was found to be too irregular to approximate a priori the average 
number of households per block. This decision was made after conducting the initial 
household count of 5 randomly selected blocks where the pre-test of the questionnaire 
design was applied for the purposes of the pilot study. 
 
Two-way systematic sampling 
Based on this list of blocks, households were then selected systematically. In the case of 
the pilot survey, I selected one out of every five households, beginning with a number 
selected randomly between one and five. The households had to be selected in advance 
in consecutive order. In the case of the pilot survey, the total number of blocks 
registered on the District map was 111. The average size of a block averaged out to 22 
household units, following a count of the first five blocks. However, as there were more 
blocks with fewer than 22 households, the total number of the sample fell under 100 
when I finished the selection of households according to the two-step systematic 
sampling method described above. The expansion of the sample size was conducted in 
such a way that the selection could be continued in a similarly systematic, two-step 
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fashion (selection of blocks and then households), beginning with the different number 
of blocks selected between 1 and 3. In the case of the pilot survey, households were 
selected from blocks with numbers of 1, 4, 7, and so on until a total sample of more 
than 150 was compiled, and this was redefined20 as the minimum sample size.  
 This sampling method took time, especially when the level of land occupation was 
low and the number of houses constructed varied block by block. Nevertheless, this 
method had some merits. First, once the selection of households to be interviewed had 
been made, interviewers could begin with any block according to their convenience. 
Second, this method provided the interviewer with easier access to the household to be 
interviewed, since the interviewer could visit the interviewee with advance knowledge 
of his/her identification (address and name of informant). Third, in case the selected 
household should be replaced due to rejection or the absence of the informant (a 
household would be replaced if the informant was absent for three visits on different 
days and times), the list of households based on the household count was useful for 
defining systematically the replacement household (usually, the replacement was the 
next household on the list).  
 
Shift to the cluster method  
I shifted the sampling method from a simple two-step systematic method to a two-step 
combined-with-cluster (landowner and tenant) method when I conducted the household 
survey in Danubio Azul.21 For Danubio Azul, a previous survey (a census taken in 1997 
                                                  
20 While the pilot survey was being carried out, I realised that Potosí la Isla had more diversity in 
terms of land occupation and consolidation than initially estimated, and this made it clear that the 
sample size needed to be expanded. 
21 I did not take into consideration the owner-occupant and tenant criterion in determining the level 
of homogeneity/diversity of the study population in the household survey for Bella Flor, but 
maintained the two-step simple method with maximum variance of 20 per cent. The proportion of 
tenants in Bella Flor was found to be insignificant, both from my general observations (the level of 
land occupation was 50 per cent or less, physical consolidation was much lower than in the case of 
Potosí-La Isla) and in a household count of selected blocks. According to the household count I 
conducted later, the proportion of tenants in the population was less than 10 per cent. This 
proportion was less than found in the main household survey, so I did not expand the sample. 
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by the community and an NGO) showed that the proportion of tenants was more than 
56 per cent of the total population. My approximation based on a household count of 
selected blocks (39 out of 118) was nearly 40 per cent. I therefore set the maximum 
variance in the formula for calculating the sampling size at 40 per cent, resulting in a 
minimum sample size of 145. In the same way, the minimum size of the sample for La 
Paz was set at 137 based on a maximum variance of 35 per cent. The two-step method 
combined with cluster was used for both the Danubio Azul and La Paz settlements. I 
conducted two different household counts; one for house owners and the other for 
tenants, and from each household list, households were selected both randomly and 
systematically with the same interval but with a different initial number. For the 
household surveys conducted in the other three settlements (Diana Turbay, Jerusalén, 
and Juan José Rondón), this two-step method combined with cluster was applied in the 
same manner. 
 Whether the combined with cluster method is more precise and reliable than the 
two-step simple systematic method should be questioned. Sometimes the information 
inhabitants provided about home ownership was not reliable, resulting in errors in 
household counts.22  
 
 
PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
As mentioned earlier, the main aims of conducting a questionnaire survey were 
threefold: to describe the socio-economic nature of the inhabitants, investigate the level 
of community participation in collective self-help actions and explore perspectives on 
the role of JACs and the institutional intervention of other social agencies from the 
                                                  
22 I discovered that owner occupants would often deny the presence of tenants in their dwellings, 
because they were not paying regular property taxes, and feared revealing information to the city 
authorities. A landowner would be required by law to pay property tax, but they were not paying it, 
because in many cases they lacked the land title deed. 
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viewpoint of the inhabitants. Given these aims, the content of the questionnaire focused 
on the following themes: 
1. Household structure, ownership of the housing lot; socio-economic characterization 
of the household heads and their partners (migrant experience, sociodemographic 
characterisation, education level, employment and income level) 
2. Physical condition of the house 
3. Provision of public services 
4. Needs suggested by the inhabitants 
5. Recognition and evaluation of institutional intervention 
6. Evaluation of the community actions and the role of JACs 
7. Self-evaluation of community participation of the inhabitants themselves 
8. Perspective on community participation 
 To measure levels of community participation I used specific criteria such as: 
attendance at routine meetings of community-based organisations (CBOs), participation 
in demonstrations or protests, participation in communal work, knowledge of 
community leaders and community activities, affiliation with subgroups involved with 
community activities, and an individual’s appraisal of his/her level of motivation for 
participation in community action.  
 The household survey was conducted by way of direct interviews at doorsteps or 
inside homes. The questionnaire was filled in by the interviewer (either myself or a 
hired interviewer) during the interview. Two assistant supervisors and I supervised the 
survey on site. After returning from the field each time, we organised the collected data 
and reviewed it critically. When errors or missing values were found, they had to be 
dealt with as soon as possible either by a second visit or by a telephone call, if such was 
available. After all these screening processes, the open answers were codified into 
groups in order of ascending frequency.  
 The pilot survey revealed some problems with the questionnaire. First, I realised that 
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some of the references to community-based organisations (CBOs) and activities were 
too specific and not relevant. The questions on knowledge, attendance at meetings, and 
affiliation with community-based organisations were modified to refer to broader 
categories of community-based organisations. Second, the question ‘Why did people 
not participate in community action?’ had been repeated several times, which was 
confusing and annoying to interviewees. The duplication was removed and the question 
repositioned toward the end of the questions about performance and opinions about 
community participation (see Appendix C for the final version of questionnaire).  
 In general, I had to admit that there were limitations to the effectiveness of the 
quantitative method in measuring levels of community participation, and this problem 
could not be resolved by modification of the questionnaire. The questionnaire strategy, 
from the outset, is limited to measuring only levels that can be evaluated quantitatively. 
In the questionnaire, I included quantifiers, like frequency of meeting attendance and 
records of various categories of community action. The judgement of the informant in 
answering these questions could sometimes be influenced by the options given in the 
questionnaire. Secondly, the meaning of ‘community participation’ is ambiguous and 
interpretations varied; the feasibility of evaluating this concept properly via 
questionnaire proved limited. Some informants could not understand the concept, even 
though they had participated in some of the community actions listed on the 
questionnaire. Interpretations varied from one informant to another. People used various 
terms—comunidad (community), entre ellos mismos (among themselves [community 
leaders]), nosotros mismos (among ourselves), entre vecinos (among we 
neighbours)—in referring to the actors that took the initiative in carrying out what we 
called ‘community-based action’. In actual practice and in interpreting the questionnaire, 
I took the words expressed by the people at face value. The only thing that seemed to be 
clear was that the people distinguished clearly between ‘the JAC leaders’ and ‘we 
neighbours ourselves’ or ‘we the community’ (el resto, o los habitantes en general). 
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Basically, the questionnaire was designed to collect information about the 
‘performance’ of residents vis-à-vis community-based actions (attendance at meetings, 
demonstrations, ‘civil strikes’, communal work, etc.). Statistical data obtained through 
the questionnaire was poor in the ‘numeric’ sense. Even though the style of the 
questions was designed to be open to multiple answers, in the brief span of the 
interview it was difficult to expect the informant to accurately recall the various 
incidents in the settlement and his actions or reactions to them. In addition, the attempt 
to determine the degree of ‘participation’ through questions about the degree of 
commitment to various community actions—meetings, protests, and the like—was 
questionable. We wrote down what people said they had done, but it did not clearly 
demonstrate their level of motivation or initiative in any instance. 
 Another limitation found in the questionnaire survey related to data collection on the 
activities of ‘other types of CBOs, except for JACs’ and the inhabitants’ participation in 
those activities. The questionnaire survey failed to capture much information on this 
matter. The main reason was that these organisations did not have any formalities 
required for confirmation of membership as in the case of JACs. Community-based 
activities organised beyond the level of the settlement (i.e., cross-settlement 
community-based activities coordinated over a wider area, for example, by Catholic 
priests), were not detected sufficiently either, since the geographical reference was 
limited to the study settlement. Most of the informants did not distinguish conceptually 
between NGOs and other institutions like foundations or religious organisations. Even 
though they did recognise the presence of these NGOs, sometimes they did not consider 
their function to be a part of community-based activities. This point was not captured by 
the questionnaire. 
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QUALITATIVE METHODS (SEMI-STRUCTURED AND NON-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS) 
 
The qualitative analysis was based on various research methods. My first and major 
strategy was the conducting of in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with selected 
inhabitants who had already cooperated with the household survey. These interviews 
aimed to gather more detailed information on their past and present commitment to and 
perspective on community participation as well as their evaluation of the involvement 
of outside institutions regarding service delivery and other community-based projects. 
Interviewees were selected from among owner-occupants who had a basic knowledge 
of community activities and leaders, independent of their level of community 
participation as indicated in the survey. Tenant inhabitants who had a relatively detailed 
knowledge of current community activities were also interviewed. On average, 9 to 10 
people per settlement were interviewed for this purpose (see Appendix B.2 for a list of 
interviewees). 
 Second, in-depth interviews (open or focused on specific topics) were conducted 
with community leaders, local politicians interested in or already intervening in the 
studied settlements, officers or technical staff of the public service agencies and other 
district administration agencies relevant to the studied settlements, as well as 
representatives of NGOs, the Catholic Church, religious groups, etc.  
 Third, observations of events or key scenarios closely connected with 
inter-institutional relations between the community, CBOs, local governments or local 
public agencies, NGOs, and politicians were recorded.  
 The in-depth interviews were utilised, partly for fact-finding but mainly for 
qualitative analysis regarding the interviewees’ perspectives on community 
participation and institutional intervention that could not be learned from the survey. 
The content of the in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants was analysed with 
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particular reference to the following points. 
Focus 1: new incidents, new interpretations of institutional intervention, performance in 
community actions, relation of such actions to the community and the District 
authorities. 
Focus 2: interviewees’ perspective on community participation; and on institutional 
(state, politician-led, NGO) intervention. 
Focus 3: interviewees’ evaluation of the leadership of the community based on their 
identification of community leaders including, or by, their personal traits.  
Focus 4: Recognition of intervention of other agencies, not reflected in the household 
survey. 
From the testimony received about the attitudes of each leader, I sought to analyse 
his/her political aspirations, capacity to influence/manipulate people in the community, 
and strategy for utilising both political power and pressure in order to improve living 
conditions in the settlement. 
 In order to measure the relationship between households, the state, and other social 
institutions, I considered who took the initiative, who took responsibility, how roles 
were demarcated in the execution process, and who was in charge of maintenance 
afterwards. In order to investigate the real level of ‘participation’ of inhabitants in any 
so-called community-based project (proyecto con participación comunitaria), I asked 
about the involvement of the community in the following processes: negotiation, 
decision-making, execution, feedback, and maintenance and/or monitoring. 
 The interviewees for the semi-structured in-depth interviews for each settlement 
were selected from the sample used for the household survey.23 The following selection 
criteria were applied: 1) a fairly long period of residence in the settlement (the period of 
reference is 10 years for an owner-occupant and 2 years for a tenant); and 2) 
                                                  
23 The number of interviewees for Jerusalén is twice that of others, since it includes the cases 
conducted in the sample of the pilot survey in Potosí-La Isla. As the content of the interviews was 
judged relevant, I decided to use it as material for qualitative analysis. 
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accessibility and availability of time to receive the interviewer. In addition, the 
geographical distance between the interviewees was a concern in order to make the 
selection of the cases representative of the study settlement and avoid a concentration of 
interviews in one or two sections of the settlement. Most of the case settlements have 
more than 1 sector, so I tried to select equal numbers of interviewees from different 
sectors. Both the household head and his/her partner were requested to attend the 
interview where possible.  
 Appendix D lists the questions introduced in the semi-structured interview. The 
questions were not always asked in the same order during the interview. The purpose of 
the interviews was not to analyse the discourse or contents but to reveal information and 
insights associated with the testimony received.  
Many questions included in the interviews were only asked in order to confirm or 
expand the content of the household survey. So, in the first instance, the in-depth 
interviews were used to obtain information which could not be elicited in the household 
survey due to the limitations of its format. For example, questions such as (0): about the 
history of migrant movement; (1) the process of moving into the settlement; (2) the 
process of dwelling construction by the self-help method were helpful in gathering more 
evidence regarding how people had moved into the settlement and how they had 
fostered solidarity in the initial stages of community participation. These would create 
the history of the settlement, clarifying the origins of the urbanisation, the process of 
land occupation and the agencies involved in the process (pirate developer, intermediary, 
political intervention, etc.).  
 The second and main aim of the interviews was to explore the facts not revealed or 
sufficiently explained in the household survey. These concerned institutional 
intervention other than that of the JACs; the inter-institutional relations involved in the 
regularisation process of the settlement from the viewpoint of the inhabitants and their 
own interpretation of community participation. Questions such as (3) to (6), and (9) and 
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(10) were helpful in achieving this purpose. Some sought to clarify the initiative of the 
community in negotiations with the District authorities and the others were intended to 
explore other types of intervention such as that by politicians and NGOs. After 
reviewing the results of the household survey I added Questions (7) and (8) which were 
new topics that now appeared relevant. Questions (12) and (13) aimed to reinterpret the 
concept of inhabitant participation and ‘empowerment of the community’. Through 
these questions I discovered that some of the concepts in the household survey were 
sometimes open to misinterpretation.  
Some interviews were interesting, providing a great deal of valuable and relevant 
information to supplement that obtained in the survey. Others, however, revealed very 
little, eliciting nothing but ambiguities. I conducted ten interviews per study settlement 
on average, in which rarely more than three or four at the maximum were really useful 
to the analysis. Interviews with tenants were generally poorer in information about 
incidents as well as community actions compared with those of owner-occupants. The 
duration of the interviews varied considerably. Those with tenants were normally 
finished after around 30 minitues, while those with owner-occupants lasted from one to 
three hours, with 90 minutes being the average.  
 I faced two main problems in conducting the in-depth interviews: reliability of the 
information and confusion over concepts. First of all, it became clear that some of the 
facts provided by the interviewees were not necessarily correct. The gap between what 
the interviewees said and the truth was the result of both poor recollections of the events 
concerned and of a deliberate intention to mislead. Indeed, the facts narrated in the 
in-depth interviews were not always coherent and sometimes did not even correspond to 
participants’ original answers in the household survey. Some of the mistakes in the facts 
given by the informants could be corrected by crosschecking with other sources of 
information (for example, the year of the first election of JAC leaders). I discovered that 
some informants would deliberately give fictitious information in order to hide his/her 
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own opinion or role or would pretend not to have been involved in a particular activity 
for personal reasons. However, in some cases, I received more than two different 
versions of a story about one incident that occurred in the study settlement and I could 
not find any reliable evidence to support either of them. The reliability of the 
information provided by my informants, therefore, was sometimes questionable. 
However, this did not mean that the content (facts) recorded in the in-depth interviews 
was not relevant. This fictionalised history shows the inhabitants’attitudes toward the 
issues of community participation, which were an important part of the interview 
questions. 
 The second problem concerned the conceptual confusion between what I meant as 
interviewer and how the interviewee perceived what I said. I had not intended to carry 
out any sort of discourse analysis on the concepts used by the inhabitants. However, in 
trying to explore the inhabitants’ views about community participation and institutional 
intervention I found I had to analyse their own interpretations of the key concepts of my 
main interest. I paid special attention to such concepts as, ‘participation’, ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘empowerment’ (which in Spanish was expressed as ‘expansion of the space of 
negotiation in favour of the community’). During the interviews, I realised that what I 
meant by these concepts as an interviewer was taken in different ways by the 
interviewees. I learned that, although the answer in a literal sense was the same, the 
inhabitants’ real actions were sometimes different. However, my recognition of this gap 
between the expression (conceptual interpretation) and their actions in practice was 
useful in improving the qualitative analysis of the content of the in-depth interviews 
(see chapter 6 for details). 
 Another set of semi-structured interviews was carried out with public officials or 
personnel in certain institutions. They were identified as ‘involved institutions’ either in 
the survey or in the interviews with the households (see Appendices B for further 
details). There were two main objectives in holding these interviews. First, the facts or 
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incidents registered in these interviews served as a counterweight to the findings of the 
household interviews, by either supporting them or raising further questions. Second, 
they helped to explore perspectives on community-based development schemes for 
low-income settlements from the viewpoint of outside institutions.  
 Key personalities—either politicians or councillors who had gained political 
influence in the area of informal settlements—were interviewed in order to understand 
their past and current involvement in the physical and social development of these 
settlements. Some of the community-based activities that were carried out by 
subdivisions of political parties were also investigated in order to gather relevant 
information concerning the commitment of political parties to the social development of 
self-help settlements.  
 
 
ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE FIELDWORK 
 
Positionality in development research 
The motivation which led me to focus on community participation at barrio level 
derived from my previous experience of studying urban poverty when I was working as 
a researcher for a state-funded development research institution in Japan, called IDE 
(Institute of Developing Economies). The dominant ethos at the Institute was that 
development research should explore the nature of important socio-economic and 
political problems in developing countries, such as inequality, injustice, corruption and 
social conflict, with the aim of identifying solutions. I have great sympathy with the 
belief that development research should provide the public and the relevant policy 
making agencies with‘correct’ information, empirically analysed in order to solve social 
problems. In addition I believe that one of the principal roles of an academic from the 
North is to use their empirical research to provide appropriate resources not only to the 
policy makers of the North but also to those of the Southern countries which are the 
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subject of the research. In order to gather adequate information about the problems 
within particular local contexts, both a macro-and a micro-level approach are required. 
 
The importance of considering local opinions 
I came to place more emphasis on the importance of including local people’s 
perspectives in my study when I recognised that state officials and local people 
interpreted the concept of community participation in very different ways (as mentioned 
on page 110). This was the direct reason for my emphasis on the local perspective. 
However, in addition, the emphasis placed by several authors on the importance of 
considering local views in development research also encouraged me to include local 
people’s narratives in my analysis.  
Chambers’ (1997, 2002) argument that we should recognise local people’s capacity 
to appraise their own needs gave me the initial impetus to examine the real practices of 
community participation in development projects. Turner’s affirmation of people’s 
alternative solutions through ‘self-help housing’ and ‘vernacular’ technology was 
fundamental for me to understand the collective self-help struggle of the barrio people 
in the initial stage of occupation (Turner, 1976; Turner, John F. C. and Robert Fichter, 
1972). From Sen (1987, 1992, 2002) I learned how important it was to focus on the 
priorities of local people and to comprehend their understanding of rationality.24  
Critiques of conventional development theory written by various Japanese scholars’ 
also led me to rethink the so-called mainstream arguments on development. Tsurumi’s 
(1979) critique of modernisation theory led her to create an alternative theory, 
‘endogenous development’. This theory highlights the capacity of local people to create 
their own process of development based on their cultural and traditional values. Murai’s 
work on ‘alternatives from local people’ (1982) criticised the way in which 
market-driven economic development in the South failed to consider the ecological and 
                                                  
24 Kaufman ed. (2006) includes useful arguments and a critical review of Sen’s capability theory. 
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cultural elements of local society. These arguments stimulated me to approach the issue 
of urban poverty by embracing the differing perspectives of the local people.  
The importance of including the local perspectives of ordinary people in development 
analysis is also suggested by development ethics theorists (see Clark, 2002: 834, for 
example). The most significant insight I gained from my reading of these theorists 
(Clark, 2002; Gasper, 2004; Crocker, 1991; Goulet, 1983, 1995) was that we should try 
to be free from the ‘given’ understanding of the mainstream concept of development 
issues (that is the ‘given meaning of community participation in this case) and 
re-consider its meaning once applied in the determined locale within its particular 
context.  
These were the key points which were central to my research and formed the 
background to myapproach to the local people and their daily practices. 
 
My position as an ‘outsider’ and its limitations 
In the field I tried to make myself as ‘neutral’ as possible. Here, being neutral means 
keeping a distance from any political groups in the community and from any external 
agencies committed to the community. On my first contact with any local people, I 
clarified my personal position as an individual doing PhD research without any 
intention to execute any concrete aid projects. This clarification was crucial in avoiding 
misunderstanding or confusion among the local people. 
Sometimes the local people were mistrustful of my presence as a stranger, but after 
clarifying my position they normally understood and opened the door. Most of the 
people I interviewed did not have any problems or reject me after this declaration.  
  Despite trying to be ‘neutral’ in the field, I felt that my presence as a stranger and 
foreign researcher had an effect on the respondents. Some were reluctant to openly 
discuss their personal experiences, although whether they would have been more open 
with Colombian interviewers of a different social class is not entirely clear. Their 
attitudes to me were slightly different from those towards local people, including my 
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assistants. However, after several visits, when the same respondents gained more 
confidence in their relationship with me, they became less reserved and gave more 
detailed information. Some spoke openly about private issues from the beginning, 
presumably believing that it would not matter if I knew of their personal problems or 
sensitive issues relevant to local society, because after all I was a stranger and would 
soon be gone. Others, who wanted to ‘sell’ their poverty to promote the international aid 
they believed was coming, deliberately exaggerated their ‘poor’ situation. Some of 
these people, who clearly associated my presence with a Japanese aid organisation, 
asked me to let them have some of my personal contacts. On these occasions, I 
reiterated my current position as a researcher and PhD. student, and explained that the 
result of the study would be used to finish my dissertation. I was absolutely clear that I 
should not be able to offer any aid concrete projects, nor try to influence policy makers 
in my country. 
Clearly then, my presence as an outsider would always affect the attitude of the local 
people to a greater or lesser extent. There was no perfect guarantee of the reliability of 
the data in the narratives, although gaining the confidence of the interviewees was 
essential to improving the quality of the data as much as its reliability. Building a 
rapport with the interviewees during the interviews was indispensable in allowing me to 
ask for a repeat visit if necessary. 
Although it was not my intention, local people’s perception of my presence 
inevitably led to me being identified as in someway related to certain groups or factions 
in the settlements. I sometimes had difficulty in approaching community leaders who 
belonged to rival factions. Some community leaders were open-minded, but others were 
quite sceptical and reserved. Some of the community leaders were not willing to be 
interviewed. In the worst case, an interview was rejected. This occurred partly because, 
although I identified myself as being in a neutral position, I was thought to be a 
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sympathiser or supporter of another group hostile to the person I sought to interview.25 
This experience brought home to me the argument that ‘value free’ research is almost 
impossible (Gold, 2002: 224). Although I identified myself as belonging to ‘nowhere’, I 
did not feel wholy free from my own value judgements, when I came across ‘unjust’ 
incidents or conflicts between X and Y sects in the community.  
With respect to the household survey, only one or two households refused to answer 
in each settlement. The rate of rejection by households selected for in-depth structured 
interviews was negligible.  
 
Confidentiality of the data collected 
I told each interviewee that the household questionnaire was for statistical use and the 
individual information was confidential. Informants’ names and addresses were filled in 
on the questionnaire only in order to identify the household when the case was selected 
for the further in-depth interview. This identification was useful when we had to come 
back to the same household to correct the information given in the first visit. 
In-depth interviews were only recorded if the interviewee gave permission. 
Recording was suspended when requested.but I was always permitted to take notes.  
If I needed to quote the contents of interviews with the staff of public institutions, I 
only identified the interviewee by their position within the institution if the quotation 
referred to public information. I did not identify anyone who was giving a personal 
opinion. In the case of interviewes with the inhabitants of case study settlements, the 
interviewees’ names were changed or reduced to Christian names to protect privacy. I 
also took photographs of the interviewees of local communities whenever I was 
permitted in order to remember the atmosphere of the interview. A copy of the 
photographs was offered to the interviewee and it was always received with pleasure. I 
                                                  
25 I was unable to conduct an interview with one of the ex-community leaders of Potosí-La Isla, 
because I had been given a reference to her from the leader of another group, through whom I had 
first contacted the community, but the two groups were rivals and had had a conflictive relationship 
for years. 
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did not use these photographs as materials for the thesis, simply because I did not intend 
to do that, nor did I ask for permission to use them. 
In the narratives of the interviews I found many details which were too sensitive to be 
repeated such as those regarding to sexual abuse, crimes and acts committed by leftist 
guerrilla groups. These data were restricted in order to protect the personal security of 
the interviewees. Issues concerning internal community conflicts which were officially 
documented in the barrio files of the DAAC as legal suits and well known publicly are 
described in the text of the thesis.  
 
My contribution to the communities and feedback from them 
  After finishing the first data analysis of the household survey, I made a brief 
summary of the data collected and gave a couple of copies to selected leaders in each 
settlement with whom I had established a special rapport. I had also a group discussion 
with some of the community leaders at one of the settlements after I conducted the 
household survey and they gave me some useful feedback. Unfortunately I could not 
arrange the same group discussion with other settlements, due to the difficulty of 
arranging a mutually convenient time with the leaders. The reaction and interest of the 
community leaders varied, as the nature of leadership and the level of academic 
comprehension of my research was different. Some leaders consulted my document 
carefully and discussed it with other JAC colleagues in order to think about further 
strategies for community activities. Others just gave the document to one of the NGO 
activists involved in the settlements as a reference resource.  
Whilst I have attempted to make the findings useful to the local people, I nonetheless 
have limited control over the readership of the results. Because of this, Brydon (2006, 
27) highlights the importance of keeping fieldwork results and similar documents 
anonymous, particularly when a researcher resorts to participatory research. However, 
this presents a dilemma if we return to the debate about ethics. Strict anonymity maybe 
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fair when the documented incidents might harm somebody. On the other hand, if the 
local people expect a concrete contribution in terms of returning systematised local 
knowledge and a history of the barrio , (and I do hope to respond to this request), 
identification of the barrio gives the document more legitimacy for them. I sympathise 
with Cloke et al.(2000), when they argue that it is necessary to disseminate the findings 
in a way which has more of an impact in favour of those local people who were 
involved in the research. As such, I included the real name of the barrios I studied and 
also used the real names of the local politicians who were publicly identified in the city 
administration. My decision to use real names in the thesis was intended to demonstrate 
the authenticity of the findings, although when, occasionally, there were any 
confidentiality issues I did not use real names. 
My aim in this thesis was to use a holistic method to understand the nature of 
state-community relationships from the point of view of the local people. The 
combination of a household survey and in-depth interviews was critical in this regard. 
While certain ethical and positionality issues arose as a result of following this approach, 
I tried always to respond to these issues in a sensitive way.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EXPANSION OF IRREGULAR SETTELEMENT AND THE 
URBAN MANAGEMENT IN BOGOTÁ TO THE 1980s 
 
After 1950, Bogotá’s population growth accelerated and housing became more socially 
segregated. The poor became more concentrated in irregular settlements located in the 
south and southwest. These settlements have presented special challenges for the city’s 
administration ever since. This chapter will present an overview of the expansion of 
irregular settlement, comparing the process in Bogotá with that in other major Latin 
American cities. It will show the relationship between the market, the city authorities 
and the community in Bogotá up to the end of the 1980s and consider why the poor 
settled on land which was sold through illegal methods. The discussion then describes 
the way the authorities sought first to control and later to integrate these settlements into 
the formal structure of the city. Finally, it considers the reactions of the residents—seen 
through community-based organisations—to the city’s integration efforts.  
 
 
BOGOTÁ’S ROLE AS THE CAPITAL CITY 
 
During the colonial period Bogotá developed as a trading centre for gold and silver, 
although not located near a mining area. After independence from Spain, it became the 
capital city, with the principal institutions of the national government of Colombia 
gathered there. Bogotá continued to serve as the centre of administration and commerce, 
while Medellín, currently the second-largest city, developed as the country’s industrial 
centre (Mejía, 1999; Vargas and Zambrano, 1988). 
Colombia never had the acute primacy which was characteristic of most Latin 
American countries. Colombia has long had a relatively balanced urban population 
distribution compared with countries where much of the urban population is 
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concentrated in the capital city, such as Santiago, Buenos Aires and Mexico City. As 
Gilbert (1975: 245) notes: 
[I]n 1973, [the] Colombian city system was close to the ‘ideal’ distribution whereby 
the largest city was approximately twice the size of the second city, three times the 
size of the third and n times the size of the nth largest city. Colombia today has four 
major cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and Bogotá’s index of urban 
primacy (population of the first city / the sum of population of the following three 
cities in terms of population size) has been until recently the lowest in the region. 
Data estimates for1990 show that the primacy index of Bogotá was 1.2. This 
compares with a primacy index of 3.5 for Buenos Aires, 2.9 for Santiago, 2.0 for 
Mexico City and 4.2 for Lima (Villa and Rodríguez, 1996). 
 Although the urban system in Colombia remained relatively balanced, concentration 
of population in Bogotá has intensified since the 1950s due to the increase of 
rural-urban migration (Camacho de Pinto, 1970; Cardona, 1976; Rodríguez, 1967). 
Bogotá’s population growth began to accelerate in the late 1930s and by 1973 its share 
of the total population had risen to 12.5 per cent. By then, the annual population growth 
rate of Bogotá was more than twice that of the national population (see Table 3.1).  
   
      Table 3.1 Population of Colombia, urban area and Bogotá (1938-2005) 
Colombia as whole Urban area Bogotá D.C.  
 
 
Year 
Population 
(thousands) 
(a) 
Annual 
growth 
(%) 
Population 
(thousands)
(b) 
Share 
(b)/(a)(%)
(urban- 
isation 
ratio) 
Population 
(thousands) 
(b) 
Share (b)/(a) 
(%) 
Annual growth 
(%) 
1938 8,555 - 2,643 30.8 332 3.9 - 
1951 11,229 2.1 4,446 39.6 715 6.4 6.1 
1964 17,485 3.4 9,092 52.0 1,697 9.7 6.9 
1973 22,862 2.7 13,548 59.2 2,861 12.5 4.5 
1985 30,062 2.3 19,628 65.3 4,236 14.1 3.3 
1993 37,635 2.8 25,848 68.6 5,484 14.6 3.3 
2005 42,090 0.9 31,566 75.0 6,778 16.1 1.6 
Source: DANE, Censo nacional de población, Bogotá, 1964, 1973, 1985 and 1993.  
Data from 1973 to 2005 were taken from the table uploaded onto the DANE web page as adjusted data 
after analysis of the latest census in 2005 (http://www.dane.gov.co/, accessed 29 November 2006.)  
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Since the 1970s the metropolitanisation of Bogotá in terms of the population increase of 
the surrounding municipalities in Cundinamarca department has become evident.1 Table 
3.2 illustrates this phenomenon. The annual growth ratio of the population of the 
municipalities inside the Bogotá metropolitan area became remarkably higher than that 
of Bogotá since the period of the census between 1985 and 1993. This suggests that the 
space for urban development within Bogotá District is almost exhausted and the march 
of urbanisation is now heading towards the surrounding municipalities (see also Misión 
XXI, 1995). 
 
Table 3.2 Population and annual growth ratio of Bogotá metropolitan area 
Population  (thousands) Annual growth ratio (%)  
 
Year 
 
Bogotá 
D.C.(1) 
Municipalities of 
Cundinamarca in  
the metropolitan 
area(2)  
 
Metropolitan 
area as whole
 
Bogotá 
D.C.(1) 
Municipalities of 
Cundimarca in 
the metropolitan 
area(2)  
 
Metropolitan 
area as 
whole 
1951 715 112 827 - - - 
1964 1,697 174 1,871 6.9 3.4 6.5 
1973 2,530 232 2,762 4.5 3.3 4.4 
1985 3,548 366 3,914 2.8 2.4 2.9 
1993 4,945 636 5,581 4.2 7.1 4.5 
2005 6,776 1,088 7,864 2.4 4.3 2.7 
  Source: DANE, ‘Datos de censos de población y estudios temáticos’, 2006, mimeo.   
  (1) The population data for Bogotá D.C. are different from those in Table 3.1, as the data are taken 
from different DANE sources. 
(2) These municipalities are Bojacá, Cajicá, Chía, Cota, Facatativa, Funza, Gachancipá, La Calera, 
Madrid, Mosquera, Sibaté, Soacha, Sopó, Tabio, Tenjo, Tocancipá and Zipaquirá. 
   
Medellín and Cali had rivalled Bogotá as major metropolitan centres throughout most of 
Colombia’s history, but by the end of the 1950s, Bogotá was generating more 
manufacturing jobs than any other city (Gilbert, 1996). As the nation’s capital, it has 
attracted a growing influx of people from all over the country. 
                                                  
1 The residential area stretches continuously between Bogotá District and some of the neighbouring 
municipalities of Cundinamarca Department (state). The settlement of ‘Altos de Cazuca’ is a typical 
example of this phenomenon. The settlement extends seamlessly over the technical boundary 
between Ciudad Bolívar locality and Soacha municipality. Gilbert (1996) includes Soacha 
municipality as part of Bogotá’s population from 1964. 
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 Bogotá’s population growth has been closely related to the capital’s increasing 
importance as the economic centre of the country. The high ratio of population growth 
in the period 1951 to 1964 was partly attributable to the influx of migrants fleeing 
violence in neighbouring provinces (1948-1958). However, the main reason for 
population growth in this period was that labour migration toward the capital city was 
encouraged by the policies of the national government. These policies were aimed at 
stimulating industrialisation, thereby promoting the development of urban areas. In 
1954, Bogotá became a Special District and gained juridical autonomy under Decree 17, 
privileging it politically and administratively. Bogotá became a separate electoral area, 
sending its own representatives to the national Congress. It became administratively 
autonomous from the Department of Cundinamarca and obtained more control over its 
own budget (Gilbert, 1996: 262). The basic structure of city administration, including 
the establishment of the major public service companies, was created in this period. 
This did not change substantially until the end of the1980s, that is, until the institutional 
reforms accompanying promulgation of the New Constitution in 1991. These factors 
helped the city to develop as a centre of manufacturing and other economic activity. Its 
share of the gross national product rose from 6.3 per cent in 1938 to 32.3 per cent in 
1988 (Cuervo, 1991). Its share of employment in the nation’s manufacturing sector also 
grew from 16.8 per cent in 1945 to 32.3 per cent in 1988 (DANE, 1989), making it not 
only an administrative and commercial pivot but an industrial centre as well. Bogotá 
became increasingly dominant among the country’s industrial cities (including Medellín 
and Cali) both in terms of population and economic output, especially after 1964 
(Gilbert, 1975; Jaramillo and Cuervo, 1987; Cuervo and González, 1997). 
 Like any political and administrative centre experiencing rapid industrial 
development, Bogotá became the target of in-migration, which fed the increased 
demand for labour. For example, McGreevey (1974: 394) points out, ‘About 65 per cent 
of the growth of the four largest cities is explained by the net inflow of migrants in the 
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1938-1951 period. The percentage of migrants in total growth was even higher (67 per 
cent) in the succeeding intercensal period, 1951-1964.’ In fact, in the case of Bogotá, the 
population increased from 638,562 in 1951 to 1,661,562 in 1964. Of those 1,023,000 
new habitants, 724,526 were categorised as net migration. Thus, 70.8 per cent of the 
increase was a social increase as a result of migration and the remaining 29.2 per cent 
was as a result of natural increase (McGreevey, 1974: 403, Table 7). 
 Changes taking place in Colombia’s manufacturing structure in this period favoured 
the city’s growth. New industries such as metal manufacturing, machines, and electrical 
appliances required complex equipment and advanced technology, which were easier to 
come by in the bigger cities, handicapping the smaller cities. Gilbert (1975: 251-52) 
points out that most of the country’s largest and most efficient companies were located 
in the major industrial centres and that the environment of larger cities served to nurture 
the proliferation of entrepreneurial talent.  
 By 1964, Bogotá had the highest per capita income of any city in the country. With 
the concentration of government agencies in Bogotá and the gradual expansion of the 
central government bureaucracy, major companies began to transfer their headquarters 
to the city. This move enabled them to reduce the administrative costs associated with 
commuting between a local city and Bogotá (Gilbert, 1975: 253). In short, access to the 
government was a major factor explaining the growth of Bogotá. In addition, Bogotá 
had its own attraction as a cosmopolitan and metropolitan centre for entrepreneurs from 
other parts of the country.   
 
 
URBAN STRUCTURE 
 
Founded by the Spanish in 1538, Bogotá’s urban design was similar to that of other 
Spanish American cities. The Spanish Viceroyalty instructed that cities be built 
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according to a rectangular grid pattern of streets with the principal plaza in the centre 
(Mohan 1994). Bogotá grew slowly during the colonial period, and accelerated little 
following independence in 1810. More rapid expansion only took place toward the end 
of the nineteenth century.  
During the twentieth century, urban expansion occurred along a north–south axis, 
parallel to the mountains, but was still based on the original grid pattern (Vargas and 
Zambrano 1988; Violich 1987). The urban area grew more rapidly; in 1900, the city 
occupied 909 hectares, by 1938, 2,514 hectares (Niño 1996). Table 3.3 shows the 
increase of Bogotá’s population, urban area and density during the 20th century. 
Between 1938 and 1985 Bogotá’s urban area increased significantly, expanding to over 
32,000 hectares.2  
 
Table 3.3 Population density and growth of urban area 
Year Population(000s) Area (hectares) Density 
1900 100 909 110 
1928 235 1,958 120 
1938 330 2,514 131 
1964 1,730 14,615 118 
1985 4,177 32,866 127 
1991 4,960 30,300 164 
2005* n.a. 30,736 n.a. 
Source: Gilbert, 1996: 96, Table 4.12. Data on urban area for 2005 is taken from Bogotá City 
website (http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/, accessed 31 May 2006). 
  
 The physical characteristics of Bogotá’s urban growth also changed. Until the 1970s 
the city had expanded largely in a north-south direction. From around that time, the 
newly developed areas began expanding westward and the regular grid pattern of streets 
was not propagated. Moreover, residential stratification by income level became 
                                                  
2 The reason why the urban area reduced from 1985 to 1991 is not known. Probably the different 
methodology was used.   
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entrenched during this period (Mohan, 1994). Gilbert and Ward (1982: 103) described 
this phenomenon as follows: 
The poor live mainly in the south and north-west, the rich in the north, with 
middle-income groups living in between. Needless to say, the affluent suburbs are 
well planned, with green zones, good services, wide, paved roads and street lighting. 
The low-income barrios are poorly serviced and are located closest to the centres of 
pollution, flooding and heavy traffic. There is also an important difference with 
respect to their legal position. The upper-and middle-income sectors live in 
architect-designed houses located in fully serviced urbanized areas which comply 
with the city’s planning regulations. Most of the poor live in settlements which fail 
to satisfy the planning regulations and are therefore technically illegal.  
Bogotá’s urban and industrial growth after the 1950s, in short, was accompanied by the 
establishment of an unequal society. Its physical expansion, moreover, was marked by 
clear residential segregation by income level (Amato, 1969). Those who could not 
afford even the low-income sector residential area had no choice but to settle on 
unserviced land, which led to the expansion of the irregular settlements. 
 
 
INEQUALITY AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
 
Although Bogotá became Colombia’s richest city, it continued to suffer, like most Latin 
American cities, from unemployment, poverty, poor quality housing and inequality. 
Table 3.3 shows that Bogotá has scored over 80 in both the quality of life and human 
development indices since the late 1990s. These data mean that Bogotá has a high level 
of human development, according to the UNDP’s classification.3 However, during the 
                                                  
3 According to the worldwide ranking by Human Development Index (HDI) in 2003, those countries 
with HDI upper than 80.0 are ranked in the first 57 countries over 177. The average HDI for the 
countries which are classified as ‘high human development’ is 89.5 while the same figure for those 
classified as ‘medium human development’ is 71.8. Compared with these data, the score of Bogotá 
in 2003 is judged as high human development (http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators, accessed 
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same period, over 40 per cent of the population were living in poverty. In 2003, 48.1 per 
cent of the total population of Bogotá was classified as living below the poverty line, 
and 14.6 per cent as living ‘in misery’ (DANE household survey, as registered at 
http://endatos.redbogota.com, accessed 28 December 2005). Approximately one million 
habitants were living in misery, of which 60 per cent were concentrated in the south of 
the city (Bogotá cómo vamos and PNDH, 2005). In 1985, the poorest 20 per cent of the 
population received only 4 per cent of the city’s income, while the top 10 per cent of the 
population received 37 per cent (López, 1990a: 41). Similar figures are not available for 
more recent years but the Gini coefficient can provide useful indications. The Gini 
coefficient for Bogotá has been above 0.5 since 1997 and was 0.56 in 2003 and 0.55 in 
2004 (http://endatos.redbogota.com/, accessed 28 December 2005) (Table 3.3). These 
figures suggest that Bogotá has been a very unequal society since 1997 and is becoming 
more so.   
  
    Table 3.4 Quality of life and poverty indices in Bogotá, 1996-2004 
Year 
Quality of 
life index 
Index of human 
development 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Percentage of 
population below 
poverty line 
1996 n.a. 83.6 n.a. n.a. 
1997 86.50 82.8 50.0 40.5 
1998 87.71 82.6 55.0 47.3 
1999 86.57 81.1 55.3 48.7 
2000 86.89 81.3 56.7 53.7 
2001 n.a. 81.7 55.5 54.6 
2002 88.69 81.4 59.3 50.9 
2003 88.43 82.5 56.0 48.1 
2004 89.57 83.3 55.3 43.4 
Source: Bogotá cómo vamos and PNDH (2005), taken from Gilbert (2006). 
 
 The limited labour opportunities in the formal sector affected the lives of huge numbers 
                                                                                                                                                  
30 May, 2006). 
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of urban poor and exacerbated the acute inequality between different strata of society. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, manufacturing production continued to increase, but jobs did 
not grow at the same rate. While there were limited opportunities for work in the formal 
sector in spite of increased demand; employment opportunities in the informal sector4 
began to expand. According to data for 1978, 60.6 per cent of employment in the 
commercial sector and 58.5 per cent of employment in the service sector were provided by 
firms employing fewer than five employees, that is, by the informal sector (Mohan, 1981). 
In addition, among the self-employed or in family businesses, ‘a large percentage are in 
construction and domestic work and therefore tend to be temporary’ (Lee, 1989: 15). From 
these data, it can be estimated that at least half of workers in the commerce and service 
sectors in Bogotá were in the so-called informal sector in 1978. 
 This trend continued in the 1980s. A survey conducted by DANE in June 1986 
showed that 49.6 per cent of all employment in Bogotá was categorised as being in the 
informal sector (López, 1990a). In 2004, around 1.5 million people were considered to 
be working in the informal sector, which corresponded to almost half of all employed 
persons (http://endatos.redbogota.com, accessed 28 December 2005).  
 By the late 1960s, the population increase in Bogotá resulting from rural-urban 
migration was greater than the capacity of the city government to provide housing and 
related infrastructure. The housing deficit for the lower-income sector (the poor) soon 
became critical. Those who could not afford to pay rent in the slums of inner city 
tenements and those who came to need more space to house their families were forced 
to find an alternative. The best alternative many people found was to build houses 
themselves on cheap, unserviced land available beyond the urban perimeter (within this 
perimeter the city administration stipulated that public services must be provided 
properly; see below for details). These dwellings were what grew into the so-called 
                                                  
4 Here the informal sector is defined as including all of the following four groups of workers: 
self-employed; employees of establishments which employ fewer than five persons; unpaid family 
workers; and workers in domestic services (housekeeping work in individual households). 
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irregular settlements of Bogotá. 
 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS 
 
Housing in Bogotá generally falls into one of three categories: the formal private 
housing market, low-cost housing provided by the national and district housing 
authorities and self-help housing. The last developed both on land developed by 
unauthorised brokers and was acquired through invasion (Vérnez, 1973; Gilbert, 1981b; 
Gilbert and Ward, 1982). By the early 1970s, roughly 40 per cent of the housing stock 
was formal private housing, another 10 per cent was public housing and the rest was 
self-help housing. It is difficult to give an exact figure for the amount of pirate 
urbanisation, but different authors have tried to provide an estimate. For example, 
Vérnez (1973) estimated that in 1970 about 46 per cent of the total number of families 
in Bogotá resided in illegal housing settlements, most of which were built by pirate 
urbanisation while in 1973 Arias calculated that 59 per cent of the total population of 
Bogotá was living in pirate settlements (Arias, 1974, quoted in Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 
103).  
 Most of the self-help housing had been created on land bought from unauthorised 
brokers commonly known as urbanizadores piratas, or subdividers. Very few homes in 
Bogotá were located on land that was invaded. The ICT 1972 survey found that the area 
of settlements created by invasion was only 0.7 per cent of the total housing in Bogotá. 
Gilbert and Ward counted 21 invasions in relation to 800 to 900 settlements in all in 
Bogotá (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 105).  
 Pirate urbanisers used all manner of illegal and devious means to develop settlements, 
sometimes in agreement with landowners, sometimes acting unilaterally.5 They rarely 
                                                  
5 After ‘selling’ the land to settlers, the brokers sometimes vanished, and ‘violent incidents, including 
homicide’ sometimes resulted from the frictions between the land brokers and settlers left in charge 
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provided any services or infrastructure, beyond the occasional standpipes to which each 
household could connect via a simple garden hose. Although pirate urbanisers usually 
laid out the settlements in a grid iron network, subsequent re-sale processes modified 
this layout. In addition, public spaces such as green zones, land for school construction 
and community halls were not always reserved as rigidly as city regulations on urban 
development required. In some cases they had decent sized roads, but in others only 
narrow internal roads threaded between the dwellings and no paved roads were 
provided (Blaesser, 1981; Mohan, 1994). The character of the land market in Bogotá is 
thus different from Lima, Santiago and Caracas, where most of the irregular settlements 
were established by invasion of public land. In Colombia itself, Bogotá also differed 
from cities such as Cali and Ibagué, where land invasion was more common (Gilbert 
and Ward, 1985).  
 Several studies (Vérnez, 1973; Gilbert and Ward, 1982; Zorro and Gilbert, 1982) 
have discussed the reasons why there was less land invasion in Bogotá. Gilbert and 
Ward suggest the following: 
Firstly, the poor have the alternative of the pirate urbanization. Whatever the 
advantages of land invasion in terms of cost, a pirate urbanization is physically 
safer and tenure is more or less assured. Given that there is no tradition of invasion 
as in some other cities, pirate urbanization serves as a safety valve by offering large 
numbers of people land at relatively low prices. Secondly, politicians have not on 
the whole sought to encourage land invasion in Bogotá. Only one opposition 
Communist group has consistently sought political support through the invasion 
process, encouraging low-income tenants to occupy lands where there is some 
dispute over title. The major reason why politicians have not encouraged land 
occupation is that land has a high market value in Bogotá and the State agencies 
                                                                                                                                                  
of subcontracted land sales. The conflicts broke out due to the fraudulent practices of land brokers or 
the settlers in charge of further land sales. Violent incidents also occurred among the settlers over the 
clandestine ‘resale’ of housing lots. (Testimonies in the in-depth interviews conducted in Danubio 
Azul, Jerusalén and La Paz settlements; see chapter 5.) 
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which hold land protect it as firmly as most private owners. In addition, the political 
system in Bogotá has developed other forms of patronage and ways of winning 
electoral support (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 105-06). 
 There are two further reasons for the low levels of land invasion. Firstly, in 
Colombian law, legal sanctions on land invasion are extremely strict, discouraging 
people from seizing or squatting on land, particularly on privately owned land. While 
the national law in theory is valid throughout the country, its application in practice 
varies from city to city. In some cities, the police are seldom called to remove invasions 
(Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 105). In Bogotá, however, police have tended to respond 
promptly when called on by landowners and are quick to take action to evict invaders. 
This being the case, illegal as the methods of the informal land market might be,6 the 
poor tended to opt for purchase of housing lots from the latter rather than invasion. A 
second factor is the absence in Bogotá of the custom of community use of public 
property corresponding, for example, to the ejido (indigenous communal) land found in 
Mexico. Together, these elements resulted in discouraging extensive land invasion in 
Bogotá (Gilbert, 1981a; Gilbert and Ward, 1982).  
 Now, why has illegal land sub-division been so persistent? Ultimately, this large 
informal market offered a reasonable housing solution for the masses of urban poor 
(Gilbert 1981a). It also served as a safety valve for the poor and prevented them from 
revolting against the elite sector. From the viewpoint of the city administration, it was 
an inexpensive solution to the problem of housing for the low-income sector. However, 
the authorities simultaneously made constant efforts to control illegal land sales. The 
following section examines how effective those efforts were. 
 
                                                  
6 As the case studies will show (in chapter 5), it was learned that brokers might or might not have a 
legitimate right to market the land, making their actions sometimes bold, de facto invasion. But even 
the landowners might be clandestinely involved in the transactions. Purchasers usually received a 
receipt of sale but rarely a title deed to their property. (These statements are based on the testimonies 
from the in-depth interviews in the Bella Flor settlement.)  
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 CITY GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION UP TO THE 1980S 
 
Housing policy in Colombia during the 1960s, as in other Latin American countries, 
centred on low-cost housing built by a national housing authority. The ICT, originally 
founded in 1939 to help finance housing for the rural sector, was revamped and in 1956 
put in charge of providing low-income urban housing. Except for a few successful cases 
such as the Ciudad Kennedy, the ICT was initially a failure insofar as it could not 
provide enough housing, especially for the very poorest (Jaramillo, 1982; 1990; Mohan, 
1994; Stevenson, 1981). 
 The main city government agency involved with the problem of the irregular 
settlements was the DAPD. The early approach to city planning in the 1960s consisted 
of controls on the area of urban development by establishing zoning laws and defining 
the city limits. These controls, however, did little to inhibit the spread of illegal land 
sub-division. From the beginning of the 1970s the DAPD redefined the ‘minimum 
standard’ for urban development (see details in the section below) and tried to 
encourage the private sector to offer low-cost housing for the poor. However, the 
number of settlements established by private developers under this ‘minimum standard’ 
programme was limited due to the high cost of obtaining public services required under 
this legal framework. The DAPD’s next strategy was a slum upgrading programme 
aimed at improving the infrastructural quality of existing irregular settlements. The 
upgrading programmes were usually conducted through official recognition of the 
settlement and then provision of service infrastructure by the respective public utility 
enterprises. 
 Initially, the city government’s overall strategy was to permit the expansion of 
low-income housing through pirate urbanisation. Later, there were gradual efforts on the 
part of certain city agencies to control and finally to service and regularise these 
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settlements. These efforts have been ‘only partially successful’ (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 
107). Why did these institutional efforts fail to control the expansion of irregular 
settlements?  
 
City and public service boundaries and zoning  
The ‘urban perimeter’ of Bogotá was established by the district government with the 
aim of controlling the physical expansion of the city. Within the established limits, 
public service agencies build, install, and maintain infrastructure, and the planning 
authority (DAPD) recognises urban development (Losada and Gómez, 1976; Gilbert 
and Ward, 1982). The urban perimeter for Bogotá was first defined under the Agreement 
No. 6/1914, when Bogotá was one of the municipalities of Cundinamarca Department. 
This boundary was modified several times under later agreements and decrees (see 
Losada and Gómez, 1976: 35-37).  
 Zoning laws define the use of land for all areas within the urban perimeter, with each 
zone dedicated to a particular kind of development: industrial, commercial, high-density 
residential, low-density residential, and so on. The first zoning law in Bogotá, which 
took effect in 1944, divided the city into seven zones. A series of standards for urban 
design and construction (e.g., street width and extent of public areas, plot ratio, etc.) 
were specified for each zone. However, most of the pirate land sub-dividers ignored 
them. The zoning Law of 1944 was modified by successive agreements. These 
modifications eased the requirements for land sub-division within the city limits. 
Despite this, settlement of illegally sub-divided land continued to expand. 
 Meanwhile, the boundary line within which city public services would be provided 
(perímetro urbano sanitario) came to be determined. The public service companies 
established this boundary on technical grounds, independently of the existing ‘urban 
perimeter’. This caused a problem, because there were always some settlements outside 
the urban perimeter but inside the area where public service infrastructure was provided, 
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and vice versa. 
 Agreement No. 25/1975 determined a broader scope for public service provision. 
From the technical and planning point of view, the constraints against the expansion of 
this perimeter were explained in the following way:  
The boundary on the east side of the city could not be expanded due to the 
additional cost of pumping water to residential zones that were located above a 
certain altitude. Usually the maximum altitude was 2,800 metres above sea level. 
The boundary on the west side, too, was limited by technical considerations. These 
were related to its location, which was below the level of the Bogotá River, making 
it vulnerable to serious drainage-related problems, a matter that was recently 
evident when the Patio Bonito and Bosa zones were flooded (DAPD, 1981: 5). 
 The notion of establishing city perimeters in order to inhibit expansion of illegal land 
sub-division was clearly not successful. The settlements violated the urban planning 
regulations but needed to be integrated into the urban fabric of the city. Subsequent 
decrees extended the urban perimeter in order to include irregular settlements 
established outside it. These extensions, however, conflicted with the efforts of the 
water service company to uphold the boundaries of their own services. Losada and 
Gómez (1976) highlighted this phenomenon as follows: 
 Rather, development of low-income housing has consistently gone beyond the 
 perimeter and the perimeter has later [been] modified to take account of the 
expansion. The existence of the perimeter has been important insofar as it has 
limited the availability of serviceable land and thereby increased the price of land 
within the perimeter and lowered the price beyond (as quoted by Gilbert and Ward, 
1982: 108). 
As stated, the boundaries were defined to limit the serviceable land but they were 
ineffective in controlling the expansion of illegal urban development. A gap also existed 
between the zoning laws and the regularisation process. The zoning laws as well as the 
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laws on the urban perimeter had actually been established to encourage the increase in 
the value of land categorised either as residential or within the urban perimeter. 
Therefore, none of these laws helped to control the expansion of irregular settlements 
beyond the urban perimeter, but worked instead to encourage them. 
 Under pressure from the expansion of irregular settlements beyond the existing 
public service authority boundaries, the city authorities had no choice but to modify the 
urban perimeter in order to integrate existing irregular settlements into the 
administrative reach of the city. In fact, the urban perimeter was extended again with the 
Agreement No. 7/1979, which replaced the Agreement No. 25/1975. With the No. 
25/1975 agreement, the previously determined urban perimeter was converted to the 
public services perimeter. New zoning legislation under the No. 7/1979 agreement 
created three categories for areas for agrological activities (I, II, and III agrological 
activity areas: AAA), and of these, AAAIII were replaceable by projects for social 
housing construction. AAAIII was located beyond the public service authority 
boundaries (more than 2,800 metres above sea level), but within the urban perimeter 
then in force. Many irregular settlements had already become established in this area. 
After 1979, urban development could be observed in such areas between the urban 
perimeter and the public service authority boundaries, but without initial guarantees of 
water supply.  
 As observed by Gilbert and Ward (1982: 108), ‘the main effects of the zoning 
legislation have been to increase the incidence of illegal low-income housing and to 
accentuate residential segregation’.  
 
Minimum standards: regulation of urbanisation 
The introduction of minimum standards (normas mínimas) was another policy which 
was intended to discourage pirate urbanisation by promoting serviced urbanisation for 
the low-income sector. ‘Minimum standards’ were applied to a series of infrastructures 
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required for the regulation of urban development. The ‘minimum standards’-policy had 
two objectives. The first was to improve existing irregular settlements by providing the 
services and urban infrastructure up to the required minimum standard and, in this 
manner, incorporate them into the formal administration of the city. The second was to 
ease the standards of urban regulations for low-income settlements, and in this way, 
reduce demand for unserviced lots developed by pirate sub-dividers. The minimum 
standard framework was thus designed both to regularise existing pirate settlements and 
to discourage the emergence of new ones. 
 The minimum standards stipulations dated back to 1902, when regulations were first 
established requiring new residential settlements to have ‘water supply, public lighting, 
sidewalks, and roads with a width not less than twelve metres’ (Losada and Gómez, 
1976: 45). However, these requirements were extremely expensive and rarely met by 
the pirate land sub-dividers whose targeted clients were the poor.  
 Modification of these regulations was introduced in 1961, under which all that was 
required was to provide standpipes for public water supply, street lights on wooden 
poles, and the construction of private latrines. However, this modification did not 
discourage the expansion of illegal settlements as most urban developers simply chose 
to ignore the regulations or did not invest in the costs required to fulfil the regulations 
(Gilbert and Ward, 1982).  
 A substantial change in ‘minimum standards’ came about with the Agreement No. 
20/1972 and the ensuing regulation decrees in 1973.7 The new framework relaxed the 
standards of service infrastructure required for a low-income settlement. Agreement No. 
20/1972 required only  
(1) that penetration roads have a stabilized base (i.e., not necessarily be paved), and 
that other roads be laid out and visible; (2) that community water spigots, one for 
                                                  
7 Subsequent regulations added on numerical standards lacking in the 1972 legislation and simplified 
procedures under which the Planning Department would actively assist sub-dividers or the 
community organisations of existing settlements in their efforts to meet the new standards. 
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every four blocks, were sufficient if their water had been tested by the Secretary of 
Health; (3) that street lighting on posts was required; (4) that a public telephone be 
available no more than one kilometre from the community; and (5) that each lot 
must have a latrine. Community laundry facilities were also required. The 
sub-divider was charged with furnishing all of this, either on its own or through the 
relevant public enterprises. Provision was made for the Planning Department to 
assist communities with their own progressive improvement in these respects and to 
coordinate the activities of the public companies (Doebele, 1975: 41-42). 
 In practice, the ‘minimum standards’ policies after 1972 promoted what was called 
the ‘sites-and-services’ development scheme as a ‘legalised’ alternative for 
improvement of housing for the poor. ‘Sites and services’ development was a variation 
in low-cost housing programmes which consisted of providing serviced or serviceable 
land and an unfinished house.8 The house was to be completed gradually through the 
self-help housing method.  
 During the five years prior to 1979, thirty-six ‘minimum standard’ urban 
development projects were approved. Other data show that the area of land developed 
under pirate urbanisation was slightly greater than that developed under minimum 
standards improvement during the period between 1974 and 1977 (DAPD, 1978, quoted 
in Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 109). Gilbert and Ward argue that the new legislation failed 
to halt the expansion of pirate urbanisation, but did at least slow the trend and made it 
easier for existing irregular settlements to be serviced and receive official recognition. 
The status of the urban perimeter and the limited amount of land available for 
low-income housing contributed to increasing the cost of the fulfilment of 
minimum-standard requirements, which in turn limited the effectiveness of the policy. 
The value of land as well as of required services were more expensive than developers 
                                                  
8 Public services provided vary, but in the Colombian case, water supply, sewerage systems and 
electricity were provided. The condition of an ‘unfinished house’, sometimes called ‘core-housing’, 
varied case by case. This alternative housing programme was also introduced in the 1970s by the 
World Bank in its housing development loan programme. 
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had expected, thus settlement under minimum-standard development proved 
unaffordable to the very poor (Molina, 1990). Therefore, the very poor had no 
alternative but to resort to purchasing land offered by pirate developers (Carroll, 1980). 
The pirate sub-dividers then discovered the advantages of developing settlements 
beyond the boundary of the District of Bogotá and in neighbouring municipalities of the 
department of Cundimaraca, especially in the municipality of Soacha, where the Bogotá 
District minimum standards decree did not apply (Gilbert and Ward, 1982). 
 
Improvement of existing irregular settlements: regularisation 
The year 1972 was the turning point for the regularisation policy of the Bogotá District 
government, although the immediate results were limited. In this year, with the renewed 
minimum standards (see above) the regulating policy focused more substantially at 
upgrading existing pirate settlements. In the same year, a Committee for Urban 
Improvement was established in the DAPD. The mission of this committee was to 
improve the physical conditions of irregular settlements in order that they could be 
integrated into official city planning schemes. The Committee for Urban Improvement 
consisted of the director of DAPD as chairman, four city councillors, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Public Works (of the special District), the director of social 
welfare, the DAAC, and the Manager of the CVP (Doebele, 1975: 43).   
 With the establishment of this committee the DAPD became the central authority in 
upgrading the irregular settlements. Figure 3.1 summarises the typical process of 
regularisation as practiced before 1990.9 The process consisted, essentially, of DAPD 
recognition of the settlement in question and normalisation of public service provision. 
It should be noted here that the legalisation process (enabling inhabitants to obtain the 
title deeds to their property) should be distinguished from that of regularisation. The 
                                                  
9 In Figure 3.1, the ‘legalisation process’ is included, since it is undertaken simultaneously with 
regularisation. It is described with dotted lines, in order to distinguish it from the regularisation 
process.  
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legalisation process usually began later and took more time than that of regularisation.10 
The actions detailed in the ‘community role’ column in Figure 3.1 were normally 
conducted through a community-based organisation, which represented the settlers and 
took an intermediary role in negotiations with city agencies. In most cases, these 
organisations were identified as communal action boards (JACs; see pages 149-51). 
 The urban improvement committee judged whether a settlement is eligible to be 
recognised and then coordinated the intervention of different agencies (public service 
authorities). Once the settlement in question was approved under the Bogotá District 
regulations, the public service authorities intervened to normalise the respective service 
infrastructures. In reality, however, as we will see below, the public service authorities 
had more flexibility and autonomy in serving the irregular settlements than the DAPD. 
They therefore sometimes went ahead in providing services, regardless of the location 
of the city perimeters (Gilbert and Ward, 1982). The name and the membership of the 
urban improvement committee changed frequently, but the basic structure and 
procedures for regularisation remained the same until the mid-1990s.  
                                                  
10 The concept of regulation is the official recognition of the settlement and normalisation of 
provision of basic services, in Spanish, legalización urbanística. Legalisation in the sense of transfer 
of land property in Spanish is legalización de propiedad de la tierra or titulación. 
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  Community role                        Government role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of a CBO (in most cases, a 
JAC) Recognition of the JAC as a legal entity, (approval of juridical 
person status by DAAC) 
Settlement petition for technical 
assistance with topographic survey 
and payment of the fee. 
Collaboration over the relocation of 
the inhabitants of the affected area.
Approval (by DAPD) under the 
Resolución of qualifications of 
settlement for regularisation  Acceptance under the
Resolución 
Technical assistance from DAPD if 
requested (before1990) 
Study on antecedent transfer of 
land for legalisation procedure 
EAAB: normalisation of water 
supply and sewerage system  
IDU: pavement of internal roads 
and improvement of connection 
with main road system.  
EEB: normalisation of power 
supply 
Negotiation with/petition to the 
public service agencies for 
normalisation of service 
delivery. 
Mitigation of the affected area, 
by UPES* if necessary 
Topographic survey accepted by 
the District Survey Office 
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Source: made by the author.
Note: UPES was reformed in 1999 and renamed DADEP(Administrative Department for 
Ombudsman of Public Space).  
Figure3.1 Traditional steps toward regularisation of irregular settlements 
 PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITIES: EAAB, EEB AND IDU 
 
Upon recognition by the DAPD’s urban improvement committee as eligible for urban 
improvement, the irregular settlements could count on the Bogotá District public service 
enterprises to upgrade their basic service infrastructure. Other agencies would intervene 
later on in the areas of public health, education, social welfare and culture, but water 
supply and sewerage, electricity and street paving were deemed fundamental to meeting 
the minimum standards of urban improvement, as outlined below.  
 
EAAB 
In the wake of a series of institutional reforms, the EAAB was founded in 1955 as a 
new autonomous municipal corporation. Water shortages in Bogotá were common 
during the period of accelerated population growth from 1951–1964. Therefore, in the 
1960s, the EAAB’s principal task was to expand the water supply network as well as the 
sewerage system. 
 At this time mega-development projects were launched in Colombia financed by 
loans received through international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
IADB. Known as the ‘Bogotá I’ to ‘Bogotá IV’ and ‘Santa Fe’ projects, they led to the 
creation of huge infrastructures such as the Chingaza and San Rafael dams. New water 
reservoirs and distribution mains were also built to meet the rapidly expanding demand 
for water. The Tibitó drinking water treatment plant was constructed at the same time to 
improve the water quality. 
  From the 1960s, the EAAB turned its attention to the poor sector, especially the 
irregular settlements. A special branch called the Division of Communal Action was 
established which focused on the irregular settlements (EAAB, 1997). Its main task was 
to improve the water infrastructure for the poor settlements through community 
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involvement in coordination with the DAAC (see below). The officers of this section 
circulated information about EAAB projects and listened to the residents’ claims and 
requests. 
 In the 1970s, the demand for a water supply in the unserviced settlements became a 
critical issue. The EAAB discriminated against settlements that were situated beyond 
the perimeter of service provision, but ultimately it made water available to outlets even 
in the most difficult-to-access areas. Temporary supply apparatus was provided through 
a public standpipe, which was built by the community in collaboration with the EAAB. 
The community provided the labour force and the EAAB provided the pipes and other 
materials. The installation of the public standpipes was the preliminary solution to water 
supply for the irregular settlements, where the individual connection to the service 
network took years to be fulfiled. In this case, the EAAB did not send out regular bills 
to individual households, but levied a flat charge to the community.11  
 The expansion of the sewerage system network in some of the low-income 
residential areas was carried out in 1975 as the part of ‘Sewerage Master Plan’. These 
works formed part of the Integrated Programme of Urban Development for the Eastern 
Zone of Bogotá (PIDUZOB; see below), which was financed partially by the IADB in 
1972-1974 (EAAB, 1971; 1972; 1973 and 1975).  
 Notwithstanding these efforts, non-payment losses became a serious problem in the 
1980s. In fact, in Bogotá during the 1970s and 1980s, 24 per cent of the total public 
water supply was not paid for. The majority of these losses were the result of negligence 
by inhabitants of the higher-strata residential areas as well as users in the commercial 
and industrial sectors. However, losses caused by illegal tapping in the irregular 
settlements were also significant. The EAAB decided to promote the normalisation of 
water service provision in order to more effectively charge for water consumption. 
Sometimes the EAAB ignored the ‘urban perimeter’ as defined by the DAPD, and 
                                                  
11 These statements were based on the interviews to the EAAB officers as well as the residents in the 
case study settlements.  
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expanded the boundaries of public service provision according to its own technical 
convenience.  
 
Bogotá Electricity Company (EEB) 
In 1951, the United Company of Electric Energy was founded as an autonomous 
municipal power company (Misión Bogotá Siglo XXI, 1995). This company became the 
EEEB (Bogotá Electric Energy Company) in 1959, the predecessor of today’s EEB.12
 In order to meet Bogotá’s increasing demand, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the EEB 
carried out a series of projects to expand the city’s power generation capacity. At the end 
of the 1970s, it embarked on a new mission to build hydroelectric power plants of larger 
capacity. The Mesitas Hydroelectric Power Station was the first constructed, and in 
1981, construction on the Guavio Hydroelectric Power Station began. The Guavio plant 
was initially planned to have a capacity of a million kilowatts, and go into operation in 
1987. However, construction was delayed considerably due to inadequate funds. The 
whole plant was finally completed only in July 1993. The Guavio project was one of the 
fundamental reasons which led to the financial deterioration of the EEB (Díaz Arbeláez, 
1988). 
 What was the attitude of the electric power authorities toward the irregular 
settlements? According to Gilbert and Ward (1982: 111), ‘In the sixties, it was common 
for the electricity company to cut illegal lines, but since 1967 an attempt has been made 
to supply and charge all barrios.’ Usually, residents of the irregular settlements obtained 
electricity by illegal connection to existing power cables in neighbouring communities. 
The draining off of contraband electricity caused not only loss of power but also 
damage to existing cable networks due to overload. The EEB realised that it would be 
more efficient to provide electricity to these settlements than to cut the illegal lines, 
which could be easily reattached. Like the EAAB, the EEB created a division to attend 
                                                  
12 As established under the Agreement No. 15/1988. Hereafter, I will use the current acronym, EEB. 
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to the needs of poor communities, with a special focus on the people of the irregular 
settlements. The main task of this office was to listen to people’s demands and 
investigate the situation of each irregular settlement in order to understand how far EEB 
intervention was technically and financially possible. Intervention took place firstly by 
provision of one or two transformers (depending on the size of the settlement). 
Connecting cables were then replaced by new ones where necessary.13 Sometimes the 
EEB requested that a community provide a certain proportion of the total cost, but most 
of it was covered by EEB investment. Similar to the provisional solution for water 
service, electricity supply was charged under a ‘unified basic tariff’, the lowest rate. The 
community would be charged on the amount used when finally the EEB installed the 
individual electric meters.  
 
Urban Development Institute (IDU) 
The IDU was established in 1972 when the Bogotá government launched PIDUZOB, a 
programme for the integral development of the eastern zone of the city (see below). 
The mission of the IDU was to enforce the construction and maintenance of roads, 
pavements, and other public works, thereby facilitating the development of public 
transportation in Bogotá. The IDU was also assigned to build parks, plazas and 
sidewalks, public buildings such as community halls, public health centres and schools.  
 Beginning with PIDUZOB, the IDU came to undertake significant tasks in the 
subsequent large integral urban development programmes, particularly the improvement 
of road networks to facilitate links between the peripheral irregular settlements and the 
city centre. It also took on the task of improving roads within the settlements.  
 IDU intervention was beneficial to the people of these settlements, but its role was 
not much recognised by communities until the 1980s. There seem to have been two 
reasons for this lack of recognition. Firstly, before the IDU was established, most public 
                                                  
13 These statements are based on an interview conducted at the EEB Planning Department in 1995. 
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works projects had been implemented by district institutions such as the Secretary of 
Public Works, the DAPD and the DAAC. Secondly, although street/road paving was a 
critical local need, for technical reasons its execution tended to come at the very last 
stage of regularisation and to be given lower priority in comparison with other basic 
services, such as water supply, electricity and sewerage.  
 
 
INTEGRAL PROGRAMME FOR UPGRADING  
 
The regularisation of informal settlements was basically conducted one at a time. From 
the 1970s onwards, with opportunities to obtain international financial aid from the 
IADB and USAID for poverty-alleviation purposes, the city government began to 
employ a new form of state intervention. The integrated approach involving different 
city government agencies was applied to wider areas of poverty concentration. 
Regularisation of the illegally established settlements formed one of its 
sub-programmes.  
 
PIDUZOB (1972-1974) 
PIDUZOB was the first attempt by Bogotá District to conduct an integrated programme 
for upgrading intervention efforts over an extensive area. The target area was the 
‘Eastern Zone of Bogotá’, which was understood as the zone extending parallel to the 
North Highway and Caracas Avenue between the urban perimeter on the north and the 
west end of the city. This area is bounded by the hills that surround the city on the east 
end extending southward (See Figure 3.2). In the early 1970s, the eastern zone of 
Bogotá was considered to be the most problematic with the highest concentration of 
poor irregular settlements in the city. 
 According to a diagnostic study of this targeted area, there were approximately 
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635,000 inhabitants, the equivalent of more than 25 per cent of the total population of 
Bogotá. In this area, more than half of the population was living in irregular settlements. 
PIDUZOB focused on improvement of the living conditions in these settlements.  
 PIDUZOB started out as a plan to build a new highway in the eastern zone of the city. 
The original idea came from political manoeuvring to gain electoral support from the 
voters in the area. PIDUZOB was a representative example of how plans for 
intervention in the poor sector were often manipulated by party politics as liberals and 
conservatives jockeyed for power (Gilbert, 1978). Ultimately, PIDUZOB came to 
consist of nine sub-programmes: pavement and construction of roads; health 
(construction of new hospitals, clinics and health centres); construction of community 
centres; construction of water supply and sewerage systems; expansion of the electrical 
power supply network; building of new elementary and secondary schools; construction 
of a new highway, named ‘Oriental Avenue’, and its connecting roads; construction of 
low-income housing; and other technical assistance. It was co-financed by the Bogotá 
District and external resources from organisations such as the IADB, World Bank and 
USAID (DAPD, 1972).  
 Unfortunately, there is no further statistical information about what this programme 
achieved. Gilbert called the PIDUZOB ‘misguided’, and wrote that ‘the later production 
of an “integrated development plan” was little more than a charade’ (Gilbert, 1978: 
116).   
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NATIONAL AGENCY SANCTIONS ON THE ILLEGAL SUB-DIVISION OF LAND 
 
Another attempt to control the spread of the irregular settlements was made by 
instituting sanctions against illegal land sub-division. When the first standards for urban 
regulation were established in 1902, Agreement 10 had set forth sanctions to be taken 
against illegal land sub-dividers (Losada and Gómez, 1976). 
 The Law No.66/1968 gave the Banking Superintendency (SIB) responsibility for 
investigating the irregular settlements and serving charges against land sub-dividers 
who had violated the city regulations on public service standards. The SIB had the 
power to put pirate sub-dividers in jail for two to six years and it could freeze their 
corporate assets until they demonstrated their capability to run the enterprise properly 
(Losada and Gómez, 1976; Gilbert and Ward, 1982). The SIB confiscated the assets of 
illegal sub-dividers and handed them over to the ICT for regularisation. 
 Neither the SIB nor the ICT, however, carried out their roles efficiently. Firstly, the 
administrative capacity of the SIB was too small to handle the vast number of illegally 
created settlements. According to Losada and Gómez (1976), in 1975 approximately 
320 settlements in Bogotá were categorised as illegal, while the SIB had a staff of only 
29. Secondly, even though the SIB intervened on numerous occasions, the financial 
capacity of the ICT to regularise these settlements was limited. In most cases, the 
conditions in the settlements were so poor that providing viable services was virtually 
impossible. The residents of the confiscated settlements distrusted the ICT and were 
reluctant to pay the ICT to buy back the land, which in turn discouraged the process of 
regularisation. The third, and probably the most persuasive reason to explain why the 
intervention of SIB failed to control the pirate urbanisation was the SIB’s political 
decision to maintain the role of the pirate urbanisers as a safety valve for the poor sector 
in the city. Therefore, the SIB tended to intervene only when the residents of the 
settlement or some influential agent such as a politician complained about their situation 
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(Gilbert and Ward, 1982). 
 It is clear then that these intervention strategies failed to control pirate sub-divisions. 
Although there was a strict legal framework of sanctions against pirate sub-division, it 
was rarely applied and the pirate sub-dividers were permitted to carry on as before. 
 
 
REACTIONS OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT COMMUNITIES 
 
As shown above, state efforts to control the expansion of the irregular settlements were 
largely unsuccessful. The state effectively continued with the attitude of tolerance 
vis-à-vis the settlements that it had adopted earlier. From the 1970s onward, the 
regularisation process did get underway through a procedural framework coordinated by 
the DAPD. Intervention by each of the public service authorities was pursued according 
to different criteria, however, so in practice regularisation varied case by case. The next 
section discusses the reaction of the residents of the irregular settlements themselves 
with respect to this state intervention.  
 
Resistance to eviction 
Cases of land invasion were relatively few in Bogotá, but the resistance to eviction was 
strong, particularly in cases backed by Provivienda (the housing support arm of the 
Communist Party). The mission of Provivienda was to promote housing solutions for 
the poor, so invasion was its form of resistance. In the decade of the 1960s and early 
1970s, most of the settlements created by land invasion were organised by Provivienda 
(Torres, 1993). In 1961 the first massive invasion was carried out in Bogotá (Barrio Las 
Colinas) and the struggle of Barrio Policarpa (in the central part of the city) began soon 
after. The struggle between the settlers and the state (as represented by the ICT, which 
was the landowner) lasted six years, and became the most aggressive case of invasion 
for housing in Bogotá.  
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 After Barrio Policarpa, Provivienda backed the creation of settlements such as 
Salvador Allende, El Qunidío, and Nuevo Chile. However, because of strong 
government repression, which made this strategy quite dangerous, and with the 
increasing dominance of the community action boards (JACs; see below), which were 
supported by an official political party, the Provivienda invasion model of settlement 
lost influence (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 106). 
 
Conventional activism through officially approved community organisations 
In the initial stages of the development of an irregular settlement, most inhabitants’ 
actions—land purchase, occupation (identification or demonstration of possession of the 
purchased land) and housing construction—were carried out through individual settler’s 
efforts. People tried to settle down even in a provisional shack as soon as possible; 
otherwise the purchased land would be either resold or invaded by others.  
 Settlers soon realised the importance of helping each other to ease the difficulties of 
daily living, and working committees sprang up spontaneously in the settlements. The 
primary risk they felt was the threat of eviction by the authorities. Land sub-dividers 
often committed fraud during the land transaction, which could make residents’ legal 
status as landholders unstable. In fact, such settlements were often categorised by local 
people as those originating in land invasion under the risk of eviction by the authorities. 
Therefore, these organisations helped to support residents in danger of eviction and 
negotiate with police.  
 Residents also had to guard against crime since there was no effective legal authority 
or police system to turn to. They formed self-defence committees which organised local 
patrols that took turns handling security problems and taking the night watch. These 
patrols, to which residents resorted as a survival strategy, became the incipient units of 
community-based collective action. 
 The spontaneously formed community-based organisations had to deal with many 
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other problems as well. Committees with names like projunta or mejora were created to 
help settlers obtain basic needs such as water and electricity. People invented various 
kinds of provisional infrastructure for these purposes (such as the popular method of 
illegal connections to existing water or electricity supply networks) through collective 
self-help.  
 Once a community wanted to improve or regularise its public utility services, it had 
to petition the service authorities, and for this they had to work through their ‘officially 
recognised representatives’. It was at this juncture that communities began to establish 
either JACs or equivalent community-based organisations.14 The establishment of a 
JAC was the first step an irregular settlement could take in order to be recognised by the 
city authorities (see Figure 3.1). The first task of the JAC was to have a topographic 
survey conducted. The DAPD would offer technical assistance but the cost of the survey 
had to be paid by the community, so the amount was usually raised by JAC leaders 
through collections from residents. The survey, once accepted by the District Survey 
Office, would be submitted to the DAPD and the settlement would then be considered 
for integration into the official map of the city. The DAPD analysed the survey in order 
to examine whether the topographic conditions met the criteria for integration into the 
urban perimeter.15 If the DAPD approved the survey, then the settlement in question 
would be included by the Bogotá city authorities in its regularisation process. 
 
The role of the JACs 
The formation of a JAC was crucial both to the residents of the irregular settlements and 
to the state in its attempts to regularise the settlements. Why were the JACs so 
important? A brief explanation of the history of the JAC organisation will show the 
                                                  
14 The ‘officially recognised representative’ of the community did not need to be a JAC; other types 
of community organisations were acceptable, as long as they met the requirements of 
juridical-person status as specified in the regulations (Resolución) issued by the City Council. 
15 This integration of an irregular settlement into the urban perimeter does not mean the physical 
expansion of the existent urban perimeter, determined by Agreement No. 6/1990, ‘Physical 
Ordinance of the Special District of Bogotá’. 
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nature of Colombian community organisation and Colombian modes of community 
participation, in particular, those in the poor sector.  
 The legal framework of the JAC was created in 1958 under the National Front 
Regime after a long period of political violence (see chapter 2, page 66). As part of the 
conciliation process during this era, the central government faced two difficult tasks. 
The first was to extend the two-party alternating system down to the community level in 
order to control the emergence of leftist movements. The second was to reconstruct 
rural areas devastated by long years of violence and civil strife. The promotion of 
so-called ‘communal (or community) action’—by the creation of JACs—was the 
strategy deployed to mobilise the populace toward both these goals.   
 ‘Community action’ here meant collective action by the inhabitants designed to 
resolve the problems they shared, based on the concept of mutual aid or solidarity. 
There were already precedents for traditional community-based collective organisations 
in the rural sector16 and the national government was able to adopt some of these. 
 A JAC is defined as ‘a non-profit civic body, composed of inhabitants of a specific 
area, the objective of which is to concentrate efforts and resources in order to resolve 
the most important needs of the community in question’ (Decree No. 1930/1976).  
Membership of the JAC is completely voluntary for neighbourhood residents, but its 
establishment and dissolution had to be approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
 While the principal function of the JAC is to resolve community problems, it has 
other important community roles. Firstly, it is responsible for protecting the lives and 
property of the community. Secondly, the JAC acts as the main intermediary between 
the community and the city administration: information generated by government 
agencies that involve the community is distributed through its members, and the JAC is 
expected to encourage people in the community to exercise their rights and duties as 
                                                  
16 Cooperative arrangements that had reinforced agricultural production in rural areas such as minga, 
fajina, ronda, mano prestada, mano vuelta, and convite (Borrero 1989).  
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citizens.17
 In Bogotá, since 1968, the DAAC has taken responsibility for community-based 
organisations. Its main tasks are to register the JACs in Bogotá and to supervise their 
activities, including the audits and arbitration of internal legal matters. In short, DAAC 
is the representative institution of the state in dealing with citizens through the JACs. 
The DAAC also intervenes whenever other public institutions, including the public 
service delivery companies, need to consult with the community regarding how to carry 
out new projects. In addition, the DAAC promotes community-based activities through 
workshops and community education, particularly in relation to procedures required for 
communicating with the city administration. Through this process, the DAAC provides 
technical and judicial assistance where necessary. A sub-division specialising in judicial 
matters handles claims, suggestions and criticisms of the community related to internal 
conflict, political corruption and/or friction with government agencies.  
 
Politicians and the JACs 
There is no membership fee for the JACs. The principal official funds which the JACs 
could count on were the community development funds created in 1970 under Decree 
158, and ‘economic assistance’ which was provided through local politicians until 1991. 
In practice, the amount distributed to each JAC was limited. As such, each JAC had to 
generate resources of its own (such as by holding bazaars or lotteries) if it wanted to 
carry out a particular community project. Where community activities depended on the 
economic support of a particular politician, patron-client relationships developed 
(herein, to be called ‘clientelistic relations’), especially in neighbourhoods with few 
services or little infrastructure (Borrero, 1989). In this study, ‘clientelistic relations’ 
refers to power relations based on political subordination resulting from the delivery of 
                                                  
17 These statements are based on the following three decrees: Decree No. 1930/1976; Decree No. 
2726/1980; and Decree No. 300/1987. See also Fisher (1984) for the debates on the functions of 
neighbourhood associations in Latin American countries in general.  
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material rewards. More precisely, this relationship is created between local politicians 
(or potential candidates) and the urban poor (potential voters), as an exchange of aid for 
votes18 (Fox 1994, 153; Gay 1990; Auyero 1999).  
 Restrepo (1994) indicated that the accelerated growth of the communal organisations 
in the 1970s was supported to a great extent by the mechanisms of partisan assistance. 
This assistance was channelled to the communities through national, regional and local 
politicians. The main problem was that the ‘economic assistance’ in question was 
handled independently from the fiscal accounts of local administrations, and therefore 
was often used indiscriminately by politicians to strengthen their personal political 
influence. In time, the inhabitants of the poor settlements became accustomed to 
receiving partisan assistance in return for votes. However, the politicians’ influence was 
felt not only in terms of economic aid. Their pressure on the city government authorities 
and intervention in the process of regularisation sometimes worked to speed up the 
process.  
 Indeed, the real impact of these clientelistic relations between the irregular 
settlements and politicians was not so much in obtaining public services,19 but in 
speeding up the time needed to obtain them. Often getting the services promptly 
installed depended on whether or not the community had strong political patronage. As 
we shall see in chapter 5, patronage was a key factor. Members of these settlements 
believed that the services had to be obtained through political pressure, access to which 
should be gained by building clientelistic relations with local politicians in return for 
voting for them (Gilbert and Ward, 1982).  
                                                  
18 The term ‘patron-client relationship’ originally derived from anthropologists’ analysis of 
interpersonal power relations resulting from formal arrangements in small local communities (see 
Scott, 1972; Foster, 1963). The concept of ‘clientelism’ and/or ‘clientelistic relations’ was widely 
adopted in describing contemporary Latin American political power relations either among elite 
politicians or in the grass-roots category of politicians and potential voters. 
19 The public service companies have functioned relatively independently of the city administration 
and been free from the pressure of local politicians. In most of cases the providers have steadily 
expanded the service networks toward the poor sector, and sooner or later, irregular settlements were 
serviced. 
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 Unconventional strategies for obtaining services: urban protests 
What could the residents of the irregular settlements do when conventional negotiations 
with the state did not work? Most had learned that basic public services would be 
provided in due course, but their tolerance was limited, so they sometimes resorted to 
unconventional methods.  
 When state intervention affected the prevailing rights of the residents, they might 
also react more aggressively. These actions were often supported by political parties, 
leftist groups and/or various NGOs. Torres (1993; 1994) identified protestas barriales 
(urban protests at the popular settlement level) that took place in Bogotá during the 
1958 to 1974 period—the National Front political regime era—and analysed their 
characteristics. He classified the protests into three categories: paro cívico (civic strike 
hereafter)20and/or road blockades, peaceful demonstrations, and resistance against 
eviction.   
 Civic strikes referred to ‘total or partial abandonment of the economic activities 
either in a determined region, city, or a group of settlements with the objective of 
pressurising the authorities to solve some urgent problems which have affected the 
majority of the residents’ (Torres, 1993: 154). Civic strikes often paralysed 
transportation when roads were blockaded at strategic locations.21 Major thoroughfares 
such as Caracas Avenue and South Highway, which run north-south and north-southeast 
respectively in the city often suffered from road blockades of this kind. The most 
common motives for civic strikes were efforts by local people to get the government to 
expand public service networks and infrastructure, or to reduce public service charges. 
                                                  
20 Paro cívico is a type of civic strike, found in some Latin American countries. In the case of 
Colombia, these demonstrations started in the 1960s, as a last resort (either in the rural or urban 
sectors) to put pressure on the authorities for citizens’ rights or needs. The actions taken in practice 
are work stoppages in both the public sector and private sectors but especially in the sectors of 
transportation and commerce, or demonstrations, paralysing traffic on main roads, etc. 
21 Civic strikes and street blockades might seem to be different terms, but those who declared that a 
civic strike was to be held in many cases resorted to blockades as the most efficient strategy, hence 
they came to be treated as virtually synonymous (Torres, 1993: 154-55). 
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Civic strikes had a significant impact as they put pressure on the city authorities rather 
than on employers as workplaces were not directly obstructed.  
 Peaceful demonstrations tended to be second choice, although the motivation was 
almost the same. These demonstrations generally took the form of a march and/or open 
meeting among the participants in a public place. The march was often organised to 
move from the participants’ residential area to the central plaza in front of the city hall, 
or to the front of the public utility company (e.g. EAAB or EEB) building. Normally the 
march concluded in a meeting at these strategic places where they would present their 
petition to the authorities in question. Members of the media would be invited to 
accompany the demonstration in the anticipation that they would help to win public 
support.  
 Torres (1993) observed that urban protests in these two forms increased in the 1970s 
and peaked with the National Civic Strike of 1977. Settlers of the irregular settlements 
continued to resort to these two strategies throughout the 1980s. 
 
 
CITY GOVERNMENT-IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT RELATIONS UP TO THE END OF THE 1980S 
 
The steady expansion of pirate urbanisation was a serious problem for the city 
authorities, but at the same time, it provided shelter for those who could not afford to 
purchase formal housing. The pirate urbanisers sold the land without public service 
provision but usually told the settlers that the services would come later. Therefore, the 
settlers demanded that the city authorities provide public services. Eventually, the city 
authorities, regularised these pirate settlements since they had no alternative housing 
policy for the poor. The state’s intervention was based on its tolerance of the irregular 
settlements despite the illegal nature of the sub-divider’s methods of selling and 
distributing the land. Irregular settlement provided a much cheaper solution than the 
 154
state building new housing for the poor. 
 There were, however, problems with this kind of intervention. Firstly, the 
regularisation process up until the 1980s did not prioritise the problem of transfer of 
land ownership. Secondly, discrepancies between the urban perimeter and the service 
provision boundaries often became a source of disagreement between the DAPD and 
the public service authorities. Thirdly, most of the service infrastructure provided did 
not include the installation of individual networks, which were left to the responsibility 
of users. In the meantime, people made do with poor quality services gained through 
preliminary connections as a result of communal efforts. Fourth, the use of political 
influence in expediting the regularisation process sometimes worked effectively, 
affecting the sequence and speed of state intervention procedures.  
 These factors taken together meant that the time spent in completing the 
regularisation process could vary considerably from one community to another, in some 
cases taking as many as ten years. Given the limitations of its administrative and 
financial capacity, the city government found that a certain degree of tolerance both for 
illegality and for the gradual improvement of the irregular settlements was the most 
effective resolution of the housing deficit. The state’s attitude was also based on the 
political calculation of its need to protect the interests of the urban elite. Meanwhile, 
people of the irregular settlements knew that living conditions would, in due course, be 
improved by state intervention.  
 Therefore, relations between the city government, the communities of the irregular 
settlements and the market during this period could be summarised as follows. 
Regularisation usually took years and the frequent delays in this process were attributed 
to the negligence of the city government. As the case studies in chapter 5 will show, 
communities sometimes resorted to aggressive actions to protest against the authorities.  
Their protests, however, served as one among various tactics for negotiating with the 
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state, and regularisation was the result of compromise between the two sides. The 
politicians who intervened in the process of negotiation took an apparent stand of 
support for the community, but their principal aim, in winning the support of the poor, 
was to maintain the stability of the regime. The nature of community organisation in the 
settlements was highly influenced by this political co-option and this inhibited the 
development of autonomous and independent political movements. The state’s 
intervention in the housing market as well as in the public services market was more 
obvious and constant. The informal housing market, dominated by pirate urbanisation, 
was ‘tolerated’ after all under the regularisation policy. As a result, informal settlements 
could be converted into formal urban communities, but they never came to compete 
with the existing formal housing market for the high-income sector. The physical 
segregation of the city by income-level was therefore maintained.  
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CHAPTER 4 
POLICIES TOWARD IRREGULAR SETTELEMENTS: CHANGES 
IN THE 1990s 
 
Development of the irregular settlements continued to expand despite the city 
government’s continuing efforts to ease the housing deficit for the poor and control land 
sub-division outside the urban perimeter. 
The management of Bogotá in the 1990s was different from during the 1980s. The 
approach of the city administration toward the irregular settlements underwent 
significant changes after 1990. Public service agencies which were involved in the 
physical upgrading of the irregular settlements became more efficient. At the same time, 
the city mayors of this period put even more emphasis on pro-poor projects.1 As a result, 
the pace of regularisation was stepped up considerably. Approximately 250 settlements 
were regularised in 1996, followed by more than 400 between 1998 and 2000.  
These changes were partly derived from institutional reforms of the Bogotá city 
administration. The reforms were applied through the new Organic Statute of Bogotá, 
stipulated in 1993 following the 1991 Constitution (Vidal Perdomo, 1994). The Organic 
Statute was the basis of further legislation regarding institutional reforms, which were 
introduced gradually during the 1990s (see Figure 4.1 for the structure of Bogotá city 
administration at 2002). 
In addition there were two major trends in Bogotá at this time: firstly, institutional 
reforms of public agencies to bring about greater efficiency, and secondly, moves 
toward increased decentralisation. This chapter will chart the development of these 
trends and discuss how the relationship between the city administration and the 
                                                  
1 Such as the construction of the Transmilenio (a new tramcar system running from the northern to 
the southern edge of the city as part of a programme of expanded and more efficient public transport), 
and improved coverage of the poor by the subsidised health service through SISBEN (System for the 
Selection of Beneficiaries of Social Programmes). 
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inhabitants of the settlements changed as a consequence.  
 The first section will focus on land prices and the nature of housing policy in order to 
explain why the irregular settlements expanded in the 1990s.    
 Then in the second section, I will analyse the main changes in urban management, 
focusing on the regularisation policy. The regularisation process of irregular settlements 
became faster and more integrated during the 1990s. Reform of the public service 
companies focused on more efficient service provision. At the same time, the urban 
management of Bogotá put more emphasis on community involvement in order to assist 
in the improvement of these settlements. Therefore, the main changes to urban 
management in the 1990s were both neo-liberal (market-led approach) and pro-poor. In 
the third section I will show some of the programmes which were executed in the 
1990s. 
 The fourth section will analyse the decentralisation process in Bogotá as the context 
in which community participation was promoted in the 1990s. The reaction of the 
community toward the city authorities after the 1990s will also be considered. The daily 
life of the people of Bogotá, especially the people of the irregular settlements became 
more difficult in the late 1990s, particularly during the period of economic crisis from 
1997 to 2000. Under these circumstances civic protests occurred calling for a reduction 
in public service charges.  
 With these elements in mind, in the final section I will discuss relations between the 
city authorities, the market and the community in the 1990s. 
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 Figure 4.1 Diagram illustrating the structure of Bogotá city administration in 2002
Source: Drawn from various diagrams from the Bogotá city website (http://www.bogota.gov.co). 
Notes on the abbreviations for public institutions: IDCT (District Institute of Culture and Tourism); IDRD (Institute  
of Recreation and Sports); IDU (Urban Development Institute); FAVIDI (District Fund for Saving and Housing); IDEP  
(Institute for Research and Pedagogic Development); IDIPRON (District Institute for the Protection of Unprotected  
Childhood and Youth); FVP(Popular Sales Fund); VSF (Vigilance and Security Fund); FGAA (Gilberto Alzate  
Avendaño Foundation); FFDS (District Financial Health Fund); CVP (Popular Housing Fund); CBC (La Candelaria  
barrio corporation); FOPAE(Fund for the Prevention of and Preparation for Emergencies) and FONDATT(Road Safety  
and Education Fund). 
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 SHORTAGE OF LOW-COST HOUSING FOR THE POOR 
 
According to the projection based on the 1993 census, the population of Bogotá will 
continue to increase by more than 2.00 per cent until 2005,2 which will create a housing 
deficit of more than 50,000 houses annually (http://metrovivienda.gov.co, accessed 1 
November 2006). Table 4.1 shows the estimated housing deficit according to 
socio-economic stratus in 1997. The majority of the housing deficit is concentrates in 
the lower strata (1 to 3).  
 
Table 4.1 Housing deficit in Bogotá according to socio-economic stratus in 1997 
Population Occupied area Houses Households Deficit of houses(1) Stratus 
1,000 % Hectare % No. No. No. %(2) %(3)
1 386 6.5 1,330 6.0 69,327 85,677 16,350 3.3 19.1
2 2,115 35.7 4,991 22.5 334,678 573,760 239,082 48.6 41.7
3 2,604 44.0 5,808 26.1 428,546 645,067 216,521 44.0 33.6
4 445 7.5 1,723 7.8 117,679 128,586 10,907 2.2 8.5
5 177 3.0 1,094 4.9 38,723 44,872 6,149 1.2 13.7
6 128 2.2 1,097 4.9 39,057 38,474 -583 -0.1 -1.5
Non 
residential 
62 1.0 6,188 27.9 12,711 16,442 3,731 0.8 22.7
Total 5,917 100.0 22,213 100.0 1,040,721 1,532,878 492,157 100.0 32.1
Source: Data of population, houses and households were based on the projection by DANE. The table is taken from 
‘información sobre vivienda en Bogotá’, http://www.metrovivienda.gov.co accessed 1 November 2006. 
Note: (1) Deficit of houses is calculated as [No. of houses] – [No. of households]  
(2) Proportionate distribution according to area. 
(3) Proportionate deficit in each category of area. 
 
  Land prices continued to rise, due to the increasing shortage of space for new urban 
development in Bogotá. A new law on land development meant that tax became payable 
on profits from the rise in land prices. However, the introduction of this tax failed to 
                                                  
2 See Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 in chapter 3 for the data of population census of 2005. 
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prevent further land price rises. Furthermore, a new national housing policy introduced 
in 1991 did little to help the poor of Bogotá since it was designed to benefit those 
employed in the formal sector. These factors combined to restrict the land market for the 
poor in Bogotá in the 1990s. 
 
Fluctuation of land prices in the formal market  
As mentioned in chapter 3 (pages 127-29), the gap between land prices in the formal 
housing market and what the poor could afford was one of the major reasons behind the 
spread of irregular urbanisation. Table 4.2 shows the evolution of land prices during the 
period from 1960 to 1997 according to the zones by land use. In general land prices 
tended to increase both in the richer neighbourhoods in the North, as well as in the 
poorer areas in the South, while decreasing in the centre (downtown) of the city. 
However, a closer  
analysis in particular periods reveals that the trends between the rich northern sector and 
the poor southern sector are different. During the construction boom in the period 
1991-94, prices in the residential area for middle and high stratus increased more than 
20 per cent annually, while those in the residential area for low stratus increased at a 
rate of 9.47 per cent. Interestingly, the construction recession (1994-97) affected the 
land prices more in the richer sector than in the poorer sector (see also Appendix 4a.1). 
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Table 4.2 Land prices per square metres between 1960 and 1977: 
real annual increase ratio (%) 
Zones by land use 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-97 1991-94
(1)
1994-97
(2)
Residential for high stratus  2.30 12.08 3.16 9.60 25.19 -2.59
Residential for middle-high stratus 11.57 8.09 1.09 10.31 26.06 -1.59
Residential for middle stratus 6.90 7.58 -1.98 8.54 22.51 -1.68
Residential for middle-low stratus -0.43 6.40 0.59 6.47 13.04 2.13
Residential for low stratus n.d. 4.25 4.48 7.24 9.47 5.89
Industrial 6.81 6.57 6.00 7.82 17.30 -0.69
Commercial and services in downtown 5.34 -0.69 -9.00 7.44 18.44 -3.01
Commercial and services in the North 10.69 10.61 -1.83 12.41 33.71 -5.07
Commercial and services in the 
popular sector 
10.13 2.82 -0.24 9.02 17.42 1.35
Source: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (1996) for the data 1960-70, 70-80 and 80-90. 
Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (1997) for the data 1990-97, 91-94 and 94-97. 
Note: (1) During the boom in the construction sector.  
(2) During the recession in the construction sector. 
 
This means that land prices in the south for low stratus have constantly increased, 
making it difficult for the poor to access land in the formal market.3
As in the 1980s, there was as yet no system to enable the state to collect on the 
financial gains produced by the rising prise of land. The Constitution of 1991 allowed 
for the participation of the state in the revaluation of land, on which basis was passed 
Law No. 388/1997 (Law of Territorial Development). This law instituted a revaluation 
tax, or, in other words, a tax on the increase in land value brought about through public 
intervention in urban development. 
Article No. 79 of Law No. 388/1997 gave the municipal and district councils the 
power to establish the standards on which the revaluation tax was fixed. The tax rate 
was to vary somewhere between 30 and 50 per cent of the highest value of the land per 
square metres. How much a plot of land rose in value depended on the amount of public 
                                                  
3 Although in 1998 and 1999 the land price for low stratus areas also recorded a negative growth 
ratio, its fluctuation was less significant than in the other areas (see Appendix 4a.1) 
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works invested in the area, particularly road construction and public utility services. The 
tax was calculated based on the assessed value of the land, which was to be less than the 
market price. 
Although the objective of this law had been to control the speculative purchase of 
land, it did not prove particularly effective. Land prices continued to rise while the 
supply of land available for urban use became scarcer. An analysis by the DAPD 
highlighted the saturation of available land inside the urban perimeter in the District of 
Bogotá (DAPD, 1999). In fact, the territory inside the urban perimeter of the city was 
estimated at 30,100 hectares of which only 8,400 hectares remained to be developed 
(DAPD, 2001c: 15). 
Molina (1997) argues the spatial saturation of Bogotá is associated with its 
metropolitanisation. Cajíca, Chía, Cota, Funza, Madrid, Mosquera, Sibaté and Soacha 
are the principal municipalities of Cundinamarca Department which form the 
metropolitan area. Recent acceleration of population growth in these municipalities4 
suggests that residents may prefer to live in less expensive areas even if they are outside 
Bogotá District (Molina, 1997: 69). Residents who choose to live in these surrounding 
municipalities compensate for increased commuting time to Bogotá by being able to 
afford more residential space. However, those who cannot spare the time to commute 
nor afford to pay for land in the formal market, even in the lowest residential category 
have no choice but to obtain land via the informal market or to rent accommodation. 
Under these circumstances: the increase in land prices and the shortage of land for 
development, the poor had little choice but to resort to informally developed settlements. 
During the period 1990-2000, the newly developed urban territory was calculated at 
3,852 hectares, of which 2,140 hectares (55.6 per cent) was categorised as informal 
development (DAPD, 2005, mimeo).   
 
                                                  
4 The total population of thirteen municipalities of Cundinamarca Department, including these seven, 
was estimated to 11 per cent of the total population of Bogotá in 1995. 
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New housing policy toward the poor  
During the 1990s, the housing authorities shifted from providing construction services 
and subsidised financing to the low-income sector to distributing subsidies to the target 
population as defined by monthly income level and tenancy of real estate. The new 
housing policy introduced the concept of social interest housing (hereafter VIS), or 
low-cost subsidised housing for the poor. Private construction companies were called on 
to build social interest housing using limited subsidies combined with long-term 
housing loans offered by private financial institutions including Saving and Housing 
Corporations (CAVs)5 (ICAV, 1993; Gilbert, 2000; Gutiérrez, 1998). 
The Urban Reform Law (Law No. 9/1989) provided the basic framework for the VIS 
programme. This law obliged the municipal authorities to create a special division 
dedicated to promoting low-cost subsidised housing. The law also simplified the 
administrative procedures required for purchasing land, issuing construction permits 
and transferring landownership (land property deed). 
The last of these was accomplished through a special treatment of the term 
‘acquisitive prescription’6 as established originally in Law No.200/1936. The new law 
permitted the time of occupation required before ownership to be reduced to between 
three and five years in cases where the occupation was recognised as being for the 
construction of VIS. Not only new projects but also existing irregular settlements 
                                                  
5 The CAVs were created in the early 1970s after the introduction of the Unit of Constant Purchasing 
Equivalent (UPAC). UPAC literally means ‘unit of constant purchasing power’. UPAC was the unit 
of saving for home purchase. The cost of construction and loan for a home was calculated in UPACs. 
Interest for UPAC savings was fixed at a slightly higher rate than that applied to general savings 
accounts and adjusted on a sliding scale according to fluctuations in consumer prices. The CAVs 
became the main private financial institutions specialising in home savings and loan. This system 
was introduced at the suggestion of Lauchlin Currie during the presidency of Misael Pastrana 
(1970-74). Currie, who was head of national planning in that period, aimed to promote economic 
growth by increasing domestic savings. The housing sector was therefore made a leading sector for 
economic growth (ICAV, 1992; Currie, 1993).  
6 Prescription, as a legal term, denotes the period of time required for continued action before a 
person can acquire or extinguish the legal effect of that action. Article No. 12, which outlined the 
transfer of landownership through ‘acquisitive prescription’, declared that an occupant could claim 
his/her right on a property as well as take legal effect of this possession (i.e., acquire ownership) 
once he/she had held that land for a specified period of time. The required time span varied on 
average from between ten to twenty years, depending on the good faith of the occupant and the 
category of land in which the settlement was located. 
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originally built through pirate sub-division were eligible to receive this recognition. 
Article No. 44 of Law No. 9/1989 requires the ICT and the Central Mortgage Bank 
(BCH) to dedicate a significant portion of their resources toward financing VIS (Giraldo, 
1989). The financial difficulties faced by ICT and BCH, however, forced the national 
government to abandon its policy of providing housing construction and financing 
through ICT. Law No. 3/1991 liquidated the ICT and created the new housing authority 
(INURBE) to provide subsidies for down payments and to offer technical assistance to 
link poor families to financing available through private institutions. Thus the primary 
housing policy switched to that of giving one-off subsidies (see chapter 2, pages 70-71). 
Despite this, the capacity of INURBE to attend to the needs of the homeless poor was 
quite limited. Table 4.3 shows the number of subsidies offered by INURBE during the 
period from 1991 to 2002. 
 
Table 4.3 Subsidies provided by INURBE 1991-2002, Bogotá and total national 
1991-94 1995-98 1999-2002 Total 
(1991-2002) 
 
No. 
subsidies 
% No. 
subsidies
% No. 
subsidies
% No. 
subsidies 
% 
Bogotá 13,287 7.4 9,232 4.6 7,620 8.4 30,139 6.3 
National 181,247 100.0 199,591 100.0 90,799 100.0 471,641 100.0
Source: Data provided by the director of INURBE from internal document, August 2006.  
 
These figures show that the subsidies offered by INURBE were insufficient to meet the 
demand in Bogotá: the housing deficit for the low stratus (1 and 2) alone was estimated 
at more than 250,000 in 1997 (see Table 4.1) yet only 9,232 subsidies were offered 
between 1995-98. 
Families eligible for VIS subsidies were those earning less than four minimum 
salaries, without their own home, and whose accommodation was poorly constructed or 
overcrowded. The cost of VIS for a family earning between two to four minimum 
salaries was to fall somewhere between 50 and 135 minimum salaries (approximately 
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6,000 US dollars and 16,200 US dollars at 1995 prices). VIS for those with less than 
two minimum salaries were to cost no more than 50 minimum salaries, of which only 
up to 15 minimum salaries’ worth could be paid for through subsidy (Gilbert, 2000: 
174). Cash savings of at least 5 per cent of the total value of the housing was required 
before people could apply for a subsidy. Subsidies were never offered in cash but in the 
form of construction materials or labour wages. The remaining costs were to be covered 
through financing (loans) from CAVs. 
This housing policy was clearly market-oriented. It was also exclusive for the sector 
covered by the social security system, given the reluctance of the CAVs to offer loans to 
those not tied to it (e.g., via family compensation funds). CAV lending for VIS 
construction, in other words, tended to be concentrated on the portion of the population 
with incomes between two and four minimum salaries. Those with incomes under two 
minimum salaries had access to INURBE subsidies but faced difficulties in obtaining 
loans from the CAVs. Informal sector workers were thus at a disadvantage. VIS 
subsidies were offered not only through INURBE but also through family compensation 
funds, which were expected to dedicate a fixed percentage of their resources toward the 
subsidies. Again, however, these subsidies were limited to formal sector workers whose 
companies participated in the funds. Thus informal sector workers, whose income level 
would most likely have been less than two minimum salaries, were excluded.  
During the Gaviria administration from 1991 to 1993, the main focus of the 
programme lay in assisting the purchase either of used houses (20.7 per cent of total 
subsidies given) or of new ones in the form of sites-and-service development (61.6 per 
cent). After 1994, the priority shifted to upgrading rather than providing homes. This 
change reflected the new policy of the Samper administration to concentrate subsidies 
on the lowest income class (those with less than two minimum salaries). Table 4.4 
shows the distribution of housing subsidies under the VIS programme during the 
Samper administration. Households with income levels under two minimum salaries 
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received 74 per cent of the total subsidies executed during this period, 44 per cent of 
which was earmarked for upgrading.  
Practically speaking, the people in this sector could not afford a loan to purchase a 
new house even if they could obtain an INURBE subsidy toward a down payment 
(Chiappe de Villa, 1999: 13-14). Thus while the Samper administration sought to make 
the VIS programme attend to the needs of the lowest-income sector, its efforts did not 
increase the ability of the poor to purchase homes (either new or used), since they still 
had to combine subsidies with long-term loans offered by CAVs, which were unwilling 
to lend to the poor.  
Table 4.4 Distribution of subsidies for VIS during the period 1994-97 (%) 
 
        (A) For households with income level under 2 minimum salaries 73.5% 
Use of subsidy Institution % 
Upgrading INURBE 21.4 
FIU-FIS-Recrea (1) 5.9 
Municipalities 4.9 
 
Sub-Total 32.2 
Purchase of new and used houses INURBE 20.0 
CPVM (2) 4.5 
CCF(3) 16.9 
 
Sub-total 41.3 
 
 (B) For households with income level between 2 and 4 minimum salaries 26.5%  
Use of subsidy Institution % 
Purchase of new and used houses  INURBE 3.7 
 CCF 18.9 
 CPVM 3.8 
Source: Chiappe de Villa (1999)  
 Note: (1) Social Investment Fund (FIS) and Urban Infrastructure Fund (FIU). Both are appropriations in 
the national budget for support of municipal government. 
(2) Corporation of Housing for the Military Sector. 
(3) Corporation of Family Compensation. 
 
The crisis faced by UPAC (see footnote 5, page 164), the principal housing finance 
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system, presented an additional problem. UPAC had initially been tied to the consumer 
price index. However, over the next 28 years the mechanism for determining the interest 
rate underwent several changes, as a result of which the rate came to be adjusted more 
according to average fixed-deposit interest rates, rather than the consumer price index. 
In 1999, however, the Constitutional Court decreed that it was unconstitutional to tie 
loan repayments to the interest rate, leading to the end of the UPAC system. In 2000, the 
UPAC was replaced by the UVR (unit of constant value) system, based on the consumer 
price index (http://www.icav.com, accessed 12 December 2005). 
As the UPAC system was discontinued and other banks started to provide long-term 
loans for individual housing purchases, the prerogatives given to the CAVs became 
much less significant than they once were. The CAVs now had to compete with local 
banks for middle- and upper-class borrowers of long-term housing loans, making it 
more difficult for them to maintain VIS loans at the privileged interest rate.  
 
 
CHANGES IN URBAN MANAGEMENT  
 
There exist two types of regulations in relation to the informal settlements. The first 
deals with regularising existing settlements, the second with both punishing the land 
brokers for illegally sub-dividing land and with preventing the spread of further 
settlements. The following section will discuss the reforms of both of these types of 
regulations carried out in the 1990s. 
 
Changes in regularisation policy in the 1990s 
Several reforms instituted in the 1990s facilitated the process of recognising the 
illegally developed settlements. Agreement No. 1/1986 simplified the procedure for 
regularising illegally developed land in zones categorised as AAAIII (land reserved for 
level-three [low fertility] agricultural use). The low price of AAAIII land made it a 
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prime target for pirate sub-division, despite the need for special legal approval in order 
for it to become recognised as urbanised land. Agreement No. 1 eased this approval. 
The new land zoning law of 1990 (Agreement No. 6: the Statute for Regulating 
Space in the Bogotá Special District) also helped to streamline the regularisation 
process. This law substantially modified the stipulations set in the previous zoning law 
(Agreement No. 7/1979). First, the new law authorised the mayor of Bogotá to 
regularise multiple settlements under one decree and eliminated the need for such 
regularisation to be approved by the City Council. Second, it widened the definition of 
urban areas considered eligible to receive public services. Previously, the urban area of 
Bogotá had been divided into two zones: land inside the urban perimeter as designated 
under Agreement No. 7/1979, and land outside this area but within the public service 
boundary (perímetro sanitario). The latter was not intended for urbanisation but met 
land development criteria and therefore was eligible to receive public services. In order 
to regularise these settlements located beyond the urban perimeter, enforcement of a 
series of Agreements had been necessary. The new law made eligible for regularisation 
all settlements outside the service perimeter which had been developed by non-profit 
organisations as social interest housing prior to 28 July 1988. Third, the law simplified 
the prerequisites for regularising urban development by no longer making it necessary 
to transfer title deeds to individual settlers before commencing normalisation of public 
service provision. The easing of requirements on legality of property considerably 
reduced the time needed to complete the regularisation process. 
A further change was the 1995 establishment of the principle of conditional 
regularisation. Under this principle, if land was partly unsuitable or dangerous for 
construction (although a shack or other dwelling had been built on it), that part was 
regularised separately after the problem was dealt with. This system helped clear the 
way for massive regularisation. In 1996 over 250 settlements were regularised, and 
Peñalosa, too, attempted to regularise more than 450 settlements during his period of 
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city government (1998-2000). 
Finally there came changes to the structure of the directive board of the Commission 
of Urban Improvement, the institution in charge of regularisation. Since 1972, the board 
had been composed of the directors of the DAPD, the Secretary of Public Works, the 
Secretary of Government, representatives from the DAAC, the CVP and Department of 
Social Welfare and four members of Bogotá City Council each from different political 
wings. Decree No. 1421/1993 barred council members from the board, which 
depoliticised the regularisation process. 
The above reforms speeded up the regularisation process, benefiting the inhabitants 
of the informal settlements. There were also some negative consequences, however. The 
quality of urbanisation suffered due to lack of compliance with requirements to create 
sufficient green and communal zones (Interview with Luis Carlos Jiménez, 22 August 
2001). Irregular urbanisation, meanwhile, failed to disappear. Even as of 1998, irregular 
settlements covered approximately 6,000 hectares (23 per cent of the total urbanised 
area of Bogotá) and housed 1.5 million inhabitants, or about 26 per cent of the total 
population of the city (DAPD, 2001b: 18). 
 
Reinforcement of legal sanctions against pirate sub-dividers 
The legal framework to control pirate urbanisation had existed since the late 1960s. Law 
No. 66/1968 gave the Bank Superintendent the power to monitor real estate transactions. 
Under this law, the Bank Superintendent could require urban developers to show 
previous records of transactions and transfer of title deeds. Land sub-dividers who did 
not submit the required documents were subject to a fine, temporary arrest or seizure of 
the real estate in question. In the 1970s, these powers were transferred to the 
Superintendent of Corporations. Thus throughout this time the responsibility to control 
pirate sub-dividers lay with the national authorities. 
In 1987 this responsibility was transferred to the municipal governments. In Bogotá, 
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Agreement No. 16/1997 delegated the power to control and monitor illegal land 
sub-division to the General Secretariat of the Bogotá District government, which in turn 
assigned this new task to the Sub-secretariat of Housing Control. The laws stipulated in 
the late 1990s increased the penalty against the unauthorised brokers by setting prison 
terms and raising the fine. Although several high-profile cases such as Alfonso López vs. 
Alfredo Guerrero Estrada and Unir I and II vs. Mariano Porras were punished under 
these measures, on the whole the sheer number of sub-dividers in operation made it 
difficult for the Sub-secretariat of Housing Control to effectively control them all 
(Martín Molano 2000, 86-87). The reinforcement of legal sanctions against pirate 
urbanisation thus did not necessarily prevent illegal settlements from spreading. 
 
Promotion of transfer of landownership 
The Peñalosa administration instituted a new policy of promoting transfer of land 
ownership to the poor in the irregular settlements. This ‘Programme for Possession of 
Land Title Deed’, which began in 1999, placed the CVP (Popular Housing Corporation) 
in charge of providing technical assistance to poor settlers who wished to obtain the title 
deed to their land. For the CVP, the programme signalled a shift from its original 
mission of providing the poor with finished houses and financing to that of supporting 
the upgrading of existing settlements.7
The CVP programme was classified into several modules based on the method taken 
to obtain landownership, including direct negotiation, cession of title (accomplished 
free of charge) and transfer of ownership by prescription (i.e., establishment of the right 
to possession). Of these methods, the last two were laid out in Law No. 9, Law No. 388 
                                                  
7 The CVP was a municipal body created in 1942 to offer low-cost housing construction and 
financing in Bogotá in much the same fashion as the ICT at the national level. In the 1980s, the CVP 
turned toward administering sites-and-service programmes, most notably the Ciudad Bolívar 
Programme (see pages 181-183 of this chapter). In 1996 the CVP became involved in running 
relocation and rehabilitation programmes for people displaced through environmental damage or 
evacuation, while at the same time its main role shifted to upgrading settlements through giving 
technical assistance to families eligible for VIS subsidies under INURBE. 
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and Decree No. 540/1998, all part of a series of legal reforms issued to buttress the VIS 
programme. These laws accorded special treatment and privileges to VIS as well as to 
land earmarked for VIS construction. In order to obtain landownership through ‘cession 
free of charge’, for example, applicants had to establish that the land belonged to the 
state, that the house standing on it qualified as a VIS, and that this residence had existed 
prior to 28 July 1988. In order to obtain transfer of ownership by prescription, the 
occupant needed to show that the house qualified as social interest housing and that the 
land had been held peacefully and without interruption (i.e., the original owner had not 
called for the eviction of the settlers) for more than five successive years. During the 
Peñalosa administration, 1,151 land title deeds were obtained with CVP technical 
assistance (DAPD 2001a). 
 
Making public service companies more efficient  
Changes in the public service companies could have significant implications for 
informal settlements given the central role of such companies in the regularisation 
process. The main focus here will be on the structural reforms undergone by the EAAB 
in the 1990s. These reforms had been enacted to save the companies from the financial 
crises in the early 1990s partly as a result of external debts accumulated during the 
1980s. The redefinition of the role of the state with respect to provision of public 
services by the Constitution of 1991 also had the effect of spurring these changes 
forward. 
 
The new legal framework for public service provision 
The current legal regime for regulating water supply and sewerage is based principally 
on the Constitution of 1991 and Law No. 142/1994. 
The Constitution of 1991 outlines the basic principles on which public service 
regulations should be based, stating in Article No. 365 that ‘It is the task of the State to 
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assure the efficient provision [of basic public services] to all the inhabitants of the 
national territory’. The constitution allows a wide variety of agencies to assume this task, 
including not only the state but also community-based organisations or individuals 
guaranteed by the state as capable of providing such services efficiently. In other words, 
the constitution opens up the possibility for non-public entities (i.e., the private sector) 
to become public service providers (CRA, 2001: 11-114; Avendaño and Basañes, 1999: 
220). 
Articles Nos. 365 to 367 are of particular significance. Article No. 365 gives the state 
responsibility for regulating, controlling and inspecting public services. Article No. 366 
declares general public welfare and improvement of the quality of life to be the social 
objectives of the state, meaning that the state is obligated to provide for basic needs in 
terms of health, education, sanitation and drinking water. Finally, Article No. 367 states 
that the powers and responsibilities related to the provision of public services as well as 
their coverage, quality, financing and tariffs should be set down by law. Tariffs should 
be determined not only with regard to cost and economic efficiency but also in 
accordance with the concepts of equality, solidarity and income redistribution. 
Law No. 142 implemented the above articles of the constitution by setting down the 
rights and duties of users and regulating local administrative agencies seeking to 
provide public services. The law placed the Superintendence of Public Service for 
Domestic Use in charge of controlling, inspecting and monitoring the public service 
companies. The fundamental objective of the law was to guarantee the efficiency and 
quality of public service, thereby improving the quality of life of the population. 
 Within this new legal framework, the public service companies could be separate 
from the state (although administered at the municipal or local level). The state became 
the regulator and inspector of public services, not the direct operator. Thus the state 
abandoned its long-time role as the monopolistic direct executor of public investment, 
shifting instead toward encouraging private-sector participation and civilian monitoring. 
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 Law No. 142 set two different goals: first, to streamline the administration and 
operation of public services in the interests of reducing the financial burden on the state, 
and second, to do so while preserving the cross-subsidy system at least to some extent. 
New tariff regulation committees—the Commission for Regulation of Drinking Water, 
Sewerage and Waste Collection (CRA) for water and public sanitation and Commission 
for Regulation of Natural Gas and Electricity (CREG) for power, gas and other energy 
sources—were established in order to develop a new system for meeting these 
objectives.  
 
EAAB  
Financial crisis 
The EAAB fell into financial crisis toward the end of the 1980s. Its accumulated 
financial deficit grew by 64.5 per cent per year from 1980 to 1992, while external debt 
payments increased at an annual rate of 14.6 per cent during the same period (as 
calculated based on data taken from Controlaría Distrital de Santa Fe de Bogotá 1993). 
Three main reasons lay behind this crisis. First was the problem of loss of water due 
to diversion of the supply by non-paying users. By 1991, the amount had grown to 40 
per cent of total water supply charges (Jaramillo and Alfonso 1990; EAAB 1993). 
Second was the high proportion claimed by personnel costs within the total expenditure 
of the EAAB. Personnel expenses rose 10 per cent every year between 1982 and 1991, 
and in 1991 the EAAB was forced to take on even more debt to pay retirement benefits. 
Third was the foreign debt incurred through the huge investment for the Chingaza 
project, which was composed with the construction of the Chuza dam, the Wiesner 
filtration plant and conducting tunnels and pipes. The total investment for the project 
was estimated at 195.5 million dollars in 1980 (EAAB, 1997: 116). The Chingaza 
project encountered unexpected geological conditions that required changes to the 
original project design. These changes delayed completion, leading to major financial 
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difficulties in 1982-83 (Gilbert, 1990: 354). Although injection of state funds allowed 
the EAAB to survive this crisis, it still needed substantial reforms to become more 
efficient and competitive. 
 
Transformation of the EAAB into a financially sound and efficient public company 
In 1993, the EAAB board of directors responded to the above fiscal crisis by developing 
a strategic plan for rehabilitating the company (EAAB, 1993). This plan called on the 
EAAB to introduce a more transparent system of personnel employment. Appointment 
by political recommendation was abolished in favour of a new system of public 
recruitment.8 The EAAB also carried out organisational reforms to reduce the number 
of division heads, thus saving personnel costs and simplifying bureaucratic procedure 
(EAAB 1993). The EAAB also increased the penalties against clandestine use of water. 
It sought to deal with large-scale clandestine users (mostly in settlements established by 
pirate sub-dividers) by promoting subsidised loans for the construction of proper 
infrastructure. 
The EAAB continued these strategies throughout the 1990s, reducing operational 
costs, cutting down on illegally consumed water and improving accountability and the 
quality of public services. 
In 2002, a new system of utilising private capital through a ‘third sector system’ 
(tercerialización: task division between the EAAB and a third company) was introduced. 
Tasks such as sales, public services and expansion of local networks are now performed 
by third companies through long-term outsourcing contracts. Public service centres 
known as Bogotá Special District Centre of Attention (CADEs) and Gestores Zonales 
(zone level attention centres) were also established at the same time that consumer data 
were systematised and put into a digital network. As a result, the number of people with 
access to drinking water increased and normalisation of water services in the poor sector 
                                                  
8 Appointing politicians as members of the EAAB board of directors was prohibited in the new 
regime (Cárdenas and Olaya, 1994).  
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proceeded more quickly than it had previously (EAAB, 2002). 
 
Revision of service charges  
The task of determining the ideal reference charges for water and basic sanitation 
services was entrusted to the CRA, the newly established regulatory body. 
Law No. 142 was followed by several resolutions issued by the Minister of 
Economic Development in order to revise the service charge regime. CRA Resolution 
No. 151 (23 January 2001)9 set down the fundamental framework for a system designed 
to scale tariffs by socioeconomic strata. The objective of this reform was to reduce 
subsidies given to lower-income users (strata 1 to 3) by gradually replacing the previous 
cross-subsidy system with that of ‘solidarity support’. The new system set four different 
categories of water fees, namely fixed charges, basic charges (charge for basic 
consumption unit), complementary charges and ‘luxury’ charges. Users belonging to 
strata 1, 2 and 3 were to be subsidised for fixed and basic charges, but not for 
complementary and luxurious consumption. The solidarity support fund was paid for 
through a 20 per cent overcharge placed on upper-income residents (strata 5 and 6) and 
the industrial and commercial sector for all four types of use. Stratum 4 users were 
assigned no overcharge. The rates for the subsidies given to the poor were not fixed, 
although they were expected to fall near certain referential figures. Subsidies for users 
in stratum 1 (the lowest) were set to fall below 50 per cent of the total amount charged, 
while the upper limit was set at 40 per cent and 15 per cent for strata 2 and 3, 
respectively. Actual rates varied according to the balance between the solidarity support 
fund and total subsidy costs (the latter should be less than the former).  
 The above system was put into effect from 2001 to 2006. Compared to the old 
cross-subsidy system, the new regime reduced the burden placed on affluent users and 
the industrial and commercial sector while raising charges for those at lower income 
                                                  
9 Subsequently modified by 2001 CRA Resolution No. 162. 
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levels (see Appendix E.3 for the new water charge for the period 1991 to 2003). 
 
EEB 
Financial crisis and privatisation  
Problems faced by the EEB throughout the 80s included inefficiency, poor management 
of investment and production (i.e., failure to set appropriate charges), inability to control 
‘lost’ electricity (diversion of power from either illegal tapping or from other pirate or 
fraudulent consumption) and accumulation of external debt resulting from delays in 
major projects such as the construction of the Guavio hydroelectric power plant. Lack 
of continuity in internal policies due to frequent changes in top management and the use 
of political influence in decision making also contributed to inefficient management of 
the company. 
The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the EEB became particularly notorious as the 
effects of political interest spread. The EEB board of directors included representatives 
of the Bogotá District Council who tended to act for their own political gain. Although 
the planning division of the EEB was responsible for developing investment plans 
within the scope of the annual budget, the final authority lay with the board and no 
project could possibly be approved without the patronage of the board members. 
Technical judgment was thus too often subordinated to political considerations in the 
decision-making process. 
The growing burden of accumulated external debt and payments for debt service, not 
to mention the continuing problem of ‘lost’ power, drove the EEB deeper into crisis. But 
the definitive blow to EEB finances came with the delay of Guavio, a massive project 
that had turned out to cost more than initially planned. The delay of Project Guavio 
combined with a shortage of rainfall in 1991-92 resulted in a serious power shortage 
that forced the national government to resort to a planned cut-down of power in 1992. 
Finally, in October 1997, the EEB was partially privatised and turned into a 
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joint-stock company. The consortium ‘Luz de Bogotá’, formed out of Spanish and 
Chilean joint private capital, acquired 49 per cent of the total stock. The other 51 per 
cent was held by the city of Bogotá. The EEB, which had previously monopolised all 
stages of power service from generation down to sales, was then divided into three 
separate companies: EMGESA (electricity generation company)10, CODENSA which 
specialised in distribution and service at the household level and the EEB, which now 
specialised in power supply from power generation sites (Benavides and Fainboim, 
2002). The capital injected to privatise the EEB, more than twice the amount initially 
projected by Bogotá City, rescued the EEB from accumulated debt and stimulated the 
rationalisation of the power sector. 
 
Rationalisation of the power sector and reform of the service charge system 
Law No. 143/1994 made CREG responsible for setting referential charges for power 
services. Five regulators (experts on power generation and cost of production) were 
assigned to analyse costs and determine charges to users in each category. The previous 
service charge system for power, like that for water, had been based on the principle of 
cross-subsidies between different socioeconomic strata. 
 The creation of CREG prompted a review of the cross-subsidy system. New 
legislation issued in 1997 (Law No.79) effectively reduced the subsidies given under the 
former service charge system.11 Under the new system, the maximum subsidy for the 
poorest sector (stratum 1) was set at 50 per cent of subsistence-level consumption (200 
kw per month), with the upper limit placed at 40 per cent and 15 per cent for strata 2 
                                                  
10 EMGESA means electricity generation company, controlled by the Spanish company ENDESA, 
but majority-owned by the EEB. EMGESA operates two generation plants fed by Muña under a 
1997 concession. Before that, EEB owned the plants. 
11 Before 1994, users were assigned different charges for power according to whether they were 
residential customers (further divided into six income strata) or commercial and industrial users. 
Basic consumption tariffs were subsidised up to 85 per cent for the poorest sector (stratum 1), while 
the two upper income strata (5 and 6) and commercial and industrial users were required to pay 40 
per cent over their own basic consumption. (Stratum 4 was considered neutral and therefore neither 
received nor paid any subsidy.) 
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and 3, respectively. Stratum 4 was neutral in terms of subsidy, while the upper strata (5 
and 6) as well as commercial and industrial sectors contributed an added 20 per cent 
over the cost of their own basic consumption. Legislation made effective as of 2001 
called for the former service charge system to be gradually phased out until completely 
replaced by the new system by the end of 2002 (see Appendix E.4 for electricity 
charges).  
Following privatisation in 1997, responsibility for normalising the service for the 
irregular settlements fell to CODENSA, the company in charge of the distribution and 
sale of power. Now that it had become private, CODENSA abolished the practice of 
offering provisional services which had been one of the reasons behind the economic 
inefficiency of the EEB. ‘Frontier transformers’ (transformers for installation outside the 
urban perimeter) and other such ‘provisional infrastructure’ formerly offered to irregular 
settlements were discontinued, as a result of which the time required for regularisation 
of power service decreased considerably. During the time of the EEB, irregular 
settlements given such provisional infrastructure (which came with minimum payment 
obligations) had sometimes neglected to complete the regularisation process, since 
doing so would require them to begin paying for the actual amount consumed. 
Therefore, the stage of provisional services could easily be prolonged by up to five to 
ten years. 
Today, normalisation of service takes much less time than it did previously. The 
whole process is now completed in approximately two months. CODENSA installs 
transformers, interconnecting cables and power meters to measure consumption 
immediately after entering into an agreement with the community, and the cost of 
installation is charged to each user on a two-year payment plan. Thus the residents of 
irregular settlements now receive a better and faster service although it costs them more. 
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PRO-POOR TYPE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS EXECUTED IN THE IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS  
 
After PIDUZOB (see chapter 3), state intervention toward the existing irregular 
settlements continued to be designed as an integral approach. In the 1990s, these 
upgrading programmes emphasised community involvement. Some project adopted the 
co-finance framework12 to promote ownership by the beneficiaries, and others 
introduced a mechanism to involve the community in the decision making process. The 
following section describes representative cases from the 1990s and outlines the main 
critiques of them. 
 
Ciudad Bolívar Programme (1985-1994)13
The Ciudad Bolívar Programme, was a project co-financed by the Bogotá District and 
IADB. At the outset, this programme was designed to be executed in five years, but in 
fact it took ten years and the major results came in the 1990s. The name ‘Ciudad 
Bolívar’ was taken from the name of the locality of Bogotá. Ciudad Bolívar locality was 
the centre of the programme’s target area compound of six localities14 in the southern 
part of Bogotá where irregular settlements were concentrated. The area of intervention 
covered approximately 1,100 hectares and had a population of 1,500,000 inhabitants in 
1984. Both figures accounted for more than 30 per cent of the size and population of 
Bogotá as a whole at the time. The total expenditure for the programme was estimated 
at 23.5 million US dollars,15 of which 13.5 million US dollars was provided by an 
IADB loan and the remaining amount provided by the Bogotá District (IADB, 1983).  
 The programme was divided into seven sub-programmes by category: roads 
(construction, repair and paving); provision of drinking water and sewerage facilities; 
                                                  
12 See chapter 5, page 250 for the detailed explanation of community co-finance framework. 
13 Although the programme started in the 1980s, the sub-programmes were mainly executed in the 
1990s.  
14 San Cristóbal, Tunjuelito, Bosa, Kennedy, Rafael Uribe Uribe and Ciudad Bolívar. 
15 The total amount of resources invested in this programme rose to 28.549 million US dollars, 21 
per cent higher than the initial estimate. 
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housing by means of the ‘sites-and-service’ system; health; education; construction of a 
communal service centre; regularisation and legalisation of neighbourhoods.  
 According to the IADB post-evaluation report on the Programme (BID, 1997), living 
conditions of the lowest socioeconomic strata (strata 1 and 2) of the irregular 
settlements located in the target area were improved16 and the target area became better 
integrated with the rest of Bogotá District. However, there were some negative aspects. 
First, the Unit for Coordination of the Programme of Bogotá District did not have the 
capacity to coordinate and oversee the institutional involvement of the various 
participating public agencies. In addition, the public service agencies, especially the 
EAAB, did not have sufficient understanding of the objectives of the programme, which 
caused delays in the execution of each project. Second, the selection of the sites for 
investment of some sub-programmes was not adequate. Difficult topographical 
conditions for construction and service provision (e.g. either steep or wetland terrain) 
meant additional costs for the whole programme. Third, the programme itself had the 
demonstration effect of prompting migration of the poor toward the southern areas of 
Bogotá. After commencement of the programme, not only did the population of existing 
settlements increase but new irregular settlements were also established by illegal land 
subdivision. As a result, the number of potential beneficiaries of the programme was 
higher than initially estimated, requiring modification of the scale of each project. 
 The most serious failure of the programme, as criticised by local residents is the 
incompleteness of the sites-and-services programme, whose implementation was 
assigned to the CVP. The CVP selected eligible households for the sites-and-services 
programme; coordinated with public service agencies such as the EAAB and EEB to 
provide basic services and offered technical assistance to the inhabitants for self-help 
                                                  
16 Road construction and repair was carried out for approximately 100 settlements, water supply 
lines were installed in 15 settlements, sewerage systems were built for 33 settlements; drainage 
systems for conservation of rainfall were built in 40 settlements. A multi-medical centre and six 
health care centres were built. Three community integral service centres and 16 neighbourhood care 
houses were constructed. Finally, 89 irregular settlements were regularised (BID, 1997). 
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home building. However, the CVP failed in not only financial management but also 
technical support. Firstly, the construction of ‘basic units’17 was not completed in the 
scheduled period. Secondly, housing lots were not sub-divided according to the physical 
differentiations of the land, causing conflict among the inhabitants. Thirdly, water 
supply and sewerage services were not completed in the period of the programme due to 
CVP financial problems. Many of the inhabitants registered for this sub-programme 
consequently had to organise themselves in order to negotiate with the EAAB to obtain 
those services (Jaramillo, Hataya and Alfonso, 1996).  
 Persistent criticisms of the failures of the sites-and-services sub-programme gave the 
Programme a negative image. Yet it made possible the creation of social infrastructure 
such as large state certified educational centres, kindergartens and sports centres, as well 
as roads providing access to other parts of Bogotá that significantly benefited the 
inhabitants of the southern localities. The Ciudad Bolívar Programme also had a certain 
propaganda effect in making the area a centre of attention not only locally but 
internationally. ‘Ciudad Bolívar’ became synonymous with ‘poverty’ and thus the 
destination of international aid and NGO support.  
 
OSP (Works with an Educational Outcome)18  
The OSP programme, which began in 1996 under the first Mockus administration 
(1995-97), aimed to stimulate community participation through implementation of small 
community projects. The programme trained participants to accomplish projects through 
mutual cooperation. 
The OSP mainly carried out such small-scale projects as the construction of 
sidewalks, steps, parks and community halls. The programme combined financial 
support from the Bogotá District with community participation, hence its 
                                                  
17The foundation and framework of dwellings were to be completed with the resources of the project. 
The rest of each dwelling was to be built through the efforts of the eligible inhabitants themselves. 
18 The OSP programme started in the first Mockus administration and continued through the 
Peñalosa and the second Mockus administrations. 
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characterisation as a ‘state-community partnership’. The size of the projects ranged on 
average from 30 to 40 million pesos (15 to 20 thousand U.S. dollars in 2000 terms). 
OSP training proceeded as follows. Community leaders (JAC or other self-identified 
leaders) who responded to the open call of the OSP attended eight workshops organised 
by the DAAC over a period of about two months. The participants first learned how to 
perceive and define the needs of the community, after which each of them designed a 
proposal for a project to be funded by the OSP. The proposals were then analysed and 
appraised by all the members. The participants themselves selected the projects to be 
carried out. Finally, the leaders of the successful proposals were taught how to enter into 
contracts with the state or other organisations in addition to other expertise related to 
project management (DAAC, 2000). 
Most of the costs of the projects were funded by the DAAC, while the local 
inhabitants provided the labour. The community signed a contract with the DAAC and 
assumed responsibility for all aspects of project management including accounting. The 
DAAC provided technical assistance and undertook supervision in order to guarantee 
the quality of the projects. A specialist in community education worked with the 
participants throughout the process to promote community participation in the field 
(Alcaldía Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.E., 1998: 39). 
Bogotá city government invested 14,253 US dollars to finance 592 OSP projects 
between 1996 and 1999. Through a series of workshops, the DAAC trained more than 
two thousand community leaders who then formed 1,029 organisations. Participants 
learned skills such as basic technical (especially architectural) knowledge, contract 
writing and project management. For 2000, another 12,413 dollars were appropriated in 
the city budget to finance 400 projects under the OSP (UN-Habitat, Best practice 
database, http://www.bestpractices.org, accessed 1 November 2006). At the end of 2000, 
500 organisations were already trained and it was agreed that the first 200 programmes 
were to be financed by the 2001 budget. Typical projects involved the creation or 
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recovery of green zones (such as the construction of small parks); construction of 
sidewalks and communal halls in the settlement. The first two categories were 
co-financed by DAAC, IDRD and IDU (DAAC, 2000).  
 
South Bogotá Project (Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Barrios Sur con Bogotá) 
(1999-2003) 
The ‘South Bogotá Project’ is an excellent example of a city-sponsored programme 
designed to promote integrated development of the irregular settlements of Bogotá. 
Originally conceived by the DAAC as a means of improving the living standards of the 
poor through community participation, the programme was partly funded through 
international financial support from the KFW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the 
German governmental agency of international assistance. 
The programme set out four principal fields of intervention: construction of physical 
infrastructure (water, sewerage, drainage and internal roads), provision of social and 
communal equipment (hospitals, educational facilities and community halls), 
encouragement of community participation and coordination between different 
institutions. The aim was to achieve ‘integrated upgrading’, not only in the sense of 
cooperation between the different institutions involved in the programme, but also 
through improving all aspects of settlement life—from physical infrastructure, public 
services and social equipment to community empowerment—in an integrated 
manner(see Appendix 4a.2 for distribution of funds by institutions).  
The target of the programme was the poorest sector in Bogotá. The intervention area 
covered a total of 40 settlements spread out over three zones in the three localities: 
Rafael Uribe Uribe, San Cristóbal and Usme (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). The 
programme was coordinated by two working groups composed of technical and social 
specialists, respectively. By 2000, the programme had achieved considerable success 
(see Appendix 4a.3 for the goal and scope of the project). 
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Table 4.5 Basic data on the zones of intervention by ‘South Bogotá Project’ 
 Zone 1 Bolonia Zone 2 Ladrilleras Zone 3 Via Oriente Total 
No. of settlements 14 16 10 40
Population 18,743 41,249 23,175 83,167
No. of lots 3,324 7,153 4,376 14,853
Area (hectares) 43 105 120 268
Area of local 
roads(square metres) 
144,839 262,614 269,865 677,318
Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Zones of intervention by ‘South Bogotá Project’ 
Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000) 
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The project promoted community participation in the decision-making process. The 
head office was responsible for coordination between the public institutions (the 
executor of the projects) and the members of the affected communities. Figure 4.3 
shows how communities were given the opportunity to participate in the design process 
as well as in the final decision-making. The same system was also used by community 
members to monitor the progress of the project. 
The community was also called upon to co-finance projects having to do with road 
construction (i.e., development of internal transportation networks). Contracts between 
the IDU and the community in question required the latter to provide 15 per cent of the 
total cost of road construction, in what was known as ‘shared project management’ 
(gestión compartida).19
                                                  
19One reason behind this sharing of costs was the fact that the international co-financing promised by 
the German government (corresponding to approximately 13 per cent of the total cost of the project) 
had not yet come through. Most of the executed projects were accordingly financed out of the 
district’s own budget. 
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South Bogotá 
Project Communities 
Workshops in zones of intervention 
with respect to changes and new 
demands for inclusion in Project 
Workshop for evaluation and 
modification of Project 
Representatives of 
communities 
Representatives of 
district entities 
Representatives of local 
districts
Announcement and analysis of results of 
workshop in zones of intervention. 
Analysis and discussion of results of 
workshop by staff of the Project 
Representatives of 
Project
Proposals and 
demands of 
communities 
Action planning for following 
fiscal year conducted by staff of 
Project
Promises after negotiation with 
district entities 
Workshops to announce and discuss new action 
planning in zones of intervention 
Figure 4.3: Monitoring and co-evaluation system of community and public 
institutions for the South Bogotá Project
Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000)
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De-marginalisation Programme 
The De-marginalisation Programme was one of the top priorities of the Peñalosa 
administration. As the name indicates, the main objective of the programme was to 
reduce the ‘marginality’ (both socioeconomic and geographical) of the disadvantaged 
population of the city. The programme, in other words, aimed to improve the quality of 
life of the population belonging to the lowest socioeconomic strata (1 and 2) at the same 
time it sought to eradicate the irregular settlements, that is, to complete the 
regularisation process. 
Like the Ciudad Bolívar Programme and the South Bogotá Project, the 
De-marginalisation Programme emphasised an integral approach. A technical and social 
working committee each composed of outside specialists (not ordinal public officers of 
the district) functioned as the coordinating agencies. All the related institutions were 
invited to participate in these committees in order to enhance efficiency and avoid 
duplication or misunderstanding. 
The programme commenced in March 1998, and the rest of that year was spent 
determining which areas to target, and how. Several meetings named ‘community 
works’ were held during the design and planning process to inform the inhabitants of the 
target areas as well as receive feedback from them. 
The initial plan called for the programme to execute 1,500 community-based projects 
and regularise 450 settlements spread out over 11 localities. Areas for intervention were 
selected based on the number of strata 1 and 2 residents as well as of irregular 
settlements that needed upgrading. More than 70 settlements (neighbourhoods) were 
finally selected and then further classified into four categories according to level of 
priority. Figure 4.4 shows these categorisations as of 1997. Five areas designated as 
belonging to the first stage (highest priority) became the ‘models’ for the programme. 
Other settlements were assigned to stage 2- A, 2-B or 3 depending on their current  
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Figure 4.4 Target area of intervention by ‘De-marginalisation Programme’
Source: DAPD, ‘Programa de desmarginalización de barrios: fases de intervención’ , 2000.
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state.20 The area around Parque Entrelasnubes21 was excluded from the programme, as 
it had already been made part of the South Bogotá Project.  
The programme established several categories for investment but out of these, water 
supply, sanitary sewerage, rainfall drainage and pavements were most strongly 
emphasised (see Appendix 4a.4: amounts allocated for the programme by participant 
institutions for fiscal year 1999).  
Unfortunately, the programme faced one crippling problem: uncertain funding. The 
Bogotá District had originally planned to procure the necessary funds by liquidating the 
ETB (Bogotá Telephone Company) through international tender. The actual revenue 
produced by the sale of the ETB, which according to plans would have provided 35 per 
cent of the total amount of investment in the programme, was thus expected to have a 
huge bearing on the scale of the projects. The disposal of the ETB was not carried out 
until the end of the Peñalosa administration, however, and the programme was cut back 
significantly as a result. 
According to Oscar Moreno, a representative of the technical committee,22 the 
programme was able to accomplish all planned projects in the five areas designated as 
being in the first stage. Several projects for areas in the second stage (2-A and 
2-B)—most of them having to do with road paving and installation of water supply and 
sewerage systems—were also completed, and those that were not had already had their 
feasibility study, cost estimates, tender and contracts done. Whether the unfinished 
projects would be carried out would depend on the budgets of the related agencies 
during the following fiscal year. This representative’s evaluation of the programme was 
thus generally highly positive. 
                                                  
20Assignments were made based on diagnostic analysis of the condition of such basic infrastructure 
as water, sanitary sewerage and rainfall drainage. 
21A large reserved area not zoned for urban development located in the southeast corner of Bogotá 
District where the three southern localities of Usme, Rafael Uribe Uribe and San Cristóbal meet. The 
area had originally been set aside for an ecological park, hence its name. 
22Based on an interview carried out by the author in September 2000 (three months before the end of 
the programme). 
 190
However, interviews with inhabitants of the stage 2 settlements revealed distrust in 
the programme, a finding that seems to reflect the persistent lack of faith among the 
poor in the ability of social investment programmes to survive changes in city 
administration. Making resident perceptions even worse in this case was the fact that the 
sale of the ETB, which had been expected to provide the financial resources for this 
programme, had failed to be carried out in time.23
 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
 
The Decentralisation process made progress in the1990s, which created a new trend in 
Bogotá city governance. Community participation was promoted in city administration 
as well. As mentioned, these processes derived from the principles of the 1991 
Constitution. The following section will describe these processes which took place at 
the same time as the new urban management systems (discussed above) were 
implemented. 
 
Creation of the JALs 
Prior to 1988, the mayor of Bogotá was appointed by the nation’s president, thus city 
politics were linked to and influenced by the two main parties (liberals and 
conservatives) (Dávila, 2004). The poor, especially those living in irregular settlements, 
have always been an attractive source of votes for these political parties. Hence the 
relationship between the political parties and the leaders of the JACs has most typically 
been that of patron and client. As shown in chapter 3 (pages 151-52), the people of the 
irregular settlements were often co-opted and lured to vote for local politicians in 
                                                  
23 The second Mockus administration later merged the De-marginalisation Programme and the South 
Bogotá Project into the Programme of Integral Improvement of Barrios (PMIB) and placed them 
under the jurisdiction of the CVP. Thus in this case, the upgrading programmes initiated by Peñalosa 
did survive the change in administration. 
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exchange for promises of construction material, food or employment. One of the 
resources used to pay for these promises was a special budget item called auxilio (i.e., 
supplementary expense budgets allocated to representatives of Congress or of municipal 
councils). The politicians had other resources such as political pressure on the operation 
of public service companies through membership of the directive board.  
Political decentralisation was a prerequisite for the poor to gain political autonomy 
and participation. Political decentralisation in Bogotá began with the introduction of 
popular elections for mayor in 1989 and for representatives (ediles) to the local 
administrators committees (JALs) of the city’s 20 localities in 1992. These elections 
afforded citizens increased opportunities for political participation. The Constitution of 
1991 further advanced the process of decentralisation by establishing the principle of 
‘administrative decentralisation’, which placed local planning and public investment in 
the hands of the localities (through the ediles and locality heads, alcalde local [before 
1991 called alcalde menor]). The constitution also introduced the concept of 
‘participative planning’ (promotion of citizen participation in decisions having to do 
with local development) in an effort to enhance transparency of public investment. 
Other citizens’ rights guaranteed by the constitution included the right to participate in 
politics, monitor public investment and make claims (tutela) for perceived needs and 
problems. 
Thus it seemed at least in theory as if the poor in the irregular settlements had gained 
new political channels through which to express their needs directly and autonomously. 
In practice, however, things did not go so smoothly. The Castro administration, which 
created the JALs, was forced to introduce changes to the system as early as in 1993. The 
task of implementing the new policy of decentralisation in Bogotá fell mainly to the 
Mockus (1996-98) and Peñalosa (1998-2000) administrations. Mockus, although he 
tried to maintain a harmonious collaborative relationship with the City Council and 
locality heads, was genuinely non-partisan. Peñalosa concentrated administrative power 
 192
in the city mayor and his cabinet and radically decreased the authority of the JALs. The 
decentralisation process thus experienced something of a zigzag throughout the 1990s. 
 
Local elections in the 1990s 
Election of the ediles was held in Bogotá for the first time in March 1992. How well the 
ediles represented local citizens, however, remained questionable for several reasons. 
One problem was the high abstention rate typical of most elections in Bogotá. The rate 
for March 1992 was higher than usual, exceeding 80 per cent. This figure was attributed 
to delays in getting the election approved, which put voters on extremely short notice 
and gave them little chance to familiarise themselves with the issues (Velásquez, 2003: 
64). The second reason was more technical. The candidacy system was based on ‘lists’ 
and not on political parties. Each candidate for the position of edil posted a list of 
supporters backed by a faction of a political party or civic movement, resulting in the 
atomisation of candidates. No single political party could rally enough momentum and 
to make matters worse, there was more segregation. As a result, the ediles who were 
elected won with only a few votes.  
 Jaime Castro started his administration (June 1992 to December 1994) as the first 
Bogotá mayor to work with the popularly elected JALs. His first task was to appoint 
heads of each of the localities from among three candidates backed by the ediles of each 
JAL to complete the structure of each local administration. But city councillors 
continued to exert strong influence on the locality heads, and this influence prevented 
the ediles from exercising true autonomy in their decision-making processes.  
The second round of election for JAL representatives was held in October 1994. This 
time, the electoral performance of the citizens was much better. There was more 
recognition of the JALs and their representatives among the electorate of each district. 
The degree to which the JALs represented citizens, however, did not improve 
significantly in comparison with the 1992 election, although the rate of abstention did 
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slightly decrease (Velásquez, 2003; Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis 
Carlos Galán, 2001). Fragmentation under the same political party (via the lists) 
continued. Candidates seeking to run independently had to fulfil several requirements, 
such as to collect 5,000 signatures. Those reluctant to go through this effort had no 
choice but to be affiliated with a traditional political party. 
The effectiveness of the elections for ediles continued to suffer from high voter 
abstention rates. Over time, however, the makeup of candidates (as gauged by affiliated 
political group) did slowly begin to vary. Although liberals and conservatives still claim 
the majority in terms of absolute numbers, this dominance has receded slightly in the 
more recent elections (see Table 4.6). Ediles backed by other political parties including 
the new civic movements have, meanwhile, come to assume growing significance 
(Gutiérrez, 1998). 
This diversification in the political backgrounds of the JAL representatives (ediles) 
may have something to do with the non-partisan profiles of Bogotá mayors such as 
Mockus and Peñalosa. Mockus, formerly president of the National University, was the 
first elected mayor from a non-political background. His electoral campaign was 
genuinely independent and non-partisan. Peñalosa, who had run in previous mayoral 
elections as a liberal candidate, finally won in 1997 as an independent. Such trends in 
the mayoral elections of the late 1990s may very well have encouraged the growth of 
non-traditional political factions and civic movements. 
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Table 4.6 Results of the elections of ediles in the 1990s by political party/movement 
 
Political 
party/movement 
1992 1994 1997 
 Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Liberal 132,238 24.3 324,404 48.4 520,232 45.6
Conservative 71,203 13.1 142,802 21.3 200,449 17.6
Leftist 25,418 4.7 18,311 2.7 14,310 1.3
Civic movement 69,815 12.9 21,172 3.2 60,262 5.3
Indigenous movement 967 0.2 10,081 1.5 14,203 1.2
Christian 22,223 4.1 11,905 1.8 37,209 3.3
ANAPO(1) 0 0.0 5,962 0.9 2,901 0.3
Metapolítico 6,880 1.3 4,226 0.6 5,393 0.5
Alliance 1,280 0.2 0 0.0 11,822 1.0
Other parties 60,616 11.2 37,016 5.5 127,597 11.2
Sub-total 390,640 71.9 575,879 85.9 994,378 87.2
Blank ballot 152,546 28.1 94,908 14.1 145,479 12.8
Valid votes 543,186 100.0 670,787 100.0 1,139,857 100.0
 
 1992 1994 1997 
Poll (%) 28.9 32.6 50.3 
Two major parties 
proportion (%) (2) 
37.5 69.7 63.2 
Source: Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán (2001) 
Note: (1) National Popular Alliance 
(2) Proportionate distribution of Liberal and Conservative parties. 
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Relationship between the Bogotá mayors and the JALs: efforts to reduce 
clientelism and corruption 
Inefficiency, corruption and poor administration ability were the qualities most 
commonly attributed to the JALs before the system underwent reform in 1993. The 
aforementioned first appointment of locality heads (alcaldes locales) carried out by 
Castro in 1992 failed to halt clientelism and corruption, and only served to underline the 
strength of the connection between locality heads and city council members. The 
powers of the JALs, especially in relation to the management of local development 
funds, were not clearly defined, and they were also hampered by the unrealistically tight 
schedules given to them to submit proposals on local development. As a result, less than 
half the funds set aside for public investment in the local budgets were actually spent 
during the first fiscal year (1993) that the popularly elected ediles were in office 
(Velásquez 2003). The ediles tended to award contracts for local development projects 
to supporters from their own constituencies, and the locality heads did not intervene. 
The city mayor’s authority vis-à-vis the locality heads was limited, and without power 
of dismissal there was little he could do to control corruption. 
 
Castro administration (1992-94) 
Castro undertook to reform the JAL system in 1993. Presidential Decree No. 1421, 
which approved the charter of the city of Bogotá, introduced several changes to local 
administration, for example by giving the mayor the power to dismiss locality heads. 
The decree also placed local development funds (FDLs) under the jurisdiction of the 
city mayor and barred ediles from sitting on the executive boards of the FDLs, a 
practice that had formerly been the source of much corruption (given that the ediles had 
the power to approve the contracts). 
Budgets having to do with local development were required to be first approved by 
the JALs. After the decree, the rate of budget execution by the JALs improved. Castro 
extended technical support to local planning efforts in the 20 localities. The locality 
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heads and ediles continued to wield considerable influence, however, and clientelism 
and corruption did not disappear. 
 
Mockus administration (1996-98) 
The Mockus administration introduced several innovations into the local planning 
process. Mockus was concerned that the scarcity of resources made available to the 
JALs for local public investment24 was making them easy targets for corruption. 
Accordingly, his administration placed the highest priority on the promotion of ‘citizen 
culture’, emphasising not only citizens’ rights and duties but also ethics and 
transparency in matters having to do with public administration. He tried to reduce 
corruption and improve the transparency in the decision-making process, for example 
through holding educational meetings to involve citizens in local planning. In other 
words, Mockus tried to stimulate citizen participation in city administration and to 
thereby impose civic control on the JAL use of local budgets without upsetting relations 
with them. 
 
Peñalosa administration (1998-2000) 
The Peñalosa administration established the UEL (Local Executive Unit) to issue 
contracts for local development projects. The directors of the UELs were all appointed 
from among the city mayor’s own subordinate officers and advisors. Thus Peñalosa 
effectively stripped locality heads of the power to allocate resources. His distrust in the 
locality heads and the ediles was what prompted him to take this alternative. 
Velásquez (2003: 207-14) points out the merits and demerits of the UEL system. On 
one hand, the quality of development projects rose and opportunities for corruption 
decreased. On the other hand, however, efficiency and effectiveness did not improve as 
much as expected. All local development projects had to be inspected by the UELs and 
                                                  
24 Under Decree No. 1421, the funds to be addressed to the localities had been set at a mere 10 per 
cent of the total district budget. 
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then be approved by the central municipal administration of Bogotá, resulting in too 
much bureaucracy and unnecessary paperwork. Increase in central control over local 
budgets also meant delays in project execution, since the UELs had to work in 
accordance with the financial state of the central government. The UELs proved too 
slow to respond to urgent projects, most of which actually required only small amounts 
of funds. Finally, the UELs almost certainly impeded the progress of local autonomy 
(i.e., of the JALs) and citizen participation in development planning, thus casting doubts 
over the districts’ commitment to the principles of decentralisation and democratisation. 
 
Citizen participation in decisions on local development (Encuentros Ciudadanos) 
It took some time before the concept of ‘participatory planning’ as laid out in Article No. 
342 of the Constitution of 1991 could be properly institutionalised. The first Mockus 
administration attempted to involve citizens in local development decisions through 
educational sessions held during town meetings. At these sessions, residents wrote down 
on cards what they thought their locality needed before depositing them in transparent 
ballot boxes. The citizens were also required to assign priorities to the needs they 
identified. After the meeting, the JAL of that neighbourhood analysed the results and 
determined which projects to implement. Approved projects were then funded from the 
locality budget (Rojas, 2004: 309-10; Villareal, 2001). In this way, people became more 
assured of the transparency of the decision-making process, which in turn helped to 
reduce clientelistic practices.  
The Peñalosa administration created a system of participatory planning in which 
projects proposed from within the community (either by individuals or by organisations) 
openly competed for funds at town meetings called Encuentros Ciuidadanos (Citizen 
Meetings). The JALs were to analyse and select submitted projects based on the scores 
assigned to each by the participants. In 1998, 252 projects were selected through five 
Encuentros Ciudadanos. The Encuentros Ciuidadanos were prized events among the 
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communities, although the insufficient time given to administrative officers to analyse 
the submitted projects did present some difficulties. 
As previously discussed, Peñalosa later established the UEL to take charge of 
designing local development projects, thus withdrawing from the participatory planning 
campaign. This turnaround was in part due to the failure of Citizen Encounters to stop 
clientelism. Ediles continued to demonstrate partisan influence, and they cleverly found 
ways to manipulate the supposedly participatory decisions on local planning made at 
Encuentros Ciudadanos (Velásquez, 2003: 217). 
The second Mockus administration (2000-2003) continued the citizen meetings 
introduced by Peñalosa. Once again, however, not enough time was allotted to analyse 
and select the proposed projects within the schedule necessary to execute the budget 
during the fiscal year. Thus clientelistic practices persisted and the frustration of the 
citizens remained (Interview with Eduardo Restrepo, a district officer in charge, August 
2004).25
 
Citizens’ rights to monitor public policy and file claim against city authorities 
The Constitution of 1991 protected citizens’ rights to make a claim against the state 
whenever the latter infringed citizen resources or property or failed to fulfil its duty. 
This right to make a claim or the right to protection was known as tutela (O’Brien, 
1995: 19). City institutions were bound by law to respond to tutela filed against them by 
citizens, although this by no means guaranteed a favourable outcome. 
The civic monitoring system established by Law No. 563/2000 provided another 
framework for ensuring accountability in local administration. This law, based on 
Article No. 270 of the Constitution of 1991 and Article No. 100 of Law No. 134/1994, 
required the appointment of one or more civic ombudspersons from the affected 
neighbourhood for all instances of public intervention (execution of public investment). 
                                                  
25 For the positive view on citizen encounters, see Pizano (2003). 
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 Civic protests in the 1990s 
The number of civic movements in the 1990s declined in comparison to previous 
decades. But ad hoc protests and collective action continued to arise, if less frequently.26 
The achievement of greater political participation and speedier regularisation in the 
1990s hardly meant that there was no more reason for protest. Civic strikes and urban 
protests, after all, remained the last recourse of the people to speak out against the city 
authorities. 
García (1997) analyses the events reported in the press as civic protests during the 
Castro administration and during the first half of the first Mockus administration. From 
June 1992 to December 1994, 77 civic protests occurred in Bogotá, of which 65 were 
demonstrations against the district government or local administration (García, 1997: 
113). Most of these protests were related to the demand for public services, housing, 
regularisation of settlements and environmental preservation. They requested the city 
government transfer a greater proportion of the local development fund in order to 
resolve their demands. During the Castro administration, there were a number of 
reasons for urban protests, however protests against the increased cost of public services, 
particularly of water, and against the partial adjustment of stratification27of the city 
were most prominent.  
   In 1993 a series of civic strikes occurred in Bogotá the most significant of which 
took place on 11 October. The civic strike was carried out in the Ciudad Bolívar, 
involving various settlements in the same locality (El Tiempo, 1993a; 1993b; 1993c; El 
Espectador, 1993d; 1993e; 1993f; Voz, 1993c; El Nuevo Siglo, 1993a). It aimed to 
protest against the city administration’s failure to address the needs of the poor 
                                                  
26 See García (2002) for the analysis of urban protests at national level. At regional level, the causes 
of protests were more diversified, such as protest for peace building, protest against political 
violence. However, around fifty per cent were related to the shortage of public services and housing.  
27 The change of stratification happened when the authorities decided to categorise some of the 
residential sectors in an upper stratus. This meant the increase of service charge, which affected the 
life of the poor. 
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adequately with respect to health, education, public services and security problems. The 
organisers, the representatives of the committee of the civic strike, requested that the 
city authorities allocate a greater proportion of their budget to tackling these issues in 
the local development plan (El Nuevo Siglo, 1993c). On 15 October, Bogotá district 
administration signed the agreement based on the proposal of the civic strike 
commission. It confirmed that the residents of Ciudad Bolívar maintain in the lowest 
stratus (estrato 1) and committed the district administration to assisting them with 
particular regard to public service charges. It was agreed to create a special EAAB 
commission to review the pending claims on the increased tariff as well as claims of 
erroneous charges; to accelerate the installation of new telephone lines; to build a youth 
centre and to promote job creation for young people in the locality. For this project, a 
budget of 22 million Colombian pesos was reserved (El Espectador, 1993g). 
  The result of the civic strike of the Ciudad Bolívar had a ripple effect. Movements to 
organise a civic strike of the same nature spread to other localities, such as Usaquén, 
Kennedy, Engativá, Suba and Bosa.  
  The poor sectors of the Usme locality also organised civic strikes in this year. The 
first attempt was in April 20 1993. The reason for the protest in April was to protest 
against erroneous invoices for service charges for water and sewerage. As a result, the 
EAAB agreed to review the charging system. The people again plunged into a civic 
strike in 17 June 1993, claiming that they had been abandoned by the city 
administration. In both cases, the people’s conventional strategy was to block the 
avenue leading to Villavicencio, the capital city of neighbouring Meta Department. In 
the June civic strike, the communities of the settlements near Caracas Avenue also 
participated, demanding the construction of a bypass between their settlements and 
Caracas Avenue. For them, blockage of Caracas Avenue was the most popular strategy 
(El Espectador, 1993a; 1993b). To negotiate with the communities, the city government 
sent a commission made up of representatives of related institutions (such as the 
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Secretary of Public Works, EAAB, etc.) who signed a memo promising execution of 
works to respond to their needs (El Espectador, 1993c; Voz, 1993a; 1993b). The content 
of the agreement included the acceleration of regularisation of the settlements, road 
construction and construction of a pedestrian bridge over Caracas Avenue toward the 
south. 
  As these examples show, in this period the communities claims regarding public 
services related to either the lack of service provision or to erroneous service charges, 
particularly with reference to the EAAB. This tendency continued through 1994. In 
many cases, the civic strikes, if well organised, pressurised the city authorities into 
providing the space for negotiation. These experiences reveal that the civic strike has 
become a useful strategy for getting the communities heard. 
  According to García (1997), 80 urban protests occurred during the Mockus 
administration between January 1995 and June 1996, of which 47 were protests against 
the Bogotá district administration or local administration. In these cases, the issue of 
education was the most significant, while the issues of the extension of public services 
and tariff problems were less common compared with the Castro administrative period. 
Other notable causes for urban protests in Bogotá at this time were the eviction of some 
irregular settlements in the upper area of the Chapinero locality due to plans for the 
construction of a new highway and the removal of downtown street vendors in an 
attempt at gentrification.28 Another new type of protest was held by taxi drivers who 
strongly objected to the rationalisation of the transportation system executed by the 
Mockus administration.  
  In June 1996, tension increased when the communities in the South 
and South-east sectors organised a big civic strike. The communities in Kennedy and 
Bosa (Patio Bonito and El Tintal Central) blocked the critical avenues leading to the 
Corabasto (central wholesale market) in the Kennedy locality. The communities’ 
                                                  
28 These attempts by the Bogotá administration were not particularly successful and the related 
protests continued intermittently throughout the 90s. 
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demands were the same as in the previous period: regularisation of settlements, 
extension of public service provision, pavements and expansion of public schools. They 
criticised the Mockus administration claiming that it was not addressing their needs 
sufficiently and complaining that the execution of the budget for social investment was 
less than thirty per cent of what had been planned (Voz, 1996). The blockage of the entry 
of the central wholesale market affected the circulation of food enormously and in one 
day, 100,000 tones of food were lost. In order to end the blockade, mayor Mockus 
himself had to attend the negotiating commission with the civic strike organisers. 
   The inhabitants of the Ciudad Bolívar as well as Usme localities conducted civic 
strikes during the Mockus administration. Both localities mobilised in May, July 1996 
and August 1997. In the case of Ciudad Bolívar, the people were frustrated by the 
failure of the city government to fulfil what they promised in the negotiations to end the 
civic strike of October 1993. Their principal argument and critique was the delay of 
regularisation of the irregular settlements and the expansion of public services. As for 
the case of the protests in Usme, the principal reason was complaints about the frequent 
shortage in water supply and poor attention of the EAAB (El Espectador, 1996).  
During the Peñalosa administration, the reasons for the mobilisation of urban protests 
varied, from protests against the district gentrification programme involving the eviction 
of street vendors and recycling workers in downtown Bogotá29 to protests by 
transportation workers against the introduction of a new transport system.30
In respect to the protests related to problems with the public services, the Usme 
communities’ claim for water continued in March and June of 1998. Ciudad Bolívar 
organised several civic strikes in 1999. Until 1998, as discussed above, the typical 
reasons for protests were delayed regularisation, lack of services and erroneous or 
                                                  
29 For example, the controversy over the street vendors and small shopkeepers in Chapinero Park 
(April-May 2000), collective negotiation by downtown ‘cartoneros’ (cartuchos) against the eviction 
(December 1999–March 2000). 
30 The new system called transmilenio is a tramcar running in its own lane, which excludes buses 
belonging to other private companies.  
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exaggeratedly increased invoicing for the services. From late1999 to 2000, a new type 
of protest emerged: protests against the increased public services tariff after the 
introduction of the new tariff regime. Typical cases were the demonstration marches 
jointly organised by the inhabitants of Ciudad Bolívar and Usme to demand a review of 
public service fees by the responsible agencies (e.g., ETB and CODENSA) in 
November 1999. In January 2000, community leaders of some sectors of Ciudad 
Bolívar mobilised the inhabitants to demonstrate to request a reduction in the service 
charge, burning a copy of the invoice in front of the offices of public service companies 
and CODENSA (El Tiempo, 2000). In many cases, the mobilisation of the popular 
sector in this way was accompanied by either labour unionists or members of leftist 
political movements. 
In sum, the characteristics of and the reasons for urban protests became more 
diversified during the 1990s. As the decade progressed the poor communities began to 
make different demands on the local government, in order to have their needs addressed 
by the local development plan. In the late 1990s, the nature of the protests reflected not 
only the organisers’ demands with regard to the lack of public service provision but also 
the difficulty of their lives as a result of the rationalisation of urban management, such 
as the increase of service charges.  
 
 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION UNDER THE NEW URBAN MANAGEMENT  
 
Integral upgrading programmes of irregular settlements in the 1990s, particularly during 
the Peñalosa administration, considerably reduced the time required for normalisation of 
public services. In 1997, at the beginning of the Peñalosa administration, there were 
approximately 380 informal settlements awaiting regularisation; by the end, only 70 still 
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remained.31
Rapid regularisation also accorded well with the need of public service agencies to 
accelerate normalisation of service tariffs in the face of the looming financial crisis. 
Rationalisation and reform of the tariff system were the two main consequences of 
changes designed to ensure these public service agencies better conformed to market 
mechanisms. 
Thus during the 1990s the regularisation process, previously beset by delays, became 
much more efficient and rational. Irregular settlements were upgraded more swiftly and 
the living conditions of the urban poor improved. 
Problems still remained, however. The first was the persistence of patron-client 
relationships. The second was that, due to increasing demand, irregular land 
sub-division did not stop. One reason was the economic crisis in the late 1990s and the 
other was the increase of internally displaced persons. Internal political conflict in 
Colombia prompted a massive flow of displaced people from the countryside to the 
cities, especially Bogotá, thus continuing the need for irregular settlements. Finally, 
previously informal settlements continued to face serious social and economic 
difficulties even after regularisation. While institutional intervention in the 1990s 
certainly did improve basic infrastructure, that did not necessarily do anything to 
alleviate other socioeconomic problems such as unemployment, lack of public safety, 
and drug consumption among the youth. Physical upgrading of settlements was 
obviously no guarantee that inhabitants’ income would automatically rise. Without more 
income, however, the residents could not hope to pay the higher public service charges. 
Thus while many former irregular settlements now enjoyed better public services and 
physical infrastructure, whether these improved living conditions were truly affordable 
for the poor was another question. 
The city mayors of the 1990s actively adopted the framework of community 
                                                  
31 Data provided by Clemencia Escallón through my interview conducted at Regularisation Section, 
DACD, Bogotá, 9 June 2000. 
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participation in seeking to upgrade the informal settlements. Top-down community 
participation had long been maintained through the JACs, and in the 1990s they were 
mobilised again through participation-oriented development projects such as OSP. For 
all the ‘participative’ nature of these programmes, there is some doubt as to the degree 
to which people were actually able to partake in the decision-making process (see case 
studies in chapters 5 and 6). 
One innovation introduced during this period was the concept of ‘participative 
planning’ developed by Mockus and Peñalosa. While participative planning did 
stimulate the proposal of local development projects from within the community, the 
results of these Encuentros Ciudadanos proved generally disappointing due to the time 
constraints imposed by budgetary schedules. 
The Constitution of 1991 guaranteed such citizen’s rights as the right to make a claim 
and serve as ombudspersons against the city administration in matters of public 
investment. Such legal frameworks allowed the people, especially the poor, to make 
their voices heard. The citizen ombudsperson system, for example, required all public 
investment to be examined by a citizen representative of the affected area, thus ensuring 
the accountability of the city administration. While this has had the undoubtedly 
positive effect of increasing civic control over local administrations, the full 
implications of the system remain to be seen. 
Whenever the above schemes did not work or were violated or state and public 
institutions reneged on their promises, communities could resort to strikes, 
demonstrations and other forms of collective protest. But citizens now carry out such 
actions while also knowing that they have other, more regular options for insisting on 
their rights. Thus community-based activism, too, has become institutionalised, and 
each time it becomes increasingly more difficult to mobilise large numbers of people. 
Patron-client relationships are still far from eradicated. Clientelistic relations persist 
among the ediles, city council members and representatives of Congress. Some JAC 
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leaders have clearly been co-opted by the ediles in exchange for local development 
projects of benefit to his/her own areas. As discussed earlier, however, the influence of 
the bipartisan regime does seem to be gradually weakening over time. Popular election 
of the ediles and mayors has had a positive impact on the civic movement. Thus, in this 
sense, opportunities for political participation have expanded. Yet whether this progress 
in political participation has had any significant influence on the nature of 
community-based struggle remains unclear. 
Gilbert (2006) credits other factors with improving governance in Bogotá, among 
them the competence of recent mayors Mockus and Peñalosa, continuity in city policies 
and increased availability of resources. While his explanation certainly seems to be 
valid in explaining the recent good governance of Bogotá, whether the same factors also 
account for the changes in the regularisation process in the 1990s bears further 
investigation. 
A final question is whether the community involvement in development projects has 
helped to promote solidarity and collective self-help. According to a survey conducted 
by Sudarsky (2003), levels of community participation (as measured by commitment to 
community-based organisations) actually decreased from 1997 to 2002, prompting him 
to suggest that people still tended to be more trustful of clientelistic arrangements than 
they were of community participation. The JACs and parents’ communities remained 
exceptions to this decline, but even for these organisations the level of participation 
averaged only 5 per cent of the population surveyed. One of the objectives of my case 
studies will thus be to examine the true significance of this ‘decreased participation’. 
Have people naturally drifted away from community activities because they feel their 
living conditions have already been improved enough? Or is the raison d’être of 
community-based organisations itself in crisis? If so, why? 
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Appendix 4a.1 Annual real growth ratio of land price according to land use in Bogotá 
Bogotá: annual real ratio of growth of land price in residential areas 
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High stratus Middle-high stratus Middle stratus Middle-low stratus Low stratus
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
2004 2005
% 
Year
 
 
Land use Residential areas Area for commerce and services 
Stratus high middle- 
high 
middle middle-
low 
low 
 
Industrial
area 
downtown North popular 
sector 
1990 -3.7 -3.1 -5.4 0.3 0.1 -1.5 2.9 2/2 2.5
1991 4.7 4.2 1.8 1.8 4.4 7.7 9.1 11.4 9.3
1992 15.3 14.8 19.3 10.2 7.6 12.3 13.4 24.6 13.8
1993 33.3 33.5 26.9 19.1 11.2 18.8 23.3 42.8 21.2
1994 30.5 33.3 23.5 15.5 9.8 23.2 21.0 36.9 19.6
1995 19.1 17.2 14.4 12.8 7.6 13.6 5.5 12.1 12.2
1996 -6.6 -4.7 -2.6 -1.5 0.6 -3.4 -6.4 -9.2 -0.2
1997 -16.1 -13.9 -14.0 -3.3 7.4 -9.6 -6.5 -14.4 -5.4
1998 -18.0 -17.0 -14.3 -11.9 -6.8 -19.9 -15.0 -15.7 -10.2
1999 -10.9 -8.6 -6.9 -6.6 -6.6 -8.3 -12.3 -12.3 -13.9
2000 -8.2 -9.0 -3.0 -1.5 2.0 -8.0 -6.5 -7.6 -6.7
2001 -9.0 -3.6 -2.6 -4.7 -1.1 -9.6 -4.1 -6.2 -5.2
2002 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -2.6 -5.4 -5.1 -6.2 -6.4 -8.1
2003 9.5 4.5 5.7 3.7 1.6 -4.7 -1.4 -3.2 -3.8
2004 7.1 7.1 -0.6 -1.8 -4.3 -4.8 -1.6 0.6 0.4
2005 3.6 4.4 1.6 1.2 0.9 2.4 1.6 1.2 2.5
Source: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (2005). 
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Appendix 4a.2 
Cost of ‘South Bogotá Project’ and source of the funds to execute the project  
among institutions 2001-2003   
 
(a) By source of funds 
 District institution Localities Community 
support 
Aid from KFW(1) Total 
 1,000 
pesos 
% 1,000 
pesos 
% 1,000  
pesos 
% 1,000 
pesos 
% 1,000  
pesos 
Physical 
infrastructure 
51,580,515 81.6 1,294,705 2.1 3,039,753 4.8 7,264,060 11.5 63,170,032
Social 
infrastructure 
1,517,450 62.9 150,000 6.2 52,000 2.2 695,000 28.8 2,414,460
Regularisation 3,675,522 71.9 50,000 1.0 37,500 0.7 1,346,940 26.4 5,109,962
Sub-total 56,773,487 80.3 1,494,705 2.1 3,129,253 4.4 9,306,000 13.2 70,703,454
Unexpected 
revenue 
2,838,674 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2,838,674
Total cost of the 
project 
59,612,161 81.6 1,494,705 2.0 3,129,253 4.3 9,306,000 12.7 73,542,119
(1) Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Leading German government aid agency.  
 
(b) By distribution of funds broken down by district institutions 
(1,000 Colombian pesos, at September 2000 prices) 
Institution Physical 
infrastructure
Social 
infrastructure
Regular- 
isation 
Unexpected  
revenue 
Total 
EAAB 5,150,727 0 0 257,536 5,408,263
IDU 23,300,449 0 0 1,166,022 24,496,471
DAMA(1) 271,250 0 0 19,563 284,813
DPAE(2) 1,992,000 0 0 98,600 2,091,600
Botanic Garden 40,000 0 0 2,000 42,000
DABS(3) 2,650,000 0 0 132,500 2,782,500
Sec. of Education 14,841,900 0 0 742,095 15,583,995
IDRD(4) 2,263,568 30,000 0 114,678 2,406,246
CVP 250,000 0 0 12,500 262,500
Localities 1,294,705 150,000 50,000 0 1,494,705
DAAC 800,620 314,000 367,522 239,507 5,029,649
Sec.of Health 0 805,000 0 40,250 845,250
Total 52,855,219 1,299,000 417,522 2,825,251 60,727,992
Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000).  
Notes: Total value of the table (b) should be the same as the sum of the total cost of the project shared by the 
Bogotá District government and Localities in the table (a), however, the original figures in the source were 
different as shown above. 
(1) Administrative Department of Environment. 
(2) Department of Prevention and Attention for the Emergency.  
(3) Administrative Department of Social Welfare. 
(4) District Institution of Recreation and Sports.  
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Appendix 4a.3
 Comparison between the proposal based on the feasibility study in 1998 vs. achievements in 1999-2000 
(South Bogotá Project)
 Proposal in 1998 Achievements in 1999-2000
Component Project Target Readjusted target Results Actors
Physical infrastructure and 
public space: Water connection of 671 Connection of 4652 lots to master 100% for diagnostic EAAB 
Improvement of infrastructure for  supply lots to master supply mains and connection of survey. (division for community action)
water and other public services network individual houses through 0% for construction. CBO
community participation Usme Locality
Regularisation of 70% for regularisation. South Bogotá Project
local networks connected to the 
Juan Rey water deposit tank
for 2,004 lots.
 Sewerage 4,555 lots Direct investment for 5,482 lots 83% for design
77% for construction
Co-financing with community 100% for construction
for 1,953 lots
Drainage 184 hectares 107 hectares 79% for design
for rainfall 72% for construction
Road network Roads in 10km 30km 0% for advance IDU
the zone CBO
Local roads 45kms 30kms 33% for design Localities
20% for construction DAAC (OSP division)
Terminal and 20 bus stops and Design for the new South Bogotá Project
bus stops 1800 square meter New transport system,
terminal Transmilenio
Intervention for 'Parque Environmental Not specified Determination of 100% for design for DAMA
Entrenubes' ecological park management plan park for 670 hectares environmental education. DAPD
100% for workshop and EAAB
environmental study. DAAC
3 meetings. IDRD
Urban planning and 3 plans for the zone Plan for 106 settlements bordering 100% for design Botanic Garden
housing scheme on the 'Parque Extrenubes' IDU 
Construction of 10 km 6 paths 10 km. each 100% for identification Subsecretariat of Control of Housing
ecological paths 0% for construction. District Supervisory Office
Cycling paths 10 km 30 km Determination of the area CBO and NGO
0% either for both design Landowner
and construction Localities
South Bogotá Project
Social infrastructure
Education-related Day care Expansion to Construct 3 day care centers 33% for design DABS
capacity for 1,900 (1,900 children) 0% for construction Secretariat of Education
Primary and 6,500 new students Construct 3 schools 67% for design Localities
secondary schools (3,000 students) 20% for construction CBO
Reform of schools for 500 students Reform of 5 schools 67% for design South Bogotá Project
43% for construction
Recreation and sports Sport centre for 6has. 12 parks in neighbourhood 77% in design and IDRD
multiple use (1/2 has each) 51% in construction DAPD
Park for children 20 units. 12 units (as a whole) Localities
Equipment for 30 units. 20 units Botanic Garden
sports  IDU
South Bogotá Project
Urban Planning
Regularisation of irregular Regularisation of 19 settlements 25 settlements 37 settlements DAPD
settlements irregular settlements 4 settlements in process Ombudsman for public space 
DPAE
EAAB
CBO
Localities
South Bogotá Project
Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000).
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Appendix 4a.4  
Institutions and their budget to be invested for ‘De-marginalisation 
          programme’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      Source: Committee of coordination of the De-marginalisation programme. 
         (1) According to the Bogotá mayor’s three-year-development plan (Plan de  
Desarrollo 1998-2001). 
         (2) Administrative Department of Social Welfare. 
         (3) Fund of Prevention and Attention of Emergence. Institution in charge of this fund 
  is DPAE. 
         (4) District Institution of Recreation and Sports. 
1999  Plan for 
1998-2001(1) Institution Million pesos % 
% 
DAAC 17,333 2.7 0.7 
DABS(2) 60,568 9.5 8.3 
DAPD   700 0.1 0.1 
EAAB 52,473 8.2 19.8 
FPAE(3) 11,310 1.8 0.9 
IDU 155,570 24.4 16.1 
IDRD(4)  20,197 3.2 0.5 
Botanic Garden 1,311 0.2 0.2 
Secretary of Education 151,013 23.7 20.8 
Secretary of Finance/ FDL 114,806 18.0 20.6 
Secretary of Health 49,000 7.7 11.2 
CVP 3,463 0.5 0.8 
Total 637,944 100.0 100.0 
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CHAPTER 5  
SIX STORIES OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN 
BOGOTÁ 
 
While the regularisation of self-help settlements became established practice in Bogotá 
from the 1970s onwards, this did not mean that the process worked at the same speed in 
all settlements. Leadership of community organisations, political patronage and city 
government administrative capacity are key factors in determining the pace of the 
regularisation process. This chapter will analyse the origin, current consolidation status 
and regularisation process of the six selected case-study settlements. The aim of this 
chapter is to explain why these six settlements, all of which started out as irregular 
settlements, showed notable differences in the pace of their regularisation.1 I will 
discuss how three conventional factors listed above explain the experiences of the six 
settlements as well as exploring other specific conditions. 
 
 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE SETTLEMENTS 
 
Table 5.1 describes the six case-study settlements. The case-study settlements have 
several factors in common. Firstly, all were established on land developed without 
consideration for city regulations. Three of them, Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and Bella 
Flor, were established on land that was illegally sub-divided. One, Diana Turbay, was 
developed by a local politician who was influential at the time. Another, Juan José 
Rondón (hereafter JJR), was promoted by an NGO.2 The sixth, La Paz, began as a 
                                                  
1 This is the analysis of my survey of the six settlements and in-depth interviews with selected 
inhabitants, supplemented by interviews with city government officials and NGO activists who 
worked with these settlements. The survey and interviews were all conducted between October 1999 
and August 2004 (see chapter 2 for details). 
2 (ex) Father Saturnino Sepúlveda Niño, the original founder of JJR, stood as a 
non-partisan-independent candidate for election to Bogotá district council four times between the 
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large-scale organised invasion but later also involved illegal land sub-division.  
 Secondly, in all of the areas, settlement started between 1981 and 1985. Thirdly, in 
their initial period of development, all were located outside the urban perimeter, 
categorised either as ‘AAA III’ (area with low capacity for agricultural use) or ‘reserva 
agrícola’ (area reserved for agricultural use). Fourthly, all fall into the lowest strata (1 
and 2) of society as defined by DANE. These four elements served as the criteria for 
selection of the case-study settlements (see chapter 2, pages 88-90).  
 In-depth interviews with the founders of the settlements revealed two further 
elements in common.3 First, until the barrio was recognised by the city authorities, 
most basic public services such as water, electricity and sewerage systems were 
provided in a rudimentary way through community efforts, sometimes resorting to 
illegal means. Second, irrespective of the way the settlement was formed, newly elected 
JAC leaders took the initiative in these collective self-help strategies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
late 1970s to the mid 1980s in vain (Martín 2000: 91). 
3 I named an inhabitant a ‘founder’ if they had settled in the barrio during the earliest period of land 
occupation.  
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CURRENT LEVEL OF CONSOLIDATION  
 
When the survey started in early 2000, the six settlements displayed very different 
levels of consolidation. I used the following criteria to measure the level of 
consolidation: land occupation (proportion of lots occupied); physical condition of 
dwellings (measured by the material of construction); rate of tenancy; availability of 
public services; per capita income; average rent and percentage of owner occupants with 
a title deed. The data per criterion were scored and summed up for each settlement to 
give a final figure. I decided on the rank of the six cases according to that figure.4
 
Physical consolidation 
The level of land occupation, the physical condition of the dwellings and the rate of 
tenancy are the basic indicators used to measure the settlement’s physical consolidation. 
 
Land occupation 
The findings of the study on land occupation for the six settlements are shown in Table 
5.2. The pace of land occupation is very different in each settlement. 
 
Table 5.2 Approximate level of land occupation in 2000 
 D. Turbay Jerusalén D.Azul La Paz JJR B. Flor
Level of land 
occupation 
98% 95% 95% 85% 60% 40% 
 Source: Data approximated by on-site observation (count) in comparison with the lots indicated 
on the maps provided by the DAPD.  
 
 All six cases were developed on land outside the urban perimeter which was not 
equipped with public service infrastructure. Knowing this, settlers bought the lots 
anyway because the price was cheap and they expected that public services would be 
installed in the future as had happened in other barrios with similar origins. However, 
                                                  
4 To score the criteria, I referred to Ward’s method (Ward, 1976: 393-97). 
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as can be seen from table 5.2, after 15 years, the occupation levels of JJR and Bella Flor 
were much lower than in the other settlements. What was the reason for this?  
 Most of the interviewed inhabitants of the other four settlements pointed to the 
arrival of the water supply as the turning point in the development of the barrio. Water 
was the most indispensable collective need for survival. As I will show in the next 
section, JJR and Bella Flor were the only two settlements which lacked a proper water 
supply provided by the EAAB at the time of survey. The lack of water therefore 
impeded the occupation process.   
 The process of land occupation is closely related to the valorisation of land (Ward 
1989). Independent of the origin of land occupation (either by invasion or 
land-sub-division), the transaction of plots in the irregular settlement has provided a 
land market for the poor. Kellett (1992) points out that the low land price in the very 
initial stage of development reflects the uncertainty of the situation (i.e. the risk of 
eviction) and the lack of infrastructure.  
 It is important to note that at the time of my survey no more land was for sale (except 
for resale). The vacant lots had already been sold. In JJR and Bella Flor, most of the 
vacant lots were found in the plain, physically advantaged parts of the settlements.5 The 
current owners, who are often land brokers, had purchased them with the aim of 
speculation.6 These speculative lots would be resold once public services and basic 
infrastructure had been improved, since the owner of the land could charge an increased 
price for the better equipped lots. In these settlements, the cost of network construction 
is paid for by the direct investment of public service companies and the cost of local 
connection to an individual house is charged to the user (or owner occupant of the 
                                                  
5 As for the case of La Paz, the vacant lots were partly those which were purchased for speculation, 
but the others were situated on the ground not suitable for construction. These lots needed special 
reinforcement in order to get permission from the city government for further regularisation. 
6 Kellett (1992), in his case study settlements in Santa Marta, Colombia, put the reason for the 
relatively high percentage of empty plots and dwellings down to speculation, though the evidence 
was inconclusive. As stated here, I interpreted the situation in JJR and Bella Flor in the same way, 
based on the narratives of the inhabitants in informal interviews with them.    
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house). Therefore the land broker profits from the difference between the price for land 
only and the price for land with service infrastructure without paying any additional 
costs himself. 
 These two elements suggest that higher land occupation levels reflect higher 
consolidation levels of the settlement.  
 
Physical conditions of dwellings 
Residents in irregular settlements build their dwellings using self-help methods as time 
and resources permit. People are prepared to invest more in their house as the settlement 
becomes more secure and better serviced. However, not all have the same ability to 
build quickly (see Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3 Physical condition of the houses of the sampled households 
 Diana 
Turbay 
Jerusalén Danubio 
Azul 
La Paz JJR B. Flor 
More than one 
storey 
72.1% 38.9% 48.7% 31.5% 18.0% 2.9% 
With a terrace 73.7% 41.4% 48.7% 39.9% 10.2% 2.9% 
Durable wall 
material  
98.8% 95.9% 97.5% 93.0% 88.3% 58.3% 
Concrete roof  78.4% 43.2% 58.9% 44.8% 25.0% 2.9% 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to  
August 2000. 
 
Rate of tenancy 
As self-help settlements develop and houses get larger some owners begin to 
supplement their incomes by renting out rooms. Some previous studies showed a 
positive correlation between the level of consolidation of the settlement and the level of 
renting (Gilbert, 1988; Kellett, 1992). This indicator also shows major variations 
between the six settlements (Table 5.4).   
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 Table 5.4 Rate of tenancy in the sampled households in 2000 
 D.Turbay Jerusalén D.Azul La Paz JJR B.Flor 
Rate of 
tenancy 
52.1% 40.3% 42.4% 37.1% 29.7% 20.4% 
 Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from  
January to August 2000. 
 
 From these three indicators: level of land occupation; physical condition of the 
houses and rate of tenancy, the physical consolidation level in 2000 of the six case-study 
settlements is, from highest to lowest: Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul, Jerusalén, La Paz, 
JJR and Bella Flor (see Table 5.5).  
 
Table 5.5 Score of the sum of three indicators 7  
D.Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
4.7 3.5 3.9 3.3 2.3 1.2 
    Source: Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. 
 
Level of provision of basic public services 
Basic public services and social infrastructure available in the barrio reflect the level of 
consolidation of the settlement.  
 
Public utility service availability   
As shown in Table 5.6, Danubio Azul and La Paz were ultimately better equipped than 
Diana Turbay and Jerusalén in terms of completion of street paving, but before 2000, 
the latter two settlements were more advanced in terms of service infrastructure. JJR 
and Bella Flor, meanwhile, were less consolidated due to the delay in completing the 
water supply and sewerage system. 
 
 
                                                  
7 For example, the score of Diana Turbay was calculated as 
[0.98+0.721+0.737+0.988+0.784+0.521=4.73]. The same method was adopted for the other cases. 
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Table 5.6 Public services available in the six settlements  
 Diana Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
Water* 1995 1989 1996 1999 2002 2000 
Electricity* 1995 1990 1997 1998 1999 1999 
Sewerage* 1995 1998 1999 2000 2004 Not yet in 
2004 
Street 
paving** 
Most 
streets 
Most 
streets 
2000 2001 Main street 
Only 
Main street
Only 
Bus stop 
/terminal 
1 3 1 None 1 nearby None 
Source: Interviews with residents in 2000 and follow-up research in 2001, 2003 and 2004. 
Notes: *Years show time of installation or commencement of service provided properly by public 
service companies.  
**Year completed. 
 
Provision of social services   
As shown in Table 5.7 and the maps shown in Figures 5.1 to Figure 5.6, Diana Turbay 
and Jerusalén were the best equipped in terms of education and primary health care. 
Diana Turbay is the only settlement with a police patrol box within the barrio.8 
Jerusalén stands out with regard to the activities of NGOs devoted to social and cultural 
development. Danubio Azul, which has a number of private schools, is the third best 
equipped. By contrast, La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor lag behind considerably in facilities 
for social services, in education as well as health.  
                                                  
8 Though a police patrol box was built in Danubio Azul in August 2006. 
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Table 5.7 Provision of social service facilities 
 D. Turbay Jerusalén Danubio Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor
Kindergarte
n/day 
nursery 
Various 
private 
and 
HOBISs* 
Various 
private, 
one public 
and 
HOBISs 
Various private 
and HOBISs 
HOBISs 
only 
HOBISs 
only 
HOBISs 
only 
Primary 
schools 
2 public 8 public 
6 private 
1 public 
6 private 
1 public 
1 private 
No public 
1 private  
No public
 1 private
Secondary 
schools 
Various 
private 
1 public 
3 private 
No public 
2 private  
No public None none 
Primary 
health care 
centres 
1 
CAMI** 
1 private 
2 CAMI  None 1 private none  none 
Community 
hall 
2 3 1 1 1 none 
Police patrol 
box (CAI) 
CAI None None None None none 
Church  1 Catholic  
3 non- 
Catholic  
2 Catholic
5 non- 
Catholic 
1 Catholic 
2 non- 
Catholic 
1 Catholic
1 non- 
Catholic 
1 Catholic 
 
1 Catholic
 
Source: In-depth interviews with residents and on-site observation in 2000. Based on some of the data 
on Jerusalén (Niño and Chaparro, 1998). 
Notes: *HOBIS (Nursery of Family Welfare) is day care services provided by a care-giver from the 
community called a madre comunitaria (community mother). Community mothers are housewives who 
run the HOBIS in their own homes supported by technical and financial assistance from the ICBF 
(Colombian Institute for Family Welfare) (see Libardo, 1999). To run a HOBIS, a woman has to 
receive some training and satisfy certain conditions required by the ICBF.  
**CAMI (Immediate Medical Attention Centre) is a public health care centre run by district subsidy. 
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  The data on service infrastructure shown in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 are summarised 
by scored indicators as shown in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8 Scored indicators of public services 
Score D.Turbay Jerusalén D.Azul La Paz JJR B.Flor 
Water 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Electricity 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Sewerage 3 2 2 1 0 0 
Paving 2 2 3 3 1 1 
Bus stop 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Kindergarten 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Prim. school 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Sec. school 1 2 1 1 0 0 
P.health c. 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Comm. Hall 1 1 1 1 1 0 
CAI 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Church 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Sum 22 18 18 13 8 6 
  Source: Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. 
Note: For water, electricity and sewerage: 3=provided in less than 5 years from the year when the 
land occupation started; 2=provided between 5 and 10 years, 1=provided more than 10 years, 
0=not available in 2000. 
For road paving: 3=fully paved; 2=mostly paved, 1=only the main road paved. 
Bus stop, Primary health care, community hall, CAI (Centre for Immediate Attention): 1= any; 
0=not found. 
Kindergarten: 2=both kindergarten and HOBIS, 1=only HOBIS. 
Primary school and secondary school: 2=both public and private schools found, 1=one of these 
found. 
Church: 2=both Catholic and other protestant churches found, 1=only Catholic church. 
 
Per capita income and average rent 
The level of consolidation is also reflected in indices of living standards such as per 
capita income and average rent. In theory, residents in a settlement that is well served in 
terms of infrastructure and public services are required to pay service fees and 
revaluated land taxes; their level of income is therefore expected to be higher than 
residents of poorly equipped settlements.  
 Table 5.9 shows the average income per capita of the households in the sample 
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survey. In terms of per capita income, the barrios are ranked from the highest to lowest 
as follows: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén, Danubio Azul, La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor.  
 
Table 5.9 Average income per capita of the sampled households (1) 
D. Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR B. Flor  
1,000 
pesos 
US$ 1,000 
pesos 
US$ 1,000 
pesos 
US$ 1,000 
pesos 
US$ 1,000 
pesos 
US$ 1,000 
pesos 
US$
Owner- 
occupant 
189.3 87.4 139.7 64.7 99.1 50.9 81,7 41.9 86.3 39.4 65.0 33.7
Tenant 118.5 54.8 118.6 54.9 96.8 49.7 89.7 46.0 79.7 36.4 51.3 26.7
Other (2) 132.2 61.1 71.3 33.0 89.3 45.9 86.8 44.5 54.0 24.6 90.0 46.7
Total 
average 
152.8 70.6 130.6 60.5 97.9 50.3 84.6 43.4 83.7 38.2 66.3 34.4
Source: Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
Note: (1) The average exchange rate between pesos and the US dollar was calculated for the period 
of the household survey conducted in each case study settlement. See Appendix E.5 for the daily 
exchange rate.  
(2) Other includes freeloaders (usufructos) and those who supervise the house. 
  
 Average rent reflects the valuation of the land and living conditions in the settlement.  
The index of rents would be expected to reflect the same order as the average income 
level, but rents in Danubio Azul were slightly higher than those in Jerusalén (see Table 
5.10).  
 
Table 5.10 Average rent for a tenant renting one room in the sampled households 
     (1,000 pesos) 
  Diana Turbay Jerusalén Danubio Azul La Paz JJR B. Flor 
Rent 118.1 91.9 94.8 69.1 42.7 37.0 
No. 64 63 62 48 35 9 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 
2000.  
 
The discrepancies shown here reflect the differences in levels of transfer of land 
ownership (title deed) between the two settlements (see Table 5.9). As stated in chapter 
4, in the 1980s, transfer of title deeds was not strictly required by the DAPD for the 
regularisation process. However, since the late 1990s, transfer of title deeds has been 
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encouraged and has become a requirement for prompt regularisation. The more clearly 
ownership is established, naturally, the higher the valuation of the land, which in turn is 
reflected, in the rent levels.9
 
Table 5.11 Percentage of owner occupants with a title deed  
 D. Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR B. Flor 
Percentage 91.3% 2.0% 36.3% 0.0% 62.2% 0.0% 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
 
 All indicators considered together, the consolidation level of the barrios studied as of 
2000 was as follows: Without doubt, Diana Turbay enjoyed the highest level of 
consolidation. Jerusalén and Danubio Azul were less well consolidated, but the 
difference between the two was not significant. La Paz was further behind. Bella Flor 
was less well-consolidated than JJR. These two ranked the lowest in terms of 
consolidation (see Table 5.12). 
 
Table 5.12 Total score of consolidation indicators 
 D. Turbay Jerusalén D.Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
Physical 
consolidation  
4.7 3.5 3.9 3.3 2.3 1.2 
Public services 22 18 18  13    8     6 
Income 152.8 130.6 97.9 84.6 83.7 66.3 
Rent 118.1 91.9 94.8 69.1 42.7 37.0 
Holding title 
deed  
0.91 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.62 0.00 
Total 298.51 244.02 214.96 170.00 137.32 110.50 
Source: Table 5.5, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. 
Note: I used the same number as the score when it was given either in percentage or number in 
pesos.  
 
                                                  
9 The study of Mexico City by Ward (1989) indicates the same trend.  
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 PACE OF THE REGULARISATION PROCESS 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 (pages 137-38), the standard regularisation process starts with 
the issue of a resolución by which the Bogotá city authorities recognise the irregular 
settlement. Once the resolución has been issued, residents can feel more secure since 
they know they no longer need to fear eviction. The resolución guarantees that the 
settlement in question is now permitted to start negotiation with public service agencies 
to normalise their utility service infrastructures. Obtaining this resolución, therefore, is 
crucial.  
 The juridical status of the JAC (formation of a JAC and its recognition by the 
DAAC) is another factor closely related to the issuing of the resolución, since the JAC 
is the officially recognised institution of the barrio through which the community can 
communicate with the respective city authorities.  
 Table 5.13 summarises the regularisation process of the six case-study settlements. 
Let us compare this process focusing on the two key points mentioned above. As 
already seen, except for JJR and Bella Flor, the other four settlements (Diana Turbay, 
Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and La Paz) had basic public utility services (water, electricity 
and sewerage) by 2000. However, the time spent between the initial year of occupation 
and the formation of a JAC, and the issue of the necessary resolución was significantly 
different from one to another. 
 First, the time between the beginning of land occupation and establishment of a JAC 
(defined as JAC designation as juridical person) varies. In Diana Turbay it took six 
years, in Jerusalén three years; in Danubio Azul five years; in La Paz four years; in JJR 
three years and in Bella Flor two years.  
 Second, the time between the first recorded land occupation and the issue of the 
resolución also varies. This process took twelve years in Diana Turbay, seven in 
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Jerusalén, ten in Danubio Azul, twelve in La Paz, fifteen in JJR and twenty years in 
Bella Flor.10  
 Until the late 1990s, after issue of the resolución, it was standard process, for water 
and electricity to be supplied first. In general, provision of sewerage was delayed and 
not built in conjunction with the water supply services, since sewers were not 
considered a matter of life or death. Sewerage also required a more complex study of 
the foundations and took more time to construct. Until a sewer system was installed, 
however, street paving could not be completed. Therefore, the regularisation process 
took years in many irregular settlements and in most of the cases, street paving was all 
but abandoned or indefinitely postponed.  
 One might expect that the earlier a barrio was recognised by the city, the faster its 
regularisation would proceed. The findings of this study, however, do not bear this out. 
For example, Jerusalén was recognised relatively quickly, but its level of consolidation 
in 2000 was almost the same or lower than Danubio Azul and Diana Turbay, where 
much more time had passed between the initial year of land occupation, formation of its 
JAC and issue of the resolución. Under urban regulations, public service agencies 
cannot start normalisation of service infrastructure before a settlement is recognised by 
the city, but in the case of Bella Flor, public services were provided before the issue of 
the resolución. In the case of Diana Turbay, even before the approval of its JAC, 
provisional services such as water and electricity were provided. Water was generally 
provided before electricity but in the cases of La Paz, Bella Flor and JJR, electricity was 
normalised before water services.  
 What were the reasons for these discrepancies? As shown in chapter 4, institutional 
reforms in Bogotá in the 1990s were bringing about changes in the legal framework of 
regularisation, which in general speeded up the process. How were the changes reflected 
in the six cases?  
                                                  
10 The resolución for Bella Flor was never issued during my follow up research, but was finally 
issued in May 2005. 
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 HISTORY OF THE SIX BARRIOS 
 
Each history will describe by whom the barrio was founded and how the inhabitants 
met their basic needs. The chronological review will introduce the main outside actors 
who intervened and describe significant anecdotal evidence, which will help to 
understand why the pace of regularisation differed in each settlement.  
 
Diana Turbay 
Diana Turbay was founded by the politician Alfredo Guerrero Estrada. Guerrero Estrada 
promoted irregular settlement both as a means of building his political constituency 
among the poor of Bogotá and as a means of personal financial gain. The construction 
of Diana Turbay began in 1981, but its origins date back to 1979. That year a group of 
people invaded housing built for the metropolitan police of Bogotá in the San Cristóbal 
locality. The Mayor of Bogotá, Jaime Durán Dussan, asked Guerrero Estrada, who at 
the time was alcalde menor11of San Cristóbal, to find a way to relocate the invaders 
peacefully.  
 Guerrero Estrada convinced the invaders to leave the occupied houses, promising 
them an alternative place to settle through new urban development. In 1980 he 
purchased part of a farm which became the settlement of Diana Turbay. He created an 
organisation called the Popular Housing Cooperative of Southeast Bogotá through 
which he organised a collective self-help housing programme. People who wanted a lot 
in this settlement were required to join this cooperative.12 When the programme began 
in 1981, more than 4,000 families signed up as members of the cooperative. They paid a 
membership fee of 2,000 pesos and purchased a housing lot on a flexible instalment 
                                                  
11 This is the head administrator of the locality (localidad), who was appointed by the Mayor of 
Bogotá until 1991. 
12 The settlement was named after Diana Turbay, daughter of ex-president of Colombia, Turbay 
Ayala, who was his personal secretary during Turbay’s presidential period (1979-82). 
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plan.  
 Guerrero Estrada gave the people an introductory lecture on the principles of 
community participation, communal work, and other self-help strategies. Land 
readjustment was the first communal project, carried out under the supervision of 
Guerrero Estrada and engineers in his employ. He also provided heavy machinery for 
excavations and road-building. Provisional infrastructure for public services was created 
through collective self-help. Housing was constructed by individual members of the 
community. Guerrero Estrada ran a brickyard nearby which sold bricks to the 
inhabitants.13
 In 1982, Guerrero Estrada was elected to the city council thanks to an electoral 
campaign supported by the working committees of the Cooperative of Diana Turbay. 
He won the following election to the city council for the period 1985-87, and also 
became a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress in 1988 thanks to 
the voters of Diana Turbay. He was re-elected to the House of Representatives in 1992 
but his strong political influence in the development of the settlement was most 
effective in the period up to the end of the 1980s. During this period, the political 
patron-client relationship between him and the settlement inhabitants worked effectively 
to facilitate the provision of public services. There were two principal water mains in 
Diana Turbay from which inhabitants easily obtained drinking water thorough hose 
connection. The committee leaders of the Cooperative also mobilised the inhabitants to 
obtain electricity by illegal connection to neighbouring settlements. Some inhabitants 
worked for the EEB and negotiated to the use of the wooden telegraph poles. Through 
these processes, Guerrero exerted political pressure in the negotiations with the EAAB 
and the EEB, and soon the provisional service system was established. By 1985 the 
settlement was divided into nine sectors (Sp. sector; subsections) most of them were 
named after the heroes of the war of independence. A working committee was formed 
                                                  
13 The brickyard was not run on a charitably basis, but as a business from which Guerrero Estrada 
made money. 
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in each sector, mainly directed by the coordinators of the Cooperative, but Guerrero was 
reluctant for the inhabitants to create JACs (interview with ex-community leaders, 
Leonor Unibio, Santos Maldonado and José Pinto, August 2000). 
 Diana Turbay took longer than the other five settlements for the issue of juridical 
person status of the JACs as well as for the resolución. Two factors explain the delay in 
Diana Turbay’s recognition by the city. The first was related to its location. The 
settlement was located outside the urban perimeter as defined by Agreement No. 7/1979. 
Therefore, it could not obtain the resolución under the framework of urban regulation at 
that time (see chapter 3, page 133). However, thanks to Guerrero Estrada’s political 
influence, Diana Turbay was able to obtain most of the public services it needed without 
the resolución (which was the prerequisite for regularisation), therefore this matter was 
of little concern to both the community and Guerrero Estrada himself. When the new 
law (Agreement No.6/1990) made Diana Turbay eligible for regularisation, the 
resolución was finally obtained. 
 The second factor was the conflict which emerged between the community leaders 
and Guerrero Estrada. Although the provisional services benefited the communities, the 
infrastructure was not evenly provided to all sectors and there was much still to do in 
terms of the physical upgrading of the barrio. Having established the JACs in 1987, the 
inhabitants started to struggle for regularisation. However, from the view of the 
communities, Guerrero Estrada was not interested in the process and neglected to 
transfer the title deeds to the inhabitants. This negligence slowed down the process of 
obtaining the resolución. According to the ex-leaders’ remarks, Guerrero’s political and 
economic interest in Diana Turbay was waning and he began creating other popular 
settlements in different localities. The JAC leaders had to mobilise the members of the 
Cooperative to make the DANCOOP (National Administrative Department for 
Cooperatives) and other related institutions to cite Guerrero Estrada for negotiation. The 
transfer of the deeds was finally accomplished in 1992 by order of the DAPD. Guerrero 
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liquidated the Cooperative without giving a statement of final accounts in 1994. After 
that, Guerrero’s political influence as well as the inhabitants’ support for him declined 
rapidly. 
 After 1995, the basic public services: water and sewerage and power system were all 
regularised. Individual connections were renewed and a meter was installed to charge 
for installation costs as well as consumption. For this renewal, the communities 
accepted the co-finance programme offered by the EAAB. As for electricity, firstly the 
EEB came to replace the posts and cables in 1995 and then after privatisation, 
CODENSA intervened to install individual meters to normalise the charges. In the 
meantime, the users paid only the minimum flat service charge. Additionally a public 
school run by the District and a public medical care centre (CAMI) was built in the 
barrio, after much effort by the JAC leaders and a JAL representative (edil) living in the 
settlement. Efforts were also made to establish a transport service and the construction 
of a police patrol box (CAI) in this period. 
 However, there were remarkable differences among the internal sectors in Diana 
Turbay. Although occupation in all the settlements began at the same time, the 
regularisation process varied from one part to another depending on the topographical 
conditions. Sectors located in the central and plain area such as Vencederos, Comuneros, 
Lanceros, Plan 95 and Plan Especial progressed faster than those in the more remote, 
steeply inclined part, such as Ayacucho, Valle, and Rincón del Valle (see Figure 5.1). 
The least developed sector, Rincón del Valle, did not have a complete sewer system or 
paved roads until 2000.  
 Local as well as international NGOs (mentioned above) began to intervene from the 
late 1980s onwards, particularly in the fields of day nurseries, non-formal education and 
primary health care.  
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Sunday market in the main street, Lancero sector (June 2000).
Paved arameda above Media Torta sector (August 2000).
Figure 5.2 Photographs of Diana Turbay settlement
Consolidated sectors (August 2000).
Edge of Rincón del Valle sector (August 2001).
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Jerusalén  
Jerusalén was started in 1982 on land that was originally a farm owned by the Gaviria 
family, one of the biggest landowners in Bogotá. The area was divided between two 
members of the family.14 One part was sub-divided by land brokers, who created an 
association for land sale. This was the origin of Jerusalén. Called the South Organisation 
Society (la Sociedad Organizadora del Sur), it started with 32 core members and one of 
them (Pedro Borda) was put in charge of signing the certificates of land transactions. 
These members had names like ‘Evangelista’, ‘Tomás’, ‘San Pedro Borda’, ‘Celso 
Cordero’, ‘el doctor Carvajal’, ‘los Albarracín’, ‘los Contreras’, ‘Romero’, ‘Beltrán’ and 
so on, most of which were assumed or alias names. As the business of land sub-division 
expanded, they hired commissioners specialising in land sales and then disappeared 
from the barrio (the interview with Carmen Fernández, community leader of 
Tanque-Laguna sector, 1 November 2003; Alape,1995; Niño and Chaparro, 1998; 
Morales, 1993).  
 María Cholo and Nohemí Ríos were two local women who had been employed by 
the landowner and permitted to live there as watchwomen-supervisors of the land. The 
land developers convinced these women to overlook their sub-division of the land for 
sale in exchange for their own individual lot. Later, María and Nohemí joined the 
Association and became involved in the illegal land sale. They were living in the lowest 
part of Jerusalén, today called ‘Plan-Cantera’, where the land sub-division started in 
1982.  
 In the initial stages (1982-1983) construction in the settlement was predominantly 
through self-help efforts and as a result, relations with the city authorities were ridden 
with conflict. In 1983, a member of the Gaviria family went to the police complaining 
of land invasion on their farm. The policemen came to evict the settlers and had many 
of the settlers’ shacks torn down, but by the next day more of the flimsy dwellings made 
                                                  
14 Elivira Gaviria de Croes and Mercédez Gaviria de Hollman. 
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of scrap timber and other crude materials had appeared (Hernando, interviewee of 
Jerusalén, 2 September 2000). The police soon gave up evicting the settlers, but then 
began to charge a ‘transit tax’ as a bribe for letting settlers bring in building materials.  
 The first projunta (community-based working committee) was formed in 1982. It 
was dedicated to carrying out various tasks such as organising a local security force, 
providing assistance to settlers in bringing in construction materials, and finding ways 
to obtain drinking water from a natural water source in the village of Quiba, two 
kilometres away. 
 At that time, Jerusalén was already divided into nine sectors: Plan-Cantera, 
Plan-Media Loma (today these two together are ‘Plan Cantera-Media Loma’), 
Bellavista-La Ye, Paraíso, Nueva Argentina, Santa Rosita-Las Vegas, Pradera-Esperanza, 
Tanque-Laguna, Potosí La Isla (see Figure 5.3).15  
 In 1985, the JACs of all nine sectors gained the status of juridical person. With 
juridical person status, the JACs were in a stronger position to confront attempts by the 
police to evict settlers as well as to campaign for recognition by the city. 
 Negotiations with public service agencies started before the resolución was issued in 
1989 at the convenience of the agencies. As most of the lower sectors of the barrio 
started out obtaining electricity through illegal connections to power lines in the 
neighbouring settlement, the EEB was faced with claims from that settlement as well as  
requests for service from the inhabitants of Jerusalén. The EEB started provisional 
service by installing a couple of transformers. For water, the settlers set up a 
water-collecting tank to pool water from Quiba, and hoses from each house were 
connected to this. Soon the capacity of this system fell short due to increased population 
so community leaders mobilised the residents to bore a hole in the water main of the 
neighbouring settlement and divert water from it using a hose.  
                                                  
15 Manuela Beltrán was omitted from Jerusalén in the study due to the different origin of land 
occupation. Manuela Beltrán was built by Priest Sepúlveda, the same activist for autonomous 
popular urbanisation who founded barrio JJR. He bought the land formally and then subdivided it 
irregularly.  
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 The mid-1980s was also characterised by the intervention of multiple outside actors. 
In 1985 the armed leftist group the April 19 Movement (M-19)16used Jerusalén as their 
urban hide-out and as a base for recruiting sympathisers in Bogotá. This meant that the 
settlement was labelled a ‘red zone’ which discouraged the Bogotá District authorities 
from intervening during that time. Intervention by the M-19, for its part, sparked 
internal violence. Calling it ‘social cleansing’, the M-19 killed those who had been 
involved in fraudulent land sales. The suspected illegal land brokers then armed and 
organised a ‘civil self-defence force’ to defend themselves against the M-19.  
 Although the Ciudad Bolívar Programme (see chapter 4) benefited the surrounding 
area, no direct investment was made in Jerusalén due to the illegal origins of its land 
occupation. However, as the Ciudad Bolívar locality became a major destination for 
international NGOs and aid organisations, the Jerusalén barrio also benefited from their 
assistance.  
  The Fundación Social17 intervened in Jerusalén from 1986 until 1998. Its 
community-based programme aimed to increase the capacity of the people to improve 
their own living conditions. The programme covered a wide range of fields such as 
health, housing, youth and day nursery care.18 The Fundación Social provided technical 
assistance as well as financial support to the small projects organised by the people’s 
working groups. Intervention of the Fundación Social was influential, but it was not 
necessarily welcomed by all the residents, since some leaders feared losing their 
clientelistic relations with political patrons and others feared having their autonomous 
leadership challenged (Interview with ex-coordinator of the Fundación Social 
intervention in Jerusalén, 17 May 2000). 
 The Fundación Social also financed the construction of a centre of activities for 
                                                  
16 One of the major leftist guerrilla groups active during the 1960s to 1980s. In 1990, after the peace 
agreement with the national government, the M-19 put down their arms. 
17 This is the NGO backed by the Jesuit Foundation and the Colmena Corporation (one of the biggest 
CAVs in Colombia). Jerusalén was presumably a potential market for social housing through CAV 
Colmena, but this potential was not realised. 
18 Most of the day nurseries were run by community mothers. See the note for Table 5.7.  
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recruiting community leaders, named CELODIJE (Local Centre of Development for 
Jerusalén). The CELODIJE building located in the Bellavista-La Ye sector was 
inaugurated in 1987.  
 ISNEM (Social Institute for Adult Education) was another influential NGO that 
began to work in the upper sector of Jerusalén (currently Potosí-La Isla) in 1983. 
ISNEM’s mission was to promote primary education and a literacy (alfabetización) 
programme for the poor. It set up primary health care and non-formal education 
programmes for children. In 1984, ISNEM built an educational facility in Potosí-La Isla, 
the origin of the present ICES (Hillside Institute of the South), a private school for 
primary and secondary education. In 1985 ICES set up primary education and evening 
literacy classes for adults. The teachers at the ICES soon got involved in other 
community problems and became leaders of the sector. Evaristo Bernate, head of the 
teachers, had a charismatic personality as well as a strong commitment to socialism 
(Corporación Taliber-Grupo de Danzas Colegio ICES-ISNEM, 1998). He soon gained 
the support of the inhabitants and was elected president of the JAC in 1988. His 
political orientation did not harmonise well with the paternalistic orientation of other 
NGOs or with the other community leaders who clung to the clientelistic support of 
local politicians. His rebellious attitude and strong emphasis on autonomous community 
struggle kept the other external institutions from approaching the sector.19 Additionally 
he was criticised as being sympathetic to the M-19 and created a rival sect in Potosí-La 
Isla. Finally he was murdered in 1992. His successors, who were also teachers at the 
ICES, led the JAC in the 1990s. Due to the ‘rebellious spirit’ image of its 
community-based struggle, Potosí-La Isla was left behind in the overtures to the city 
government for regularisation and became one of the less developed areas of Jerusalén. 
The ICES still plays a key role in the community and one of the teachers, Leonidas 
                                                  
19 For example, according to the testimony of an ex-activist of the Fundación Social, the group had 
difficulty intervening in the sector Potosí La Isla. Evaristo was ideologically opposed to the 
intervention of any outside actor that seemed to him to infringe upon the autonomy of the 
community. 
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Ospina has been identified as one of the best recognised community leaders of the 
sector (see chapter 6).  
 Politicians were also actively involved. Rafael Forero Fetecua made available heavy 
machinery for opening up the land and excavating roads (Cabrera, 1985). He also 
provided a water tank truck for water sales and two electricity transformers in the very 
early period before the respective public agencies provided the proper infrastructure.  
 All these actors together helped the community to learn how to negotiate with the 
state. Finally in 1989 Jerusalén was recognised by the city and the resolución issued. 
After that, regularisation progressed steadily. The EAAB provided official standard 
pipes for drinking water in 1989, and then expanded the network for distribution. Lalo 
Gil, a community leader based in Manuela Beltrán sector, pressured the EAAB for 
normalisation of the water supply, which was finally accomplished in 1992. He ran for 
the position of edil and won the second election of the JAL in 1995. His influence was 
particularly strong in the lower and flatland sectors.  
 The EEB maintained provisional services with a flat, unified charge. For sewerage, 
the process was delayed due to topographical difficulties in some areas, but from 1992 
onwards, construction gradually made headway and finished in 1996. The community 
of Jerusalén continued pressuring the District authorities and public service agencies, 
claiming their right of access to basic public services. Their dissatisfaction with the 
response of the District authorities ended with a civic strike in 1993. This was the 
biggest protest in the 1990s, involving the Ciudad Bolívar locality as a whole.  
 From the mid 1990s to 2000, community-based activism in Jerusalén has shifted its 
focus to problems caused by reform of the tariff regime and privatisation of the EEB. 
They launched protests at the respective agencies calling for reduction of service 
charges. Community leaders requested meetings with these public agencies to discuss 
the increase in charges, although with no concrete result. From late 1999 to 2000, they 
organised a couple of demonstrations at the head office of the ETB as well as at 
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CODENSA, calling for lowering of service charges (El Tiempo, 2000). 
 Another serious problem for Jerusalén was the lawsuit filed by the Gaviria family 
against the District of Bogotá demanding compensation for the value of the land taken 
over from them by urbanisation. As a result, in 2000, the resolución was suspended, 
which further impeded upgrading projects (especially paving) in the settlement. 
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Figure 5.4 Photographs of Jerusalén settlement
Panoramic view of Tanque Laguna sector taken from Potosí La Isla sector (October 1999).
Edge of the Potosí la Isla sector with view of 
Caracolí settlement in the background (October 1999).
Recreation area and school in Tanque Laguna sector (October 1999).
Typical consolidated houses (August 2001). 
Edge of Plan Cantela-Media Loma sector (August 2001). 
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Danubio Azul  
The barrio Danubio Azul has grown up on the land of two different landowners. Sector 
A (upper part of the barrio) was property belonging to ColCerámica (a ceramic 
company of Corona group), one of the country’s principal producers of ceramic goods. 
The lower part, Sector B, was part of an ancient, state-owned farm called Chiguasa.20  
 ColCerámica had held the land corresponding to Sector A since the 1950s as a quarry 
for kaolin clay, the raw material for tiles and other products. After the kaolin supply was 
exhausted in the mid-1970s, the land was abandoned until a certain party filed a claim 
of ownership in 1978. Then, the police put up no-trespassing signs, built a fence around 
the land, and set up a watchman’s hut. 
 While the ownership of the land was in dispute, the property was supposedly under 
the control of the police, but in practice it was unsupervised. Taking advantage of the 
situation, a group of land-invading brokers led by Aniceto Rojas began illegal land 
sub-division not only in Sector A, but also in Sector B. Many of the early settlers bought 
lots from Aniceto Rojas and most of the certificates of land sale were signed by him.  
 The 1978 claim of landownership was found to be fraudulent and was settled in 
favour of Azulejos Corona, the predecessor of ColCerámica, in 1988. However, the suit 
kept Azulejos Corona from taking care of the land and when his representatives visited 
the land again, occupation by settlers living in flimsily built shacks had advanced 
considerably.  
 Finally, the Corona company gave up ownership of the land and placed it under 
supervision of an affiliated organisation, ‘Fundación Corona’ (a non-profit organisation 
financed by Corona to develop projects for social welfare) with the aim of further 
reconciliation with the settlers. Fundación Corona decided to facilitate the transfer of 
title deeds to the land to individual settlers (current owners), requiring them to pay only 
for the paperwork. The transfer of title deeds in Sector A was conducted gradually 
                                                  
20 At first, it was considered that the land belonged to the Ministry of Justice, but after analysis by 
the CVP, it was revealed that the land came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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(interview of Miguel Núñez, employed of Fundación Corona, 30 October 2003).  
 The land in Sector B had also been sub-divided and sold by land brokers, but it was 
categorised as invasion of state property, so no activity corresponding to transfer of title 
deeds was conducted during the 1990s. 
 The land occupation process accelerated in 1988, when Ramón Agudelo purchased a 
lot to settle there. He encouraged former neighbours and tenants to come together and 
build their own houses. Ramón became the first president of the JAC and it was he who 
named the barrio Danubio Azul. 
   Ramón was a competent and effective community leader, since during his 
presidency he succeeded in negotiating with the public service companies for 
regularisation for the settlement. However, at the same time, testimony by some 
inhabitants, as well as the prosecution documents submitted to the justice sector of the 
DAAC, reveal that Ramón cheated the inhabitants by illegal sale of the lots. For 
example, he resold lots that had already been sold to other inhabitants. He also came 
into conflict with Aniceto Rojas over the transfer of title deeds. Aniceto Rojas and his 
fellow land brokers never lived in Danubio Azul, except in the very initial stages, they 
seldom appeared in the barrio and eventually disappeared for good, leaving the rest of 
the business in the hands of the barrio leaders, led by Ramón.21  
 In terms of recognition by the DAAC, Danubio Azul is made up of one sector, run by 
one JAC. However, there were two more community-based organisations, which 
competed with the JAC. These were ASINDESODA (Danubio Azul Asociation for 
Integration and Social Development) and Prodesarrollo. These two organisations were 
run by ex-leaders of the JAC. After a disagreement on the inner politics of JAC, three of 
its leaders created independent organisations. Both organisations obtained juridical 
person status as community-based organisations to serve social development in the 
                                                  
21 Testimonies of the inhabitants indicate that many of the brokers (who sold the land to settlers) in 
the initial stages of urbanisation either absconded or were killed. Their sales practices caused 
problems and violence amongst themselves and with the settlers to whom they sold the lots, who 
accused them of fraud and threatened to kill them. 
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settlement. ASINDESODA, led by José (until the middle of 2000) had a leftist 
ideological background. Prodesarrollo, led by Coronado, supported the Liberal party 
and became a rival political organisation opposing the JACs in electoral campaigns for 
Bogotá city mayor. Relations among the three have been contentious, leading to violent 
incidents in the community. Ramón Agudelo was eventually shot dead in public, during 
a community assembly. His widow (Inés) suspected the leader of ASINDESODA to be 
responsible for the murder, but there was no evidence.22 However, it was also suggested 
that Ramón may have been killed due to problems caused by his illegal land 
transactions.23
 The regularisation of Danubio Azul moved remarkably quickly after the projunta 
was created in 1989. The first JAC was soon organised and gained juridical person 
status in May 1990. Ramón became the first president of the JAC, and coordinated the 
efforts of the inhabitants in obtaining water and electricity by illegal connection to the 
neighbouring settlement supply lines. He then started negotiations with public service 
agencies endeavouring to attain normalisation of the services. However, after that the 
regularisation of the settlement did not run as smoothly, since certain parts of Danubio 
Azul overlapped with areas of environmental preservation and were considered unsafe 
for construction. After a topographical analysis and the relocation of several households 
from the areas in question following intervention by the DPAE,24 the settlement was 
eventually recognised in 1994. 
 In February 1995, the community organised a big civic strike to demand that the 
                                                  
22 The leader of ASINDESODA was threatened with ostracism from Danubio Azul on suspicion of 
this murder. 
23 Ramón and his family (especially his widow, Inés) may have been the principal pirate land 
brokers. Some testimonies from the inhabitants reveal that Ramón Agudelo’s family held the title 
deeds of some residents’ housing lots without transferring them to the residents, even after 
Fundación Corona started the transfer of individual ownership to the residents. Ramón worked hard 
to push the regularisation process for public services, but his main motivation in working for the 
community seems to have been to benefit from the increase of land prices. 
24 The DPAE (Direction of Prevention and Attention of Emergency) is the direction of Bogotá 
District city administration in charge of relocation programmes for people whose residences are 
designated as located on land not suitable for housing construction. 
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District authorities and the public service companies accelerate the regularisation 
process. The inhabitants occupied Caracas Avenue blocking traffic for two whole days, 
until finally the representatives of the public service companies such as the ETB, EEB, 
EAAB, IDU, as well as representatives of the Mayor and the DAPD came to talk to 
them. The District authorities representatives tried to convince the inhabitants to 
suspend the blockade, guaranteeing that regularisation would be expedited. After the 
demonstration, the regularisation process was pushed ahead, and in July 1995, the 
agreement between the community and the EAAB was signed for a project to renew the 
water supply system. In December of the same year, the resolución recognising the 
settlement was issued. Water supply, sewerage system and electricity were provided 
during 1995-96. 
 The JAC leaders worked hard to tap other sources of funding from the city 
government. In 1997, the Danubio Azul JAC was chosen by the OSP (Work with an 
Educational Outcome; see chapter 4 for details) programme financed by the DAAC for 
a project to build a community park. Through this project the community built a park in 
an area marked as vulnerable to soil subsidence. This area had been the central kaolin 
clay quarry site, and when the residents moved in, there were huge holes in the land. 
The DPAE strongly recommended relocation of the settlers who were living near the 
holes, because of problems with drainage and pollution. The JAC leaders mobilised the 
inhabitants, especially those living in the surrounding areas, to participate as community 
labour in the OSP’s scheme. The ground was filled in order to build a firm foundation 
for the park and as a result, the families at risk were saved from relocation. 
  A further, decisive stage of regularisation came when Danubio Azul was selected as 
an area for intervention in the first stage of the De-marginalisation Programme 
(explained in chapter 4). From the viewpoint of the District administration, keeping an 
eye on this settlement was the most effective strategy for maintaining public order in 
this area and staving off another damaging civic strike. The infrastructure for a drainage 
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system to handle heavy rainfall and the paving of internal roads in the settlement were 
completed under the De-marginalisation Programme. 
 As for the presence of NGOs, Fe y Alegría (an NGO sponsored by a Catholic 
organisation in Spain) and groups belonging to the Catholic parish church of the 
neighbourhood,25 have made great contributions. Fe y Alegría runs a private school 
which provides both primary and secondary education and is considered to be the best 
of Danubio Azul’s educational institutions. Members of the clergy (Catholic priests and 
sisters) are engaged in social welfare activities set up under the leadership of Father 
Manolo, head priest (from 1991 until 2005) of the parish church for the neighbourhood 
which includes Danubio Azul and La Paz. Manolo coordinated community-based work 
in the fields of education, health and nutrition. A typical example was is the creation of 
a community restaurant for needy children (comedor infantil). Community volunteers 
run the restaurant, which provides lunch and a snack between meals to children in the 
settlements at minimal prices. Manolo was very charismatic and his work was much 
praised by residents of all political persuasions. The sisters’ group has been dedicated to 
non-formal educational efforts for adolescents with the aim of reducing juvenile 
delinquency and other social problems such as juvenile pregnancy, domestic violence, 
mistreatment of children, and so on.  
                                                  
25 This is the concept of parroquia, or geographical parish unit by which people attend the Catholic 
Church. This unit became customary in Spain, and, after its introduction in the colonial period, 
spread through most Latin American countries. The members of one parroquia usually come from 
two or more settlements (barrios). In this case, the corresponding parroquia, called Fiscala, includes 
the Fiscala, Danubio Azul, La Paz and other settlements. 
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Installation of sewerage system financed by the de- 
marginalisation programme (February 2000). 
Finishing the pavement (June 2000). 
Figure 5.6 Photographs of Danubio Azul settlement
Community assembly at the recreation area (January 2000). 
View of Sector A before the intervention of the de-
marginalisation programme (January 2000).
Panoramic view of Danubio Azul after completion of  
the de-marginalisation programme, taken from La Paz  
showing the arameda avenue in between (August 2004). 
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La Paz 
La Paz is located immediately to the north of Danubio Azul, but its development has 
been very different. The whole of La Paz was long considered to belong to the 
state-owned Chiguasa farm (in the same way as Sector B of the Danubio Azul barrio). 
In 1984, a group of activists from Provivienda backed by the Communist Party 
promoted a massive invasion involving approximately 500 families. This group was 
called ‘Civic Movement for Peace’ from which the name of the settlement came.26  
 Another testimony explained that the watchmen of the Picota Jail built their own 
houses near the jail, currently part of the barrio of La Paz. Later these watchmen 
sub-divided the land into housing lots to sell.  
 However, the majority of the land was urbanised by professional land sub-dividers 
using illegal methods who began selling the land in 1985. These sub-dividers were 
identified by the inhabitants as: ‘Black María’, ‘Bald Fernández’, Alfredo Guerrero 
Estrada, Yudí Consuelo Pipelón, Evarito Guerrero, Ciervo Cruz, Blanca, Ciro Antonio 
Flores, José Beltrán and Gustavo Espitia. Enrique Sampedro Borda was the head of the 
sub-dividers and signed most of the certificates of land transaction. Most of those 
named above did not live in the settlement, and some were killed in conflicts sparked by 
their own fraudulent land transactions. Soon after the land-sub-division started, the land 
sub-dividers had already sub-contracted to a few of the first settlers of the barrio, who 
took charge of land sales in their place. As the pirate urbanisation of La Paz became 
common knowledge, more potential buyers came and the land sale business became 
more competitive. On occasion the settlers re-sold lots previously sold to someone else 
who had not yet taken up residence. According to the testimonies of the residents in La 
Paz, many lots were re-sold more than once (Flor del Carmen, interviewee of La Paz, 18 
June 2000).   
                                                  
26 Based on the interview to Miguel Angel Caicedo, ex-leading member of the JAC of the Torre 
sector and on the interview to Nelson Velazco, community leader and edil of the Usme locality from 
2004. 
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 José Naranjos was the first president of the JAC of the sector named after him. He 
was himself engaged in the land sub-division business but worked for the community as 
the barrio’s first leader. The relationship between Naranjos and the land brokers was not 
clearly understood, and the stories of the inhabitants surveyed suggested that his land 
sale business had been consigned to him by the initial land sub-dividers. 
 The occupation process started from the central and rather steeply inclined sectors, 
currently named Naranjos, La Torre and Caracas. The flattest and most topographically 
advantageous places such as Cebadal Medio and Cebedal Chicó were the last to be 
occupied.  
 During the initial period (1984-1986), there were frequent attempts by the police to 
evict settlers. Sometimes the policemen demanded a bribe in exchange for allowing 
settlers to stay on the land. If people refused to pay, they risked assault by the police.  
 The projunta (the first working committee) was organised in 1985 representing the 
entire area of present-day La Paz. At the beginning, the committee was called the Civic 
Committee for Peace derived from the activism of Provivienda. However Provivienda 
failed to expand their leadership to include new comers during the first few years. By 
1987, La Paz had been divided into four sectors: Torre, Naranjos, Caracas and Cebadal, 
and each sector organised its own JAC. By then, the influence of Provivienda had 
mostly disappeared. Recognition by the DAAC was delayed. Juridical person status was 
finally received in 1988 for one unified JAC for the whole settlement. Later in 1989 
individual juridical person status was given to the JAC for each sector.  
 Issue of the resolución was delayed until 1996. Public services were supplied in the 
meantime through collective self-help action. Community leaders took the initiative to 
organise residents, and they acquired a provisional system for water supply as well as 
for electric power by illegal connection to neighbouring settlements in the same area.  
 In the late 1980s, the head of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality (alcalde menor) provided 
the inhabitants with machinery to build internal roads. Guerrero Estrada, city councillor 
 249
and promoter of Diana Turbay, supported the community in pressuring the public 
service agencies (e.g., EAAB and EEB) to respond to their need for normalisation of 
services. 
 For water service, at first the JACs coordinated illegal hose connections to supply 
lines for the neighbouring settlement of Palermo. Following this, the people organised a 
sit-in protest at the offices of the EAAB to demand water delivery by water tank truck. 
As a result, water supply by tank truck continued for almost six months. After the civic 
strike in 1990, held jointly with Danubio Azul, the EAAB introduced a provisional 
service charging a minimum fixed rate, called ‘Plan 50,’ which meant that the user was 
charged for 50 cubic metres per month. However, this system was not acceptable to the 
residents, since the rationalisation of consumption was not reflected in the payment. So, 
people again organised a collective sit-in demonstration at the EAAB’s offices in 1993. 
The EAAB’s Division of Community Action responded by negotiating with the JACs 
and finally agreed a contract to install a local water supply network under the 
programme currently called ‘community participation’. In this programme, the 
community should pay a pre-determined percentage of the total cost of the work for 
individual connection to the network in advance. The rest of the cost should be paid for 
using a two to three-year loan.27 However this programme was successful only in the 
Cebadal sectors. Its failure in the other sectors was firstly as a result of the residents 
finding it difficult to pay the required amount and secondly because there was 
corruption among the JAC leaders in the management of community payments. The 
EAAB ultimately decided to invest without relying on co-finance from the community 
in building the water supply infrastructure for the barrio.28  
 To obtain an electricity supply, the people of La Paz organised their first civic strike 
                                                  
27 I will call this sort of programme a ‘community co-finance programme’. 
28 This option resulted in higher monthly payments for users. The cost of installation of the local 
network of water pipes was charged (with long-term credit) in addition to the fees for individual 
consumption and installation of internal connection and of a meter, thus in sum, charges added up to 
40,000 pesos per month in 2000, which was more expensive than the regular monthly charge for a 
stratification 3 (middle-income) stratum community. 
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in 1989. In 1990, the EEB installed provisional transformers at several sites and people 
started to pay a fixed minimum charge.  
 State intervention was minimal and the regularisation process for La Paz was 
practically abandoned during the 1980s. In 1999, however, after being selected as one of 
the target areas of intervention under the South Bogotá Project, La Paz was suddenly 
converted into one of the best cared for areas in the city of Bogotá.  
 With the arrival of CODENSA, the normalisation of power delivery and the 
installation of a meter at every individual dwelling were completed in 1997-1998. By 
September 2001, most of the physical upgrading projects, such as the rainfall drainage 
system, sewerage and paving of internal roads were completed.  
 Since 2001, the transfer of individual housing lots has been studied by the 
legalisation division of the CVP, with the aim of legalising the settlement in favour of 
the inhabitants, under the category of special transfer of state property for social 
housing.29
 The community leaders’ tendency to rely on clientelistic relations with local 
politicians continued into the 1990s. In 2000, Nubia Medrano, one of the ediles 
(representatives of JAL) of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality, and her colleague, councillor 
Severo Correa, were highly influential. Some of the projects that benefited La Paz (for 
example, building a community hall for the Caracas sector) were funded by FDL (Local 
Development Fund), after she submitted a proposal. In this way, she gained the support 
of the inhabitants, but the key element was her patron-client relationship with the JAC 
president of the Cebadal sectors, Agapito García.30  
                                                  
29 This process will take a long time, because one of the pirate developers who sub-divided many 
plots of La Paz asserted his right of ownership, and, while the court once supported his claim in the 
District civil court, the CVP later overturned the judgement. 
30 A typical example of her political intervention is illustrated by an incident where she pressured the 
Mayor into modifying the design for a local road construction project according to the inhabitants’ 
preferences, rather than following the technical specifications recommended by Project South 
Bogotá. 
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Figure 5.8 Photographs of La Paz settlement
‘Olla’. This area is considered by locals to be a ‘red zone’(high risk) at the edge of  
la Torre sector on the border between La Paz and Danubio Azul (December 1999).  
Rudimentary ‘steps’ made from used tyres (December 1999).
Community participation in a paving project financed by the 
Bogotá South Project (February 2000).
The Catholic church in La Torre sector showing the paved 
road financed by the Bogotá South Project (August 2001).
Caracas Sector, after the completion of work to 
upgrade the infrastructure financed by the Bogotá 
South Project (August 2004).
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Juan José Rondón (JJR) 
JJR was created as a social housing programme settlement based on communal work 
under the guidance of Father Saturnino Sepúlveda. A Catholic priest and community 
activist, he also had a background in sociology. He initiated the practice of mobilising 
communal labour for social development in the rural sector in the early 1970s,31 and 
then applied a similar programme to community development for urban areas in Bogotá 
during the 1980s. He created a community-based self-help organisation called ‘Integral 
Community Companies’ under which he conducted social development programmes at 
16 sites in Bogotá; JJR was one of them. Its principal aim was to provide social housing 
for the poorest sector through collective self-help management.  
 Saturnino did follow the regular procedures for settling urban areas, but he was not 
interested in negotiating with the city authorities to obtain public services. The 
participants in the programme were required to attend a training course of 40 hours in 
total, which was composed of theory of community work, human relations and basic 
engineering skills for construction.  
 Saturnino purchased part of a farm called San José that corresponds to the upper part 
(called the First Sector) of JJR today. He began sub-dividing the land in 1983, and sold 
each housing plot, with an area of 72 square metres (6m x 12m), unequipped with basic 
services, at an average of 30,000 pesos with the option to pay by instalments.  
 Saturnino helped inhabitants to obtain basic services during the initial stage of 
development. He rented heavy machinery to prepare the land, adjust the size of housing 
lots and to create internal roads. The participants in the programme affiliated with the 
JJR Association were organised into small groups for communal tasks. Other basic 
public services were also performed by community-based self-help work. In the initial 
stage, the inhabitants of JJR tapped natural sources of water such as a spring on a 
neighbouring farm, but as the number of inhabitants increased, this supply proved 
                                                  
31 He introduced a system called ‘rural community self-management companies.’ 
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insufficient. Saturnino’s aim was to build a utopian community based on autonomous 
management by residents, so he rejected any kind of intervention by the city 
administration. One group of inhabitants, however, did not accept his inflexible 
adherence to the principle of self-management, so the community eventually divided 
into two groups: ‘pro’ Saturnino and ‘anti’ Saturnino. What started off as minor friction 
between the inhabitants and Saturnino, escalated to the point of death threats being 
made against Saturnino. He ultimately left JJR in 1986, appointing one of the 
community leaders, Canizares, as president of the JJR Association in charge of 
transferring the individual title deeds to each plot of land to the settlers. 
  After this, the struggle for public services started through the JAC leadership which 
was formed in 1986. The inhabitants negotiated with the owner of a brewery located 1 
km away for permission to tap water from a mountain stream running through the 
factory property. The community built three water tanks32 to serve as supply reservoirs 
and finally water supply from the brewery started in 1990. The water was distributed to 
individual houses by hoses connected to the water tanks. The inhabitants appointed a 
person to be in charge of maintaining this communal water-supply system.33 Each 
household was expected to pay him a monthly fee of 500 pesos to maintain the system. 
However, soon the system deteriorated due to high water pressure and the poor quality 
of the tank material. Despite this, the communal water system remained in use 
throughout the 1990s. 
 The situation changed following the agreement between the EAAB Division of 
Community Action and a group of seven irregular settlements of the Usme locality, 
including JJR, to introduce an alternative system of water supply co-financed by the 
community.34 The project was not executed immediately, however. The EAAB 
                                                  
32 A child of the community fell into one of the water tanks by accident and drowned, which caused 
a crisis in relations between Saturnino and the inhabitants, who attributed the accident to his poor 
management of the project. 
33 This water watchman was called ‘aguadero’ and in practical terms made his living on the 
maintenance fees. 
34 The seven settlements that were the target of EAAB intervention are now collectively known as 
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commissioned CIDER (Interdisciplinary Centre of Regional Studies) of Universidad de 
Los Andes (a private university in Bogotá) to carry out a diagnostic study of the 
socio-economic situation and inhabitants’ needs and to promote understanding in the 
community about EAAB intervention. Intervention of the EAAB under the CIDER 
programme continued from 1997 to 1999. Its overarching mission was to raise popular 
awareness regarding the regularisation process and bolster the people’s capacity for 
community development so as to carry out regularisation through the co-finance 
programme. The regularisation of the water supply system consisted of four 
sub-projects: construction of a water-treatment plant; construction of a local-district 
network of water mains; construction of a sector-specific water supply network, and 
individual house connections. Under the scheme of community participation, the first 
two were carried out by direct investment of the EAAB, the third was undertaken by the 
community, and the cost of the last was charged to the user. Community funds collected 
for the third sub-project were to be controlled by a new organisation called 
COOPBAUS (Public Service Cooperative of Hillside Settlements of Usme). A board of 
directors of the COOPABUS was created, including representatives (JAC leaders) from 
the seven settlements covered by the project. The relationship between the leaders of 
COOPABUS and the inhabitants did not run particularly smoothly, due to a general 
distrust of cooperatives at that time. The general manager of COOPABUS was Alberto 
Hernández, who was a candidate for the post of edil in the Usme locality.35 The 
COOPABUS initiatives produced friction with other political groups in the 
seven-settlement area (called ‘Yomasa’) where the EAAB was intervening, particularly 
with those who administered the rudimentary water supply system that had been created 
by the community (interview with Alberto Hernández, 16 August 2000). According to 
                                                                                                                                                  
the ‘Yomasa sector’. 
35 Law on cooperatives in Colombia requires a general manager from outside of the affiliated 
membership. In the case of COOPABUS, the eligible person for this post should be a non-resident of 
the seven settlements. Hernández lived in Usme but outside of these settlements. As he was ex edil 
of the locality and influential in the neighbourhood, people affiliated with COOPABUS requested 
him to take the position. 
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Hernández, the JAL of Usme locality appropriated approximately 250 million pesos 
from the FDL for the third sub-project (sector-specific water supply network). However, 
the COOPABUS was not eligible to contract work for such a large amount of money. 
Ultimately, the funds were transferred to the jurisdiction of the UEL (see chapter 4 
regarding the function of the UEL). As a result, the budget that was supposed to be used 
for the sector-specific water supply network was not realised, and the construction 
process was delayed.36  
 With regard to the remaining services and infrastructure; the sewerage and drainage 
systems were built by community labour, but their quality was very poor. Electric power 
was initially obtained by illegal connection to lines in neighbouring settlements where a 
regularised power network was available. This situation was left uncorrected for a long 
time, but after the EEB was privatised, CODENSA approached the community and 
regularised the power supply network. Waste collection was another problem in JJR, 
since EDIS (District Company of Public Services), then the District of Bogotá official 
waste collection company, did not collect waste in the residential areas, but only at the 
highway in front of the barrio. The inhabitants of JJR built a container for the deposit of 
waste at the edge of the highway so that the EDIS truck could easily collect the garbage 
deposited there once a week.37 
 In 1989, the Michalenas Catholic sisterhood purchased a series of plots from 
Saturnino with the aim of building a centre for their activities.38 These included a 
rehabilitation and training programme for women and social housing for disadvantaged 
women from their shelters in downtown Bogotá. In the early 1990s, the sisters settled in 
JJR and gradually became involved in other community development activities. Soon 
after, the church that is today located in JJR was built with funds donated by a Canadian 
                                                  
36 The COOPABUS project failed and the EAAB finally invested to regularise the water supply 
system in 2002 without relying on the community co-finance programme. 
37 In 1995, EDIS was privatised. Today one of the four private waste collection companies collects 
waste from the JJR area. 
38 Based on an interview with Ester Castaño Mejía and Ana de Jesús Rodríguez Jiménez, 5 August 
2000. 
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voluntary group that had visited the settlement. The building of the church had 
important implications not just for JJR but also for the other irregular settlements nearby. 
Although these settlements did not compose a parish, in practice the newly built church 
became a central point of reference for the people as well as Bogotá District authorities 
and other external organisations. 
 At first, the inhabitants did not welcome the sisters and the women under their 
protection as the latter had all previously been street prostitutes. However the sisters 
gradually gained the inhabitants’ sympathy and recognition through their other activities, 
such as workshops providing manual training for local women in garment 
manufacturing and handicraft skills, social activities for mothers and children and 
emergency first-aid courses. In 2003 the Michalenas convent built a new garment 
manufacturing factory, with the aim of developing it as a satellite of their factory in 
downtown Bogotá.39
 After the departure of Saturnino Sepúlveda, the community was divided into 
different groups with competing candidates for the presidency of JAC and there was no 
strong leadership of JAC activities. When the regularisation process began, especially 
after the water service normalisation project began in 1997, the sisters assumed the role 
that would have been played by the JAC, negotiating with the Botogá District 
authorities as representatives of the community.  
 The lower half of the current area of JJR was purchased and sub-divided by another 
group of urban developers. This is now called JJR’s ‘2nd sector’. Started as illegal land 
sub-division without any coordinating leader, its development process was totally 
different from the upper sector. Although there was intervention by NGOs for example 
through social housing programmes provided by SERVIVIENDA40 and San Vicente 
                                                  
39 The main site of the convent’s rehabilitation activities had been carried out downtown and in 
another neighbourhood in the south called 20 de Julio. Their garment factory had international 
clients in such places as the UK and their products were mainly export-oriented. 
40 Association for Popular Housing. A cooperative producing cheap prefabricated housing units 
(Gilbert, 2000: 190). 
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Paúl, there was no leader who coordinated activities for the whole sector. It did not, 
therefore, succeed in forming its own JAC, and today JJR as a whole (first and second 
sector together) is represented by one JAC. 
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 Figure 5.10 Photographs of Juan José Rondón settlement
First sector (August 2000). 
Second sector (August 2000). Social housing built with the help of the loan
 programme run by the sisterhood (August 2000).
Entrance to the barrio. A small plaza built by a new  
barrio upgrading programme run by Bogotá city with  
the church in the background (August 2004). 
An example of consolidated houses in the first sector  
(August 2004). 
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 Bella Flor 
The land where Bella Flor and its neighbouring settlements, Mirador and Paraíso, are 
located was originally called ‘Los Alpes’, a farm belonging to Victor Cangrejo Cobos 
and then to his son Luis Augusto Cangrejo Cobos. Luis Augusto divided the land into 
three and sold two parts to Hernando Ruiz and Juan Borda and left the last part to his 
half-brother, Victor Cangrejo Jr. Located on land more than 2,800 metres above the sea 
level, the farm was not categorised as land suitable for urban development until 1990. 
Hernando Ruiz and Juan Borda used the land as a stone and earth quarry, so the housing 
which was later developed there is surrounded by quarried areas where disturbed earth 
poses the risk of landslides. 
 Illegal land sub-division on property belonging to Victor Cangrejo Jr. began in March 
1984. Victor Cangrejo Jr. failed to get the settlers evicted in 1987, because the transfer 
of title deeds of the land had not been completed before Luis Augusto died and Victor 
Cangrejo Jr. was recognised as his heir to the property. Other testimony suggested, 
however, that Victor Cangrejo Jr. was acquainted with the head of these land 
sub-dividers and had employed him to handle the sub-division of the land with the aim 
of benefiting from its future increase in value. According to the inhabitants, David 
Salguero Franco, his brother Salmón Salguero Franco, Heder Ramón Ramírez, Luis 
Otalora, Efrain Giraldo and Francisco Redondo were the first group of sub-dividers. 
David Salguero was the head of the group and signed most of the certificates of land 
sale. Francisco Redondo lived in the neighbouring Mirador barrio and was president of 
the JAC there, but the other land sub-dividers soon disappeared from Bella Flor, 
consigning the rest of the land for sale to other early community leaders. 
 In 1986 the first settlers organised a projunta headed by Jaime Rico Vargas (one of 
the directing members of the JAC as of 2000). He collaborated with another community 
leader, José Chacón, who became the first president of the JAC. Flor Elba Cárdenaz 
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(then a councilwoman) and her partner José Antonio Rodríguez (a politician) assisted in 
the initial stages of barrio development, finding a way to obtain water through a 
provisional system and organising the first JAC. Through their political influence, the 
JAC received juridical person status in 1987. Originally known by other names, the 
barrio was renamed, after Flor Elba Cárdenaz, by the JAC leaders at this time. 
 In 1988 an urban activist group affiliated with the guerrilla group M-19 intervened 
with donations of food and other assistance to the residents in social projects, but their 
presence did not last long due to conflict with JAC leaders over leadership of the barrio. 
After the disarmament of the M-19 group, ex-member Patricia Arévalo came forward as 
a candidate for the post of edil and was elected in 1995. She became involved in the 
upgrading process of Bella Flor, but due to the topographical difficulties her 
contribution was very limited. 
 In fact, State intervention was restricted during the 1980s, since Bella Flor is located 
more than 2,800 metres above sea level and categorised as an area reserved for agrarian 
use as defined under Agreement No. 7/1979, which remained in force until 1990.41
 The poor leadership of the JAC has also impeded the negotiation process with the 
city authorities for regularisation of the settlement. The first community leader, José 
Chacón, died in an accident and his efforts to negotiate with the public service agencies 
were not followed up effectively by succeeding JAC directors, who engaged in corrupt 
practices. The barrio was divided into several sectors and two JACs were created. At 
the time of the survey the lower sector was directed by Miguel Carrero and the upper 
sector was directed by Excelino, but little collaboration was observed between the two 
sectors. 
 Until the construction of the road connecting the barrio to the lower sector of Ciudad 
                                                  
41 2,800 metres above sea level was stipulated as the boundary line between the urban perimeter and 
land for agrarian use, under Agreement No. 25/1975. According to the stipulations of Agreement No. 
7/1979, regularisation of settlements located in ‘reserva agrícola’ (land reserved for agrarian use) 
requires the issue of another agreement by the District Council of Bogotá to incorporate them into 
the urban perimeter. This procedure was simplified by Agreement No. 1/1986 and by Agreement No. 
6/1990.  
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Bolívar in 1995, the role of the state in this settlement was insignificant. In 1997, the 
negotiations between the EAAB and the community made some progress. A community 
co-finance project, called ‘alternative water service provision,’ was undertaken 
following a contract between the EAAB and the community in 1997, but the 
construction of infrastructure for the water supply was suspended due to corruption in 
the contracted company. Madres Comunitarias,42 a Bella Flor-based group, launched a 
demonstration demanding water supply infrastructure from the District of Bogotá. As a 
consequence, in 1998 the EAAB agreed that it would start direct investment in Bella 
Flor to build water supply infrastructure, which was finally completed in June 2000. In 
the meantime, the EAAB and the Metropolitan police delivered water by tank truck to 
the sector three times a week, continuing until May 2000.  
 At the same time as the arrival of the EAAB project, CODENSA came in to replace 
the provisional utility poles with more permanent ones and install electricity meters and 
connecting cables for individual dwellings. This process of normalisation of the power 
supply was finished by May 2000. The project to build sewerage was also contracted 
and the design and planning processes finished by September 2000.  
 Additionally, in 1999 the DPAE intervened to facilitate the regularisation of Bella 
Flor, since there were several plots categorised as unsafe for construction.
 Community organisation remained problematic in Bella Flor, however. JAC leaders 
of the upper sector were suspected of lining their own pockets with fees charged to new 
settlers for the cost of provisional infrastructure, when in fact this had been built by 
communal work. They never clarified the accounts for use of communal funds. 
Rumours circulated that the JAC leaders had engaged in illegal transactions with the 
aim of speculation. In 2000, Excelino, president of the JAC, was accused of fraud and 
finally discharged.43
                                                  
42 Abbreviation of Asociación de Madres Comunitarias Zonal, a local organisation with members 
from neighbouring barrios Paraíso, Los Alpes and Mirador. 
43 He was accused of selling off plots which had been reserved for community use. 
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 In 2000, there were two more community development groups in Bella Flor backed 
by politicians. The first, the association for female household heads, the elderly and 
children, was named ‘ASIMITER B.F.’ (Bella Flor Integral Association of Female 
Household Heads and the Aged Group) and financially supported by an aspirant for 
district councillor (Fernando Mansilla). This intervention was in part motivated by his 
campaign for councillor in the upcoming election. The other group was a non-formal 
education programme run by ‘Negra Grande’ (the nickname of Leonor González Mina), 
a member of the House of Representatives with whom Miguel Carrero, JAC president 
of the lower sector, had created a patron-client relationship. Additionally Flavio Maya, a 
lawyer, and a candidate for district councillor, was advising inhabitants of the sector on 
land-owning legalisation, offering to do the paper work for the procedure. As he stood 
for district councillor soon after, his intervention is similarly categorised as action 
initiated to drum up support for a campaign to achieve regularisation of the electricity 
supply. 
 Some NGOs, however, were not motivated by political interests. The Catholic priest, 
Father Garavito, built a private school for primary education (el Colegio María 
Auxiliadora) using charitable donations from members of his parish community. This 
was the only educational establishment in the settlement, though the quality of the 
teachers was very low.44 Another cleric, Brother Dairo, was known for his creation of a 
solidarity group named Pastoral Group. He was affiliated with a Catholic Church 
located in the residential area of stratus 6 (the highest socio-economic stratus) in Bogotá. 
He organised a group of women in the wealthy Catholic parish and another group of 
women in Bella Flor. Together they coordinated community-based social work projects 
for women and children, such as bazaars, the celebration of Mothers’ Day, building a 
mini park for small children, coordinating a nursery programme for the children of the 
settlement and so on. Support both in material and pecuniary form was collected from 
                                                  
44 There were no officially recognised schoolteachers; a couple of policemen were teaching as part 
of their social contribution to the community. 
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members of the high-income parish. A church for the community of Bella Flor and a 
facility for their activities were also built by this charity. 
 Another intervention by a non-official agency was that of a German philanthropist 
based in Bogotá. He provided a series of prefabricated houses through charitable 
donations from volunteers in Germany collected through his personal networks. 
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A newly installed tap after the regularisation  
of the water supply (August 2001). 
Figure 5.12 Photographs of Bella Flor settlement
Sector A. The first view of Bella Flor when approaching from  
the centre of Ciudad Bolívar (November 1999). 
Donkeys carrying water in plastic tanks.  
Sector D, flat area. (November 1999). 
Rudimentary water distribution via a hose connection.  
Sector E, in front of the electricity pylon (November 1999). 
Inhabitants running out with drums to collect water  
from the water-tank car (November 1999). 
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 DIFFERING PACES OF REGULARISATION  
 
As we have seen in the accounts above, intervention by the state can be a decisive factor 
in the regularisation of the settlements in Bogotá. While the topographical conditions of 
the settlements were obviously technical factors that affected state intervention, the pace 
of improvement in infrastructure and community services, however, depended on other 
factors such as political involvement, NGO intervention, nature of the local leadership 
and community participation.  
 
Factors established in previous studies 
The factors pointed to in previous studies as having the greatest impact on the 
regularisation process are as follows. I will relate each of them to the experience of the 
six case settlements. 
 
Clientelistic relations between local politicians and community leaders 
Cornelius (1975) and Peattie (1968) showed that ‘doing politics’ with local politicians 
was a common tactic through which the poor pressured the governmental bureaucracy 
to meet their needs. When the political regime is based on a system of competition 
among different political parties, the poor sector is often targeted as a group with whom 
to expand partisan influence. This was certainly the case in Venezuela and Colombia 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. In Venezuelan cities, institutional intervention in the 
irregular settlements was subordinated to the particular interests of political parties 
(Grohmann, 1996: 46).  
 Where the political regime was authoritarian or quasi authoritarian such as in Mexico 
under PRI, neither the PRI nor opposition parties had the need to seek the political 
support of the poor (Cornelius, 1975: 201). However, inhabitants of Mexican irregular 
settlements had to resort to politics to solve their problems, because the decisions on 
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social subsidies were made through ties between local politicians (PRI members) and 
public officials. In Mexico, therefore, partisan influence was indispensable in order to 
attain the upgrading of the irregular settlements (Cornelius, 1975; Eckstein, 1977).  
 In Colombia, too, community leaders of the popular sector found it effective to seek 
the help of political patrons to resolve their collective needs. In fact, the community 
without any technical capacity or assistance (either from a pirate urbaniser, outside 
NGO activist, or community leader with technical knowledge) had enormous difficulty 
in obtaining basic services. Therefore, communities tended to ask local politicians for 
assistance as a last and easy resort. The linkage between local politicians and the 
community in the poor sector can be attributed to the patron-client relations that arose in 
the context of the bipartisan coalition in Colombia (Leal and Dávila, 1990; Gutiérrez, 
1998).  
 We can find this tendency in the process of the formation of JACs in the studied 
communities. Independent of the nature of the founder of the barrio, all six 
communities struggled to build JACs due to the need for these to be approved by the 
Bogotá District government. The settlement of La Paz began as a result of an organised 
invasion backed by the communist party, but soon the emerging leaders preferred to 
form conventional JACs to facilitate the linkage with traditional partisan politicians. 
The inhabitants of JJR demonstrated a similar way of thinking when they rejected 
Saturnino’s anarchical (non partisan) position. In the case of Danubio Azul, though 
political patronage was not so strong, the emergence of dominant JAC leadership was 
fundamental to push forward the regularisation process. Diana Turbay is a typical case 
of a settlement founded on a patron-client relationship between the first settlers and a 
politician, Guerrero Estrada. The later conflict between the community and Guerrero 
can also be explained by the end of the patron-client relationship. Even Jerusalén, an 
atypical case in which the community leaders sought to establish a civic movement 
against such partisan practices, was not entirely free from clientelism. In its initial 
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period, the intervention of Rafael Forero Fetecua, one of the most influential politicians 
in Bogotá during the 1980s, was significant in order to push forward the development of 
Jerusalén.  
 
The nature of community leadership and its relations with the state and other outside 
actors  
Ward and Chant (1987) examine the role of community leadership and its relationship 
to the state and other outside agencies intervening in the development of the irregular 
settlements. Based on numerous case studies conducted in different countries, they 
categorise the character of leadership by types of leader-state relationship: patron/client; 
co-option/incorporation; routinisation and autonomy/independence (Ward and Chant, 
1987: 89-92). They argue that the state will ultimately intervene whatever the 
leader-state relation is, but the first reaction and approach of the state is different. While 
the leader is more collaborative and flexibly accepts the state approach, the relationship 
facilitates improvement of infrastructure and service provision. In contrast, when the 
leadership aspires to be independent or autonomous, this is interpreted as a challenge to 
the state that can cause state intervention or control to be either delayed or abandoned 
(as a penalty). As they state, ‘The position of independence and class mobilization that 
they adopt represents a considerable threat to the state which may respond in one (or 
several) ways: to co-opt, to ‘divide and rule’, to ‘starve’ into submission or, ultimately, 
to repress’ (Ward and Chant, 1987: 92).  
 Under the same logic, the nature of intervention by outside agencies such as NGOs 
(including churches) has also been influenced by relations with community leaders. 
When the external actor and the internal community leadership combine forces to fight 
for community needs, the result is a mutually beneficial situation that advances the 
regularisation process. Outside actors may be local politicians, NGO activists, or 
religious groups. The concerns of the community leader and those of the intervening 
actors must of course seek benefits for the whole community and not be privately 
motivated.  
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 As for the community leader-state relationship of the case-study settlements, we can 
classify it by the nature of collective actions conducted in the regularisation process.  
Diana Turbay was the most obedient in its relationship with the state as it seldom 
protested against the city government. In fact, the community organisation’s first 
function was to organise the electoral campaign for Guerrero. There was no need for the 
inhabitants to make a claim on the state, while they could rely on Guerrero’s political 
patronage. After the community leaders confronted Guerrero over the ownership 
transfer, however, the community resorted to calling for the state to intervene. In 
contrast, Jerusalén’s leaders have aspired to be independent and searched for autonomy 
from partisan politics. The civic strike with the biggest magnitude in 1993 in Bogotá 
showed its resistant position against the state. Although the civic strike helped the 
community to start up a dialogue with the city authorities, the result was negative and 
further delayed the regularisation process. Contrary to the experience of Jerusalén, the 
management of civic strikes organised by Danubio Azul and La Paz sometimes meant 
that the state intervened to restore public order in the neighbourhood. In the case of JJR, 
Saturnino rejected the idea of a relationship with the state. After he left, however the 
community failed in creating a strong leadership to develop its approach toward the 
state. Bella Flor, like JJR, experienced a delay, but the reason was slightly different. The 
intervention of leftist activists and rumours of other armed groups in the 1980s was one 
of the explanatory factors impeding state intervention. Corruption amongst the 
leadership also prevented effective community-state interactions. Finally, in JJR and 
Bella Flor difficult topographical conditions made it difficult for the state to approach 
these communities both literally and in terms of urban planning.   
  As for relations between the community and NGOs, the experience of the Fundación 
Social in Jerusalén and the Michalenas sisterhood in JJR are typical examples of how 
friction arose over community leadership. The case of ICES in Jerusalén is a rather 
more positive example where the NGO was accepted by the community and reinforced 
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community organisation and capacity to negotiate with the state. 
 
Public service agencies’ capacity to manage the regularisation process  
Based on comparative case studies in Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, Gilbert 
confirms that politicians assisted communities in attaining regularisation but also 
criticises the gap between their own appraisals and actual practice (Gilbert, 1981a). He 
shows examples of settlements where political influence was clearly a factor in 
obtaining prompt services (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 163). Under the ‘exaggerated’ 
effects of political influence, sometimes the real impact of public service agencies’ 
attention to the irregular settlements was not properly evaluated. Gilbert also criticises 
exaggeration of the virtues of community participation in the irregular settlements. He 
argues that the notion of ‘community participation’ or ‘solidarity’ is ambiguous, because 
sometimes community participation is stimulated by political interest (Gilbert, 1987). 
Particularly in the case of Bogotá, the public service agencies are fully capable of 
providing services to areas even with topographically difficult conditions, so sooner or 
later any irregular settlement should be serviced (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).   
 Gilbert points out that neither community-based activism nor pressure by local 
politicians has been particularly effective in promoting the regularisation process. The 
administrative capacity and technical efficiency of the respective public service 
agencies have in reality been the decisive factors in the advance of regularisation. 
  The experiences of JJR and Bella Flor clearly support this argument. These two, the 
most disadvantaged in terms of topographical and technical conditions, gained basic 
service infrastructure in the end. The setting up and subsequent failure of the 
community co-finance programme also suggest that neither community development 
efforts nor political intervention were effective. The accelerated regularisation in 
Danubio Azul and La Paz after being included in the special upgrading programmes 
also provides supportive evidence. Jerusalén, though labeled as a ‘red zone’, was 
 273
gradually upgraded after all. The most striking case is Diana Turbay. I first assumed that 
the installation of all the public services was accomplished thanks to Guererro’s 
political influence. However, my interviews with the inhabitants revealed it was not 
entirely correct. After the formation of JACs in 1986, the rest of the regularisation 
process was carried out according to the state’s technical concerns and administrative 
procedures without Guerrero’s patronage.  
 The above three factors were prominent features of previous case studies conducted 
in different Latin American countries. They clearly help to explain the regularisation 
process in the 1980s for the settlements surveyed in this study as well. There were 
further aspects of the process, however, that should be elaborated upon.  
 
Community-specific factors found in the case-study settlements 
Cornelius, based on case studies in Mexico, analysed the differences of progress in 
public service provision among the settlements as follows: ‘extreme disparities arose 
from the varying conditions under which specific communities were formed, as well as 
from incidents involving local leadership and other community-specific factors (…)  
All these have influenced the quality of the communities’ relationships with political 
and governmental officials over time’ (Cornelius, 1975: 215). 
 Each of the settlements examined in my study has what Cornelius called 
‘community-specific factors’: topographical features, original promoter of urban 
development—local politician, NGO activist, or illegal land sub-dividers—intervention 
of leftist groups, etc. 
 The impact of internal conflict/segregation among the residents or between the 
community and intervening outside actors is a typical case in point. The city authorities 
are not concerned with whether a community’s claim is based on the consensus of the 
settlers or not, but are concerned when the barrio has a reputation for violence or 
instability. This was the case of Jerusalén in the 1980s when public security was heavily 
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affected by the presence of leftist-movements. 
 Internal conflict also weakens community activism aimed at the fulfilment of local 
needs. Particularly while the barrio was still in the process of filing for recognition 
under the resolución, the community needed to struggle for the provisional services 
either by communal effort or by negotiating with the respective public service 
companies. In this period, therefore the strength of community integration is crucial for 
settlement development. Bella Flor is a good example. It was still at the stage of filing 
for recognition in 2000 but there was no community integration due to the absence of a 
strong leader. The leadership of Bella Flor collapsed after the ex-JAC president was 
charged with fraud in the illegal sale of land to settlers. 
 In the cases of Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul,La Paz and the very initial stages of JJR, 
the internal relations between the landowner, land brokers and first community leaders 
caused the conflicts. However, the effects of the conflict varied settlement by 
settlement. 
 Internal conflict or segregation is sometimes sparked by intervention from outside 
actors. The case of JJR after Saturnino left is a good example of this. The initiative of 
the Michalenas sisterhood group helped to facilitate the city intervention process. Some 
accepted its commitment but others did not. Those who did not accept it as representing 
the community, claimed that the sisterhood was manipulating the JAC president at the 
time. This split in the community weakened further community-based collective efforts.  
   
 
STORIES OF THE SIX BARRIOS: A DISCUSSION OF HOW A VARIETY OF FACTORS COMBINED 
AND INTERACTED IN EACH SPECIFIC CASE 
 
In the 1980s 
As discussed, in addition to the three factors mentioned above, other 
community-specific factors determined the nature of the regularisation process. The 
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differences in the 1980s among the six case-study settlements can be explained by 
noting the different combinations of the factors at play in their development. 
 
Diana Turbay 
Political clientelism was the telling force in regularisation in the case of Diana Turbay. 
The time span between the beginning of the occupation and the installation of basic 
service infrastructure was the shortest of the six cases. Most services were obtained in a 
matter of five years. Negotiations between the community and the public service 
companies were carried out through the JAC by means of letters of petition with the 
signatures of the inhabitants listed. The logistical work done by the JAC was 
accompanied by letters of recommendation written by Guerrero Estrada. The inhabitants 
of Diana Turbay never resorted to violence to demand that the related agencies provide 
services. Their typical strategy was rather to use political pressure on the Bogotá district 
administration with the backing of influential patrons like Guerrero Estrada, although 
this patronage was lost gradually in the late 1980s due to the conflict between the JAC 
leaders and Guerrero over transfer of land ownership. This is also a typical phenomenon 
of clientelistic relations. As Gay points out in his case study of favelas in Rio de Janerio, 
‘The relationship between politician and community is purely transactional and, 
therefore, neither static nor stable (Gay, 1990: 655). 
 
Jerusalén 
In Jerusalén, by contrast, advances toward regularisation are mainly explained by the 
second factor: strong community leadership and its sometimes conflictive relationship 
with the city authorities. Until 1989 the inhabitants struggled a great deal in negotiations, 
either with the DAPD or the public service companies. After the resolución was issued 
in 1989, the public service infrastructure was gradually installed. However, the work did 
not progress smoothly and sometimes collective protests occurred. The presence of 
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leftist movements in the mid-1980s presented a threat, making public service agencies 
reluctant to intervene for a time. Ultimately, the District authorities were able to utilise 
the Ciudad Bolívar Programme, the large-scale development project implemented in the 
surrounding area, to increase state presence and control the ‘rebellious’ settlement. The 
impact of political clientelism is nevertheless undeniable. Rafael Forero Fetecua, one of 
the big names in Bogotá, identified as a ‘politician and pirate urban developer’ during 
the 1970s and 1980s, aided the development of Jerusalén in its initial stage. However, 
his political influence was not strong enough to gain the sympathy of residents in all 
sectors of the settlement. In fact, the JAC leaders association (ASOJERUSALEN45) was 
formed in 1984 to establish their own non-partisan civic movement.  
 
Danubio Azul 
The regularisation of Danubio Azul was also rapid, but it was achieved mostly in the 
1990s with the arrival of a charismatic community leader, Ramón. During the 1980s the 
occupation process was delayed because of the condition of the land, and its recognition 
was suspended due to controversy over the ownership of the land. 
 
La Paz  
The regularisation process was extremely slow in La Paz. At the beginning, the 
commitment of Provivienda had a negative effect on state intervention. Having settled 
the area as a result of invasion of state property, the inhabitants’ right to live there was 
not guaranteed, so they found it difficult to fight for their needs. The limited economic 
capacity of the community was another obstacle. In the mid-1980s, the EAAB proposed 
an alternative means of establishing a water supply through a community co-finance (or 
cost-sharing) programme. This project failed due to the residents’ inability to pay the 
required amount in advance. It was also said that the failure was caused by the corrupt 
                                                  
45 Barrio Jerusalén Association of Popular Movement.  
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management of the community leaders in that period. The weakness of its community 
leadership was, therefore another crucial factor explaining the delay in the development 
process. 
 
Juan José Rondón 
In the case of JJR, the land developer Saturnino Sepúlveda’s firm belief in self-help 
development and thus his rejection of any intervention by the city authorities, divided 
the settlers. The resulting internal conflict weakened community spirit and negatively 
affected negotiations between the community and the city authorities. Saturnino left in 
1986, putting Canizares in charge of the transfer of land ownership to individual settlers, 
but he did not push forward the regularisation process. 
 
Bella Flor 
Yet other factors explain the delay in regularisation in Bella Flor. First was the 
corruption of the JAC leaders involved in illegal land sale after the initial land 
sub-dividers left. The settlers’ poor economic resources also made it impossible for 
them to resort to finance-sharing for upgrading projects. As in the case of Jerusalén, in 
the late 1980s, Bella Flor experienced the intervention of leftist activists (members of 
the M-19 guerrilla group), which had the effect of discouraging intervention by the city 
authorities. 
 For Bella Flor as well as JJR, the location of the land (more than 2,800 metres above 
sea level) was an obstacle to the improvement of infrastructure throughout the 1980s. 
Consequently, the regularisation of the water supply took more than 15 years. 
 Topographical disadvantages, therefore, were perhaps less significant than lack of the 
kind of firm community leadership that facilitated the process in places such as the 
neighbouring settlements of Mirador and Paraíso. 
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New factors in the 1990s  
In the late 1990s, the legal framework for recognising the irregular settlements was 
eased, speeding up the regularisation process. The privatisation of the EEB expedited 
provision of energy services to the more disadvantaged areas. The integrated upgrading 
projects such as the De-marginalisation Programme and the South Bogotá Project were 
aimed at improvement of broader areas and did not undertake regularisation at the 
barrio level. The state’s intervention came to work through the merits of scale, thereby 
achieving a broader impact than for other poor areas where no intervention was going 
on. 
 These changes were clearly reflected in developments in the settlements covered in 
the case study. First was the acceleration and completion of regularisation through the 
efforts of a competent mayor and his special investment programme. The process that 
took place after 1997 in Danubio Azul and La Paz worked more efficiently than that in 
Jerusalén and Diana Turbay in the 1980s. In Danubio Azul and La Paz, the installation 
of power service, building of the sewerage system and completion of street paving were 
conducted as part of an integrated project, while in Diana Turbay and Jerusalén, some 
services—such as street paving—remain incomplete even now (observed in August 
2006). The reason is simple: Danubio Azul and La Paz were selected for intervention 
under the special programme for integrated upgrading promoted by the Bogotá District 
government under the Peñalosa administration (1997-2000). In addition, the case of 
Danubio Azul involved a combination of strong community leadership and internal 
struggle for hegemony among the leadership. In fact, it is said that the strong 
intervention of the city authorities was prompted by the internal conflict erupting from 
rival factions’ antagonism toward the JAC leaders and the resulting security crisis in the 
community. Political decisions by the city administration regarding this situation led to 
the selection of Danubio Azul as one of the first five settlements for intervention under 
the De-marginalisation Programme.  
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 Second, the reform of urban planning regulations brought in to speed up the 
regularisation procedure changed the situation for Bella Flor and JJR after 1990, where 
the process had been slowed due to the disadvantages of their topographical location. 
The new plan to promote transfer of land ownership also worked in favour of Danubio 
Azul and the ensuing transfer to individual title deeds hastened its regularisation 
process.  
 Third, privatisation of the EEB became a new element accelerating the regularisation 
process. In the cases of Bella Flor, La Paz and JJR, installation of electric power service 
had preceded the normalisation of water supply services, unlike in other settlements 
where regularisation took place in the 1980s. The EAAB also became more efficient 
due to institutional reforms, promoting the installation of individual water meters and 
thereby accelerating intervention in these informal settlements.  
  As shown, the regularisation process of the six cases was mostly determined by 
conventional factors such as leadership, political clientelism and intervention of the city 
authorities. On the other hand, in the 1990s, notable developments in regularisation 
were often the result of the new city government’s approach and the drive for efficiency 
adopted by the mayor.   
  We have seen that all of the above factors, combined differently, determined the 
different pace of the regularisation process in the six case study settlements. The case 
studies have also shown that the differing relationships between community leaders, the 
state and other outside actors influenced the chronological development process of the 
settlements. However, the changes in the regularisation policy in Bogotá during the 
1990s suggest that increasingly the most influential factor is the city government’s 
capacity and will to upgrade these settlements.  
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CHAPTER 6 
COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP, PARTICIPATION AND 
INTERACTIONS WITH OUTSIDE ACTORS: INHABITANTS’ 
VIEWS 
 
This chapter will analyse the nature of leadership, community participation and 
relationships between the inhabitants and community-outsiders in specific cases. It 
explores who community leaders really are, as identified by the inhabitants, and tries to 
establish which qualities are highly valued in a leader. This chapter will also discuss 
whether the community-politician relationship has changed and will examine the role of 
other forms of outsider intervention. It will go on to critically analyse the relationship 
between the community and the state, attempting to clarify their contradictory 
interpretations of the meaning of community participation. In addition, it will suggest that 
economic factors and trust/distrust of the community could affect state-community 
relations and the applicability of community co-financing projects. 
  
 
THE NATURE OF COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP  
 
In the initial stage of their development, the city authorities were not involved in these 
settlements and inhabitants had to struggle to obtain their basic needs through collective 
action. Among the six studied settlements, Diana Turbay is unusual in that it had more 
support from the public service companies from the very beginning thanks to its political 
patronage. Despite this, the community still had to organise to further the regularisation 
process. The JACs were, without exception, the main channel for the communication of 
residents’ needs to the city government. Strong and effective leadership was crucial to 
advance the regularisation of the settlements. Frequently, however, community leaders 
became involved in corruption or internal conflicts which impeded either community 
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integration or negotiations with the city government.  
  I will begin by discussing the people who the inhabitants recognised as community 
leaders. Then I will analyse how they evaluated the work of the leaders and whether this 
evaluation of the community leadership changed at the different stages of consolidation.  
 
Who are the community leaders? 
In the household survey, we asked the household heads to identify those who they judged 
to be community leaders. We defined a community leader as anyone who led any kind of 
effort to resolve collective needs. However, there was no single concept of leader as 
understood by the inhabitants and the result of the survey was different in each settlement. 
Some defined the leader as those who dedicated themselves to serving the community. 
Others identified the leader mechanically with the president or directing members of the 
JAC. They frequently added negative comments about these leaders after they identified 
them.  
 Except for in Diana Turbay, more than the half of the surveyed household heads 
identified the names of those they judged to be the leaders (Table 6.1). 
 
         Table 6.1 Households naming community leaders  
 Diana Turbay Jerusalén Danubio Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
Named(1) 81(15) 95(24) 96(19) 84(16) 78(13) 57(7) 
Not named(1) 86(69) 74(42) 62(46) 59(37) 50(23) 46(14) 
Total no. 167 169 158 143 128 103 
% (2) 48.5 56.8 60.7 58.7 60.9 55.3 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
Notes: (1) The figure in parenthesis is the number of tenants in each category. 
 
If we analyse the household heads that identified the leaders by their arrival year at the 
settlement, we can see that those who named the most leaders arrived at the settlement in 
the period when the land occupation process was very active. Table 6.2 shows this trend 
clearly in the cases of Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul and La Paz (see the highlighted 
figures). The trend is less defined in the other cases possibly because their occupation 
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process was more gradual than the first three settlements. 
 
Table 6.2 Arrival year at the current settlement of the household head by category of leadership 
recognition  
 Diana 
Turbay 
Jerusalén Danubio 
Azul 
La Paz JJR Bela Flor
 
Arrival period  (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A)  (B) (A) (B)
   -1985 44 16 35 12   2   0   8  2 18   3   7   1 
1986-90 24 12 21 14 42   5 41 11 21   5 10   3 
1991-95 12 15 25 18 33 12 25 11 27 10 20   5 
1996-2000   1 43 14 30 19 45 10 35 12 32 20 37 
Total 81 86 95 74 96 62 84 59 78 50 57 46 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
(A) means ‘named leader’. (B) means ‘did not name leader’.  
 
 In some settlements there was a clear consensus about particular people, but in others 
not.  Table 6.3 shows the first ten leaders who were named most frequently in the survey.1 
In Diana Turbay, Guerrero’s presence as the community leader was still significant, but 
those who named him were the inhabitants who arrived at the settlement in the very initial 
period.  The others, except for Rosiasco, were ex JAC leaders. These people served on the 
directing board of the JACs in earlier periods. Rosicasco has served as edil for Rafael 
Uribe Uribe locality since 1994.  
 As for the case of Jerusalén, in contrast, the first two names, Leo and Humberto are 
currently the active leaders. Leo is a school teacher but has also devoted himself to the 
working committee of the JAC since the death of an earlier leader, Evarist. Humberto is 
the JAC president of his sector. He has also led the ASOJERUSALEN since it’s 
foundation and is its current president. Both Evaristo and Rafael Forero were dead but 
they were identified as the community leaders who had been of greatest service to the 
settlement. Lalo Gil has served as edil for the locality since 1994.  
 Danubio Azul is the most striking case, with Ramón and his group being clearly 
identified as the leaders (in fact 66 of the household heads surveyed named Ramón, see 
Table 6.3). Ramón was the first JAC president and Inés, his widow, succeeded him as 
                                                  
1 For Jerusalén and JJR, more than ten leaders were listed, as there were several persons in the same 
group of frequency. 
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president until 2001.  Rómulo was the vice president of the directing board of the JAC 
during Inés’ presidency. The other leaders named were from community-based 
organisations; some of which were competing for leadership against the JAC (see chapter 
5).  
 In La Paz, Agapito was the most active JAC president in the settlement and it was he 
who created the clientelistic relation with Nubia Mederano (edil for the locality) in 2000. 
Miguel was one of the first presidents of the JACs just after the JAC got its juridical 
person. He was a member of the electoral campaign for Serpa (a member of the 
Colombian Liberal Party) but did not get along with the political position of Agapito.  
José Naranjos was one of the founders of the JACs but he had left the settlement at the 
time of the survey.  Sifredo was another JAC president, of the Caracas sector in 2000.  
 The list from JJR shows a more marked segregation of leadership. Jesuan was the 
ex-JAC president after the period of Primitivo and Felipa.  Since Jesuan tried to maintain 
the water supply system set up by community action, he was opposed by the other JAC 
leaders who supported the regularisation of the public services. By contrast, Felipa 
worked together with the sisterhood group to promote regularisation of the settlement.   
 In Bella Flor, Excelino, José and Francisco were identified as the leaders of the 
settlement, as they worked for the regularisation process of the settlement. At the same 
time however, the inhabitants’ frequently criticised them for their corruption and reported 
rumours of the illegal land transaction committed by Excelino and Francisco. Francisco is 
a relative of Excelino and was involved in the self-help housing process in the initial 
period of the Bella Flor settlement. However, he had to leave the settlement due to the 
scandal of his corrupt land transaction. The others were leading members of the JACs but 
did not necessarily get along with Excelino. 
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 As Desai (1995) found in slums in India and Cornelius (1975) in his cases in Mexico, 
those identified as leaders were in general slightly better-off than the rest of the 
inhabitants. Many of them had a small business at home and/or their partners had a stable 
job. This economic condition permitted them to dedicate more time to community 
activities. A few of these leaders became involved in the business side of  land 
transactions after the land brokers had left, having, in many cases, consigned their 
business to the leaders. Some had already worked as a leader in a previous community 
and most of them originally came from the rural sector to Bogotá.  When the leaders were 
NGO activists or clergymen, their educational level was significantly higher than the rest 
of inhabitants and they had more knowledge on how-to negotiate with the state.  
 
Who should be responsible? 
Why were these individuals recognised by the inhabitants as leaders?  The qualification 
for a community leader is based on his perceived capacity to solve collective problems 
and to promote the improvement of living conditions.  As discussed, the JAC is the 
officially recognised community organisation of these irregular settlements through 
which the inhabitants could negotiate with the city authorities for regularisation. The city 
authorities and public service companies are ultimately the agencies responsible for 
providing public services. However, the results of the household survey suggest that the 
community considered the JAC leaders to be the agencies directly responsible for 
bringing about public service improvements.  
In the segment of the household survey regarding ‘Diagnosis of (Unsatisfied) Needs’, 
respondents were asked to identify the ‘three most problematic services’. Table 6.4 lists 
the institutions the surveyed household heads considered responsible for resolution of the 
three identified needs (responses to Question 44: Who [or what institution] do you think 
is responsible for improving public utility services?; see also Appendix 6a.1 for details). 
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Table 6.4 Institution responsible for resolving most urgent problem/needs* 
 D. Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
Institution No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Government 243 48.5 218 43.0 200 42.2 151 35.2 157 40.9 94 30.4 
Public 
companies/ 
Institutions 
 
78 
 
15.6 
 
81 
 
16.0
 
59 
 
12.4
 
36 
 
8.4 
 
91 
 
23.7 
 
128 
 
41.4 
JAC 131 27.9 172 33.8 181 38.2 230 53.6 116 30.2 78 25.2 
Politicians 17 1.6 12 2.4 3 0.6 3 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other CBOs 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.4 0 0.0 2 0.5 5 1.6 
Catholic church 0 0.0 1 0.2 3 0.6 2 0.5 4 1.0 2 0.6 
NGO 0 0.0 3 0.6 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.3 0 0.0 
Don’t know 32 6.4 20 4.0 28 5.9 7 1.6 13 3.4 2 0.6 
Total 501 100.0 507 100.0 474 100.0 429 100.0 384 100.0 309 100.0 
Source: Responses to Question 44, Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from  
January to August 2000.  
Note: The respondents of the survey were requested to record only one main institution. 
 
When the need identified was a public service such as water supply, sewerage or 
electricity, the respective public service company was clearly identified as responsible. 
The institutions identified for other services such as schools, medical centres or paving 
were either ‘government’ or ‘government through JAC intermediary’. When they could 
not identify easily which institution was responsible they tended to give ‘junta’ (meaning 
the JAC), as the quickest and easiest response (see Appendix 6a.1). The prevalence of this 
response suggests that the inhabitants delegated to the JACs matters relating to the 
fulfilment of their collective needs or problems.  
  
Evaluation of community leadership 
A good leader was one who could obtain a real and visible service for the community.  
The narratives of interviewees manifested that the JAC leaders’ main role was to obtain 
resources to improve settlement infrastructure and the supply of public services. Those 
who contributed a great deal to obtaining these services (mainly water and electricity), 
even in a provisional form, were highly valued by the settlers.  
Political skill is another factor used to judge leadership ability. Political autonomy in a 
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community leader is not necessarily regarded positively. What is seen as more important 
is the ability to use political contacts to obtain outside resources for the collective benefit 
of the community. 
 Settlers have two options regarding the political autonomy of community leaders. One 
view is that the community should be independent of local politicians’ influence. 
Adherents of this position are determined to solve communal problems using the 
community’s own initiative, without resorting to the assistance of politicians. In order to 
be able to do this there has to be a strong local figure with a firm political ideology and 
knowledge of politics, who could gain the sympathy of the community. Some of the 
community leaders of Jerusalén with these capacities took the initiative in creating their 
own civic movement (ASOJERUSALEN) independent of traditional partisan politics. A 
contrasting example was that of Father Saturnino Sepúlveda, founder and developer of 
JJR. He was a socialist activist who rejected reliance on the influence of local politicians. 
He sought to develop an autonomous community, but failed in getting support from the 
settlers. 
 The other dominant view is that the community has no choice but to depend on the 
power and influence of local politicians.  The occupation process of the studied 
settlements began in the early 1980s without the presence of the city authorities. Up to the 
end of the 1980s, against the backdrop of municipal government ‘tolerance’, the 
expansion of the irregular settlements was encouraged by clientelistic relations between 
the community and local politicians who promoted the upgrading process in the initial 
stages (chapter 3). Except for a few cases where leftist activism played an influential role, 
settlers tended to consider that they had no choice but to resort to clientelistic relations 
with local politicians in order to press their interests with the city government. Indeed, 
this tendency led to the widely accepted perception of the JACs as intermediate 
institutions whose express purpose was to obtain funding from the local district 
administration and other outside sources. A community had to have a political patron in 
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the local district that would facilitate access to development funds (cf. the examples of La 
Paz, Bella Flor). 
The JAC (leaders) earn respect when they have the backing of certain 
politicians. The JAC has collaborated a lot [in the electoral campaigns 
of] these politicians, since without the JAC support in our barrio, they 
(these politicians) [might not be persuaded to give the resources to us 
but] hand them over to some other barrio (community). Without 
politics (the help of politicians), there would be no money (funds). By 
means of the politicians there is money.  However, in return, the people 
(we) have to vote for them. [María del Carmen, La Paz]  
 
In the list of leaders given by the inhabitants, those who had led the community in the 
struggle to gain a water supply in the very initial stage of land occupation were identified 
without exception. However, those leaders in office at the time of the survey were less 
recognised, as shown by the case of Diana Turbay in particular. This tendency however, 
should be understood in the light of who named the leader and when the community 
struggle was heaviest. In Diana Turbay, for example, the peak of negotiations for 
regularisation came at the time when the first JACs were searched for recognition from 
the DAPD. The conflict against Guerrero emerged at the same time as the liquidation of 
the cooperative, between 1991 and 1993. Therefore, the people who were living through 
that period could name the first JAC leaders, such as Arturo, Graciela, Santos and so on 
whereas the first settlers who became associated with the cooperative named Guerrero. 
These settlers were grateful to him for providing access to their lots with favourable 
payment conditions. Those who arrived at the settlement after 1995 were mostly tenants 
and had little information about the community. Owner occupants who arrived during the 
same period should have known who the current JAC leaders in their sector were, but 
they had fewer opportunities to get involved in the collective action to acquire basic needs. 
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In fact, inhabitants who had arrived in the early 1980s seldom named the incumbent JAC 
leaders at the time of my study but rather those who had struggled for the barrio.  This 
was firstly because there were no longer any urgent needs in terms of basic services and 
therefore the inhabitants were less interested in community struggle and secondly 
because there were now more tenants who were not involved in community activities.2    
  Jerusalén showed the same tendency as Diana Turbay. The only notable difference is 
the high recognition of current leaders such as Leonidas and Humberto. The reason for 
this can be found in their particular profiles. Leonidas arrived in Jerusalén in 1983 to 
serve as a school teacher but also dedicated much of his time to community action.  
Leonidas had a reputation as a community activist as well as an educator but one who 
never got himself involved in political campaigns. As for Humberto, he had had a hand in 
coordinating the ASOJERUSALEN since the mid-1980s and had stood for edil in the 
local election in 2003 and won a seat for the period 2004-07.3 In Jerusalén, the civic 
movement that created ASOJERUSALEN meant the the JAC leaders were active in 
advocacy at city government meetings. The identification of these leaders therefore was 
firm thanks to their high visibility.  
As for Danubio Azul, the reason for the high presentation of Ramón and Inés was 
simple. The history of the JAC in this barrio was relatively short and these two were the 
only JAC presidents by 2000. As shown in chapter 5, the occupation process in this 
settlement was accelerated by the arrival of Ramón in 1988. In fact, the majority of the 
surveyed household heads who named the leaders arrived at Danubio Azul in the period 
1986-95 (see Table 6.2).  1995 was the year when the JAC, led by Ramón, signed the 
contract with the EAAB for the work to regularise the water supply. Therefore, it was 
obvious that the inhabitants would name him and his successor, his widow Inés, as their 
                                                  
2 Interestingly, the tenants who were the children of the first settlers named similar leaders to the 
old settlers. They remembered the experience of community struggle from their childhood or 
adolescence. 
3 The civic political movement backed by ASOJERUSALEN formed an independent party called 
‘Movimiento político communal y comunitario’ (Communal and community political movement). 
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community leaders.  Inés was also recognised in her own right as she was associated with 
the sudden acceleration of the city government’s approach through the 
De-marginalisation Programme. The other leaders from community-based organisations, 
which were mostly opposed to the JAC were also active. Those who sympathised with 
them named the representatives of these organisations, for example Coronado, José and 
Maria.  
 In the case of La Paz, the high number of nominations of Agapito was mainly thanks to 
his political capacity to mobilise resources. Sometime he resorted to his linkage with edil, 
Nubia Mederano. He was most active in the distribution of information on recent state 
intervention, such as the application of the South Bogotá Project. During his presidency 
of the JAC the regularisation process was accelerated. Miguel and Amanda were the 
leaders of the Torres sector. Miguel took a strong initiative to confront the police when the 
settlement was to be evicted.  After his retirement from the JAC directing board in 2000, 
he created his own NGO to promote a community restaurant for the local children backed 
by his political connections with the Serpista group.4    
 JJR and Bella Flor were in the very earliest period of their regularisation process when 
they were studied. All the leaders named in the case of JJR were currently active in 2000 
except for Fr. Saturnino in JJR.  Here, the nomination of leaders demonstrates the rivalry 
of the groups surrounding different leaders.  As for Bella Flor, no strong leadership was 
established due to the internal conflict and corruption of the JAC leaders. The inhabitants 
named them knowing their defects, because after all, through their negotiations, the 
regularisation process made gradual progress with frequent delays and interruptions.  
 
Corruption as one of the factors weakening community leadership   
Leaders whose management of community activities was transparent were able to obtain 
the trust of the community. However, in practice, few leaders were felt to be honest. Inept 
                                                  
4 A local group which was supporting Serpa’s wing of the Colombian Liberal Party. 
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management or the corrupt handling of community funds quickly aroused settler distrust. 
As pointed out in chapter 5, one of the crucial factors delaying the regularisation process 
in Bella Flor was the poor quality of community leadership. The majority of interviewees 
in that settlement blamed the corruption of the JAC leaders for its slow development. 
Community leaders committed the initial sale of land and sometimes engaged in 
fraudulent transactions. Cases were reported where they sold land in La Paz that belonged 
to individual settlers and in Bella Flor where they disposed of land set aside for 
community use. 
 Numerous interviewees also complained about community leaders pocketing funds 
that had been collected for community expenses. As one settler in Bella Flor put it:   
They (JAC leaders) charged (requested the money from) us as much as 
possible on the pretext that the money should be invested in communal 
work, but in fact, they made use of it only for their own benefit. [Fanny, 
Bella Flor] 
 
In Bella Flor, settlers were asked to contribute funds to pay for a professional to prepare 
the map that had to be submitted to the District Surveyor’s Office for regularisation. Then 
they were asked to make further payments on the grounds that the authorities had refused 
to accept the plan and another was required. Interviewees suspected that these funds had 
been siphoned off. In La Paz, the leaders were suspected of fraudulently managing the 
funds collected as the deposit required by the EAAB for constructing a provisional water 
supply. In Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La Paz the leaders were accused of skimming 
funds from the contributions made to pay for service charges. When a provisional supply 
system was installed, the JAC leaders received a collective bill for the whole settlement 
as individual houses did not yet have official addresses. They sometimes charged 
inhabitants more than they should have done. 
 Of course, it is understandable that community leaders should be tempted to take some 
   292
money. After all, their efforts on behalf of the community were voluntary and although 
they were slightly better-off in the community, they were definitely poor, categorised as 
strata one or two. But when temptation led to malfeasance, it stimulated distrust in the 
community toward the leaders. 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND POLITICIANS  
 
Settlers realised that initially they needed the patronage of politicians to bring services. 
Many interviewees considered resort to politicians’ support to be the only functional 
strategy to obtain services. ‘A poor settlement without a political patron will not get 
ahead’ is a typical expression among many inhabitants. As two residents put it: 
We had to fight (struggle) politically, since services can be provided 
only through política. We can do nothing if we do not have a political 
patron in the government. [Dora, Diana Turbay] 
The needs and services have been obtained all the time through 
‘politics’. When one needs to do something, they say always that ‘this 
should be handled with [the help of] politicians, since they will help in 
exchange for votes’. [Martha, Diana Turbay] 
 
Table 6.5 records the number of politicians who settlers recognised had either been 
influential in the development of the settlement or had frequently visited the settlement. 
 
        Table 6.5 Households naming specific politicians*   
 Diana Turbay  Jerusalén Danubio Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
No.  88 42 43 71 21 47 
Total no. 167 169 158 143 128 104 
   % 52.7 24.9 27.2 49.7 16.4 45.2 
Source: Bogota Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
*Number of households in the sample survey indicating recognition of any politicians (for list of 
politicians, see Table 6.6). 
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 Inhabitants of Diana Turbay, La Paz and Bella Flor registered high rates of recognition 
of politicians, while Danubio Azul, Jerusalén and JJR showed very low rates. Notably, the 
stories of the former three settlements feature a politician who played a prominent role in 
settlement development. Guerrero Estrada in Diana Turbay, Nubia Medrano (edil of the 
Rafael Uribe Uribe locality) in La Paz, and Flavio Maya, candidate for city councillor, in 
Bella Flor are typical examples.  
 The fact that a politician was identified by many people in the settlement does not 
mean that the community actually had confidence in him. Most local politicians showed 
up, to offer support for various programmes for upgrading living conditions in the 
settlements, only at election times. Once those elections were over —whether they won or 
lost— few returned or did anything to fulfil the promises made in their campaign 
speeches. As Martha, in Diana Turbay, put it: ‘Politicians promise a lot but never carry 
out their promises.’  
 Most settlers gradually became disenchanted with the high-handedness and populism 
of politicians. They came to recognise how those politicians tried to manipulate people 
like themselves. In Bella Flor, for example, many people were persuaded to support one 
candidate in exchange for receiving donations of food. This happened frequently in the 
other settlements as well. As time went by, such attempts to ‘buy votes’ were less 
successful:  
Nowadays we are not so stupid as to buy votes only in exchange for 
food at the price of 20,000 pesos! Such a gift does not do anything (for 
us) at all. They visit us to ask for our votes whenever they are 
campaigning, but they are all liars! They never do what they promise. 
We do not need such shady politiqueros. What we need people who 
really do things. [Leonor, JAC president Diana Turbay] 
 
In practice, while many settlers were disillusioned with politicians generally, they often 
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held inconsistent views about individual politicians. Ultimately, their judgement 
depended on what politicians did to help their settlement independent of their electoral 
campaign. In fact, I seldom heard anyone say that a politician had fulfiled the promises he 
made during his campaign.  
Table 6.6 shows that current members of JAL (ediles) form the most commonly 
mentioned group. In the case of Jerusalén, Lalo Gil and Hugo Gaona, both incumbent 
edils of Ciudad Bolívar, score quite highly on the list. Interviewees from Diana Turbay 
identify Jorge Rocciasco, the incumbent edil who is a resident of the settlement. For La 
Paz, Nubia Medrano was most often identified. Bogotá District councillors, mayors and 
national presidents were other politicians mentioned by the inhabitants, though their 
score were quite limited. 
  Most of the names of incumbent politicians identified by the community were 
associated with a specific project to upgrade the physical condition of the settlement. 
Political manoeuvring to obtain the inhabitants’ votes through political promises in 
electoral campaigns does not work quite as simply as it used to. 
 The predominance of the names of ediles as the most influential politicians is an 
indication of the spread of the political and administrative decentralisation process in 
Bogotá. The community’s overtures to local politicians are now more concentrated on the 
ediles in their locality than before. The settlers believe that they are more likely to 
understand local needs. They are beginning to promote candidates from their own 
community to attract direct attention from the local administration. In Jerusalén, for 
example, community leaders reinforced the ASOJERUSALEN institutionally in order to 
place their own community leaders on to the JAL.5
                                                  
5 The original civic movement, named JERCOM, was created in 1985. JERCOM was later 
renamed ASOJERUSALEN in order to obtain juridical person status in order to meet electoral 
regulations. 
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The changing nature of political involvement in the six settlements 
The following stories tell of the politicians involved in the case-study settlements. They 
demonstrate that while people need political help, they soon learn to distrust most of the 
politicians concerned. 
 
Diana Turbay 
The settlement was founded by Guerrero Estrada who eventually was voted on to 
Bogotá’s council largely with the support of the community. In the early stage of 
development, the settlers voted for him in exchange for his assistance in obtaining a 
housing lot. One resident sees political intervention as something natural and is 
convinced that the community cannot carry out any concrete project without a political 
patron.  
The community goes on relying on the aid of the politicians, after all, 
because we ourselves, just residents, what can we do? Anyway, one is 
grateful for what they have done. This settlement has become what it is 
now, we know because of what they have done (especially pavement) 
and we appreciate that. [Segundo, Diana Turbay] 
 
 Luis accepts that he helped the community and retains a feeling of obligation to him.  
He did ask for our votes, but he did many things for the community as 
well. For that, I feel grateful to him. [Luis, Diana Turbay] 
 
 But people soon began to realise that Guerrero was not acting in their best interests: 
Of course, the people knew that the services were not provided at the 
beginning of this project [run by Guerrero’s Cooperative: Southeast 
Bogotá Popular Housing Cooperative], but they were told the services 
would be there soon. Frustrated, the inhabitants decided to organise a 
   297
JAC. Forming the JAC, they sought to be independent from 
[Guerrero’s] Cooperative and manage the regularisation process in their 
own way. The movement in favour of organising a JAC was not 
convenient for Guerrero, as it undermined the control over the 
settlement and people he had held through the cooperative.  
[José, Diana Turbay] 
 
 Other residents of the community, especially those who settled after Guerrero’s 
influence had begun to decline, tended to criticise him most strongly:  
He had auxilio funds from the Bogotá City council. But they say he 
used the money to purchase more land! He also committed ‘fraud’, 
having some people pay for land without actually handing it over. For 
these reasons, right now people do not allow him to enter Diana Turbay. 
People reject him or in some cases accuse him of wrong doing. [José, 
Diana Turbay]  
 
 It does appear that Guerrero’s urban development project for the popular sector 
became little more than a business for his own profit. He made a considerable amount of 
money in Diana Turbay, which he used to buy more land to develop other large scale 
projects such as Alfonso López in Usme, Juan José Rondón6 in Ciudad Bolívar, and 
elsewhere. Meanwhile he abandoned Diana Turbay, although the community still needed 
more support from him in order to acquire further social infrastructure.  
 Others, of course, defend him on the grounds of what he did for the settlement in the 
initial stages of its development. 
There are a lot of people saying things about Guerrero that are untrue . . . 
Here people accuse Dr. Guerrero of many things. They always attack 
                                                  
6 This is a different settlement from the one of my case study settlements with the same name, Juan 
José Rondón. 
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him. His actions reveal many contradictions and he has a lot of enemies. 
The people are very ungrateful. He is actually very honest, and people 
accuse him of things he has not done. [Segundo, Diana Turbay] 
 
Politics have not disappeared from Diana Turbay with the departure of Guerrero. Some 
ediles actually live in the settlement and appear to have been successful in helping the 
settlement. Everyone recognises that they have done this with the purpose of political 
self-promotion. But, perhaps because of the precedent set by Guerrero, the inhabitants are 
now accustomed to living in an atmosphere full of political propaganda and manipulation.  
 
Jerusalén 
Jerusalén is known for its association with Rafael Fetecua, a politician of great influence, 
particularly in its initial period of development. 
Fetecua helped deal with road-building problems, but he did not help as 
much as they (people) say. Fetecua had more to do with the other side of 
the neighbourhood, [areas] like Sierra Morena and Arobrizadora, which 
were covered by the Caja de Vivienda Popular programme.* 
Intervention by politicians has been limited in this settlement. They 
came and helped the people, but afterwards they wanted votes in return. 
They said that they would help with such and such after received our 
votes, but they could not promise. Evaristo** said he would not permit 
the politicians to intervene, since if that happened, development of the 
settlement would become just a matter of political interest and 
politicians would just come here to purchase votes. It should be better 
for the community to handle its projects itself. [Pedro, Jerusalén]  
(*Rafael Forero Fetecua was the owner of the territory around the Jerusalén.  
**Former community leader. See chapter 5, page 236.) 
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The policy followed by Evaristo has been maintained and carried on by Leonidas, an 
ICES teacher and the current community leader of Jerusalén. 
 However, the arrival of NGO activists with socialist sympathies and the intervention 
of the leftist guerrilla group (M-19) transformed the settlement into one of the most 
conflict-ridden communities in the city. Although there is still a group that seeks to resort 
to traditional partisan support, Jerusalén is wary of any manipulation of the community 
by politicians and has tended to reject interventions undertaken at their initiative.  
There is no such political manipulation as there used to be. Today one is 
more aware of what is going on . . . But, before, when this settlement 
started, many politicians came in and manipulated us as they wished. 
We received all the offers they provided. We voted them into the seats 
(of the city council or Congress), voting for them even when it was not 
necessary. But they soon forgot about us and our community (barrio) 
(…). Today we do not believe so readily when a politician says he will 
give us such and such. If we accepted 20 offers before, today we may 
accept just two, for example. Today the influence of politicians (and 
politics) has greatly decreased due to their lies. Also, today we are more 
aware of things. [Beatriz, Jerusalén] 
 
 Jerusalén has not, however, abandoned the strategy of seeking political support 
through lobbying. The difference between the arguments of the leaders of Jerusalén and 
those of Diana Turbay or La Paz may be found in the level of consciousness of their 
autonomy in selecting a political patron as ‘partner’ in support of their development. For 
example, in the 2000 electoral campaign, ASOJERUSALEN put two JAC leaders 
forward as candidates for edil in Ciudad Bolívar, backed by their own citizen’s movement. 
It also supported the electoral campaign of Hernando Gómez who was running for mayor 
of Bogotá. He was backed by his independent civic movement and his election pledges 
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had much in common with ASOJERUSALEN. Gómez and ASOJERUSALEN struggled 
jointly in support of his political statement criticising the new urban planning policy POT 
(Spatial Development Plan),7 which was one of the big issues in the city administration at 
the time. 
  
La Paz 
Nubia Medrano (edil of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality) played an outstanding role in La Paz. 
Some of her project proposals (such as the construction of a community hall for the 
Caracas sector) were approved by the local administrators’ committee. She also 
intervened when the community did not agree with the original street-paving plan 
proposed under the South Bogotá Project and approved by the DAPD. She supported the 
inhabitants’ counter plan and requested a hearing on the matter with the director of the 
DAPD. She succeeded in submitting a tutela and secured a change in the pavement plan 
in favour of the inhabitants.  
 The inhabitants’ evaluation of Nubia Medrano is the most positive, but their narratives 
also suggest that the community was thoroughly accustomed to receiving political 
intervention and Nubia’s initiatives reinforced their dependence on political patronage.  
Government programmes can be here, and the government can do many 
things for us, but it can be done only when there is somebody (a 
politician) who struggles to get auxilios! Without his/her presence, 
nothing can be done! These two (Nubia Medrano and Severo Correa) 
have been getting support for the improvement of this settlement. Thanks 
to their good advice and support, the community gained the space for 
                                                  
7 POT is a master urban planning scheme approved under Decree 619 of 2000. There was a series 
of debates over the central philosophy of the plan. In general, this plan was based on a concept 
seeking the merits of scale for government intervention. The geographical unit for urban planning 
was changed from the ‘barrio’ to UPZ (Zone Unit for Planning), a unit composed of several 
barrios. Under the UPZ system, the identity of particular barrios would be weakened and 
community-based activities would also be affected (Ortiz-Gómez and Zetter, 2004). This is one 
point in Gómez’s criticisim of the POT. 
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negotiation. [Flor del Carmen, La Paz] 
 
She pushed a lot in order that the resources (partida) would not go to 
benefit other barrios. It is thanks to her efforts that we have received all 
these services we are using!’ [María del Tránsito, La Paz] 
 
She (Nubia) is the one (politician) who really cooperated for the 
improvement of the settlement. Many (politicians) visit a lot and 
promise to do a lot but never do anything at all. She is different. 
[Ludovina, La Paz] 
 
La Paz is a settlement where one politician after the other came to offer something in 
return for votes. In this context, Nubia Medrano ran for the position of edil. By 2002 she 
and Severo Correa (a councillor), who was linked to Nubia through a political alliance, 
were the two politicians who worked for this settlement. Most of the testimonies of the 
inhabitants show that the community has the common understanding that it can only 
negotiate with the city authorities for the improvement of the settlement when it has the 
support of local politicians like these. 
  
 
THE RELATION WITH OTHER OUTSIDE ORGANISATIONS  
 
As described in the histories of the six settlements, relationships with a variety of 
institutions—political parties, NGOs, religious organisations, and so on—have been 
instrumental in the development of the informal settlements of Bogotá. Building 
partnerships based on equal power relationships between the actors was far from effective 
as far as I could observe. The relationships with these organisations were ambivalent, but 
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ultimately distant and often conflictive.  
 Religious groups were present in all of the settlements. They ran various kinds of 
social services: care giving for the aged or support for households with sick persons; 
education and medical care, training centres for women (sometimes with special attention 
to single mothers), and community restaurants (comedor popular, comedor escolar). 
There appears to be a clear division of labour between the religious organisations, on the 
one hand, and the JAC and local administration, on the other; no form of partnership 
between them was revealed in the results of interviews. 
 Non-religious NGOs were also involved in the settlements, mostly in the field of 
education: primary school or supplementary educational courses,8 day nurseries, 
management of community restaurants or micro financing for women. Many of their 
activities overlap with those conducted by the religious groups. In some cases, the NGOs 
are social action groups managed by supporters of political parties. Like the religious 
groups, however, they seldom form partnerships with the JAC leadership. Their 
intervention is usually totally independent. 
 In most of the cases, the inhabitants of the settlements greatly appreciate the social 
activities conducted by these groups, but also consider the organisations to be somewhat 
aloof, not encouraging the inhabitants to help plan their activities. ‘Son muy de ellos’ 
(they run their own thing) was an expression that frequently came up in the testimonies of 
the interviewees regarding the NGOs. 
 The different NGOs do not collaborate with one other. Each organisation or each 
group has its own projects and its own way of doing things. Indeed, when an NGO is 
backed by a political movement, its presence can result in conflict with the other 
organisations. Leftist political movements, in particular, tended to compete with and 
come into conflict with the JAC, as in the case of Danubio Azul. In La Paz, for example, 
                                                  
8 These courses were designed to help pupils who had missed classes to catch up with the ordinary 
primary curriculum.   
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one of the NGOs that managed the ‘school canteen’9 was run by the activist Miguel 
Angel, a supporter of the Colombian presidential candidate Horacio Serpa. This NGO 
made clear its rivalry with the political group supporting Nubia Medrano. As long as the 
decision-making process is not open to the community, these organisations will continue 
to be ‘strangers’ and their activities will be considered temporary, stopgap measures.  
 Another problem impeding continuity and ‘localisation’ of outsider-group initiated 
activities in the settlements is their subordination in the hierarchical structure of the 
central bodies they answer to (in many cases based elsewhere in the world) and their 
dependence on financial support provided by the donor organisations. The activities of 
the NGOs are therefore largely controlled by the central (external) organisation. This may 
be the reason why they have failed to develop the potential for recruitment of local 
successors (leaders, administrators) to continue the programmes they have introduced. At 
best they can recruit people at the assistant level from the community but it is hard to 
foster top leaders who are capable of managing the whole project. As illustrated by the 
example of the Fundación Social in Jerusalén (see chapter 5, page 235), the projects 
begun by the NGOs are often not sustainable once they withdraw from the settlement and 
financial support from the central organisation is withdrawn. 
 Too much involvement by an NGO, on the other hand, such that it becomes a dominant 
force in the community, as in the case of the Catholic sisterhood in JJR, can generate 
problems as well. The inhabitants’ evaluations of that NGO were both positive and 
negative: the nuns were contributing to the upgrading process of the settlement but they 
trod on the toes of the community leaders. Because the sisters were well educated they 
were better equipped to manage the projects than the local leaders. As they were honest in 
their financial management, they gained the trust of the city authorities and the public 
service enterprises. As a result, they now play an important role as mediators between the 
                                                  
9 Although called a school canteen, this eating establishment was not affiliated with any proper school 
in the settlement. It was built to serve meals at low prices to serve the primary school-aged children in 
the barrio whose families could not afford to feed them properly. 
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poor communities in JJR and its surrounding Yomasa sector as a whole, and the Bogotá 
city authorities. Their indifference toward local politicians was also sometimes criticised. 
Those who were interested in reinforcing the relationship with local politicians feared 
that their political influence in the community would be threatened by the sisterhood’s 
strong leadership. In this sense, the sisterhood was not fully welcomed by the community. 
However well intentioned the Catholic sisterhood’s activities in JJR may have been, they 
ultimately generated internal conflicts and divisions among the inhabitants.  
 
 
COMMUNITY-STATE RELATIONS 
 
In this section I will analyse the community-state relationship in order to discuss whether 
the increased state approach stimulated community participation.  During my field 
research, I realised that the community interpreted the concept of community 
participation in a different way from that of the public officers of the city administration 
(see chapter 2). I will start by clarifying this conceptual problem: what does ‘community 
participation’ mean in practice? 
 
The meaning of ‘community participation’ in the community co-financing 
programmes  
Ties have been established between different institutions and the settlements in the course 
of promoting development projects for the poor settlements.  However, there is little 
evidence that partnerships in which both participate freely and equally in the 
decision-making process have been forged between the two. Most of the collaboration 
has been very limited and most power has rested with the city authorities. 
 For years the public utilities have tried to involve the community in the sense of 
getting them to contribute to the cost of the project. The community would be required to 
pay an agreed-upon proportion of the total cost, usually varying from 30 to 40 per cent. 
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After construction, the community would pay off the rest of the installation cost on a 
monthly basis together with a charge for their consumption (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). The 
EAAB is effectively providing credit to the community. This framework has been applied 
since the 1970s, and in 2000 the EAAB began to use the term ‘community participation’ 
to refer to it. The term ‘community participation’ makes the arrangement sound positive, 
but in reality the plan is about getting the residents of the irregular settlements to pay the 
costs of installing the local water supply infrastructure. Therefore, I decided to name it 
‘community co-financing project/programme’ through this thesis (see chapter 5, page 
250). The relationship between the company and the community is therefore, essentially 
one of creditor and debtor.  
 As one employee of the water company pointed out:   
We may as well say outright that the EAAB ended up charging the 
people of these irregular settlements the cost of expanding local 
networks! However, there are options. Under the community 
participation method, the residents have to collect a considerable fund, 
but if they succeed in doing so, the regularisation process should be 
more rapid and the total cost of the construction should be less 
expensive. Therefore, this method had merit both for the community as 
well as the EAAB. [Representative of EAAB, 3 November 1999]  
 
The ‘community administration’ (gestión comunitaria) method was a similar attempt by 
the public investment executor to involve the community in sharing the cost of 
street-paving projects.  The Bogotá South Project in La Paz and the De-marginalisation 
Programme in Danubio Azul implemented this method whereby the IDU (responsible for 
local street paving) commissioned the community to administer the collection of funds. 
The resources the community was requested to provide were symbolic (less than 5 per 
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cent) in relation to the total cost of the project.10 The JAC leaders appointed one 
responsible person per block to remind the residents (owner occupants) to deposit the 
money into the designated account.11  
 According to some city officials, however, the commitment of the community to the 
scheme served another purpose:  
The share of the community in the total cost is very reduced and 
symbolic, the aim being to create the perception of ‘ownership’ in the 
beneficiary community. [We believed] the people should be responsible 
for administering the money collected among the beneficiary 
households. Through this experience, the community would attain a 
consciousness of ownership toward the project, and not be mere passive 
receivers. [Director of South Bogotá Project, 12 April 2000] 
 
Although a sense of ownership was intended to increase the autonomy of the community, 
the shared responsibility was ultimately symbolic and rhetorical. All the testimony of the 
residents in the community in question indicated that the project design had already been 
finalised when it was offered to the community. There was no participation in the 
decision-making process about what it should do or how it should proceed.  
 This is shown by the way that the South Bogotá Project was implemented in La Paz. A 
committee was established in which community representatives and the staff of the 
Project could discuss action plans. In most cases, however, when new action plans were 
proposed, the Project staff would state that the budget had already been negotiated and 
approved by the district authorities, which said implicitly that changes could not be made. 
                                                  
10 Each beneficiary household had to pay 100,000 pesos (approximately 5.00 US dollars in 2000) in 
the case of the De-marginalisation Programme and 30,000 pesos in the case of Bogotá South Project 
per street frontage. 
11 In the cases of both ‘community participation’ and the ‘community management’ methods, labour is 
contracted on the discretion and according to the criteria of the contracting company. In all the cases I 
observed, residents of the settlements concerned called for labour to be hired from the community. In 
the case of La Paz, the South Bogotá Project took the community’s request into consideration but it 
was not made obligatory for the contractor. 
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Thus, in practice the committee served only as a channel for presenting information and 
consulting on formalities. For example when the pavement plan was shown to the 
community representatives and they requested changes to the plan, a row broke out. The 
community representatives challenged the top-down nature of the community 
participation in the Project, and were forced to resort to political patronage to get 
themselves heard. Eventually Nubia Medrano (edil of the locality) intervened. She 
requested an audience with the director of DAPD and succeeded in convincing her to 
change the plan.  Whereas, in theory the committee should have allowed the community 
representatives a role in the decision-making process, in fact this was not the case and the 
community’s only real influence was through political pressure. 
 A similar situation occurred between the community and the district officers who were 
in charge of the De-marginalisation Programme in Danubio Azul. Taking the South 
Bogotá Project as a model of community participation, the De-marginalisation 
Programme also sought to stimulate communication with people in the beneficiary 
communities. They introduced an apparatus for raising awareness in the community 
concerning Programme intervention. Section coordinators accompanied by social 
workers paid frequent visits to the sites with the intention of informing the people about 
what was going on. Again their approach was top-down and no allowance had been made 
for two-way discussion in the decision-making process. As a result, there were apparently 
serious misunderstandings regarding arrangements for payment for the project. Many 
interviewees said they did not understand why they had to pay for the paving project that 
was supposedly financed by the district government. 
 In contrast, the OSP scheme (see chapter 4) for building small-scale social 
infrastructure provided more space for the beneficiaries of intervention projects to 
express their own ideas and present requests in the decision-making process. The OSP 
projects were selected through competition so people could propose their own project 
designs. Once a proposal was selected, the winning group could execute the project with 
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technical assistance and funds provided by the DAAC, but the community had to handle 
the administration of the project. In this way, the OSP succeeded in promoting 
community administration in the real meaning of community responsibility and 
autonomous development. The OSP scheme accorded greater respect to community 
initiative and the communication between the community and the DAAC (city authorities 
in charge) was two-way. In this sense, the partnership was created directly between the 
community involved in the OSP and the DAAC.  
 
Participation in collective activism  
The methods and strategies which the six communities used to obtain their collective 
needs varied considerably according to their circumstances. For the irregular settlements, 
community participation is generally understood to mean a commitment to collective 
action to address collective needs.  In the very initial stage of development, when there is 
no state presence, communal work (trabajo comunitario) is the most common strategy to 
solve problems. Opening up local roads, construction of water deposit tanks, installation 
of conduits for provisional sewerage are typical examples.12 Then, once official 
negotiations with the city government are established, they use more conventional 
methods, such as petitions signed by the residents to express their demands.  
Community meetings and assemblies are the principal decision-making space for the 
community. Normally these meetings are held on Sunday mornings because they are the 
only days when most of the household heads can be present. The rules of the JACs call for 
the recording and filing of the minutes of all these meetings. The JAC assembly is the 
supreme organisation for the discussion of communal matters but if the community is 
                                                  
12 Usually adult and young men are requested to provide their labour while the women are put in 
charge of preparing food and beverages for them. Those who are not available to take on any of 
these jobs collaborate by providing some monetary payment. 
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negotiating with the city authorities, or when a public service company is planning 
intervention through a certain project, the representatives of these outside organisations 
are often invited to the assembly. They give an explanation of the projects, discuss work 
to construct service infrastructure, outline requirements for community payments and so 
on.  
When this conventional procedure does not work, or if there are delays in the 
regularisation process, the JAC leaders (sometimes joined by the labour unions) resort to 
various forms of protest, such as demonstrations, occupation of the offices of the city 
authorities and civic strikes. For the inhabitants, involvement in these violent actions is 
also seen as participation.  In colloquial terms, they use the expressions ‘we participate’ or 
‘we collaborate’ in order to refer to their involvement in these actions. Whilst  community 
leaders come out with statements such as ‘we always organise protests whenever we 
need’, the real number of inhabitants who take part in these actions is usually limited (see 
Table 6.7).   
Regularisation of most of the public services was obtained through negotiations 
between the JAC leaders and the respective agencies of the Bogotá city administration 
and public service companies. While most of the leaders of the six settlements used 
petitions signed by the residents to demand services, tactics varied from one settlement to 
another. In Diana Turbay, the leaders used negotiation; in Jerusalén, leaders were far more 
aggressive in expressing their demands to the city authorities. In Bella Flor the residents 
protested violently when the government tried to evict the community in the early stages 
of land occupation. 
 Table 6.7 summarises the strategies or collective action used to obtain public services.  
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Table 6.7 Commitment to community-based activities by type of action (multiple responses, 
answered by household heads)  
D.Turbay Jerusalén D. Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor(A) Past 
(B) Present (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Attend meetings 164 77 131 68 150 128 189 195 103 106 34 97
Sign a petition 26 10 25 16 20 11 30 26 2 13 11 13
Civic strike 0 0 3 2 11 10 11 6 0 0 1 2 
Demonstration 3 0 12 6 11 9 11 5 0 0 4 6 
Make claim  1 1 11 10 4 4 7 4 1 0 3 6 
Office occupation 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Communal work 88 9 60 25 37 8 86 6 100 13 30 20
Others 7 1 17 5 19 4 10 8 13 3 9 8 
Total 289 98 260 133 254 174 344 250 221 135 92 152
Source: Responses to Question 57, Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from 
January to August 2000. 
 
‘Attendance at meetings’, ‘signing a petition’ and ‘participation in communal work’ were 
the three most common kinds of action. Violent protests, such as civic strikes, 
demonstrations, and city authority office sit-ins, were less common and involved fewer 
people.  
After the regularisation process started, the need for communal work declined. The 
differences between the accounts for the past (A) and the present (B) in all six settlements 
reflect this tendency clearly. After a few years the situation described by one resident no 
longer applied: 
When we came here, there was nothing here. [To obtain services] 
Everybody worked with a pickaxe and a shovel in their hands! We all 
had to struggle and toil. It was hard, but we did not have any other option.     
[Elvira, Jerusalén]   
 
Local opinion about community participation 
Some of the previous studies suggest that the pace of collective self-help actions or 
community participation in informal settlements usually slows down as living conditions 
improve and basic public services are installed (Eckstein, 1977; Torres, 1993).  Each 
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inhabitant loses his/her own motivation for getting involved in communal actions and 
becomes content to leave these matters in the hands of a small number of community 
leaders. However, the figures from the sample household survey do not fully support this 
argument. 
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 Table 6.8 shows that the community thinks that there is more community participation 
than previously in Bella Flor, La Paz, Danubio Azul and Jerusalén. One inhabitant 
explains this as follows: 
  Now people are for the first time seeing the results of the state intervention in the 
form of officially provided services, so they feel more motivated to participate 
[Martha, Bella Flor]   
 
People used to be resigned to the idea that this barrio would not develop since it 
started as land invasion.  However, suddenly the attention of the city 
[government] increased [through inclusion in the South Bogotá Project], and this 
reawakened the people’s awareness of the importance of working together. 
[Pedro, La Paz]    
 
The community is now ‘more motivated’, since we observe the change 
[progress] in the barrio. Whenever there is something [any project] of benefit to 
the people, they [we] are motivated to collaborate to carry it out. [Dina, JJR]   
 
The perspective of the inhabitants on community participation is mainly determined 
by their experiences of involvement in community action. The intervention of the state 
gave them more confidence and the stimuli to greater involvement, since there is no 
longer a fear of eviction. Thus, in this sense, greater state intervention could bring about 
greater community participation.  
However, the case of Jerusalén, which had been mostly consolidated, cannot be 
explained by this statement. In settlements that had access to most of the basic public 
services—water supply, sewage, electricity, natural gas and telephones—the inhabitants 
thought that current community participation was ‘passive’ or ‘slowing down’. These 
were the perceptions prevalent in the case of Diana Turbay. However, why did JJR, which 
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was just at the take-off point in the development process at the time the survey was 
conducted, record such a clear slowing-down tendency (54 per cent for ‘less active’ 
against 28 per cent for ‘more active’ among owners)?  
     My ‘past’ and ‘present’ categorisation in the question on the level of community 
participation was problematic since the time frame which defined ‘the past’ varied among 
interviewees. Those who settled in the very initial period considered today’s community 
less active than in the past. Their argument was that ‘the people are no longer struggling 
for basic services as we did when we came in.’ Those who came later, once state 
intervention had increased, found the current community to be more active than when 
they arrived. They argued, ‘the people are now more conscious of what is going on and 
they are trying to collaborate with each other.’  Thus, these differences occurred because 
the starting point of reference varied according to inhabitants’ year of arrival.  
     I intended to clear up this problem by analysing the interviewees’ opinion according to 
their arrival period (see Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9 Evaluation of community participation between the past and the present  
according to the interviewee’s arrival year at the settlement  
Settlement Arrival period More active Less active Equal Not know 
-1985 24(8) 28(3) 10(5) 0 
1986-90 13(4) 16(6) 4(3) 1(1) 
1991-95 7(5) 12(7) 0 7(5) 
1996-2000 8(7) 4(3) 3(3) 31(29) 
Diana Turbay 
(total 167) 
Total 52 60 16 39 
-1985 21(3) 18(3) 7(1) 5(2) 
1986-90 19(3) 8(2) 7(2) 5(3) 
1991-95 10(4) 21(8) 4(2) 5(5) 
1996-2000 12(8) 5(4) 1(1) 20(17) 
Jerusalén 
(total 169) 
Total 62 52 19 35 
-1985 3(2) 0 0 0 
1986-90 17(3) 25(2) 5(0) 1(0) 
1991-95 25(9) 10(2) 7(0) 1(1) 
1996-2000 20(9) 6(3) 8(8) 30(27) 
Danubio Azul 
(total 158) 
Total 64 41 20 32 
-1985 6(1) 4(1) 0 0 
1986-90 27(8) 19(1) 6(0) 1 
1991-95 18(6) 10(2) 6(2) 1 
1996-2000 10(3) 5(3) 6(4) 23(10) 
La Paz 
(total 143) 
1 missing 
Total 61 38 18 25 
-1985 5(0) 14(4) 2(0) 0 
1986-90 6(0) 20(3) 0 0 
1991-95 13(6) 18(3) 5(1) 1 
1996-2000 8(3) 7(1) 3(1) 26(15) 
JJR 
(total 128) 
Total 32 59 10 27 
-1985 8(1) 0 0 0 
1986-90 7(0) 4(1) 2(1) 0 
1991-95 15(4) 6(0) 3(0) 1(0) 
1996-2000 11(1) 11(1) 5(0) 30(11) 
Bella Flor 
(total 103) 
Total 41 21 10 31 
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
 
The highlighted periods indicate times when there was an influx of newcomers (owner 
occupants).  In all of the communities except Jerusalén, more interviewees who arrived in 
the initial period of the community struggle for public services answered that the current 
community was ‘less active’. In contrast, those who arrived later tended to answer ‘more 
active’. A possible explanation for the case of Jerusalén is that there was a considerable 
difference in the regularisation process between the upper sectors and lower sectors and 
therefore the evaluation of the inhabitants varied accordingly. The continuing protest 
activities of the community in the early 1990s (such as their involvement in a 
locality-wide protest in 1993) could also explain the higher frequency of ‘more active’ 
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answers from inhabitants who arrived between 1991 and 1995.  
There were two further possible reasons for the inhabitants’ contradictory answers: 
distrust of the leaders and disillusionment with community activities. Therefore, 
regardless of their own involvement in community struggle or identification of the 
community leaders, many people did not value the process of their struggle in itself but 
only whenever they saw positive results. There are various causes of this disillusionment 
and the next section attempts to explain them.  
 
Disillusionment with community action 
People’s two-fold appreciation of community action mainly derived from their distrust of 
those who were handling the community-based projects. Those who had been actively 
involved at the initial stages of development often became reluctant to participate again, 
due to disillusionment and negative feelings about the worth of working for the 
community. Those who had been close observers of the JAC activities (e.g., frequently 
attending the community assemblies) tended to be negative about their own participation, 
since they were very familiar with the internal conflicts generated by rivalries among 
different sects of the JAC and the jealousies created toward JAC leaders.  
The work with JAC is voluntary and economically not worth doing, and 
it is not even properly appreciated. People show no gratitude for the 
work of the JAC! [Jesuan, JJR] 
 
People are totally unmotivated, since they think that critical comments 
or individual opinions are being ignored. There are many factions and 
many arguments, so it is impossible to arrive at a consensus. That is the 
fundamental reason for the delay in the progress [of physical upgrading 
of the settlement]. [Rafael, JJR] 
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The increasingly bureaucratic manner in which the JAC organisation functions also 
disillusioned people. The more populous the settlement, the more likely the board of 
directors of the JAC is to become arrogant and high-handed in its handling of community 
affairs. Furthermore, the older the settlement becomes, the bigger the generation gap 
between the ‘founders’ (the first generation of inhabitants and their community leaders) 
and the younger community leaders. In many cases the older generation grows more 
conservative and its leaders tend to cling to their positions with the result that JAC 
internal politics sometimes become more closed. Since they are not included in the real 
decision-making processes on community action, inhabitants may increasingly leave 
matters in the hands of the JAC leaders and grow apathetic and disinterested in what the 
latter are doing. The distance between the JAC leaders and the inhabitants increases, and 
responsibility for community-related activities is increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of the few members of the JAC board.  
People are now less involved in the community actions. They tend to 
wait for the JAC (leaders) to do everything and do not collaborate at all. 
This settlement practically has all the services, [so] people in the 
community do not feel the need to fight for anything more.  
[Luis, Diana Turbay] 
  
The inhabitants are less active than before in community activities, 
because they have all the necessary services. So, most people are 
satisfied. Also, there is no leader to promote new projects.  
[José, Diana Turbay] 
 
The community is now less active and motivated to participate. So 
many people and organisations have been involved in community 
development that people have come to think that things are taken care 
   318
of by So-and-so A, Such-and-such organisation, or So-and-so politician. 
That leads them to assume: ‘We can just leave it up to them!’ On the 
other hand, those who once had the passion and spirit to work hard [for 
the community] have already have done so much that they are now too 
exhausted to continue. [Flor del Carmen, La Paz] 
 
Two further obstacles to increased community participation appear to be on the one hand 
a lack of any sort of charismatic personality, or, on the other hand, the presence of 
individuals so deeply entrenched as leaders that they cannot be replaced. 
I feel less motivated to get involved in community participation now, 
because the JAC leaders are always the same, and they have not done 
much to improve the settlement. [Martha Lucia, Diana Turbay] 
 
The impression of many interviewees was that the inhabitants have become content to 
leave any difficult procedures required for the regularisation process up to the JAC 
leadership. Increasingly, the more they have left administrative matters up to the 
discretion of the core members of the JACs, the more these organisations have become 
indispensable to the community. This situation, however, varies considerably according 
to the awareness of the inhabitants regarding the collective needs of the settlement, the 
level of education of the inhabitants, and political interest at the individual level.  
 In fact, other testimonies recorded in the interviews indicated positive trends in 
community participation thanks to what the inhabitants have learned from experience.  
Individual inhabitants are now acting more autonomously and 
independently of the activities conducted under the direction of the JAC 
leaders, since many people are now better trained and have learned how 
to handle the procedures for dealing with state or city authorities.  
[Beatriz, Jerusalén]   
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 Now the people at least know where and how and with whom they have 
to talk when they (we) have a problem or a need they want fulfilled.  
[Blanca, JJR] 
 
In this sense, people in the community have improved their capacity to negotiate. 
However, since they tend to hand over all their problems to the JAC, the better organised 
the JAC, the less likely people are to learn how to handle individual matters and deal with 
the kind of documentation required by the city offices. 
 Community participation is also sometimes affected by the ill feeling that arises when 
economic development creates feelings of jealousy and competition among the residents.  
No one wants to go back to the poor and miserable way they lived 
before. [Therefore] even the smallest advantage can trigger jealousy 
among the neighbours. Any improvement of a house causes other 
people to feel jealous. [Fabio, Diana Turbay] 
 
The sense of unity that formed among the residents when conditions were poor and the 
settlement was marginalised by the city disappears over time. As living conditions in a 
settlement improve, economic disparities among its population begin to appear that 
negatively affect the motivation of inhabitants to become involved in community 
activities. The arrival of tenants, who are usually less interested in the settlement’s 
problems affect this as well.  The interviews with tenants revealed that they had little 
knowledge or interest in the issue of community participation and found it difficult to 
evaluate.  
  
   320
 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND COMMUNITY-STATE RELATIONS  
 
The service companies, from their standpoint, were always prepared to service these 
settlements, but it took time because of technical and financial difficulties (Gilbert and 
Ward, 1985). In the meantime, these marginal communities struggled to obtain basic 
water supply, sewage, and electrical supply services through various—including 
illegal—means. In the 1980s, the services were installed more quickly either by aid 
provided by individual politicians or by pressure applied by politicians to push ahead the 
regularisation process. In the 1990s, with the introduction of the idea of pro-poor growth, 
public programmes played a dominant role in the regularisation of the settlements’ public 
service needs. Public service companies also had to make their management more 
efficient in order to resolve their financial crisis. As a result, the regularisation process 
speeded up significantly.  
     In the late 1990s however, there were a series of collective protests against increased 
service charges and fees. Usually, the cost of the service before and after regularisation 
differs. People understood that they should pay more for the new, properly installed 
service (Estache and Gómez-Lobo, 2001). However, the economic recession of 1997 to 
2001 meant that the burden of the new service charges and fees on their household budget 
was a heavy one.  Should the protest against the increased fees in 2000 be understood as a 
result of the new tariff system or simply as a result of the economic crisis?  Could these 
economic factors affect the applicability of community co-financing programmes as 
well? The following section will discuss the impact of the economic recession on 
state-community relations. 
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Economic conditions necessary for the success of community co-financing 
programmes  
Most of the irregular settlements are located in areas where the topography made the 
regularisation of public services technically quite difficult. Thus, from the beginning, 
these areas were at a disadvantage as far as service installation was concerned. To serve 
them properly (i.e., expand the service networks to these settlements), appropriate 
infrastructure had to be built, the cost of which was even greater than that for 
communities with standard topography13.  
 However, perhaps an even more critical factor was whether the proposal to make the 
residents pay for the work through loans to be paid back in instalments over a period of 
years is feasible. Such an approach depended on the economic capacity of the residents to 
pay, but also—when it came to intervention by the public service authorities—on the 
percentage of occupation of the land.  
 There is no requirement regarding population (in order to conduct 
regularisation through the ‘community participation’ model). However, 
what happens is that their low income level affects the number of 
persons who can pay. Or, [if the land occupation level is too low and 
there are very few lots/households that are potential users], the number 
of lots defines whether the programme (through ‘community 
participation’) will succeed or fail. We (the EAAB) intervene to install 
infrastructure and provide training courses (for consciousness-raising in 
the community) when the land-occupation indicator exceeds 75 to 80 
per cent. It is extremely difficult to carry out an upgrading programme 
by the community participation model in a settlement with a 
land-occupation index less than that. [Representative of EAAB, 10 May 
                                                  
13 For example, to provide water service to the settlements located at elevations of 2,800 metres or 
higher above sea level, pumps had to be installed at an additional cost. In the case of the 
settlements located along the banks of a river or stream, moreover, special treatment facilities 
were required in constructing sewerage networks. 
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2000] 
 
Due to its own financial limitations, the EAAB placed higher priority on settlements with 
higher land-occupation density (more than 50 per cent). The delay in the EAAB approach 
to settlements such as JJR and Bella Flor was partially due to their low-land-occupancy 
rates. In most of the cases, the EAAB, particularly the office in charge of the irregular 
settlements (headed by Fernando Fandiño in 2000), was responsible for promoting 
regularisation through the community co-financing programme. For the community, the 
more it could pay in advance, the lighter the burden of monthly fees for loan repayments 
would be. For the EAAB, the more capital available at the outset, the greater the 
advantage in financing the work contracted under the programme. After all, this cost for 
expansion of the local networks would normally have been charged to the urban 
developers who would have passed on the costs to the purchasers of the real estate. In the 
case of the irregular settlements, the members of the community were required to pay 
directly. This was the trade-off for the low price of the land, but in the longer term, the 
community had to pay very high costs to attain regularisation. 
Of the six case-study settlements, only Danubio Azul and La Paz were successful in 
achieving regularisation of the water supply network under the community co-financing 
programme. In 1995 these two settlements signed the contract for the integrated 
regularisation of water supply under the programme. In the case of La Paz, there had been 
a failed attempt to regularise services in the late 1980s when land occupation was still low. 
But the programme was suspended when the community failed to collect the necessary 
down-payment funds. Ultimately, the regularisation of public services (water and 
sewerage simultaneously) was advanced under the integrated upgrading programme of 
the South Bogotá Project. Regularisation under the community participation model was 
partially implemented in some sectors of Jerusalén, as well as Diana Turbay. Diana 
Turbay had been served earliest, but its final upgrading was conducted in the 1990s using 
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the community co-financing programme14. Bella Flor however, failed to implement the 
community co-financing programme since its physical and economic conditions did not 
meet the standards of the EAAB.  
The inter-settlement COOPABUS project launched in the nine-settlement area 
(including JJR) of Yomasa was a variation of the community co-financing programme. 
The limited economic capacity and low level of land occupation of the individual 
settlements had impeded the EAAB in installing the service in a relatively efficient and 
financially sustainable way.  Work had not started at the end of 2000 because of strong 
distrust in the community regarding the down-payments to be deposited in the 
COOPABUS account. In the end, the project failed due to the corruption of the 
COOPABUS.   
The community co-financing [or cost-sharing] programme for regularisation was 
essentially a strategy for encouraging people to pay part of the cost of the infrastructure in 
advance. The reasoning behind this framework is clearly based on cost-benefit logic. 
Similar to the term ‘ownership building’, ‘community participation’ (or administration) 
programmes were a form of rhetoric used to convince the beneficiaries to share the costs 
and thereby enable the work to start. At the same time, once a settlement could fulfil its 
duty to pay, it gained the right to make a claim for the process of regularisation to start. 
Beyond this, the three indispensable elements for carrying out this programme were a 
sufficient minimum economic capacity to meet the requirements of the EAAB, strong 
leadership and the trust of the inhabitants to guarantee the payment. 
However, when the installation costs and regular payments were too high relative to the 
economic capacity of the population, there might be problems. 
                                                  
14 This statement is based on the correspondence and records of the JAC in the DAAC ‘barrio file’and 
testimonies of the inhabitants. 
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Inhabitants’ reaction toward the new tariff regime during the economic recession 
The privatisation of the EEB in 1995 and the new regime under the CODENSA speeded 
up regularisation of the electrical power supply in the irregular settlements. The EAAB, 
while it continued as a public enterprise, has been expected to be more efficient in its 
management since surviving the financial crisis in the early 1990s.  
 As described in detail in chapter 4, a new regime for water and electric power supply 
was established under the Constitution of 1991 and the National Law No.142/1994 on 
public services. Under this law new commissions (CRA and CREG) were set up to 
regulate tariffs and fees. Subsidies for the lowest socio-economic strata were to be 
gradually reduced.  Some interviewees thought that they would pay increased fees in 
exchange for a better service. Others complained about the increased fees since they 
could not afford to pay them. Let us look at how the service charge increased and how it 
burdened the household economy in these settlements. And then, we will look at the 
inhabitants’ arguments against the new service charges.  
 
Increase of water and sewerage charges 
 As discussed, implementation of the gradual reduction of subsidies for low 
socio-economic strata (1 to 3) for water and sewerage services was delayed during the 
previous plan. There had been a lot of political polemic against the possible increase of 
water tariffs since the CRA was established, even though service charges had been 
increasing since 1994. Table 6.10 shows the real annual increase ratio of basic tariffs for 
water and sewerage for the period between 1991 and 2003. It takes 1994 as the base year 
when the new regulatory regime started. Clearly enough, the basic tariff for all strata grew 
gradually until it reached a peak in 2000 when it started to decline. Proportionally, the 
increase of the ratio for strata one and two were higher than the other strata. Except for the 
sudden steep increase in the ratio for stratus 6 in 2000, the ratios for strata one and two 
were highest even after 2000.  
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Table 6.10 Evolution of service charges for water and sewerage:  
                      real annual increase ratio for basic tariffs(*) 1991-2003 
Stratus 1991
-92 
1992 
-93 
1993 
-94 
1994
-95 
1995
-96 
1996
-97 
1997
-98 
1998
-99 
1999 
-2000 
2000 
-01 
2001
-02 
2002
-03 
      1 8 -7 3 0 19 20 20 23 39 36 31 32 
2 -1 3 2 0 11 23 23 23 23 20 17 17 
3 -1 1 3 0 9 13 14 16 23 20 17 17 
4 -1 2 3 0 7 7 7 9 18 11 10 10 
    5 -1 1 3 0 4 4 4 7 21 15 8 9 
    6 -1 1 3 0 1 1 1 5 37 19 3 3 
Source: EAAB, Tarifas acueducto Resolución CRA 76/99 Acuerdo 15/99 EAAB. 
Note: In this table, the ‘tariffs’ mean the sum of the water tariff and sewerage tariff. Basic tariff 
means the sum of the ‘fixed charge’ and the ‘charge for basic consumption of 20 cubic metres’. 
See Appendix E.3 for the table on the evolution of the basic tariff for water and sewerage (in 2001 
Colombian pesos). 
 
 Table 6.11 approximates the changes in the burden of service charge for water and 
sewerage (for a monthly consumption of 20 cubic meters) on the estimated average 
monthly income for each stratus.15 This approximation suggests that the burden of 
payment for these services proportionally increased from the late 1990s. This tendency is 
particularly marked for strata one and two (CRA, 2006).  
                                                  
15 The indices used for calculating the weight for the different strata were taken from those used in 
Junca Salas (2000) for a similar exercise. Junca based his indices on the estimated salary calculated by 
strata in Medellín (Colombia’s second city). If the base salary was under-estimated then the burden on 
the monthly income for Bogotá would be less, but the effect of such an under-estimation would affect 
all the strata equally. 
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    Table 6.11 Burden of service charge for water and sewerage on average monthly income(%)  
Stratus 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 1.19 1.29 1.20 1.24 1.24 1.48 1.77 2.13 2.62 3.65 4.91 6.47 8.53 
2 1.49 1.48 1.53 1.55 1.55 1.71 2.11 2.59 3.19 3.91 4.70 5.49 6.42 
3 1.49 1.48 1.51 1.56 1.55 1.69 1.92 2.18 2.52 3.10 3.73 4.36 5.11 
4 1.39 1.38 1.40 1.45 1.45 1.54 1.65 1.78 1.95 2.30 2.56 2.81 3.10 
5 1.38 1.37 1.39 1.44 1.43 1.49 1.54 1.61 1.72 2.08 2.39 2.59 2.82 
6 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.10 1.51 1.80 1.86 1.92 
Source: As Table 6.10. 
Note: As the basic tariff was calculated at the 2001 value, I applied the legal minimum salary in 2001 as the 
basic reference for the monthly income as follows:  
 
Legal minimum salary (per month) for 2001 was 286,000 (Colombian pesos). 
Stratus Index for weight Base monthly income(Col.$)
1 0.79   225,940 
2 1.62   463,320 
3 3.37   963,820 
4 6.25 1,787,500 
5 10.5 3,003,000 
6 20.2 5,777,200 
 
The residents responded to the increase in the service charge by reducing their 
consumption. In fact, the average consumption of water for stratus one was reduced from 
47.91 cubic metres/month in 1994 to 24.52 cubic metres/month in 2004. However, this 
strategy of rationalisation of water consumption was similarly observed in the other 
socio-economic strata (see Table 6.12).   
 
Table 6.12  Evolution of average consumption of water 1994 to 2004 by strata (㎥/month) 
Stratus 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 47.91 52.30 43.45 39.64 34.21 32.20 30.60 29.54 27.08 26.60 24.52
2 48.67 48.15 47.01 40.15 36.82 34.36 32.25 30.83 28.77 27.81 26.45
3 46.12 44.92 42.47 36.60 34.47 32.29 30.81 28.89 27.04 26.35 24.50
4 41.69 40.43 37.87 34.10 29.91 29.12 28.57 27.77 26.59 26.97 24.56
5 46.56 45.61 43.55 38.25 34.16 33.37 33.02 32.33 31.27 31.59 29.35
6 56.68 52.34 50.87 46.27 39.08 37.25 37.42 36.14 25.55 36.93 35.47
  Source: EAAB, as Table 6.10.  
 
Increase in electricity charges 
We can also look at the fluctuation of the service charge for electricity.  I will approximate 
this based on the figures of reference created by CREG. CREG had eliminated the 
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subsidies provided for the fixed charge (cargo fijo) by 2002, as it had planned. Table 6.13 
gives a summary of the increase ratio of the service charge for the period 1983-2004. It 
highlights the steep increase after the privatisation of the EEB in 1997. It also suggests the 
effect of the elimination of subsidies by strata. Since 1997, the service charge for the 
lower strata (one to three) increased much more than the upper strata (four to six). 
  
Table 6.13 Annual increase ratio of service charge for electricity by strata (%) 
Stratus 1983 – 2004(average) 1983-1997(average) 1997-2004(average)
1 0.53 -6.21 15.50 
2 4.82 1.54 11.71 
3 6.94 5.32 10.25 
4 3.99 5.27 1.47 
5 2.68 3.30 1.44 
6 -0.12 -0.44 0.52 
Total (average) 3.35 0.33 6.41 
Source: Otero Prada, 2006: 20. 
Note: see also Appendix E.4 for average annual service charge (in 1992 Colombian pesos 
/KW/Hour). 
 
As in the case of the water and sewerage service, the inhabitants began to reduce their 
electricity consumption in the late 1990s.  
 
Table 6.14 Monthly consumption of electricity (kw/h) 
Strata 1985 1990 1992 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 
1 142 191 194 178 140 119 117 120 
2 167 234 171 180 156 141 137 138 
3 220 282 243 201 192 176 170 170 
4 411 350 300 239 243 220 211 207 
5 548 460 376 310 305 279 274 272 
6 742 614 494 445 436 403 399 393 
Source: Data for 1985 from EEB, other figures from CREG, cited in Otero Prada, 2000: 21.  
 
As a consequence, the burden of payment for electricity on the average monthly income 
slightly increased in strata 1 to 3 after the decrease between 1998 and 2000, but the 
burden decreased in strata 4 to 6 (Table 6.15). 
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Table 6.15 Approximate burden of service charge for electricity on average monthly income (%) 
Strata 1985 1990 1992 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 
1 3.70 3.30 3.75 4.59 4.64 9.31 5.04 5.18 
2 2.15 2.94 2.43 3.51 3.23 3.35 3.44 3.43 
3 1.57 2.24 2.27 2.98 2.49 2.65 2.72 2.78 
4 2.31 2.20 2.50 2.11 2.18 2.02 2.07 2.08 
5 2.85 3.67 4.04 1.96 2.03 1.83 1.92 1.94 
6 3.10 2.18 3.22 1.56 1.53 1.38 1.45 1.46 
Source: Data for average service charge by strata were taken from Otero Prada 2006: 18.  
Data for consumption is taken from Table 6.14. 
Calculated according to the same monthly income by strata used in Table 6.11. 
 
Approximation of burden of service charges (water, sewerage and electricity) on monthly 
income in six settlements in 2000 
Based on the statistics above, Table 6.16 intends to simulate the burden of charges for 
basic public services in the studied settlements.    
 
Table 6.16 Simulation of the burden of service charges (water, sewerage and electricity) 
    on monthly income in six settlements in 2000 
 Diana 
Turbay 
Jerusalén Danubio 
Azul 
La Paz JJR Bella 
Flor 
Income (1) 
Col. $  
603,000 526,000 
 
346,000 
 
311,000 317,000 247,000
Ratio vs. 
SML(2) 
2.31 2.02 1.33 1.19 1.21 0.94 
Water (3) 10,906.17 10,906.17 10,906.17 4,667.64 4,667.64 4,667.64
Electricity(4) 13,616.31 13,616.31 13,616.31 9,537.00 9,537.00 9,537.00
(3+4)/(1)(%) 4.06 4.66 7.08 4.56 4.48 5.75 
Source: Income data taken from Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted  
from January to August 2000. 
Service charge data taken from Appendices E.3 and E.4. Data for monthly consumption of 
electricity taken from Table 6.14.         
Note:  
(1) Weighted average (mean) of household income in the sampled survey. 
(2) Legal minimum salary in 2000= 260,100 Colombian pesos.  
(3) Monthly service charge for water and sewerage consumption of 20 cubic metres.  
The figure for stratus 2 in 2000 for Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Danubio Azul. The figure for 
stratus 1 in 2000 for La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor. 
(4) Monthly service charge for average electricity consumption in 2000. The figure for stratus 2 
 in 2000 for Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Danubio Azul. The figure for stratus 1 in 2000 for La Paz, 
JJR and Bella Flor.  
 
We also have to understand that this increase in the service charge occurred during the 
period of economic recession. As Figure 6.1 shows, in the period 1997 to 2001 an 
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economic crisis hit Colombia which was felt harshly in Bogotá (see Dávila 2004).    
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
 
Figure 6.1: Bogotá: annual increase of GDP per capita (1990-2003) 
Source: DANE (http://www.dane.gov.co/), accessed 1 December 2006. 
 
During the same period, the performance of the labour market deteriorated. The 
unemployment rate in Bogotá increased from 11.3 per cent in March 1993 to 20.3 per cent 
in December 2001 (see Appendix 6a.2). The real growth ratio of the minimum salary in 
Bogotá was negative throughout the 1990s (see Appendix 6a.3). 
 In the six case study settlements, the rate of household heads in the sample survey who 
were not occupied in the previous month represented between 9.5 per cent to 16.2 per 
cent of the whole sample (Table 6.17).  This rate was not exactly the same as the 
‘unemployment rate’ since many household heads were categorised as informal sector 
workers. 
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Table 6.17 Employment rate in the past month of six settlements 
 Diana Turbay Jerusalén Danubio Azul La Paz JJR Bella Flor 
(A) Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
Occu- 
pied 
144 86.2 148 87.6 143 90.5 113 79.0 108 84.4 91 88.3
Not 
occu- 
pied 
 
23 
 
13.8 
 
21 
 
12.4
 
15 
 
9.5 
 
30 
 
21.0
 
20 
 
15.6 
 
12 
 
16.7
Total 167 100.0 169 100.0 158 100.0 143 100.0 128 100.0 103 100.0
(B) Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
Occu- 
pied 
61 46.2 47 39.2 67 57.3 58 55.8 42 53.2 35 46.7
Not 
occu- 
pied 
 
71 
 
53.8 
 
73 
 
60.8
 
50 
 
42.7
 
46 
 
44.2
 
37 
 
46.8 
 
40 
 
53.3
Total 132 100.0 120 100.0 117 100.0 104 100.0 79 100.0 75 100.0
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000. 
Note: (A): household head, (B): household head’s partner. 
  
In Table 6.18, which summarises the job structure of the sampled households, those who 
are identified as ‘independent workers’ and ‘self-employed workers at home business’ 
together are categorised as informal sector workers.  To install a home business at their 
own house is one of the survival strategies for these communities, but in general, the 
income generation by most of the jobs found in the settlements was unstable.  
 
Table 6.18 Job classification of the household heads in the sampled survey (frequency) 
Diana 
Turbay 
Jerusalén Danubio 
 Azul 
La Paz JJR Bella  
Flor 
 
A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Independent 
Worker(1) 
67 25 74 23 59 31 65 36 66 19 57 26
Home 
business(2) 
14 15 18 12 16 14 6 7 7 4 9 2 
Unskilled 
employed 
63 21 56 12 68 22 42 15 35 19 25 7 
Total 144 61 148 47 143 67 113 58 108 42 91 35
Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to Aubust 2000. 
Note: A: household head, B: household head’s partner. 
(1) Includes assistant/worker in construction, informal venders, assistants to bus drivers, domestic service 
workers and other informal service workers. 
(2) Includes owner of shops, restaurants, bakeries and other workshops run by the household head and his 
family at their own home.   
  
As analysed, there was a real increase in service charges both for water, sewerage and 
electricity in the late 1990s.  I only have income data for the year 2000 for the studied 
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households but during the economic recession of 1997-2001, the burden of these service 
charges on the household income would have been sorely felt. Interviewees explained 
that this was because many inhabitants had to pay not only the increased charges for 
regular consumption but also extraordinary costs for individual connection to the newly 
regularised service. This cost was usually paid with an initial deposit and a two or three 
year-loan for the balance. The monthly payment was normaly invoiced together with 
normal payment for service charge.  As Tránsito explains, 
In La Paz, most of the people finished paying off the loan for the 
installation two years ago (1998). The setting of a meter for the 
consumption of the service was charged at either 191,000 pesos, for a 
house with a business or other commercial activity and 67,000 pesos 
for an ordinary house. This payment could be paid in a one or two 
year-loan, which was charged monthly with the consumption fee. (. . .) 
For example, the minimum tariff was about 2,000 pesos or 3,000 pesos, 
which has increased drastically now to 20,000 or 30,000 pesos [for 
consumption only]. The loan for installation of the meter was charged 
separately [and paid in instalments of] about 2,000 pesos per month. 
This change was considerable. [Tránsito, La Paz] 
 
The first reactions to the increase in public service charges were negative. After the public 
utility meters for recording consumption were installed in their homes, many inhabitants 
expressed dismay at what were, by their standards, expensive charges, although they 
admitted that the quality of service had improved.  
Since the CODENSA [came in to upgrade the infrastructure] in 1998, 
the power supply system changed. The quality is improved. The power 
supply used to be very unstable but now there are no more power 
shortages. I am paying an average of 10,000 pesos per month for 
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consumption. The cost of installation of the local network was a 
one-time payment of 160,000 pesos. The water supply was also 
regularised and a meter installed. Now, whenever I am late in paying 
the fees, the service is immediately suspended.  [Luis Beltrán, Danubio 
Azul] 
 
The charges for a proper service usually rose because they had been undercharged 
before (during the semi-regularised provision). The charges after the late 1990s also 
increased because the EAAB had to abide by Law 142 and subsidies were reduced.  A 
further perceived change in the new tariff regime was the fact that the payment was no 
longer negotiable between the community and the respective companies, even if political 
pressure was applied.  This was more clearly understood in the case of electricity after the 
privatisation of the EEB.  
At ICES [JAC office], I asked them [the JAC leaders] what to do. Then 
they made me sign the [CODENSA] document to be included in the 
computer [on-line system]. By that signature, they would put the meter 
at my house and then the power would come. I had to do as I was told, 
since the letter we sent would not serve at all! The JAC did nothing to 
support us! (Since the power service has changed to a private company, 
JAC’s negotiation process does not work.)  [Pedro Sierra, Jerusalén] 
 
Pedro’s criticism of the JAC leaders’ attitudes implies his understanding that it was no 
longer possible for the JAC leaders to negotiate with CODENSA to make changes if the 
inhabitants protested against the cost.16 Under the EEB system, he had been paying what 
was called a ‘minimum fee’ of 3,300 pesos (for unlimited use), but after the arrival of 
CODENSA, he had to join their system or lose the right of access to electric power. 
                                                  
16 However, the JACs of Jerusalén organised a big demonstration to protest against the high fees 
charged by different public service companies in 2000 (El Tiempo, 2000). 
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 Most people viewed the change to a regularised power system run by CODENSA as 
the exchange of increased tariffs for improved quality of service. Tránsito, an inhabitant 
of La Paz, said that in the days when they had only a ‘provisional service’ and paid the 
‘minimum tariff’ they had some advantages such as not having to worry about the cost in 
terms of how many household appliances they used, though they had many technical 
problems due to the overuse of the power. Some people quickly grasped the value of the 
improved quality of the service and better quality of life that they could enjoy as a result. 
Regarding the power supply, I prefer the CODENSA system, since the 
service is more efficient. When I asked about the fee, they immediately 
sent someone to check the fee and admitted that the meter had not been 
correctly read. What we consume, we have to pay for. [Marina Garzón, 
Danubio Azul] 
  
 The new regime left no more room for fuzzy, flexible payments. Access to the service 
is not a matter of negotiation but a business transaction. The payment was generally 
standardised, although the lowest strata did continue to receive a subsidy.  
When we were paying the ‘minimum fee’, the charge for water was 
from 5,000 to 10,000 pesos, but now it is from 15,000 to 17,000! The 
minimum fee for electricity was from 5,000 to 10,000 pesos but now is 
16,000 pesos! This [must be] a trap!  [Bernabé, Jerusalén] 
 
This comment clearly expresses the inhabitants’ feeling of the ‘sudden increase of 
charges’ and therefore the increased burden on their household budget.  
 
Reaction of the community to protest against the increased service charge 
As discussed in chapter 4, in the 1990s the communities in the poor settlements continued 
to mobilise the people to join protests such as demonstrations and civic strike once all the 
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conventional strategies of negotiation had stalled.  The biggest civic strike in Ciudad 
Bolívar in 1993 had a ripple effect and in 1993-94, the civic strikes spread to other 
localities such as Usme, Usaquén, Engativá, Kennedy and Bosa. As mentioned in chapter 
5, the community leaders of Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and La Paz often resorted to these 
protests in order to negotiate with the city authorities.  Their complaints against the public 
services up until 1999 included delayed regularisation, shortage of services (water, 
specially) and erroneous invoicing for public services. However, in 2000, they also 
organised protests to complain against the increased tariffs. During my field work, I 
accompanied the protest against CODENSA organised by ASOJERUSALEN backed by 
some labour unions (January 2000). They also got together with the communities of 
Usme to organise a manifestation in which they burned copies of the service charge 
invoice in front of the respective public service companies’ offices and requested a 
reduction in the service charge (June 2000) (El Espectador, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c). 
However, no community-state relation negotiations on this issue took place and the 
community had not achieved a positive result by the end of my field work (2000).17   
 
 
CONCLUSION: INHABITANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
 
This chapter has shown that the community recognised good leadership as that which was 
able to mobilise resources and get results in terms of benefits for the community. Political 
patronage was always considered important and close relations between leaders and local 
politicians were positively valued as long as the relationship was effective and brought 
tangible results. Qualifications for leadership were judged by concrete outcome, so the 
                                                  
17 From late 2000, emerging leftist political movements such as Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) 
began to provide greater support for these community protests. In fact, Luis Garzón from the PDA 
launched his electoral campaign promising a reduction in the water service tariff. After he became 
mayor of Bogotá in 2003, the basic charge for water was significantly reduced (El Tiempo, 2004a; 
2004b; El Nuevo Siglo 2004; 2005). However, for the purposes of this thesis I have separated political 
negotiations regarding public services from the protests which occurred under the initiative of 
community leaders.  
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leaders continued to resort to political patronage as long as it worked. Before the start of 
state intervention, community leaders were crucial to the organisation of collective 
actions. Once the JAC leadership was recognised by the city authorities, the JAC 
directing board was recognised as the intermediary agency between the community and 
the state. The variety of collective actions to which the community resorted reflected the 
strategies of the JAC leaders. However, the JAC leaders were often tempted to help 
themselves from the money that passed through their hands, and chronic cases of 
corruption generated distrust in the community, hindering the process of development. 
Therefore, the quality of the leadership was an important factor in determining the speed 
of consolidation of the irregular settlements. 
 Although the effect of clientelistic practices was reduced, the close relationship 
between the community leaders and local politicians, particularly ediles of the locality 
remains. The influence of politicians over the regularisation process itself (especially 
with CODENSA) has declined so assistance from politicians is now exclusively based on 
the procurement of resources for community development. Predominant among the local 
politicians identified by the residents were the ediles who had access to such resources. 
Today the community has other ways of obtaining services for example from the pro-poor 
programmes (which were widely offered by Mockus and Peñalosa), so they no longer 
rely on clientelist practices as they used to. In addition, they are now more aware of the 
possibility of gaining a seat in the JAL through a civic political movement. 
 The role of outside organisations (politicians, NGOs, religious groups) was crucial to 
the development process of irregular settlements. However, the analysis showed that 
enduring partnerships were rarely created between the community and outside 
organisations particularly in terms of decision-making processes. 
 Inhabitants commit themselves to communal activities when they can see its returns in 
terms of improvements in their living conditions in the settlements. In the initial stages of 
land occupation, the residents had to collaborate for their survival and to secure their 
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place on the land. However, as the consolidation process progressed, their motivation for 
participating in communal activities decreased for the simple reason that they now had 
most of what they needed and did not need to fight for anything. The cases which were 
just in the initial stage of regularisation highlighted the circumstances in which the 
inhabitants were stimulated to participate as they observed the recent intervention of the 
state. However, even in such circumstances, without firm and transparent leadership, the 
community activities were not well attended. Once becoming disillusioned with their 
community leadership, despite knowing the necessity of participation, inhabitants are 
often reluctant to get involved in collective action. The combination of these factors 
means that sometimes the opinions, actions and reactions of the inhabitants are 
contradictory. 
 The residents’ attitudes toward the improved but more expensive service provision in 
2000 had to be understood in the light of the economic recession. The community 
co-financing programmes implemented by the public service companies helped them to 
learn the logic of cost in exchange for economic benefits, as well as the logic of 
consumption. From the late 1990s, under the new tariff regime, the service charges began 
to be based on the units consumed. Subsidies which greatly benefited the users in the 
lower strata were gradually reduced. Under these circumstances political intervention 
was largely ineffective and community reliance on local politicians in respect to the 
problems of service charges declined. There was little role for the JAC leaders either, 
since the space for negotiations on the tariff issue was quite limited. Regarding the 
reluctance of the inhabitants to pay for the installation of local networks, many people 
were unwilling to pay the down-payment because they distrusted the JAC leaders who 
were collecting the money.  People were sceptical of any delays in the installation of the 
work due to technical problems since they tended to associate such problems with bad 
management or corruption among the JAC leaders. Though the public service companies 
tried to convince the inhabitants to join the community co-financing programme under 
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the rhetoric of community participation, this did not necessarily increase community 
involvement. The main determining factors in encouraging the community to pay were 
firm, competent and transparent leadership and the inhabitants’ purchasing power.  
 In fact, the economic circumstances of the case study communities affected not only 
the applicability of the community co-financing programme but also determined 
community reaction to the increased public services charges. Under the new tariff regime, 
the burden of public service charges on the average household income increased. This 
increase occurred at the same time as the economic recession hit the poor hard. The 
subsequent protests against the increased public services tariffs were with good reason as 
there was no alternative channel for negotiations between the community and the city 
authorities on this issue. 
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Appendix 6a.2 
Bogotá: quarterly unemployment rate from March 1990 to December 2000 
    
0
5
10
15
20
25
year
%
1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
 
Quarter Unemployment
rate (%) 
Quarter Unemployment
rate (%) 
Quarter Unemployment
rate (%) 
1990/Mar. 7.96 94/Mar. 8.14 98/Mar. 14.76 
90/Jun. 10.09 94/Jun. 7.71 98/Jun. 13.28 
90/Sep. 8.84 94/Sep. 4.92 98/Sep. 14.41 
90/Dec. 10.76 94/Dec. 7.24 98/Dec. 18.03 
91/Mar. 9.18 95/Mar. 6.49 99/Mar. 18.00 
91/Jun. 8.90 95/Jun. 7.82 99/Jun. 19.10 
91/Sep. 8.14 95/Sep. 6.25 99/Sep. 19.30 
91/Dec. 8.12 95/Dec. 8.23 99/Dec. 16.90 
92/Mar. 8.41 96/Mar. 9.48 2000/Mar. 19.60 
92/Jun. 9.09 96/Jun. 10.33 2000/Jun. 20.70 
92/Sep. 7.30 96/Sep. 9.13 2000/Sep. 20.30 
92/Dec. 8.54 96/Dec. 8.46 2000/Dec. 20.30 
93/Mar. 7.33 97/Mar. 11.39   
93/Jun. 7.02 97/Jun. 9.89   
93/Sep. 5.24 97/Sep. 10.59   
93/Dec. 5.68 97/Dec. 12.91   
          Source: DANE, Encuesta de hogares, various numbers (1990-2000). Data from 1990 to 1999 are 
          taken from DAPD (2000). Data for 2000 are from DANE website: http://www/dane.gov.co/,  
accessed 15 November 2006. 
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Appendix 6a.3 
Bogotá: minimum legal wage and its real annual growth ratio 
(1986-2004) 
 
                       Annual growth ratio of minimum legal wage 
 
 
-8.00 
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-5.00 
-4.00 
-3.00 
-2.00 
-1.00 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
% 
1986 1990
1995
2000
1997
 
 
Year 
Monthly minimum 
legal wage 
(Colombian pesos) 
1985 13,558 
1986 16,811 
1987 20,510 
1988 25,637 
1989 32,560 
1990 41,025 
1991 51,716 
1992 65,190 
1993 81,510 
1994 98,700 
1995 118,934 
1996 142,125 
1997 172,005 
1998 203,826 
1999 236,460 
2000 260,100 
2001 286,000 
2002 309,000 
2003 332,000 
2004 358,000 
   
Source: Banco de la República, website: 
http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_prod_salar.htm,  
accessed 30 November 2006. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis has discussed community involvement in Bogotá as it has evolved over time. 
It has also analysed the nature of the relationship between the community, the state and 
other outside actors in the irregular settlements. 
 First, the study outlined the relationships between poor communities, local 
politicians and the city government before and after implementation of institutional 
reforms in the 1990s. A comparison of the pace of regularisation and intervention by 
outside institutions in the six case-study settlements illustrated this change. 
 Second, the study clarified the meaning of community participation as it evolved 
through time. Community participation in terms of co-financing projects was widely 
established among Bogotá government institutions in the 1970s. This kind of 
community involvement was very different from the real community participation that 
they had experienced in their struggle for land and basic services when the 
neighbourhood was first established. 
 In this concluding chapter, I summarise my principal findings with respect to the 
research questions raised in chapter 1. Then I discuss how the findings relate to the key 
theoretical ideas and issues discussed in chapter 1. I also discuss the relevance of the 
findings to poor communities beyond the context of Bogotá and Colombia. Next, I 
comment on my research method and reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of my 
approach. Finally, I suggest some relevant topics for future research.  
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ANSWERING AND REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Question 1: How have the nature of community struggle and government 
approaches to the poor changed as a result of the recent strengthening of 
democracy and decentralised government?  
Before institutional reforms in the urban regularisation process came into force, 
regularising irregular settlements often took years. To accelerate the process, people 
resorted to various tactics to negotiate with the city authorities, using either political 
pressure through their patron or aggressive protests such as blocking roads. Many 
politicians were directors on the boards of public service companies, which made 
political intervention in the regularisation process possible. Acquiring political 
patronage therefore was often an essential route to obtain legal title and/or services. 
 Other factors were also critical in determining the extent and timing of government 
intervention. Topography was influential insofar as it influenced the cost of servicing. 
Similarly the number of people in the community was important, particularly to those 
politicians who were interested in increasing their support at times of election. Before 
1990, therefore, the settlement regularisation was largely dependent on patron-client 
relationships. Find a patron and the whole process was likely to run faster. 
During the 1990s, the relationship between local communities and politicians 
gradually changed. After 1991, politicians were no longer allowed to act as directors of 
the public service agencies and a special allowance (auxilio) for city councillors and 
congressmen to allocate to good causes was also withdrawn. These elements reduced 
the space for political intervention in the regularisation process.  
 Today a formally recognised procedure exists by which JALs can propose projects 
through their edil es to the District administration. Each edil proposes projects which 
should in theory reflect the local needs expressed by specific communities.Today, 
community leaders now evaluate local politicians on the basis of whether or not they 
respond to community requests; in the past, the link was based much more on the 
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politician’s party affiliation. In this sense, community leaders today have more 
bargaining power and can pick and choose from the offers of politicians depending on 
what fits their needs. The creation of JALs generated a new route for the urban poor to 
represent their needs to the local government. Now the communities’ strategies for 
meeting their needs are directed through the ediles. 
Of course, most communities were aware of the ‘ineffectiveness’ of political 
patronage and some leaders were always critical of the political manoeuvres of local 
politicians. The changes introduced by the 1991 Constitution which restricted 
clientelism at the local level were welcomed even if patron-client relationships between 
local leaders, ediles and their city councillor patrons still persisted. What changed was 
that the communities learned that they could now follow a number of alternative 
strategies and as a result their approach to local politicians became more selective.  
In the 1990s, communities continued to ask politicians for help, but this was only one 
tactic. The city’s focus on regularisation as a priority policy turned erstwhile passive 
clients into citizens with rights to press the authorities to give them what they wanted. 
As a result, local politicians’ traditional manoeuvring ceased to be as effective as it was 
in the 1980s. 
 From the mid 1990s urban management became more efficient and accelerated the 
regularisation of informal settlements. Even the most disadvantaged irregular 
settlements now received government attention. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the time 
elapsed between recognising the juridical status of a JAC and receiving full legal rights 
(issue of resolución) was cut considerably.  
 Whether the new accelerated procedures reduced conflict between the settlements 
and the authorities is less than clear from the case studies. There was a great deal of 
variation between the communities. The people in Diana Turbay never used aggressive 
tactics in their negotiations with the city authorities whereas those in La Paz, which 
were led by the Communist Party, were at first very aggressive. In Jerusalén 
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mobilisation of the community and the organisation of protests has remained a regular 
strategy.  
  Privatisation of service provision also reduced the potential for clientelism. 
Privatisation of the electricity company led to the new company supplying even the 
most disadvantaged informal settlements. The procedure involved in the provision of 
power services has become an individual matter (i.e. individual connection to the 
network and installation of a meter are provided on the basis of individual 
credit-payment) rather than a matter for collective negotiation.  
Several NGOs and church activists have intervened in the all of six settlements I 
studied, but the extent and length of their commitment varied depending on the nature 
of community leadership. In every case, there was some conflict between the NGOs, the 
Church and the community inhabitants. In the case of JJR, the community was set up at 
the initiative of an NGO activist who later came into conflict with the community over 
their wish to seek state support. When he left the community created its own JAC 
although it never had any real ability to mobilise the community. 
In Jerusalén, the community benefited from the intervention of numerous NGOs even 
though competition among them generated divisions amongst the inhabitants. In cases 
like Bella Flor, where strong leadership never developed, different NGOs came and 
went without ever linking closely to community activity. 
  Did the settlements with strong community-based organisations develop faster than 
those without? Yes and no. In Jerusalén, the strong community-based organisations had 
a very difficult period at the beginning of the 1980s, due to rumours about its leader’s 
sympathy with a left wing guerrilla group. These rumours discouraged the state from 
helping the community. In contrast, in Danubio Azul, several community-based 
organisations came into conflict in the mid 1990s. As a consequence, the settlement was 
targeted for strong intervention through the de-marginalisation programme. Overall 
strong community-based organisation seems to have been influential insofar as it 
 347
attracted the state’s attention, although how the state responded depended on the 
political circumstances.  
  The 1991 Constitution increased community autonomy, by recognising the legal 
rights of citizens to make demands on the State. Communities now have the right to 
demand services and help from the state. The city government has even campaigned to 
raise people’s awareness (conscientización) of their rights1 and taught them how to 
make claims (‘tutela’) against the relevant city authorities for delays or negligence. The 
appointment of an ombudsman to monitor the public infrastructure provision also gave 
the citizens more influence over resource allocation. This is one of the positive 
implications of democratisation, equipping citizens with an awareness of their own 
rights and the strategies with which to demand them.  
  Thus this thesis has shown that the decentralisation process ensured that the 
community struggle was no longer wholly dependent on political patronage. The 
relation between communities and state has become more direct and made political 
mediation less essential. On the other hand, communities have also lost some influence 
as service provision has been increasingly influenced by market forces. Private 
companies negotiate with individuals rather than with communities. 
 
Question 2: How has the increasingly market-oriented approach to urban and 
economic development affected the lives of people in the barrio? 
The Bogotá city government made public service agencies work more efficiently while 
introducing a series of pro-poor programmes in the 1990s. Competent mayoral 
leadership led to the implementation of well-integrated upgrading programmes in the 
peripheral areas of Bogotá. As a result, the physical upgrading of the settlements made 
remarkable progress and living conditions in the poor sectors improved significantly.  
                                                  
1 There is a special division in every department and secretariat of the city government to deal with 
‘claims’ and ‘demands’ (tutela) submitted to the city authorities. The division responsible for the 
(poor) communities has the job of making these citizens’ rights known to everyone in order to justify 
the functions of the city. Involvement in such popular education activities has become a strategy for 
politicians to gain popularity. 
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Community-based collective action tends to disappear once settlements are 
regularised because it is no longer necessary. In the late 1990s, the upgrading of 
infrastructure stimulated by the privatisation of electricity delivery and the 
commercialisation of water delivery were noted in most of the case study settlements.  
Whether the inhabitants (at the individual level) can sustain this new level of living 
conditions depends increasingly on what they can afford to pay given the policy to raise 
tariffs to more ‘economic’ levels that was applied more rigorously after 1994. As 
Bogotá utilities attempted to rationalise public service provision, so the burden of 
payment for public services on the household income increased. 
There was no longer a space for negotiation between the communities and the public 
service delivery companies. The relationship changed from that of collective action to 
simply that of consumer and provider.  
Having stated this however, it cannot be said that collective community action 
disappeared all together. My study found that the poor communities still maintained the 
potential to reactivate community action whenever necessary to demand that new 
collective needs were met. For example there were protests against the increased public 
service tariff in the final stage of my fieldwork in 2000.  
  Thus, as the case studies have shown, the pro-market orientation of the city 
government improved the living conditions of the urban poor, but at the same time it 
reduced the space for them to negotiate collectively. In the end, individual purchasing 
power has become key to determining the sustainability of improved life for the poor. 
However, this shift means that communities will still organise collective protests but 
only when they have no other way of making their needs known.  
 
Question 3: How effectively has the participatory approach of the city government 
to the community affected the lives of people in the irregular settlements since 
1990?  
What was most significant in the relationship between the state and communities in the 
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1990s was the emphasis by the city authorities and public service companies on 
adopting community co-financing programmes to facilitate regularisation. 
 Community participation was an essential part of these community upgrading 
programmes. This form of ‘participation’ was introduced by the city government as part 
of their search for cost-effectiveness. It was therefore different from the kind of 
participation which existed at the very initial stages of development of the irregular 
settlements whereby inhabitants were involved in communal work in order to obtain 
rudimentary utility services. Communal collaboration in upgrading projects was lumped 
together under the rubric of ‘community participation’. Central to the earlier form of 
community participation was the idea of mutual help among the residents in a spirit of 
solidarity and it also had its own decision-making system. So, although the living 
conditions of the poor improved remarkably as a result of the new type of community 
participation, the ‘participatory’ approach introduced was different from that practised 
earlier under the community’s own initiative. 
The concept of ‘community participation’ employed by the city government and 
public service companies, referred to an investment strategy to back up the 
implementation of community-development projects. It did require a certain level of 
economic capacity, though the payments made by the communities were still highly 
subsidised. If the inhabitants did not have the purchasing power to pay the requested 
amount in advance, the project would fail.  
In the most economically disadvantaged settlements, where the total burden of 
charges for the construction of service infrastructure would have been quite expensive, 
people were given the opportunity to pay with longer-term credit. The total cost for the 
poorest people was thus lower than for those with greater purchasing power. The 
community participation programmes, therefore, did contribute to the improvement of 
daily life in the poor settlements. 
As discussed above, the participatory approach of the city government is different 
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from that traditionally practised in the irregular settlements. However, the state-initiated 
form of community participation has successfully executed community development 
projects, and once completed, these projects have definitely improved the living 
conditions of the urban poor.  
 
Question 4: How far did community participation succeed in the involvement of 
the community in the decision-making process and enforce its control over 
resource allocation?  
The framework of community participation in the slum upgrading projects has involved 
the targeted community in the execution process, but not necessarily in the 
decision-making process. This was clearly proved by the community co-financing 
programmes executed in conjunction with either the EAAB or the IDU which did not 
offer any real space for the beneficiaries to become involved in the decision-making 
process. 
Many inhabitants to whom I talked demonstrated that they had learned their own 
rights and become more aware of what they could do to make claims. They can now 
demand access to services and infrastructure as their human right, instead of requesting 
them as a favour from political patrons. However, whether the whole community 
became autonomous or self-aware of their own rights was questionable. Some people 
stated that they now knew where to go to make a claim and how to manage problems 
themselves without resorting to the support of politicians but these were generally the 
community leaders. Others have continued to believe in the effectiveness of 
patron-client relationships in negotiations with the state. In general, the rank and file 
inhabitants of the consolidated settlements have become more dependent on the JAC 
leaders and accustomed to having their needs met through their mandate.  
Community participation in terms of community co-financing projects flourished as 
the city authorities encouraged communities to participate and plan the ways in which 
their neighbourhood should develop. This was true of the EAAB and IDU as well as 
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de-marginalisation programmes which promoted this financial framework in order to 
involve the targeted beneficiaries.  
However, once again, the meaning of community participation thus interpreted by the 
city authorities is not the same as the involvement of the community in the kind of 
collective action traditionally undertaken. This was more than clear from the findings of 
my case studies which led me to label current community participation practices an 
‘illusion’. People are always consulted whenever community participatory projects are 
to be executed, but this does not mean that they are involved in the decision making 
process. As a consequence, they do not have any degree of control over resources. 
 
 
THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS 
 
How do the findings of this research relate to the theoretical ideas discussed in chapter 
1? I now focus on three debates: the meaning of community participation; the effects of 
decentralisation on popular participation; and the results of the privatisation of public 
services on the urban poor.  
 
Community participation: the gap between theory and practice 
If there are various meanings of community participation, particularly if community 
participation is understood differently by the state and poor communities, why is the 
concept still being used?  
Community participation in the six case study settlements is an illusion insofar as 
practice falls so short of the ideals embodied in the notion. The kind of participation that 
was taking place in the poor settlements of Bogotá pretended to be something that it was 
not. 
  People sometimes trust the possibility of community struggle or community 
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participation in order to fulfil their needs. They sometimes engage in community affairs, 
but for many reasons, often drop out. Sometimes they drop out because they have come 
to distrust the leadership and this leads to disillusionment with the whole idea of 
community participation. 
  In using the term ‘illusion’ I am not saying that ‘real’ community participation never 
takes place. Many people in the study settlements did believe in the virtue of 
community participation. However, once they found out about the various negative 
aspects, problems and conflicts associated with their collective action and communal 
struggles, they realised that their image of community participation was an illusion. 
They learned that state-initiated community participation schemes were being employed 
to improve cost-effectiveness in project implementation rather than for community 
control over resource allocation. However, they accepted this situation and were 
extremely pragmatic in their attempts to obtain services for the settlements.  
  The ways in which the authorities failed to involve the community in planning most 
projects is a further sign that community participation in Bogotá is an illusion. None of 
the regularisation programmes which I analysed in my case studies involved the 
inhabitants at the design stage. The views of the community were listened to at various 
times but there was never any hint that the population would be permitted to discuss the 
budget and how it was to be spent. Community participation often meant little more 
than co-financing. Surely participation involves more than putting one’s hand in one’s 
pocket? 
  Finally, community participation in practice often broke down because of the nature 
of the local leadership. Many of the JALs and community organizations demonstrated 
major failings in terms of leadership. Some proved to be corrupt, some were too 
authoritarian, some were afflicted by internal conflict. Community participation is 
clearly an illusion if the local leadership does not reflect the views of the community or 
are unable to implement those views. The case studies revealed how many initially 
 353
enthusiastic people became disillusioned with local leaders and ceased to participate.  
 So, did the community ever get together to press for neighbourhood improvement? 
Cleary they did, but the involvement was much stronger when the settlements lacked 
any kind of service. As the literature has repeatedly shown, community participation 
declines as settlements consolidate and receive services. This is what White (2000: 144) 
has termed the dynamic nature of participation.   
 Desai (1995) criticises the notion of spontaneous or authentic community 
participation as identified by Western academics. Reflecting on this argument in my 
study on urban settlements in Colombia, I found that it is partly true because it is very 
difficult to find ‘purely spontaneous community participation’, except for at the very 
beginning stage of land occupation. The JAC was a state-created community 
organisation, but based on the traditional practices of communal work in the rural sector, 
such as reciprocal self-help communal action. Once a JAC is recognised and registered 
to the DAAC, it gains legitimacy to negotiate with the city administration in exchange 
for being controlled and inspected by the DAAC. Thus, people struggle spontaneously 
to gain this legitimacy but after they create a JAC, it is controlled by the state 
organisation.  
I would argue that the illusion of community participation should be interpreted in 
various ways as community participation itself takes different forms. ‘Community 
participation’ has been employed as a positive tool in order to accomplish ‘good 
governance’ in line with the current thinking of mainstream international aid 
organisations. Nevertheless, previous studies in Africa, Asia and Latin America suggest 
that there are a series of factors in the local context which impede the full 
implementation of community participation. Failures in the participatory approach are 
mainly believed to derive from problems with the different pre-conditions necessary to 
make community participation work (see Desai, 2002; Brett, 1996; Jenkins, 1999). The 
following are my reflections on some of the critical issues related to community 
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participation and its limitations based on my findings.  
 
Debate on the effectiveness of participatory projects (local conditions which may 
impede effectiveness) 
Previous studies outlined the limitations of community participation when it is 
employed for service delivery in search of cost-effectiveness. Although community 
participatory projects should have a positive effect if they are implemented as planned, 
local conditions can constitute negative factors which impede the projects (Brett, 1996; 
Jenkins, 1999; Adat and Haddad, 2002). The failures of the community co-finance 
project which the EAAB intended to conduct in JJR and Bella Flor and in several 
sectors of La Paz are examples which illustrate these negative factors at community 
level. Brett (1996) suggests ‘unequal distribution of knowledge and skills among the 
members of the community’ (see chapter 1) may be problematic, but in these cases, the 
obstacles were the rank and file inhabitants’ distrust of the community leaders who were 
in charge of collecting money combined with the limited ability of the inhabitants to 
afford the down payment. In fact, community leaders (mostly either the president or 
other members of the directing board of the JAC) were accused of corruption.  
My findings suggest that the quality of community leadership is the key to driving the 
upgrading process of irregular settlements. This involves the leaders’ dedication and 
capacity to run effective strategies, including their ability to maintain good 
communications with both politicians and the local government. Conversely, corrupt 
and unmotivated leaders are one of the causes of failure in development projects. Brett 
(1996) argues that the ‘cost’ of community participation is also problematic, since the 
labour time of leaders in participatory projects is relatively expensive. Community 
leaders’ work as members of the JAC is voluntary and not economically recognised.  
Ex and current leaders frequently commented that ‘people do not appreciate what we 
have done for the community’ reflecting the frustration felt by community leaders. Their 
frustration over the lack of reward could lead to corruption.  
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Lack of accountability is another issue relating to the corruption of leaders. As Fox 
(1992) points out, leadership accountability within the community is key to whether 
participatory projects succeed or fail. In most of the cases where inhabitants claimed 
JAC leaders were corrupt, lack of accountability in the communal activities under the 
JAC institutional framework was more than obvious. In contrast, accountability can be 
enforced by the existence of participatory subgroups as Fox (1992) suggests. The 
experiences of Jerusalén and Danubio Azul are good examples of this. In Jerusalén, 
several community-based organisations beyond the JAC monitored the activities 
initiated by the JAC directing boards. In Danubio Azul, several rival community 
organisations monitored each other, therefore, the JAC was always under pressure from 
inside the community. 
Differences between leaders and rank and file members in terms of knowledge of 
how to manage the participatory projects, including communications with public 
agencies was clear in my case study settlements. The more bureaucratic a JAC becomes, 
the less motivated the rank and file members of the community become, tending to 
delegate community issues to the JAC leaders. As Jenkins (1999) highlights, a gap 
between the interest and motivation of the leaders and the rest of the community can 
weaken the level of engagement of the community in participatory projects. 
Another obstacle to the completion of participatory projects is the conflict between 
the time frame requested by the project managers and the time required by the 
community for its decision making processes (Jenkins, 1999; Schalkwijk, 2002; 
Goldfrank, 2002). The limitation of the results of participatory local planning via 
citizens’ focus groups (Encuentros Ciudadanos) clearly illustrates this conflict (see 
chapter 4). 
Government officials also became disillusioned as a result of the limitations of the 
participatory approach. A typical comment that I often heard from the community 
leaders was: ‘Here, nobody participates when they (the state) really encourage the 
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community participation in terms of involvement in the projects. People [only] get 
together and “participate” in the meeting or events whenever they can get something 
free.’ Adjectives such as ‘participative’ or ‘communal’ (or ‘convivencia’ meaning to live 
together in a spirit of solidarity) were fashionable in the titles of community 
based-development projects or programmes, yet the projects clearly did not live up to 
their name. Sudarsky’s (2003) analysis of community participation revealed that the 
residents’ commitment to grass-roots organisations declined over time, including their 
participation in the state-created JACs. This means that the potential achievements of 
community participation through community-based organisations was limited. For the 
city administration, having a ‘counterpart’ organisation (such as the JACs) should have 
been indispensable in approaching these settlements, therefore, the result of the study is 
disappointing, since it highlights the fact that it was difficult for the state to access and 
involve the people in participatory projects. This means that community participation is 
an illusion for the state as well. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the 
participatory approach (pages 13-16 in chapter 1).  
 
The issue of empowerment: beyond the efficiency vs. empowerment dichotomy 
 In the late 1990s, Colombia was moving towards a more neo-liberal form of 
economic and state management and was also encouraging greater decentralisation as 
part of that shift in policy. I was convinced that under these circumstances, the state 
would need more participation from the community and other non-governmental actors 
in the execution of development projects. The community should have gained more 
autonomy, a stronger voice to call for its needs to be met. And, the state should have 
greater respect for the citizens’ voice.  
 I soon realised that my expectations were wrong, or at least that the reality was 
neither so clear nor so simple. The real practices looked contradictory, ambiguous and 
complicated. It was not difficult for me to understand that the rhetoric of community 
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participation used by the public officers and the one used by the inhabitants were not the 
same. However, it took me more than a year—after I left Colombia- to understand the 
reason why the inhabitants expressed their idea of participation in different and often 
contradictory ways. 
I used the term community participation as a key tool in my study, to assist me in 
my main intention to examine the relationship between the community and the state, 
focusing on the regularisation process. My awareness of the different meanings of 
community participation at the community and state level led me to the term ‘illusion’ 
to express the gap between the intention of the state and the expectation of the 
community. However, it was more than obvious that those community participatory 
projects I observed were mainly designed with cost-effectiveness in mind (and as such 
community participation was considered as a means) and not for community 
empowerment. No space in which the community could influence the decision-making 
process was offered. 
If we perceive participation as something static, we tend to use a simple dichotomous 
classification: community participation as a means (to search for cost-effectiveness) vs. 
community participation as an end (empowerment). However, as I stated in chapter 1 
(page 17), it is more than clear that the top-down interest of efficiency does not always 
fit with the bottom-up interest of empowerment. Therefore, participation is a site of 
conflict. 
Community participation has many meanings and is a term that is, after all, an 
ideological one. The case study settlements revealed that certain practices had always 
existed at the initial stage of development, which I called community-initiated 
participation—i.e., collaboration based on a spirit of solidarity and the concept of 
mutual aid. The so-called community participation programmes adopted in the 1990s 
(i.e., state-initiated participation) in order to implement regularisation projects 
mobilised only the intended beneficiaries of a specific project.  
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 Community participation should mean something more than that. In practice, the 
evidence from the communities shows that at different times various forms of 
participation were involved:  
• community involvement for mutual benefit in a spirit of solidarity and collaboration;  
• a payment and investment plan created as a finance-sharing alternative to propel 
regularisation through the public service authorities; 
• mobilisation of the inhabitants either to support a politician or to launch a civic 
movement to present their demands to the state. 
  Each form of community participation depended on the inhabitants’ notion of what 
they needed most at the time. Initially, people might work together because of mutual 
need; there were no services and only collective effort would provide them. However, it 
is difficult for inhabitants to maintain a strong sense of community solidarity in the long 
term. In the informal settlements of Bogotá, the inhabitants have also used ‘community 
participation’ whenever it has served their purpose. It has been a highly pragmatic 
approach to satisfying their basic needs. The city administration also increased its 
ability to provide services in the 1990s which helped greatly to improve the physical 
conditions of these settlements. 
 In the 1990s, under the new constitution with its laws protecting citizens’ rights, 
‘participation’ of citizens in the political arena as well as their right to demand basic 
needs was clearly recognised. Under this legal framework, community-based 
organisations and community-based participation have gained legitimacy. They had 
official legitimacy before, but this only functioned under the patron-client system. 
Today, communities have a real voice, with which they can represent their needs as well 
as criticise the negligence of the public administration. Citizens’ rights to insist on 
public audits and transparency of public investment are now officially recognised. 
After all, as Mohan (2007: 781) states ‘participatory development is both an end and 
a means’, and I would argue that community participation has the dual potential of cost 
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efficiency (a mean) and empowerment (an end). As discussed, community participation 
has different meanings for different stakeholders. However, in the end, both functions 
(end and mean) are imbedded in the concept and efforts to accomplish these two 
sometimes results in conflict, leading to limited effectiveness. These contradictions are 
due to the limited or erroneous assumptions of mainstream debates on participatory 
development, which lack sensitivity to the local conditions and structural determinants 
(Desai, 2002; Mohan, 2007). As Mohan (2007) suggests, the poor’s involvement in 
political processes is another agenda to be focused on. 
 
Role of NGOs 
The community participatory development projects initiated by Bogotá city or by the 
public were usually implemented in a ‘top-down’ way. Any proposal to build 
infrastructure had to be approved at the assembly of the JAC in the settlement in 
question, but the community’s real participation in the decision-making process was 
extremely limited.  
 On the other hand, many NGOs provided assistance in the irregular settlements. The 
timing of NGO intervention varied according to the needs and level of state intervention. 
In the case of communities completely without state intervention, the role of NGOs in 
supporting the collective self-help activities of the community was considerable from 
the very initial stage of development. Once state intervention had begun, however, NGO 
activists became less important. Clark (1995) and Desai (2002) discuss the difficulties 
inherent in creating healthy state-NGO relationship, and my findings also illustrated the 
friction between NGOs and community leaders. Real partnerships between NGOs and 
community leaders were rare. To make the situation worse, internal conflict often 
occurred between the existing community leaders and NGO activists, when the latter 
challenged the leadership. The experience of Jerusalén and JJR provide typical 
examples of this.  
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 The myth of community debate 
The mainstream concept of community participation is based on several assumptions, 
one of which is that the targeted community is homogeneous and the socio economic 
conditions of inhabitants are equal. Those who put forward the ‘myth of community’ 
argument have demonstrated the complicated internal structure of community (Lee, 
1994; Gujit and Kaul Shah, 1998; Cleaver, 2002). The internal segregation between 
different sects or organisations in the case study settlements (i.e. Danubio Azul, JJR and 
the initial stage of Jerusalén) evidences the heterogeneous nature of so-called 
‘community’ in the poor urban settlements. Conflict among these groups in the 
settlement tends to weaken the community involvement in a participatory project, as it 
impedes the creation of consensus in the community. Participatory projects such as 
community co-financing projects request the acceptance and agreement of the intended 
beneficiaries in order to meet cost-effectiveness targets, but this may not be possible in 
such segregated communities. 
  In addition, when the settlement becomes consolidated and different sectors are 
established within it, such as in Diana Turbay and Jerusalén, the identification of 
inhabitants with the larger community of the settlement tends to disappear or at best 
weaken. The identification of the inhabitants with the concept of ‘community’ is equal 
to ‘we community’ (see narratives in chapter 6) which means the group of neighbours 
with whom they share daily activities and communication. In contrast, the identification 
of ‘community’ by a participatory project defines the community as the targeted 
population, which may exclude local ‘neighbours’ in the same settlements. In addition, 
eligibility of the community co-finance projects is limited to homeowners, which 
excludes tenants, for example.  
  Thus, the various complex definitions of ‘community’ that emerged during the course 
of this research as used by the people of the barrios and other relevant actors 
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highlighted the inadequacy of the rather static conceptual definition of ‘community’ that 
I had employed as a working definition at the beginning of my study (see chapter 1).  
As a consequence, my findings contribute to the debate around the myth of community.  
 
The impact of privatisation and commercialisation of basic services on community 
participation and on community-state relationships  
Bogotá has greatly expanded its service coverage and improved the quality of its service 
delivery over the last fifteen years (Dávila, 2004; Gilbert, 2006). The downside of this 
improvement is that it has reduced the space for negotiation between the community 
and the delivery companies. Community participation was less effective because the 
new form of service delivery created a direct relationship between the companies and 
individual households. The community was not involved in that relationship and 
therefore could not help when sometimes individuals could not afford to pay for the new 
service. This is the negative side of privatisation or at least of the more commercial 
pricing of public utilities. However, when many people could not pay the tariffs the 
community sometimes responded by protesting against the company. 
  Protest by the barrio people against the increased tariffs was valid as they had no 
alternative means of negotiating with the respective agencies open to them. While they 
sometimes attempted to organise a meeting with representatives of the company these 
attempts did not usually meet with a quick or concrete response. This reaction was 
similar to those found in the other Latin American countries. 
As I argued in chapter 1, rising tariffs had a negative effect on the poor. Prices rose 
because both public and private utilities were following the rules laid down by the 
national government to improve service delivery. Law 142 of 1994, which was intended 
to improve the finances of Colombia’s public utilities companies, demanded that 
average tariffs rose and that the subsidies given to the very poor should be cut. Thus the 
rise in tariff has nothing to do with privatisation (Gilbert 2007). 
As discussed in chapter 1, the negative impact on the life of the urban poor in my 
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cases in Bogotá; should be interpreted as the result of a change in tariff policy and a 
combination of other macro-economic factors, such as the economic recession that hit 
Colombia in 1997 and the increase in unemployment. Life clearly became more difficult 
for many people. However, the inhabitants’ perception of ‘service charges being too 
expensive’ is not necessarily based on empirical fact, but based on their comparison 
with the period before regular water or electricity services had been installed when they 
were using rudimentary services very cheaply. Clearly, obtaining electricity through an 
illegal hook-up was bound to be cheaper than the cost of a proper service. 
 
How democratisation and decentralisation influenced the effectiveness of 
community participation 
New legal frameworks to protect citizen’s rights and to introduce an ombudsman system 
to monitor the public administration were benefits brought by democratisation which 
conferred legitimacy on community participation. The decentralisation process created a 
new local administrative board (JAL) through which demands relating to local needs 
could be referred directly to the local government. The intention of this reform was to 
reduce clientelism amongst local politicians (councilors and JAC leaders) but 
inadvertently generated a new type of patron-client relationship between ediles and JAC 
leaders. However, the role of the edil to address local needs at barrio level and make 
proposals for development projects financed by the FDL was significant and provided 
more options for the community to make their own choices. In this sense, 
decentralisation was a good thing in that it promoted more community participation in 
the decision- making process at the level of local administration. A typical example of 
this was the new participatory planning system, called ‘Encuentros Ciudadanos’ 
introduced during the Peñalosa administration (see chapter 4, pages 198-99). The 
experiences of Encuentros Ciudadanos, however show the limitation of effective 
community participation in the selection of local development projects due to conflicts 
over the time frame available for decision-making as discussed earlier. 
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  Thus, the findings show that the institutional reforms for decentralisation and 
democratisation aimed to empower the community in the local state-community 
relationship, but partly failed in practice. 
 
Multilateral relationships involved in the practice of community participation: 
autonomy, clientelism and the market mechanism: the changing nature of the 
state-community relationship  
Following the decentralisation and privatisation processes, how did the relationship 
between the state, community and market change? Does community participation work 
in the regularisation process of the poor settlements in this context? 
First, during the process of regularisation of the irregular settlements the 
state-community relationship became closer and more direct than in the period when 
clientelism was more influential. At the same time, politician-community relationships 
became less influential as did politician-state (city administration) relationships. 
Community participation programmes (co-financing programmes) are nothing new, but 
now that the circumstances under which the framework was introduced have changed: 
there is less space for local politicians to exert political pressure. 
 Second, despite the application of community participation programmes, the 
empowerment of the community did not occur. The contact between public service 
companies and the most disadvantaged settlements increased and the community had 
more access to information and knowledge regarding the regularisation process. In this 
sense, the community became more informed, with a better technical knowledge of state 
intervention. However, this does not constitute the empowerment of the community 
itself, as all the programmes were delivered in a top-down way. 
 Third, the political co-option of the community by local politicians with the aim of 
expanding their pool of potential future voters reduced, as urban administration became 
more competent and rational. A series of institutional reforms in the 1990s technically 
impeded the execution of political co-option.  
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 Fourth, economic circumstances, in other words, the market-community relationship 
in terms of public service consumption, affected the life of the poor. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic performance, the market-community relationship in terms of the labour 
market, also affected the affordability of the payments necessary to carry out 
community co-financing projects in the name of community participation. This last 
point is an external factor which affected community participation. 
The case studies revealed that community organisation was an internal factor 
determining how community participation functioned. The representative community 
organisation such as the JAC promoted community participation as a reinforcement of 
collective control of the public works rather than as something which would empower 
the inhabitants.  
 This, from the point of view of public officials, was in order to promote the idea of 
ownership2 of the project by the community. However, collective responsibility in order 
to establish ownership by the beneficiaries will not work in the final analysis without 
individual responsibility. If any one inhabitant fails to pay, then the co-financing 
programme gets stuck and in this situation collective responsibility is ineffective. 
Moreover, this collective responsibility (or communal administration) is usually 
entrusted to the hands of a few directing members of the JAC. Any serious distrust of 
the leadership of the JAC limits the applicability of the community-co-financing 
project.  
 Entrusting community organisation to the JAC leaders can be dangerous in that it 
delegates all of the decision making process regarding community affairs to them, even 
though a community assembly exists and forms the highest level community 
decision-making organ. This administrative delegation could lead to delegated 
communal activities, and as a result, the motivation of the rest of the members of 
community would decrease. Therefore, if the delegated community leader (president of 
                                                  
2 ‘Ownership’ here means having the self awareness to become involved and be responsible for 
something, in this case, a project.  
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the JAC, for example) becomes corrupt, then the negotiation with the state will fail, and 
intervention will soon be suspended. This happens when there is internal segregation or 
conflict among the community which leads to the absence of a community leader who 
actually represents the community. This was the case in Bella Flor where the absence of 
a JAC president due to accusations of corruption caused a delay in further state 
intervention for regularisation. Conversely, in the case of Danubio Azul, although there 
was an ongoing conflict between three different groups, they maintained a pragmatic 
alliance and concentrated their efforts on making their demands, thus helping to push 
forward state intervention. 
 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS TO COMMUNITIES BEYOND BOGOTÁ 
 
Following the findings of my case study settlements in Bogotá, I would argue that the 
points below would be of use in other cases, particularly in those which are undergoing 
reforms of a broadly neo-liberal nature such as market-led urban management reforms, 
and decentralisation. 
  First, community participation does not work as part of market-led development 
policies and even less so during an economic recession. This is because the most 
decisive factor for community participation under these programmes is the purchasing 
power of the individual. All the relationships become simply a contract between 
individual users and providers and there is no real space for negotiation between the 
community and the state.  
Community participation can gain legitimacy through democratisation when related 
institutional reforms recognise it as part of citizens’ rights. The voices of the poor and 
the vulnerable have increasingly been heard as civil control of public administration 
through the ombudsman system has strengthened. However, this institutional 
framework does not work under a highly market-led urban administration because the 
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potential for the execution of development projects which include a community 
participatory approach is limited by the targeted population’s purchasing power.  
Despite these considerations, the role of community-based organisations will not 
totally disappear. However corrupt the leadership is, however the distrust of the 
inhabitants is demonstrated, community-based organisations can be the last resort for 
mobilising the people if necessary. Under the market-led mechanism, political 
patronage has less influence and the community loses the space for negotiation with the 
state. Urban protest or aggressive demonstrations organised by community-based 
organisation with or without the support of the left wing should be the final alternative 
for the poor to make their needs known to the state.  
Second, despite having mentioned the limitations of community participation under 
the market mechanism, the findings support the relevance of community participation. I 
would say it is not a waste of time. All the stakeholders, including the state, the 
community, the NGOs and politicians have continued to use the concept of community 
participation, knowing its limitations and the gap between theory and practice. Why? 
One quick answer is the political standpoint of the city administration, or specifically 
the mayor, in gaining the support of the poor communities. He (or the city 
administration) is also concerned with the need to accomplish ‘good governance’ for 
which community participation is one of the key means. In other words, using a 
participatory approach is ‘politically correct’.  
The other reason found in my study, and which has general significance is, the 
pragmatism of the community. Even if the practice of community participation is far 
from what the community expects, it is generally accepted. However disillusioned they 
are by the poor performance of their community leaders, they nonetheless appreciate the 
importance of the communal collective works in meeting their needs. The connotations 
of the statement of one community leader: ‘we would accept whatever the state offered, 
although we knew it was not real participation’ suggested that communication between 
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the community and the state was founded on the community’s pragmatism.  
Third, the findings highlight the fact that community participation is not static but 
dynamic, and this can be explained through examining the perspective of the inhabitants. 
There is always a gap between the mainstream concept of ‘community participation’ 
and the practices in the local context. This gap is not a simple dichotomous distinction 
between ‘community participation’ for cost-effectiveness (means) and that for the 
empowerment (end) of the community. It has different interpretations from the 
perspective of the community, according to the changes in the internal structure and the 
local needs of the community. Therefore, the mainstream concept of community 
participation should be understood when contextualised within the local situation.  
Fourth, it should be recognised that community participation reflects the power 
relationships between the state and the community. If in the practice of community 
participation, there is respect for the initiative of the beneficiaries (communities), then 
the community is more independent and free to express their own ideas, particularly in 
the decision-making process. If there is very limited space for negotiation, or space in 
which the community can express their opinions, or they are excluded from the 
decision-making process, then the state-community relationship is quite authoritarian 
and imperative. The legal framework to protect citizens’ rights is key to controlling the 
state’s power over the community. Community leadership and its capacity to mobilise 
the inhabitants and engage them in community participation is crucial to protecting the 
position of the community vis a vis the state.  
Fifth, community participation (even state initiated programmes) should be 
considered in a positive light if the limitations in the local context are resolved and the 
factors below dealt with satisfactorily. These factors are: the state’s appropriate 
knowledge of local needs, firm community leadership; minimum level of purchasing 
power of the community (to support cost-effectiveness), effective legal framework to 
protect citizen’s rights, the consensus to accept and engage in the participatory projects 
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in the community, the capacity of the local administration, among others. The 
decentralisation process provides elements to reinforce some of these items, but can fail 
to provide other conditions (for example, administrative decentralisation can actually 
reproduce the patron-client relationship which can corrupt community leadership as 
discussed above). Privatisation does not necessarily impede these factors, but combined 
with other external conditions (such as macro-economic performance), it can affect 
them. 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS FROM THE RESEARCH  
 
My plan was to study a number of poor settlements through a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The first consisted of a household survey, the 
second took the form of in-depth interviews. I thought that was the best way of 
understanding community participation. While the plan still seems reasonable, carrying 
out that plan was more difficult. 
First, there was the problem of how best to select the case studies. I wanted to choose 
irregular settlements (i.e. settlements that were formed without planning permission, 
usually through pirate urbanisation or invasion) that had been formed about the same 
time and occupied similar kinds of problematic topography. From this uniform base I 
could then consider how different forms of community participation had led to different 
rates of barrio improvement and servicing. In practice, however, finding similar kinds 
of settlement that had been formed at exactly the same time was impossible. Rather than 
choosing settlements that had been formed in the same year, I had to work in 
communities formed at different times in the 1980s. 
  Second, using a household survey had both merits and limitations. The 
socio-economic information gathered in the six settlements provided a useful profile of 
the community. The survey was also helpful in providing data from which potential 
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interviewees could be selected for the in-depth interviews and in generating information 
from which histories of the different sections of the settlements could be constructed. 
However, in hindsight I collected far too much information and much of it has not been 
used in the thesis. In addition, I had a problem in rigorously following my sample 
design. Sometimes the maps that I was using proved unreliable and I had to adapt the 
sample, making it slightly less rigorous. 
Third, the qualitative approach was also more complicated than I had expected. The 
in-depth interviews were sometimes problematic insofar as people’s replies were often 
inconsistent. Sometimes, too, I did not fully understand what my informants said, 
particularly when they used local slang. Equally, they did not always understand the 
kinds of words and concepts I used. In such cases, I relied on my research assistants for 
help. However, the in-depth interviews did prove valuable in providing the detailed 
information which was lacking in the household survey. The opinions expressed in the 
interviews turned out to be the most useful source of information about the changing 
nature of community participation in poor settlements. The inhabitants’ narratives led 
me to completely re-think my understanding of the concept of community participation. 
Overall, it is clear that the interviews were an essential complement to the quantitative 
survey. 
Finally, I was unsuccessful in organising more than one group meeting with the 
people in the settlements; both because I ran out of time and because some groups 
proved uncooperative. Group meetings with selected leaders or those inhabitants who 
were particularly interested in my study would have proved useful in two ways. First, to 
obtain feedback on my results and to correct any errors of interpretation and, second, to 
communicate the results of my study back to the communities. In hindsight, it is a pity 
that I could not organise more than one group meeting. 
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 TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The results of the case studies suggest that upgrading projects are not necessarily the 
best solution for poor communities. The key problem is that services have to be paid for 
and many of the inhabitants have very limited budgets. While perhaps the majority 
benefited from the new services, some did not. The extent to which formal service 
provision puts pressure on poor households is perhaps worthy of further study. 
Many organisations often work in a community and the relationships are not always 
harmonious. My study suggested that some communities, such as JJR, were split by the 
conflicts between the different types of community organisation. In other 
neighbourhoods, such as Jerusalén, different organisations worked harmoniously. 
A closer analysis of the relationship between the JACs and other community-based 
organisations such as the association of community mothers and the social activities of 
the Catholic Church, would therefore be useful. How can collaboration be improved at 
settlement level? Can alliances be established that will build up a wider 
community-based civic movement?  
  In chapter one I touched upon gender issues and the role of women in community 
leadership. Although I did not pay sufficient attention to women’s roles in the thesis, it 
is clear that women played an important role in all six settlements. One of the most 
active JAC leaders of nine sectors in Diana Turbay was a woman. Danubio Azul was 
also led by a woman and Jerusalén had two women presidents of the JACs. It is true that 
women were in a minority on the boards of most JACs , but their presence was 
significant and they had a significant voice in the meetings. Future research should 
further explore the role of women in community leadership, examining why they get 
involved and the reasons why they are sometimes excluded from leadership roles. 
  The relationship between NGOs and local communities also proved interesting. 
 371
However, I was unable to make an exhaustive study of all the NGOs operating in the 
different settlements because there were so many. Future work might investigate 
whether their involvement in poor settlements represents a more positive way of 
empowering the communities than state involvement alone. Equally, the relationship 
between the NGOs and the state needs further clarification. 
One issue arose after the research had begun. As a result of so much violence in the 
Colombian countryside large numbers of displaced people are coming to the city, indeed, 
Bogotá is the largest recipient of these refugees. During the fieldwork, I heard numerous 
complaints about the ‘newcomers’ who had arrived in the community, especially when 
the migrants were Afro-Colombians. Perhaps as a result of discrimination in the 
settlements, black families have sometimes established separate colonies. This 
phenomenon, especially when it creates local conflict, is very worrying – a case of 
discrimination of the poor by the poor. Given the sheer numbers of the displaced people, 
few will have much choice but to settle in the self-help settlements in the city. This 
could develop into a major source of conflict and further analysis would be useful. 
A final question worthy of further work comes back to the issue of participatory 
development: its effectiveness and the degree to which it empowers poor people. While 
the quality of life in poor settlements also depends on the state of the local economy and 
the effectiveness of urban governance, effective local participation can only help 
improve living conditions. But how communities can be empowered is less than clear. 
Perhaps the whole nature of the citizen-state power relationship needs to change, 
particularly in cities as unequal as Bogotá. Community involvement forms part of the 
empowerment process but how it can best be used to improve people’s lives needs 
further reflection and research.  
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APPENDIX A 
Locations of primary documents and bibliographical research 
 
Bogotá:  
    Central library of Universidad de los Andes 
Central library of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana 
    Documentation centre of Bogotá city council  
    Documentation centre of El Espectador  
    Documentation centre of El Tiempo  
Documentation centre of EAAB (Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá)  
Library of CIDER (Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regioinales), Universidad de los 
 Andes 
    Library of CINEP (Centro de Investitgación y Educación Popular) 
    Library of DAPD (Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital)  
Library of Luis Carlos Arango 
     
London:  
    British Library 
    Senate House Library 
    UCL (University College London) Main Library 
    UCL Science Library 
 
Tokyo:  
    Central library of Sophia University 
Library of IDE (Institute of Developing Economies) 
 
Washington, D.C.:  
Library of IADB (Inter-American Development Bank)    
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APPENDIX B.1
List of the intervieweed public officials
Name Institution Date of interview
Norberto Rodríguez Alcaldía Ciudad Bolívar 28 Sept. 1999
Maria Margarita Ruíz South Bogotá Project (Director) 28 Sept. 1999; 12 April 2000
Julio Gómez DAPD 4 Oct. 1999
Martha Isabel González Ministry of Development 5 Oct. 1999
Diego Bravo CAR 26 Oct. 1999
Fabio Giraldo CRA 27 Oct. 1999
Fernando Fandiño EAAB, (Gestión Comunitaria) 3 Nov. 1999, 21June 2000
Alba Garzón EAAB, (Gestión Comunitaria) 3 Nov. 1999
Sonia Gaviria UPES-DPAE 26 Jan. 2000
German Rey Ofice of Demarginalisation 2 Feb. 2000
Isabel Caro Secretay of Health 14 Feb. 2000
Martha Letícia Suárez South Bogotá Project 12 Apri. 2000
Carlos Restrepo EAAB  19 May 2000
Glenda Luna DAPD, (direction of regularisation) 23 May 2000
Humberto Pederazal DAAC 24 May 2000
Fernando Mantilla DAAC 24 May 2000
Amanda Chiribí Subsecretary of Control and Housing 25 May 2000
Jorge Mendoza Subsecretary of Control and Housing 29 May 2000
Humberto Lizalazo Inst. Culture, Recreation and Sports 31 May 2000
Jairo Suárez CVP(Popular Housing Fund) 31 May 2000
Miguel Bejarano CVP(Caja de Vivienda Popular) 31May 2000
Clemencia Escallón DAPD, (direction of regularisation) 9 Jun. 2000
Favio Acero Planning, Alcaldía Ciudad Bolívar 13 Jun. 2000
Andrés Escobar Metrovivienda 16June 2000
Nelson Crúz Alcaldía Usme 19 June 2000
Coronel Betancur Metropolitan Police of Tequendama 21June 2000
Uriel Gómez EAAB 21 June 2000
Eduardo Restrepo DAPD, (direction of regularisation) 24 Aug. 2000
Victor Firstman EAAB 29 Aug. 2000
Silvia Olano BIC-EU Cd. Bolívar Programme 4 Sept. 2000
Nicolás EAAB (assistant of ex-CIDER project) 4 Sept. 2000
Astríd Alvarez EAAB (director) 6 Sept. 2000
Asdribal Romero IDU 12 Sept. 2000
Henry Navarro EEB 15 Sept. 2000
Edilia Aldana Méndez ICBF 1Dec. 2000
Olga Cecilia Pinilla DAAC 6 Dec. 2000
n.a. DABS 7 Dec. 2000
Francesco Ambrosi DAAC-OBS 28 Aug. 2001
Luz Dari León CVP(legalisation) 30 Aug. 2001
n.a. CREG 31 Aug. 2001
Sandra Fonseca Arenas CREG(sub-director) 12 Aug. 2004
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                List of the interviewed NGO and CBO activists and politicians
Name of activist NGO/CBO name (related barrio) Date of interview
Margareth Flórez Fundación Corona 3 Nov. 1999
José Castiblanco ASINDESODA (D. Azul) 8 Dec. 1999
Father Manolo Church (La Paz) 2 Feb. 2000
n.a. Hogar Integral (Jerusalén) 10 May 2000
n.a. Jardín Alegría de Vivir (Jerusalen) 12 May 2000
Brother Dairo Pérez Pastor Social (Bella Flor) 15 May 2000
Rodrigo Quintero Fundación Social (Jerusalén) 17 May 2000
Streengel Social Housing NGO (Bella Flor) 7 June 2000
Barbara Romero Asociación Madre Comunitaria (B. Flor) 11 June 2000
Hugo Villamíl Promotoria Comunitaria Usme 17 June 2000
Father Garavito School backed by the church(Bella Flor) 20 June 2000
Joséfa  Hope Internacional (Diana Turbay) 23 June 2000
Leonidas Ospina ICES (Jerusalén) 26 June 2000  
Ester Castaño Mejía,  Sisterhood group for women's vocational 5 Aug. 2000
Ana de Jesús Rodríguez training (JJR)
Alberto Hernández COOPBAUS (JJR) 16 Aug. 2000
Father Saturnino Sepúlveda Founder of JJR (JJR) 22 Aug. 2000
Fernando Tamayo Fundación Social (Jerusalén) 6  Sept. 2000
Patricia Zapata Fundación Fe y Alegría (La Paz, D. Azul)28 Nov. 2000
Teresita de Jesús Mendito Centro Comunitario Champagnat(La Paz)1 Dec. 2000
Sister Elsa CEC(Danubio Azul) 1 Dec. 2000
n.a. Club Michen (Diana Turbay) 18 Aug. 2001
Carmen Fernández CELODIJE (Jerusalén) 25 Aug. 2001
Name of politician position (related barrio) Date of interview
Antanas Mockus ex mayor 6  Oct. 1999
Flavio Maya candidate (Bella Flor) 31 Jan. 2000
Jorge Rociasco edil  of Rafael Uribe Uribe(Diana Turbay)30 May 2000
Alfredo Guerrero candidate (Diana Turbay) 2 June 2000
Jaime Castro ex mayor 6 June 2000
Juán Betancourt candidate (La Paz) 7 June 2000
Hugo Gaona edil of Ciudad Bolívar (Bella Flor) 13 June 2000
Nubia Medrano edil   of Rafael Uribe Uribe (La Paz) 14 June 2000
Leonor González Mina Congresswoman (Bella Flor) 23 June 2000
Teresa Baracaldo Bogotá councillor 8 July 2000
Fernando Mejía edil  of Usme (Diana Turbay) 18 July 2000
Hermán Arias candidate (Jerusalén) 20 Nov. 2000
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APPENDIX C 
Questionnaire used for the household survey 
 
Irregular Settlement Household Survey 2000 
 (Translated from Spanish to English) 
 
I. IDENTIFICATION 
1. Name of settlement 
2. Sector of settlement 
3. No. of sector block  
4. No. of household 
5. Address 
6. Telephone number  
7. No. of households in this house 
8. Name of informant 
9. How many persons live in the household? 
10. Ownership/tenancy of the house in which the household is situated. 
(1) Owner 
(2) Tenant   Æ Go to question I-10-(1) 
(3) Usufructo 
(4) Supervisor of the house 
10-(1) How much do you pay as the monthly rent? 
  
II. MIGRANT RECORD OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
11. Where were you born? 
Bogotá   Æ Continue 
Other departments:  
Specify department (         ) 
  Specify municipality (        )  Æ Go to 13. 
12. Have you lived anytime outside of Bogotá? 
(1) Yes  Æ Continue 
(2) No  Æ Go to 15. 
(3) Not inform  Æ Continue 
13. When did you leave your birthplace? 
Year:  
14 (a) Native of Bogotá (born in Bogotá) 
What year was the last time when you came back to live in Bogotá? 
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Year: 
14 (b) Those born outside of Bogotá: 
When did you arrive to live in Bogotá? 
Year: 
15. When did you come to live in this settlement? 
Year: 
16. How long have you been living in this house? 
17. For the owner of the house: 
(1) In what year did you obtain the lot?   
(2) How did you obtain the lot?       (a) Purchase 
(b) Invasion 
 (c) Inheritance 
 (d) Gift 
 (e) Other 
(3) Do you have title deed to the lot?  If yes  Æ When did you get it? 
 No 
 Not inform  
 
III. DESCRIPTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
18. Name 
19. Sex: Man/Woman 
20. Age 
21. Relationship to the household head (household head, children, sibling, parent, 
parent-in-law, brother/sister-in-law, grandchild, nephew/niece, children, 
sons/daughters-in-law, other relation, no relation). 
22. Marital status (married, free union, single, separated/divorced, widow) 
23. Which of the following activities mainly occupy you during the last week? (for 
household members 5 years or older). 
(1) Work 
(2) Work, but in the last week I was on holidays/on leave  
(3) In search of work 
(4) Study 
(5) Housekeeping 
(6) Live on rent 
(7) Retired (live on pension) 
(8) Sick (unable to work) 
(9) No particular occupation 
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24. Who is the primary breadwinner of the household? 
 
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD AND 
HIS/HER PARTNER 
25. Did you have work during the last month? Or, do you have work now?   
26. What kind of job do you have? 
27. Field of work: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity/gas/water, construction, 
commerce, transportation, finance, services, other. 
28. Position in that job: (owner/employer, self-employed, employed in the public sector, 
employed in the private sector, worker of the public sector, worker of the private sector, 
domestic worker, unremunerated work in the household) 
29. How many persons work in your enterprise? 
30. Do you have any work other than the job you mentioned above? 
31. Do you do any of your work at home? 
32. Do you have any additional income? (multiple responses):   
 (income from work of other member of household; rent; pension; aid from relatives 
outside the household) 
33. What is your approximate monthly income? 
34. Do you have any type of social security plan? (Prepaid medicine, SISBEN, EPS, other) 
35. What schooling have you completed?  
(1) None 
(2) Primary school 
(3) Secondary school (traditional system) 
(4) Secondary school (technical school) 
(5) University and other advanced school 
(6) Other vocational/technical education 
 
V. PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
36. What type of power (fuel) do you use for cooking? (electricity; propane gas; natural 
gas; kerosene; firewood) 
37. Are you connected to a sewer system? 
38. What type of toilet do you use? (toilet connected to sewer system; toilet and septic 
tank, toilet without connection to any system, pit latrine, nothing available at home) 
(1) Are you sharing toilet facilities with another household? 
39. From where do you get water for cooking?  (tap at home, by hose connection, 
purchase water from the water tank truck, buy bottled water) 
40. What do you do generally with garbage?  (pick-up by a private company; leave at 
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common settlement dump, burn) 
 
VI. DIAGNOSIS OF (UNSATISFIED) NEEDS  
41. Can you identify your level of satisfaction with the following public services and social 
infrastructure in the settlement? 
(excellent, good, ordinary, bad, very bad, services not available, don’t know) 
42. What services in the following list are the most problematic for you and your family? 
Can you identify the three most problematic in the order of urgency to improve? 
 List of services: water, sewerage, electricity, gas, transportation, road pavement, waste 
collection, public telephone, (home) telephone, health care centre, kindergarten, 
primary school, secondary school, market, park and/or green zone   
43. What types of problems are there with the three services identified above? 
(1) Not available 
(2) Service is frequently suspended 
(3) Poor service (of the public service company) 
(4) Cost is very expensive 
(5) No vacancies in the school 
(6) A lot of delinquency 
(7) Difficult access 
(8) Other 
44. Who (or what institution) do you think is responsible for improving public utility 
services? 
(government, public enterprises, edil, NGO, JAC, other types of community-based 
organisations, politicians, Catholic church, NGO, other)  
45. Was any communal action or community project undertaken in order to improve these 
services you identified as problematic? 
46. Is the community doing anything to improve these services? 
47-50: Questions about the needs regarding to economic aspects 
47. What services or systems in the following list are the most necessary for you and your 
family? Can you identify the three most necessary in level of urgency? 
    List of the services [systems]:  
(1) Community credit for housing 
(2) Cooperative bank 
(3) Training centre for technical work 
(4) Arbitrary system to resolve the conflict between owners and tenants or among 
 inhabitants. 
(5) Employment agency (centre) 
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(6) Communal information board for exchange of information on employment 
(7) Credit (microfinance) for micro enterprises 
48. To whom would you resort to obtain these services or systems above identified? 
(Government, edil, political party, politicians, JAC, other type of community 
organisation, religious community or parish charch, NGO, others) 
49. Was any communal action or community project undertaken in order to 
improve the services you identified as problematic? 
50. What other type(s) of community service or system do you think would improve the 
economic condition of you and your family? 
 
VII. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVITIES 
51. Do you know any of the organisations in the following list? 
(1) JAC 
(2) Committee of JAC 
(3) Association of parents of family [Parents Association]  
(4) Association of community mothers 
(5) Tenant association 
(6) Church (parish church) 
(7) Youth group /organisation 
(8) Group/organisation of the aged people  
(9) Group/organisation of sports 
(10) Cultural group/ organisation 
(11) Religious group (identify:    ) 
(12) NGO 
52. Do you attend the meeting of the above organisations? Which one? If not, what is the 
reason? 
(1) Short of time, for work  
(2) Not interested in 
(3) Don’t like 
(4) Attend the other household member (partner) 
(5) Problem with the people 
(6) Negligence 
(7) Do not socialise much with people in the settlement 
(8) Because I am very new in the settlement 
(9) Because I am a tenant 
(10) Other 
53. Although you do not attend, do you know the frequency of the meetings of any of the 
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organisations?  Which ones:   
54. Are you affiliated with or a member of any of the organisations identified above? 
55. Do any other members of your household attend the meetings of any organisation on 
the list? 
56. Who are the principal community leaders (in this settlement)? 
Did you participate in any community action during the past year (1999)? 
Identify the type of action, aim of action, and the organisation(s) that led the action. 
Aims (purpose of the action):  
(1) Rolling the land 
(2) Installation of electric power 
(3) Installation of water supply system 
(4) Installation of sewerage  
(5) To defend the kerosene distribution system   
(6) Installation of natural gas 
(7) Problem relating to public service tariffs 
(8) Street paving 
(9) To have a school built 
(10) To have a health care centre built 
(11) Other: Identify 
Actions:  
(1) Attend meetings 
(2) Sign petition letter 
(3) Civic strike 
(4) Demonstration/protest 
(5) Present claim for the need at government office  
(6) Protest sit-in at government office 
(7) Participate in communal work 
(8) Other  
Organisation leading the action:  
(1) JAC  
(2) Other community-based organisation 
(3) Labour union 
(4) NGO 
(5) Provivienda 
(6) Developer (urbanizador) 
(7) Politician 
(8) Other 
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57. Did any of the members of your household participate in community actions during the 
last year? 
58. Between the time you came to live in this settlement and 1998, did you participate in 
any type of collective action or community-based action in order to fulfil the following 
aims? 
(*options same as above). 
59. Can you identify the community leaders during that period (from the time you came to 
live in this settlement until now)? 
60. (For those who answer ‘No’ to 58 nor 59):  
 Why have you never participated? 
61-(2) (For those who answered ‘No’ to 59 although they participated in some action in the 
past year (= yes to 58): Why, although you once participated in actions, have you not 
participated in any recently? 
61-(3) (for those who answered ‘No’ to 58 but ‘Yes’ to 59): Why did you not participate in 
the past, although you have recently? 
62. Do you think that your participation in community-based activities serves to solve the 
problems in the settlement? 
63. Do you feel that the community is more active or less active than before in making 
efforts to solve the problems of the settlement? 
64. Do you feel yourself more motivated or less motivated than before to participate in 
community actions? 
65. Do you know other entity that is working or that has worked for improvement of the 
settlement? 
66. Do you know any politician who has had influence in bringing about improvement of 
the barrio? 
67. Do you know any project/programme of the city (government) or public companies 
which is now in process or which was going on in the past? 
Yes  Æ identify:      Æ go on to 68 
No  Æ continue to 69 
68. Do you think that such projects/programmes will bring about improvement of the 
quality of life of this settlement? 
 
VIII. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE HOUSING AND THE GOODS THE  
HOUSEHOLD HAS 
69. What is the size of the lot? 
70. The principal materials of the walls are:   
(1) Brick, cement-block, concrete 
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(2) Sun-dried brick bahareque 
(3) Zinc 
(4) Wood 
(5) Other non-durable materials (paper, paroy, plastic sheeting, etc.) 
71. The predominant materials of the roof are: 
(1) Eternit (tile) 
(2) Zinc 
(3) Concrete 
(4) Paroy (plastic sheeting) 
72. Number of stories of the house    
 Does the house have a terrace? 
 Does the house have a basement? 
73. Number of rooms in the house (other than toilet and kitchen) 
74. Goods that belong to members of the household. 
(1) TV (colour) 
(2) TV (black and white) 
(3) Washing machine 
(4) Refrigerator 
(5) Radio 
(6) Telephone 
(7) Video set (Betamax, VHS) *Identify: To whom does this device belong? 
(8) Audio set 
(9) Computer 
(10) Motorbike/ motorcycle 
(11) Automobile (pre 1994 model) 
(12) Automobile (post 1994 model) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Main themes of questions introduced in the semi-structured interviews 
(original in Spanish) 
 
(0) Personal history of migrant experience  
(1) The process of moving into the settlement 
-How and by whom did you learn about this place (present neigbhourhood)? 
-How did you obtain the land (housing lot)?   
-Did you have any particular connection with a local politician who gave you the 
information? 
-How much was the land when you purchased it? 
-Did anybody (politician, church, NGO, family, etc.) help you financially with the purchase 
of the land? 
(2) Process of house construction by the self-help method 
-How and where did you get the materials for construction, assistance for the labor, 
technical assistance, and financial support?     
-Was there any process of mutual aid (among neighbours) available for this process? 
-What was the relation between you, your family and the JAC directing members? 
-Were you the target of any eviction notice conducted by the authorities (police)?  
-If so, what was the situation and how did you defend yourself?   
-Who helped you and your neighbours at that time?    
(3) Process of obtaining provisional services (water and electricity), opening of roads and 
access to transport systems.      
-How was the process started?   
-In which type of community action did you participate?    
-What were relations like between the community and the JAC leaders in that period? 
-Were there any other institutions or persons who assisted the community in that period? 
-Who were the ‘leaders’ you identified in the previous survey?   
-What was the nature of the process of negotiation (or of struggle) between the community 
and the local government with respect to the provision of public services in that period? 
-Do you remember any kind of conflict within the community at that time?  
(4) Process of obtaining other institutions of social infrastructure (schools, day care centers, 
primary health care centres) 
-What was done to get the process going? Who took the initiative in promoting these 
services? 
-What action did the community and you yourself take?    
-Who helped the community in the process and how?    
(5) Process of regularisation of the settlement 
-Who took the initiative? 
-Who took the responsibility to finance the work?  
-How were the related tasks distributed in the process of execution? 
-Who was in charge of maintenance and monitoring of the construction process? 
-To what extent was the community involved in the negotiation process? 
-To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?  
-To what extent was the community involved in the execution process?   
-Did the community have a chance to give feedback to the local government? 
-To what extent was the community involved in the maintenance and monitoring process? 
(6) The present process of state intervention in terms of public investment, if any  
-To what extent was the community involved in the negotiation process? 
-To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?  
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-To what extent was the community involved in the execution process?   
-Did the community have a chance to give feedback to the local government? 
-To what extent was the community involved in the maintenance and monitoring process? 
 (7) Process of transfer of title deed of land  
-Do you hold the property rights to the land already?   
-If not, at which stage of the negotiation process are you in respect to this issue? 
-What does the community think about the process of transfer of title deed and what is your 
own opinion on this matter? 
(8) Question on current problems of tariffs on public services 
-Please give the average amount you pay for the public services.  
-Approximately what percentage of your total monthly income does it correspond to? 
-Please approximate the structure of your monthly (household) expenses vs. monthly 
income. 
(9) Evaluation of the functions of the JAC and self-evaluation of your own involvement in the 
community work organised by JAC leaders.  
(10) Relations with other community-based organisations and NGOs identified in the previous 
survey.  
(11) Perceptions of horizontal relations between the household and other social actors. 
(12) Perception of his/her own participation in community action.  
(13) Perception of capacity for negotiation between the community and the state.  
-Do you consider that the community has gained more room for negotiation?  
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                 APPENDIX E.1
                GDP total Colombia, annual increase ratio and GDP per capita
                        1970-96 (1975 US dollars)
GDP/cap
million US$ Annual 1975 US$
at 1975 price increase ratio(%)
1970 9,942.5 6.7 440.7
1971 10,535.1 6.0 456.0
1972 11,343.1 7.7 479.5
1973 12,105.7 6.7 499.9
1974 12,801.2 5.7 516.3
1975 13,098.6 2.3 516.1
1976 13,718.0 4.7 528.1
1977 14,288.4 4.2 537.5
1978 15,498.7 8.5 569.9
1979 16,332.4 5.4 587.1
1980 16,999.9 4.1 597.6
1981 17,387.0 2.3 597.9
1982 17,551.9 0.9 590.6
1983 17,828.1 1.6 587.2
1984 18,425.5 3.4 594.3
1985 18,998.0 3.1 600.1
1986 20,104.5 5.8 622.3
1987 21,183.9 5.4 642.6
1988 22,044.8 4.1 655.2
1989 22,797.4 3.4 664.4
1990 23,773.6 4.3 679.8
1991 24,249.5 2.0 679.5
1992 25,230.4 4.0 693.0
1993 26,589.1 5.4 716.2
1994 28,135.2 5.8 743.4
1995 29,776.2 5.8 772.6
1996  (pr) 30,386.4 2.0 773.3
Source: DANE and Banco de la República.
Taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_prod_salar.htm
accessed 26 November 2006.
(pr) means preliminar data.
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GDP total
           APPENDIX E.2
      Colombia, annual increase ratio of consumer price index
             1970-2004 (Base: December 1998=100)
Annual increase
Year ratio of CPI(%)
1970 6.58
1971 14.03
1972 13.99
1973 24.08
1974 26.35
1975 17.77
1976 25.76
1977 28.71
1978 18.42
1979 28.80
1980 25.85
1981 26.36
1982 24.03
1983 16.64
1984 18.28
1985 22.45
1986 20.95
1987 24.02
1988 28.12
1989 26.12
1990 32.36
1991 26.82
1992 25.13
1993 22.60
1994 22.59
1995 19.46
1996 21.63
1997 17.68
1998 16.70
1999 9.23
2000 8.75
2001 7.65
2002 6.99
2003 6.49
2004 5.50
Source:DANE, taken from 
 http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas,
 accessed 26 November 2006.
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APPENDIX E.4 
 
Average service charge for electricity per KW/hour by strata (1992 Colombian pesos) 
Year Stratus 1 Stratus 2 Stratus 3 Stratus 4 Stratus 5 Stratus 6 
1990 8.21 11.81 14.30 20.32 32.06 37.14 
1991 8.58 12,17 15.05 20.37 49.24 55.24 
1992 9.18 13.20 16.30 26.80 61.80 71.80 
1993 9.35 14.15 18.63 27.45 58.67 67.67 
1994 9.25 14.40 19.73 27.13 55.07 63.13 
1995 8.89 13.94 20.11 29.00 54.28 62.33 
1996 9.95 15.12 21.55 42.05 56.60 59.86 
1997 9.65 14.39 21.58 44.07 52.61 56.07 
1998 12.34 17.58 24.76 37.44 51.78 55.29 
1999 15.36 20.01 26.64 35.86 44.86 44.96 
2000 19.10 24.44 31.74 41.01 51.12 51.69 
2001 25.07 29.77 38.90 44.13 53.00 53.00 
2002 24.63 29.02 38.29 43.17 51.95 51.95 
2003 25.86 30.89 40.96 46.68 55.84 55.84 
2004 26.46 31.24 42.73 48.81 58.13 58.13 
Source: Otero, Diego (2006). 
Note: Original data for 1990-94 from CID, ‘Estudios de penetración del gas natural en 
la EEEB’; and the data for 1995-2004 from CREG. 
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APPENDIX E.5
     Daily exchange rate during the period of household survey (January to August 2000)
       (Colombian pesos per US dollar)
Date January Februrary March April May June July August
1 1,873.77 1,973.36 1,948.05 1,958.12 2,004.47 2,096.96 2,150.76 2,174.55
2 1,873.77 1,970.61 1,950.88 1,958.12 2,004.47 2,095.10 2,150.76 2,175.02
3 1,873.77 1,965.61 1,956.80 1,958.12 2,001.62 2,118.57 2,150.76 2,173.62
4 1,874.35 1,947.55 1,961.16 1,963.22 2,015.92 2,118.57 2,150.76 2,177.67
5 1,895.97 1,948.60 1,961.16 1,964.10 2,027.26 2,118.57 2,151.05 2,180.64
6 1,912.69 1,948.60 1,961.16 1,968.92 2,033.17 2,118.57 2,163.44 2,180.64
7 1,911.33 1,948.60 1,965.63 1,986.96 2,033.17 2,121.73 2,168.65 2,180.64
8 1,900.14 1,950.59 1,964.26 1,996.24 2,033.17 2,127.03 2,165.51 2,180.64
9 1,900.14 1,949.54 1,960.47 1,996.24 2,044.59 2,125.30 2,165.51 2,176.52
10 1,900.14 1,946.51 1,959.77 1,996.24 2,031.86 2,115.86 2,165.51 2,176.17
11 1,900.14 1,952.29 1,958.48 1,998.25 2,021.68 2,115.86 2,171.63 2,179.60
12 1,902.25 1,948.16 1,958.48 1,986.75 2,031.96 2,115.86 2,182.56 2,180.89
13 1,904.54 1,948.16 1,958.48 1,987.38 2,039.29 2,106.97 2,172.16 2,180.89
14 1,917.38 1,948.16 1,957.50 1,987.36 2,039.29 2,122.24 2,166.22 2,180.89
15 1,920.83 1,950.77 1,955.75 1,987.39 2,039.29 2,111.09 2,156.32 2,180.99
16 1,920.83 1,949.61 1,954.26 1,987.39 2,035.54 2,110.57 2,156.32 2,185.45
17 1,920.83 1,946.79 1,950.01 1,987.39 2,037.10 2,114.80 2,156.32 2,185.46
18 1,919.21 1,945.31 1,952.98 1,996.29 2,047.79 2,114.80 2,144.01 2,185.75
19 1,928.51 1,947.41 1,952.98 2,003.02 2,055.35 2,114.80 2,151.56 2,183.01
20 1,945.17 1,947.41 1,952.98 1,996.07 2,076.85 2,115.15 2,155.81 2,183.01
21 1,938.84 1,947.41 1,952.98 1,996.07 2,076.85 2,123.58 2,155.81 2,183.01
22 1,931.97 1,943.83 1,956.98 1,996.07 2,076.85 2,134.34 2,152.30 2,183.01
23 1,931.97 1,941.54 1,959.84 1,996.07 2,094.73 2,129.13 2,152.30 2,187.83
24 1,931.97 1,944.18 1,954.57 1,996.07 2,111.94 2,123.99 2,152.30 2,196.72
25 1,943.88 1,947.72 1,954.83 1,991.17 2,142.14 2,123.99 2,147.65 2,205.60
26 1,939.63 1,947.28 1,954.83 1,988.65 2,113.28 2,123.99 2,153.91 2,208.82
27 1,958.17 1,947.28 1,954.83 1,998.95 2,096.52 2,123.99 2,165.37 2,208.82
28 1,976.14 1,947.28 1,958.93 2,002.95 2,096.52 2,135.65 2,173.78 2,208.82
29 1,976.72 1,946.17 1,955.14 2,004.47 2,096.52 2,136.22 2,172.79 2,208.17
30 1,976.72 1,949.75 2,004.47 2,077.28 2,139.11 2,172.79 2,204.22
31 1,976.72 1,951.56 2,084.92 2,172.79 2,208.21
Source: Banco de la República website (http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/, 
accessed 15 September 2006).
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Appendix F: Bogotá: current socioeconomic stratification.
Source: Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. 
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APPENDIX G 
Photographs showing examples of the results of communal work and state intervention 
  
Photograph 1. Communal work to build a provisional sewerage  
system in Bella Flor (Februrary 2000). 
 420
 
 
 
Photograph 2. 'Aeroducto' (hose connection of water supply in the air) built by communal work 
in JJR (November 1999). 
 421
 
           Photograph 3. Bella Flor showing electricity posts recently installed 
            by CODENSA (August 2001). 
           
 422
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4. Jerusalén (foreground) and the settlements of social interest houses and school  
(in the background) built by the Ciudad Bolívar Programme. (August 2004). 
 423
 
 
 
 
Photograph 5. Paved arameda between Danubio Azul (right-hand side) and La Paz  
(left-hand side) financed by the South Bogotá Project (August 2004). 
 
 424
  
Photograph 6. Steps built by ‘OSP’ in La Paz (August 2004). 
 425
